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Abstract 
	 ﾠ
Mainstreaming inclusive violence prevention is a policy option that has been under-
studied. As a strategy, mainstreaming responds to the transversal nature of violence 
both  in  its  multi-dimensionality  and  multi-causality,  and  ultimately  highlights 
violence’s  intrinsic  links  to  development.  It  also  acknowledges  the  strong  gender 
dimensions at play in the manifestation and reproduction of violence. Building upon 
this  understanding  and  developing  a  framework  for  it,  this  research  examines 
opportunities and constraints for mainstreaming inclusive violence prevention in the 
agendas  of  Multilateral  Development  Banks  (MDBs)  in  Latin  America  and  the 
Caribbean (LAC). 
For the past three decades, citizens in LAC have suffered from pandemic levels of 
violence, which has proved extremely complex and difficult to tackle. Governments in 
LAC have called for support from two of the largest MDBs in the region, the Inter-
American Development Bank and the World Bank.  Both have responded, yet slowly 
and  timidly.  This  research  asks  three  main  questions:  Why  has  violence  prevention 
remained marginalised in MDBs’ agendas despite its socio-economic multiplier effects 
on development? What are the opportunities and constraints to mainstream inclusive 
violence  prevention  in  MDBs’  agenda?  How  do  national  counterparts  perceive  the 
potential for mainstreaming inclusive violence prevention and the relevance of MDBs 
in this regard?  
The  research  uses  a  qualitative  methodology,  including  more  than  150  in-depth 
interviews with MDBs’ staff, shareholders, counterparts, and key informants, and a case 
study in Colombia.  Building on three conceptual bodies of literature related to priority-
setting, mainstreaming and donor-recipient aid relations, the research uses cognitive 
frame,  actor  power,  operational  knowledge  and  organisational  treatment  as  keys  to 
explore the research questions. The findings show that multiple constraints exist, such 
as competing cognitive frames, contradictory incentives for staff, leadership turnover 
and lack of in-house expertise, and scattered efforts to develop operational knowledge.  
Yet  opportunities  also  exist,  including  an  increasing  internal  space  for  dialogue, 
particularly in some sectors, and interest and demand from countries.  
The main contribution of this thesis is to develop a framework to disentangle factors at 
play in the emergence and institutionalisation of new, complex, transversal issues that 
could be usefully adapted to other contexts and topics.   	 ﾠ
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
   
 
‘We owe our children a life free from violence and fear. We must address the roots 
of violence. Only then will we transform the past century’s legacy from a crushing 
burden into a cautionary lesson.’ 
 
Nelson Mandela (1918-2013) 
 
1.1 Introduction 
	 ﾠ
This research examines how and the extent to which inclusive violence prevention has 
penetrated  the  agenda  of  Multilateral  Development  Banks  (MDBs)  working  in  Latin 
America and the Caribbean (LAC), and has been recognised as a transversal issue that 
could be mainstreamed. Mainstreaming inclusive violence prevention is a policy option that 
has been under-studied so far. It responds to the transversal nature of violence in both its 
multi-dimensionality  and  multi-causality.  Its  inclusiveness  reflects  the  strong  gender 
dimensions  in  the  manifestations  and  reproduction  of  violence.  It  also  highlights  the 
intrinsic  links  between  violence  and  development.  Although  MDBs  have  not  officially 
committed  to  implementing  a  mainstreaming  approach  for  the  inclusive  prevention  of 
violence,  they  have  acknowledged  the  option,  and  the  mainstreaming  literature  clearly 
provides  a  relevant  body  of  research  to  study  transversal  issues  within  development 
organisations.  
 
This research has three specific objectives. First, it aims to better understand why, despite 
the well-acknowledged destructive socio-economic multiplier effects of violence in Latin 
American countries, violence prevention has been slow to emerge in the agendas of MDBs 
working  in  that  region.  Second,  it  seeks  to  identify  opportunities  and  constraints  to 
mainstream  inclusive  violence  prevention  in  the  agenda  of  MDBs.  Third,  it  seeks  to 
comprehend  the  perspective  of  a  country,  the  Republic  of  Colombia,  on  the  role  and 
contribution  of  MDBs  in  inclusive  violence  prevention,  and  margins  of  manoeuver  for 
mainstreaming the inclusive prevention of violence at the national and local levels. By so 	 ﾠ
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doing,  this  thesis  aims  to  contribute  to  advancing  operational  and  policy-oriented 
knowledge in violence prevention in institutions and policies in the developing world. 
 
Preventing violence in Latin America and the Caribbean is a major development challenge. 
For more than three decades, the region has suffered from pandemic levels of violence.
1 
With homicide rates ranging from 21 to 25 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants (hphti), LAC 
has had more than three times the world average (6.9 hphti) (data of 2010 or latest year 
available, UNODC 2011). These averages hide high variations among and within countries, 
with  cities  like  Guatemala  City  or  Caracas  showing  alarming  rates  of  over  100  hphti
2 
(opcit). Beyond homicides, the region also shows very high levels of victimisation,
3 with 
on average 30 to 40 per cent of the households surveyed reporting at least one victim of 
violence or crime over the past year  (Lagos and Dammert 2012). In terms of intimate 
partner violence, even though systematic data at the regional level are lacking, country 
specific surveys indicate significant levels, with more than half of women as victims of 
violence at some point in their life in countries like Peru
4  (WHO 2005).  
 
High levels of violence have enormous costs for individuals, families, communities and 
societies at large. In addition to the human suffering and trauma, violence negatively affects 
human and social capital (Buvinic, Morrison and Shifter 1999; McIlwaine and Moser 2001; 
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
1 The Pan American Health Organisation (PAHO) talks about pandemic levels of violence when they are 
higher than 10 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants (hphti) (Guerrero and Concha-Eastman 1997). Since 1980s, 
LAC average homicide rates have constantly been above 10 hphti. UNODC defines homicide as unlawful 
death purposefully inflected on a person by another person, and uses a variety of national and international 
sources of data based on criminal justice or public health systems (UNODC 2011). 
2 Rates were respectively 116.6 hphti in 2010 in Guatemala City, and 122 hphti in Caracas in 2009, latest year 
available (UNODC 2011: 118). 
	 ﾠ
3 Victimisation rates include all forms of violence and crime. A sample of the population is asked: ‘Have you 
or a family member been assaulted, attacked or victim of a crime over the past twelve months?’ (In Spanish: 
‘¿Ha sido Ud. o algún pariente asaltado, agredido o víctima de un delito en los últimos doce meses?’) (Lagos 
and Dammert 2012:24). It is then possible to disentangle by form of violence and crime.  
 
4 In  urban  Peru  (called  ‘Peru  City’  in  the  WHO  survey),  51  per  cent  of  women  surveyed  have  ever 
experienced physical or sexual violence or both in their lifetime, this rate was 69 per cent in ‘Peru Province.’ 
See ‘Prevalence of lifetime physical or sexual violence by intimate partner’ (WHO 2005:6, Figure 2). 
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
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Moser and Winton 2002; Krug et al. 2002; Dahlberg and Butchart 2005),
5 and economists 
have estimated that violence could cost up to 15 per cent of the Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) (Londoño 2001; Concha-Eastman 2002; Soares 2009; Skaperdas, Soares, Willman 
and  Miller  2009).  This  is  three  times  the  share  of  the  GDP  dedicated  to  Education  in 
countries  like  Mexico  or  Brazil  (World  Bank  Edstats  2010).  These  enormous  costs 
necessarily hinder the sustainable development of countries in the region.  
 
Today, in LAC, one of the most urbanised and unequal regions in the world, violence most 
severely affects the urban poor. Rural areas are not exempt though (Imbusch, Misse and 
Carrión 2011), but with more than 75 per cent of the population living in cities in LAC, 
violence  follows  the  population  concentration  (UNODC  2011,  2014).  Violence  affects 
everyone,  but  more  severely  poor  men  and  women  who  tend  to  live  in  areas  where 
infrastructure, public services and other commodities are scarcer or of less quality. Some 
neighbourhoods are ‘controlled’ by illegal groups that often use violent means including 
threats and fear to maintain their power (Kruijt and Kooning 1999; Rotker 2002; Moser 
2009; Colak and Pearce 2009; Pearce 2010). Public authorities, including the police, do not 
dare enter these territories or are coopted through corruption (opcit). To literally survive, 
those  living  in  these  marginalised  and  highly  violent  neighbourhoods  either  pay  for 
protection, hire private guards, disengage from social life, or take justice into their own 
hands  as  shown  through  ‘social  cleansings’  (McIlwaine  and  Moser  2001;  Moser  and 
Winton 2002; Rudqvist, Hettne, Löfving et al. 2003; Winton 2004; Kliksberg 2006; Baird 
2011;  UNODC  2013).  Violence  also  tends  to  stigmatise  those  who  live  in  poor 
neighbourhoods, even though only a minority actually act violently. This stigmatisation 
increases further the injustices that those men and women struggle with. 
 
Violence is a highly complex phenomenon that evolves along a gendered continuum. Its 
complexity comes from its multi-dimensionality and multi-causality. As all social, and thus 
relational, phenomena, violence has strong gender dimensions that clearly appear in the 
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5 Violence  negatively  impacts  human  capital  through  disabilities,  poor  performance  in  school,  traumas, 
depression,  disabilities,  loss  of  productivity,  loss  of  wellbeing,  reproduction  of  the  violence  cycle,  etc. 
Violence also hinders social capital because it generates fear and tends to weaken social ties and lessen the 
propensity of people to associate, organise, and help each other.  
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reproduction of violence. In fact, many forms of violence reinforce each other: men and 
women who are violent on the streets tend to also be violent at home; men and women who 
have  suffered  or  witnessed  violence  during  their  childhood  have  more  probability  of 
becoming violent or victimised adults; men who are violent with women tend to be violent 
with children or the elderly or other men (Bott, Morrison and Ellsberg 2005; Willman and 
Makisaka  2010).  The  concept  of  a  continuum  of  violence  that  translates  violence’s 
reproduction in time and space (Pearce 2010) thus needs to be gendered to fully grasp the 
relational,  complex  nature  and  dynamics  of  the  phenomenon,  and  to  adequately  guide 
policymaking.  
 
Despite its overwhelming negative impact, violence has proven to be particularly difficult 
to prevent. Only a few examples exist in LAC that have successfully reduced violence in a 
sustainable way. Bogotá and Cali in Colombia, and Diadema in Brazil are probably the 
most  famous  examples  (Guerrero  and  Concha-Eastman  1997;  Buvinic,  Morrison  and 
Orlando 2005; Heinemann and Verner 2006; UNODC and World Bank 2007; Soares and 
Naritomi 2010; Petesch 2013; UNDP 2013). But they are the exceptions rather than the 
rule.  Actually,  as  previously  noted,  many  cities  throughout  the  region  face  alarming 
situations.  Many  factors  contribute  to  make  preventing  violence  a  very  challenging 
endeavour. Among them, the fact that understandings of violence are highly ideological 
makes  policymaking  even  more  partisan  and  inconsistent,  which  in  turn  makes  the 
implementation of strategies and programmes precarious. This lack of continuity represents 
a severe obstacle for violence prevention strategies to produce results, and more generally, 
to better understand how preventing violence in developing countries works. 
 
In  fact,  today,  preventing  violence  in  LAC  is  better  understood  theoretically  than 
empirically. Over the past decades, knowledge has progressed on the causes but also the 
solutions to violence. In particular, a growing consensus now exists on the multi-causality 
of the phenomenon that has increasingly been recognised as a development challenge. The 
World Health Organisation has promoted the ecological model to disentangle the multiple 
factors facilitating the perpetuation of violence at different levels of interaction, from the 
individual to the societal levels. This is highly valuable, for it highlights the multi-causality 
of violence and its context-specificity. However, such a diagnostic tool also easily appears 	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overwhelming when translating it into policies and programmes, in particular in developing 
countries contexts characterised by resources scarcity and institutional weaknesses. Indeed, 
despite this greater theoretical consensus (at least in the development community), how to 
translate  the  multi-dimensionality  and  the  multi-causality  of  violence  into  multi-sector, 
gender-sensitive policies in the developing world is still a pending question.  
 
Among possible policy options, ‘inclusive violence prevention mainstreaming’ (violence 
prevention from a gender and development perspective) has been little explored in the 
literature and research relating to violence. It might provide an option for the sought-after 
operationalisation of the ecological model, for it suits transversal, multi-causal issues, and 
builds  on  the  above-mentioned  concept  of  the  gendered  continuum  of  violence.  In 
particular, it sheds light on the importance to address domestic violence as part of an urban 
violence prevention strategy, instead of in siloes as it is commonly the case. It also draws 
attention to the role of women in the perpetuation and prevention of violence, as opposed to 
the traditional male-biased focus, and recognises the association between violence and the 
dominant model of masculinity as a risk factor. It finally places policies and programmes to 
prevent violence within an inclusive development paradigm that supports the double idea 
that violence is preventable and a shared responsibility.  
  
1.2 The role of Multilateral Development Banks in violence prevention  
	 ﾠ
Among the multiple stakeholders of the development process, MDBs gather a series of 
characteristics that gives them a unique position to deal with violence: they are generalist 
institutions,  therefore  working  in  all  sectors  relevant  to  violence  prevention;  they  have 
direct access to the highest ministries in Government (Ministries of Finances and Planning), 
which a priori facilitates a multi-sector approach; they have joined in the Beijing Platform 
for  Action  to  Mainstream  Gender  and  have  developed  specific  plans  of  action  to 
mainstream gender in their development agenda; their publications and conferences are 
oriented to policymakers and give them a voice to influence development paradigms; and 
they play a catalysing role for further international assistance, through their multilateral 
status, their safeguards and their financial conveying power (see Box 1 on basic facts on 
MDBs). 	 ﾠ
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Box 1: Basic facts on MDBs 
There  are  eight  main  MDBs  in  the  World:  the  International  Bank  for  Reconstruction  and  Development 
(IBRD) created in 1944 at the Bretton Woods conference; the International Development Association (IDA) 
created in 1960 to respond to the specific needs of the least developed countries: IBRD and IDA are grouped 
into  the  World  Bank  Group  (commonly  called  World  Bank);  five  regional  banks:  the  Inter-American 
Development Bank (IADB), the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the African Development Bank (AfDB), 
the Development Bank of Latin America (CAF), and the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) all created in the 
late 1950s-1970s (respectively 1959, 1964, 1966, 1970 and 1975) to complement IBRD and IDA funding 
with a special regional focus; and the European Development Bank (EBRD) created in 1991 at the end of the 
Cold  War  (Head  2004:  248).  In  addition,  there  are  a  number  of  sub-regional  development  Banks  and 
multilateral financial institutions.  
 
All MDBs share a similar mission of economic development. They provide loans and grants to developing 
countries to finance specific projects (investment loans) and policies (policy-based loans).  Those loans are 
reimbursable at preferred conditions (usually 20 to 30 years at low interest rates). This financial status gives 
them a specific role within the international development community, for certain types of influences matter 
more  than  others,  and  economic  influence  is  certainly  among  the  most  influential.  A  Board  of  country 
members governs these financial institutions. The Board combines borrowing and non-borrowing countries in 
all  MDBs,  but  members’  power  or  voting  share  varies.  At  the  World  Bank  for  instance,  the  shares  are 
proportionate to countries’ contribution, making the US and the European holders of the majority of shares 
(with the US having a veto power), while for example, at the IADB, borrowing countries in LAC hold 51 per 
cent  of  shares.  In  addition  to  their  commitment  to  development,  non-borrowing  countries  receive  some 
incentives to become members: their firms are eligible for bidding for equipment and civil works financed 
through MDBs’ projects (with the exception of EBRD) (Head 2004: 249).  
 
Since their creation, MDB’s mandates have continually expanded, and yet, at the same 
time, their relevance has also been questioned. MDBs originally financed infrastructure 
(mainly transportation and power-related infrastructure) and were referred to as ‘brick and 
mortar’ banks. Different waves have widened the scope of interventions, first to human 
development with a focus on health and education in the 1980s, and then to more complex, 
multidimensional  challenges,  such  as  environmental  sustainability,  equitable  income 
distribution,  institutional  strengthening,  banking  regulations,  gender  inequalities, 
corruption,  climate  change,  road  safety,  among  others  (Satterthwaite  1999;  Head  2004; 
Gutner 2005). Some authors have denounced this expansion as an unmanageable ‘mission 
creep’  (Einhorn  2001;  Gutner  2005;  Nielson,  Tierney  and  Weaver  2006),  while  others 
justify this expansion in relation to the complexity of development and the need to get 
involved in complex issues that hinder sustainable and equitable development and poverty 
reduction (Head 2004).  
 
More generally, MDBs have faced severe critiques on their legitimacy and relevance that 
remain until today. In terms of legitimacy, critiques in the literature have focused of their 	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
21 
role  in  global  power  relations.  In  particular,  authors  like  Wade  or  Cammack  have 
questioned the dominance of the US and Non-borrower countries in the governing boards 
of MDBs, in particular at the World Bank (Wade 2004; Vestergaard and Wade 2013) as 
well as the predominantly neo-liberal policy frameworks of MDBs in which approaches to 
participation of developing countries are highly controlled (Cammack 2004; Wade 2004). 
Wade (2013), for instance, examined and criticised the governing reforms at the Bretton 
Woods institution and emphasised how giving more predominance to borrowing countries, 
and in particular to the poorest countries remained a rhetorical exercise. He points out how 
the asymmetry in power between non borrowing and borrowing countries  suggest a lack of 
legitimacy in a changing world economy power. Cammack (2004) has also criticised the 
legitimacy of MDBs like the World Bank through an examination of what they meant by 
poverty reduction and has highlighted how reforms were predominantly neo-liberal and 
geared towards capitalist accumulation at the global level. In terms of relevance, criticisms 
have also been significant. They have spanned from ineffectiveness to reducing poverty; 
too narrow or too broad interpretation of their mandate (too narrow economic focus versus 
‘mission  creep’);  disregard  of  human  rights;  contradictions  in  policy  prescription;  poor 
financial advice; excessive and ineffective conditionalities; and weaknesses in staffing and 
management among others. Some have even argued for a dismantlement of MDBs (see 
Head  2004  citing  Meltzer  Report  2004:300).  Head  (2004)  points  out  though  that  their 
counterfactuals would be either an increase in bilateral assistance, which might be more 
political,  more  fragmented  and  less  well  funded;  and/or  an  increase  in  private  sector 
lending, which might be extremely costly for least developed nations. He concludes that the 
myriad of criticisms reflect the growing importance that MDBs have gained as regulatory 
bodies.  
 
In  the  context  of  middle-income  countries,  to  which  most  LAC  countries  belong,  the 
question of MDBs’ relevance has gained a particular salience. In the 1990s, private capital 
flows to middle-income countries increased sharply. Hence, financial resources were not 
scarce anymore and private lenders actually exceeded MDBs flows. In this context and 
given the general criticisms above mentioned, whether or not MDBs had lost relevance and 
influence in those countries became a source of debate that remain until today. The Gurria 
and  Volker  Commission  (2001)  studied  the  question  and  concluded  that  MDBs  should 	 ﾠ
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continue providing lending and advice to middle-income countries, in particular in times of 
crises to limit the impact on the poor. The Commission recalls that lending is a vehicle for 
promoting policy reforms and international goals and standards, such as poverty reduction, 
human  development,  protection  of  the  environment,  financial  accountability  and  better 
governance, and that middle-income countries value the technical advice and safeguards 
that accompany MDBs lending (Gurria and Volker commission report 2001:7). MDBs’ 
relevance in LAC also needs to be placed in perspective with the diversity of the region that 
gather  countries  with  different  needs,  from  lower  middle  income  countries  such  as 
Nicaragua or Honduras, to fragile economies such as Jamaica, and upper middle income 
countries like Mexico or Brazil. 
 
Despite debates on MDBs’ relevance and legitimacy, LAC Governments have called for 
the support of MDBs in violence prevention. Since 2001, Heads of State and Government 
explicitly  ‘urge[d]  multilateral  organisations  to  intensify  their  support  and  technical 
assistance to those countries that so request[ed], in the elaboration of national strategies and 
actions  regarding  [violence  prevention].’
  6 In  2009,  Heads  of  State  reaffirmed  their 
commitment to public security in the Americas and their call to International Financial 
Institutions’  support  in  that  respect:  ‘We  thus  invite  the  international  community  and 
international financial organisations to continue making financial contributions and other 
appropriate  forms  of  assistance,  within  the  scope  of  their  respective  competencies,  to 
facilitate the achievement of the objectives of public security in the Americas.’
7	 ﾠ
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For the past fifteen years, MDBs have worked on violence prevention, but only recently has 
the issue gained more visibility within the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) and 
the  World  Bank,  the  two  largest  MDBs  working  in  LAC.  The  IADB  was  the  first 
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6 During the third Summit of the Americas (April 20-22, 2001), 34 Heads of State and Government agreed on 
an  action  plan  to  address  the  most  important  challenges  faced  by  the  Hemisphere  of  the  Americas,  as 
identified  throughout  a  three-year  consultation  and  negotiation  process  with  member  States, International 
Organisations, Financial Institutions and Civil Society Organisations.  The Declaration of Quebec City and 
Action Plan set out the priorities for the region for the coming years. http://www.summit-americas.org/eng-
2002/quebeccity-summit.htm, accessed December 25, 2011.  
 
7 Declaration of the fifth Summit of the Americas, available at:  
http://www.summit-americas.org/V_Summit/decl_comm_pos_en.pdf, accessed January 12, 2012. 
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International Financial Institution (IFI) to approve stand-alone loans
8 with the objective of 
reducing violence and crime (referred to as ‘citizen security projects’). The loans were 
approved in 1998 for two countries: Colombia and Uruguay. Since then, the IADB has 
remained the MDB with the largest violence prevention-related portfolio in the region, but 
still a comparatively small portfolio (only 16 loans in the 14-year-period, 1998-2011). The 
World Bank has shown even more resistance to dealing with violence prevention. While the 
IADB was preparing and approving the first citizen security projects, the World Bank was 
publishing studies that would slowly open the door to include violence prevention within its 
mandate. In the mid-2000s, the World Bank LAC Region took the operational lead on the 
issue  and  started  to  include  small  components  of  violence  prevention  within  Urban 
Development projects. By the end of the decade and the beginning of the next, the World 
Bank had developed policy dialogue with some of its clients on the issue and had approved 
budget  support  with  components  to  prevent  violence.  The  recent  World  Development 
Reports (WDRs) on Conflict and Security (2011) and on Gender (2012)
9 also mark a shift 
in  the  World  Bank’s  position  towards  violence,  at  least  in  terms  of  institutional 
acknowledgement  of  the  importance  of  the  issue  for  development.  Yet,  in  both  banks, 
investment lending explicitly targeting violence prevention has been tiny considering the 
overall lending of MDBs. Even for the IADB that has the biggest lending portfolio, half a 
billion US dollars over 14 years is almost negligible in comparison with the yearly amount 
the regional bank lends. In 2013, for instance, for one year alone, the IADB approved 168 
projects for nearly 14 billion US dollars (IADB 2014).
10 
 
1.3 Research questions and methodology 
 
With  the  overarching  objective  of  better  understanding  opportunities  and  constraints  to 
mainstream inclusive violence prevention in the agendas of MDBs, this thesis asks three 
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8 A stand-alone loan consists in a self-contained operation with its own objectives, components and indicators, 
as opposed to a mainstreaming process or safeguards (for example gender, environmental sustainability or 
indigenous rights) that are supposed to be included in most projects to improve the quality and sustainability 
of the operation, independently of its main objective.  
 
9 WDR 2011: Conflict, Security, and Development, and WDR 2012: Gender Equality and Development.  
 
10 http://publications.iadb.org/handle/11319/6422, accessed May 2014.	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main research questions: 
•  Why  has  violence  prevention  remained  marginalised  in  the  agendas  of  MDBs 
despite violence’s socio-economic multiplier effects on development?  
•  What  are  the  opportunities  and  constraints  to  mainstream  inclusive  violence 
prevention in MDBs’ agendas?  
•  How do national counterparts perceive the potential for mainstreaming inclusive 
violence prevention and MDBs’ relevance in this regard?  
The  research  uses  a  qualitative  methodology,  including  167  in-depth  interviews  with 
MDBs’ staff, shareholders, counterparts and key informants, and a case study in Colombia. 
I chose to undertake a comparative analysis of the two largest MDBs working in LAC, the 
IADB and the World Bank, to better understand commonalities and differences regarding 
the emergence, treatment and institutionalisation of violence prevention, and to identify 
opportunities and constraints that go beyond the specificities of a single case.  For this, I 
interviewed 85 staff members at all levels of the organisations, representing eight sectors 
(Education, Social Protection, Health, Gender, Urban Development, Transport, Justice, and 
Citizen  Security/Violence  Prevention).  I  also  interviewed  11  international  experts  on 
violence prevention as key informants.  
 
I also undertook a country case study to analyse donor-recipient relations in more depth. I 
chose  Colombia  for  the  following  three  reasons  that  I  discuss  further  in  Chapter  4: 
Colombia has been pioneer in the field of violence prevention policies in LAC; the country 
has a large portfolio and a long standing relationship with MDBs; Colombians’ expertise 
and  experience  in  addressing  violence  make  the  informants  knowledgeable,  making  it 
possible to deepen the level of reflection on their own policies and the role of MDBs. For 
the case study, I analysed the National Development Plan and the National Citizen Security 
Policy  to  assess  the  extent  to  which  violence  prevention  was  treated  as  a  transversal, 
gender-sensitive issue. I also interviewed 71 stakeholders, including ten national agencies 
and  ministries,  secretaries  in  four  municipalities  (Bogotá,  Barranquilla,  Medellin  and 
Cartagena), academics, and practitioners. These interviews aimed to identify opportunities 
and constraints to mainstream inclusive violence prevention at the local and national levels, 
and  to  investigate  counterparts’  perceptions  of  the  relevance  of  MDBs  in  violence 	 ﾠ
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prevention.  
 
This thesis focuses on violence in urban settings and includes all forms of interpersonal 
violence (including domestic violence), that is, what has been referred to as ‘everyday 
violence’ (Sheper-Hughes 1992). I adopt the definition that the World Health Organisation 
(WHO)  promoted  in  its  2002  World  Report  on  Violence,  and  to  which  academics, 
policymakers and practitioners have largely subscribed since then: 
‘The  intentional  use  of  physical  force  or  power,  threatened  or  actual,  against 
oneself, another person, or against a group or a community, that either results in or 
has  a  high  likelihood  of  resulting  in  injury,  death,  psychological  harm, 
maldevelopment or deprivation.’ (WHO 2002:5) 
 
This definition has the advantage of being as comprehensive and inclusive as possible, for 
it acknowledges different forms of both violence and its consequences, while being precise 
enough to be applied in policy debates. The research focuses on violence, not crime. It is 
important to distinguish both terms, for they are often used interchangeably, but refer to 
different concepts. While crime is an illegal activity that depends on the legal system of a 
country and is therefore time and space specific, violence, as above defined, is arguably 
universal (thus the debates around its definition and its scope that I examine in Chapter 2). 
Violence and crime often overlap, but not necessarily. Some crimes are not violent (money 
laundering or corruption), while some forms of violence are not always considered as a 
crime (for instance, marital rape or some forms of child maltreatment in some countries) 
(Buvinic and Morrison 1997, 1999). 
 
1.4 Structure of the thesis 
 
The  thesis  is  structured  as  follows.  Following  this  Introduction,  Chapter  2  provides  an 
analytical  background  in  the  understanding  of  violence,  its  link  with  gender  and 
development.  Chapter  3  discusses  conceptual  understandings  of  the  emergence  and  the 
mainstreaming  of  inclusive  violence  prevention.  It  adopts  a  social  constructivist  and 
collective  empowerment  stance,  and  combines  selected  debates  from  three  interlocking 
bodies of literature: priority setting, mainstreaming, and donor-recipient relations in the 	 ﾠ
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context of aid to identify four analytical categories. These categories respectively examine 
cognitive frame; actor power; operational knowledge; and organisational treatment. Each 
category  then  unfolds  in  specific  variables  that  I  empirically  examine  in  the  findings 
chapters, as explained in Chapter 4 that describes the methodology. Chapter 5 discusses 
violence  in  LAC  with  a  special  focus  in  Colombia,  and  analyses  the  main  features  of 
policymaking in the region and in the Andean country. Chapter 6 looks at the emergence 
and treatment of violence prevention within the development agenda of the IADB and the 
World Bank during the period 1998-2011. Chapters 7 and 8 build on this stocktaking and 
process  tracing  exercise  to  analyse  why  it  has  happened  that  way.  Building  upon  the 
conceptual framework developed in Chapter 3, they respectively analyse cognitive frame 
and  actor  power  (Chapter  7),  and  operational  knowledge  and  organisational  treatment 
(Chapter 8) in an empirical way so as to better understand the slow emergence of violence 
prevention and identify opportunities and constraints to mainstream the inclusive violence 
prevention in the agenda of both banks. Chapter 9 focuses on donor-recipient relations and 
presents the findings from the case study in Colombia. Based on in-depth interviews with 
stakeholders at the national and local levels, it discusses opportunities and constraints for a 
mainstreaming approach to the inclusive prevention of violence at the country level, and 
studies counterparts’ perception of MDBs’ relevance in that respect. Finally, Chapter 10 
concludes by reflecting on the main findings and contribution, and highlights directions for 
further research.   
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Chapter 2: Gendered Understandings of Violence and              
the Implications for Policy 
 
 
‘The most important thing we have learned after decades of research on violence is that 
violence, and more specifically, youth violence, can be prevented.’ 
 
Joan Serra Hoffman, Lyndee Knox and Robert Cohen (2011) 
 
 
Violence is an eminently complex development challenge, whose gender dimensions are 
often overlooked. It is complex for at least three reasons. First, it is polysemous. Violence 
refers  to  multiple  imaginaries.  Second,  it  is  multidimensional.  Even  in  its  narrower 
understanding (physical, direct violence), it has multiple manifestations and categorisations. 
Third,  it  is  multi-causal.  These  multiple  causes,  or  risk  factors,  vary  according  to  the 
context and the form of violence. Violence is also highly gendered, as all social phenomena 
are. However, because of certain cognitive frames and limitations in data and measurement, 
violence in urban settings is generally seen as a ‘young male syndrome’, as young men are 
both the main victims and perpetrators of homicides. But as males do not live in isolation 
and homicides are just the tip of the iceberg of violence, multiple gendered dimensions are 
in fact at stake in the reproduction of violence. In that regard, the gendered continuum of 
violence shows how different forms from the private to the public spheres reinforce each 
other,  and  how  models  of  masculinity  and  femininity  are  important  variables  in  the 
equation. Finally, violence is interrelated to mal-development, both in its causes, and its 
costly and long-term consequences, which increases multi-fold the complexity at play.  
 
Different policy approaches exist to address violence in urban settings, however, there is 
still a gap between policy and research to translate the complexity and gender dimensions 
above  mentioned.  In  particular,  the  ecological  model  that  is  a  useful  tool  to  guide 
policymaking  towards  multi-sector,  gender-sensitive  approaches,  still  needs  to  be 
operationalised to translate the theory into practice.  
 
This chapter is organised as follows. Sections 2.1 to 2.5 examine the characteristics of 
violence as a complex phenomenon that intersects with gender and development. On the 	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basis of this, Section 2.6 explores the different policy responses to violence, highlighting 
the gap between policy and research and looking for potential bridges. Section 2.7 then 
concludes on one potential bridge, mainstreaming inclusive violence prevention that will be 
discussed further in Chapter 3.  
 
2.1 Violence as a polysemous concept 
	 ﾠ
2.1.1 Narrow to wide definitions: Where to place the boundaries? 
	 ﾠ
Violence  is  intuitively  understood,  yet  its  definition  has  long  been  debated  among 
philosophers,  anthropologists  and  sociologists.  A  core  question  is  where  to  put  the 
boundaries of the definition of violence (Bufacchi 2005). In its narrowest understanding, 
violence is defined as the individual or collective use of physical superiority or force on 
another person; or the abusive use of force to constrain another person (Vautrelle 2009:8). 
The core parameter is someone else’s body (Chesnais 1981; Coady 1986; Dewey 1980). 
Violence here implies inter-subjectivity, intentionality and harm.  
 
Feminist scholars have criticised the narrow focus on the harmed body alone, and have 
proposed referring to the notion of illegitimacy instead. They argued that violence was not 
always visible. In fact, sexual and psychological violence might not mark the body, but 
nonetheless traumatically affects the integrity of the person. Similarly, some objects can be 
taken or destroyed to hurt somebody, and living under threat or constant fear can lead to 
long-term  trauma  (Hester,  Kelly  and  Radford;  Radford  and  Stanko  1996).  In  extreme 
contexts, genocide survivors also witnessed how psychological violence can be among the 
most  terrible  acts  of  violence  (Bufacchi  2005:198).  Non-feminist  scholars  have  also 
endorsed the dichotomy between legitimacy and illegitimacy to define violence (Sheper-
Hughes and Bourgeois 2004; see also Riches 1986; or Garver 1968 who defines violence in 
reference to violation and transgression).  
 
At the end of the 1960s, Galtung (1969) widened the understanding of violence even more 
to place it in the context of human rights and development. By so doing, he highlighted the 
distinction between direct violence that is perpetrated by a person or group of persons, and 	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
29 
structural violence, where violence is built into unequal power relations. In the same year, 
Arendt  (1969)  argued  that  violence  was  not  just  about  force,  but  the  instrumental 
expression  of  power  (Bufacchi,  2005:195-196).  Violence  thus  became  a  restriction  of 
liberty or deprivation linked to injustices and inequalities. Galtung (1990) then introduced 
the concept of cultural violence to express the structural and direct violence that could be 
made  acceptable  through  symbols  and  rituals  in  the  social  life.  Bourdieu  (1998,  2004) 
adopted a similar approach when he defined what he called ‘symbolic violence’, that is, 
violence that is imposed by the dominating patriarchal system. Bourdieu explained that 
when  the  dominated  accept  and  conform  to  the  dominant’s  limits,  even  without 
consciousness,  symbolic  violence  takes  the  form  of  ‘bodily  emotions’,  such  as  shame, 
humiliation,  or  anxiety.  Following  Galtung  and  Bourdieu,  Salmi  (1993)  argued  that 
violence needed to be understood in its widest meaning and proposed to define it as  ‘any 
avoidable action that constitutes a violation of a human right, […] or which prevents the 
fulfilment of a basic human need’ (cited in Bufacchi, 2005:196). In this sense, deprivation 
is a form of violence. 
 
These  wide  definitions  of  violence  have  been  criticised  for  being  vague  and  for 
encompassing  everything  that  contradicts  any  socio-economic  rights.  Betz  (1977),  for 
instance,  argues  that  such  wide  definitions  would  make  violence  inescapable,  and 
ultimately meaningless. Even definitions focusing on illegitimacy have been condemned 
either because they made violence hard to measure, or because they leave undefined the 
question of who was to judge whether the act was legitimate or not (Pearce 2007:17). By 
doing  so,  critiques  referred  to  the  unsolved  question  of  the  universality  versus  the 
subjectivity of violence (Vautrelle 2009; Schröder and Schmidt 2001; Riches 1986; Pearce 
2007). 
 
Such concerns are valid in the context of policymaking that requires actionable boundaries, 
but they undermine the structural factors at stake in the reproduction of violence that if not 
acknowledged will remain unaddressed. In fact, structural and symbolic violence have the 
advantages of placing debates on contemporary violence in the context of development and 
diversity. That is, wider definitions refer to political debates regarding the societies we are 
building.  Such  debates  are  healthy  reminders  in  the  context  of  Latin  America  and  the 	 ﾠ
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Caribbean, characterised with high levels of inequality and violence, and highlight the link 
with (mal)development and unequal gender relations (see below). Figure 1 summarises key 
parameters used to define violence along a scope going from narrow to wide meanings.  
 
Figure 1: Definitions of violence 
	 ﾠ
 
Source: Author. 
 
2.1.2 The definition adopted in this thesis 
	 ﾠ
As mentioned in the Introduction, this thesis adopts the WHO’s definition of violence, for 
its  actionable  comprehensiveness.  In  particular,  the  definition  gathers  key  elements 
common to most definitions such as intentionality and harm in all its forms, and can be 
applied to private and public settings. Violence is thus defined as follows: 
‘The  intentional  use  of  physical  force  or  power,  threatened  or  actual,  against 
oneself, another person, or against a group or a community, that either results in or 
has  a  high  likelihood  of  resulting  in  injury,  death,  psychological  harm, 
maldevelopment or deprivation.’(WHO 2002:5) 
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2.1.3 Definitions and imaginaries: multiple cognitive frames on violence and its 
solutions 
	 ﾠ
The polysemy of violence translates into different imaginaries, or cognitive frames,
11 that in 
turn shape policymaking. Yet, these coexisting interpretations are seldom acknowledged 
(Parkes, Heslop, Oando et al. 2013). Hume (2009), among other feminist scholars, has 
shown how whoever names violence inevitably installs a hierarchy within violent acts as 
well as among victims. As such, the dominant definition in a given context needs to be 
systematically questioned. 
 
A common source of confusion leading to different cognitive frames lies in the multiplicity 
of related terms. They include crime, un-safety, insecurity, delinquency, abuse, aggression, 
and incivility, among others. In particular, and as explained in Chapter 1, violence and 
crime are often used interchangeably, when they refer to different concepts. It is important 
to distinguish violence and crime, first because focusing on violent crime might overlook 
certain forms of violence, and second because addressing crime inevitably refers to the 
criminal justice system while solutions to violence require a broader understanding of its 
root causes (see Section 2.6). 
 
The profusion of expressions also concerns solutions to violence, which in some instances 
reveals a lack of clarity. Most common expressions include violence prevention, violence 
and  crime  prevention,  crime  prevention,  citizen  security,  human  security,  social 
coexistence, peace, public safety, national security, and public security, among others. Most 
of  these  expressions  are  very  broad  and  need  to  be  precisely  defined.  When  used 
interchangeably, they indicate, at least, a lack of conceptual clarity relating to violence and 
its solutions. When used purposefully, they refer to specific and intended cognitive frames. 
For  instance,  referring  to  ‘security’  does  not  have  the  same  connotation  as  ‘social 
coexistence’ or ‘public safety’. Indeed, security often refers to the use of repressive state 
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
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apparatus, while safety has a broader scope and refers to public health and unintentional 
events (such as road accidents, diseases or natural disasters). Being precise and consistent 
with definitions and expressions helps build a common understanding around the issue that 
in turn helps clarifying debates in public policy (see Section 2.6 and Chapter 3).  
2.2 Violence as a multi-dimensional phenomenon  
	 ﾠ
2.2.1Multiple forms of violence with different statistical treatment 
Violence encompasses multiple manifestations within three broad typologies: self-directed, 
interpersonal,  and  collective.  Self-directed  violence  includes  suicide  and  self-abuse. 
Interpersonal  violence  includes  domestic  violence  (intimate  partner  violence,  child 
maltreatment,  elderly  abuse)  and  community  violence  (when  strangers  and  non-family 
members  are  perpetrators  of  the  violent  acts).  Collective  violence  refers  to  violence 
perpetrated by organised groups or institutions for political, economic, or social objectives, 
such as wars, armed conflicts between states, organised crime, terrorism, etc. (WHO 2002: 
5). As stated in the Introduction, this thesis focuses on interpersonal violence in urban 
settings.
12  
 
This multidimensionality leads to the question of measurement when talking of ‘violence’ 
in general. In fact, violence is commonly measured in terms of homicides, for this is the 
most reliable and comparable statistic. However, homicide rates only provide a limited 
picture  of  the  problematic  and  generate  a  bias  towards  young  males  who  traditionally 
appear as the main perpetrators and victims of homicides (WHO 2002, 2005, 2010, 2013; 
Bannon and Correia 2006; UNODC 2011, 2014). In contrast, violent acts that do not lead to 
death are those that affect the daily lives of millions of women, men and children. Many of 
those violent acts remain invisible though, for statistical systems do not capture them either 
because  they  are  under-reported,  for  technical  reasons  (difficulty  to  measure),  or  for 
political motives.  
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12 In other words, this thesis does not include self-directed violence, political violence or organised crime. 
Nonetheless, it is important to recognise that as categorisations are fixed, they are by definition limited. In 
violence, boundaries are in fact often blurred. For instance, as I explain later in the chapter, it is unclear how 
youth gangs are linked to drug trafficking and organised crime.  	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There are four main sources of data regarding violence, but issues commonly exist on data 
availability  and  reliability.  Data  sources  include  police  records,  hospital  records, 
victimisation  surveys,  and  specific  qualitative  studies  and  surveys,  including 
epidemiological  surveys.  Police  and  hospital  records  are  the  main  sources  for  official 
statistics, but their quality and reliability hugely vary from country to country, in particular 
in developing countries where statistical systems are usually weak and prone to political 
manipulation (Rüdqvist, Hettne, Löfving et al 2003; UNODC and World Bank 2007). Even 
when statistical systems are relatively strong and transparent, they might not provide an 
accurate picture of the situation in terms of violence. Many violent acts are indeed never 
reported, and represent what is commonly called the ‘dark figure’ or the ‘black figure’. To 
overcome such issues, victimisation surveys have been developed. They consist in taking a 
random sample of the population and asking households if they have been victims of a 
violent act or a crime
13 (with or without violence) within a specific timeframe (usually the 
last  year).  These  surveys  are  also  useful  to  target  specific  forms  of  violence,  such  as 
intimate partner violence or child maltreatment, as well as for collecting specific data on 
the  victims  and  perpetrators  and  other  crucial  information  (means,  place,  time,  etc.). 
Nonetheless, victimisation surveys depend on the willingness of the victim to share, their 
memory, the quality of the questionnaire and the professionalism of interviewers, and do 
not  necessarily  include  all  forms  of  violence.  Thus,  qualitative  ethnographic  or 
anthropologic studies or ad-hoc surveys can be helpful in documenting specific forms of 
violence  and  providing  complementary  information.  They  usually  respond  to  specific 
purposes and target forms that remain statistically invisible, such as child maltreatment, 
elderly  abuse,  intimate  partner  violence,  school  violence,  violence  against  minorities 
(including  ethnic  groups,  and  lesbian,  gay,  bisexual  and  transsexual  (LGBT)  groups), 
violence at work, violence against persons with disability, and emotional violence. Such 
data  collection  and  the  different  treatment  of  forms  of  violence  inevitably  impact 
policymaking. If we do not know the scope of an issue, it is more difficult to put it high on 
the  political  agenda  and  develop  sound  policies  and  programmes  to  address  it.  It  is 
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noteworthy  that  data-related  issues  most  commonly  concern  forms  of  violence  whose 
victims are usually women, children, the elderly, or minority groups. 
2.2.2 How to categorise violence?  
As violence is multi-dimensional, different approaches exist to categorise violence, which 
adds a layer of complexity to the phenomenon. As Table 1 summarises, violence has been 
classified  in  terms  of  motives,  types,  victims,  aggressors,  the  relationship  between  the 
victim and the aggressor, gender, the consequence of violence, the place where it occurs, or 
the mean (Buvinic and Morrison 1997; McIlwaine 1999; Moser and Schrader 1999; WHO 
2002; Moser 2006). These multiple ways to categorise violence make it even more complex 
to address, for they offer competing perspectives to analyse the issue.  
 
Table 1: Categories of violence 
Categories of violence  Sub-categories 
Motives  Economic, social, socio-economic, political, racist, irrational/passional/anomic 
Types  Sexual, physical, psychological 
Victims  Children, men and women of certain ages, ethnicity, sexuality, dis(ability), 
profession 
Aggressors  An individual, self, a group of individuals, for example, gangs or pandillas 
Relationship between the 
victim and the aggressor 
Acquaintance, family member, stranger, peer, relative 
Gender  Gender-based violence including violence against transsexuals 
Consequence of violence  Lethal, non-lethal, needing medical assistance  
Place where it occurs  Rural, urban, school, workplace, public transportation 
Means  With firearms, with white arms, without arm 
Source: Moser and Schrader 1999; McIlwaine 1999; Buvinic and Morrison 1997; WHO 2002; Moser 2006. 
 
2.3 Violence as a multi-causal phenomenon  
	 ﾠ
2.3.1 Understanding violence with multi-disciplinary lenses 
	 ﾠ
Numerous disciplines have sought to understand violence and its causes. From sociology, 
economics, anthropology and political sciences, to psychology, biology, neurosciences, and 
more recently to urban planning, gender studies, public health and development studies, all 
disciplines have proposed and favoured theories to explain the emergence of violence.  
 
This diversity offers richness, but also makes understanding the causes of violence more 
complex, and at times, overwhelming. In fact, most disciplines remain in siloes, and their 	 ﾠ
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supporting  theories  appear  at  times  contradictory.  While  sociologists emphasise  norms, 
culture and social organisation
14 (Hirschi 1969; Hein 2010), economists generally endorse a 
rational  choice  theory  and  discuss  opportunity  cost  (such  as  widespread  impunity  for 
example). They also look into net utility for individuals or groups of individuals (‘expected 
benefits’) to behave violently or illegally (Becker 1968). Anthropologists point to rituals 
and  traditions,  in  particular  in  the  transition  from  childhood  to  manhood  and  the 
implications of belonging to a group (identity formation and sub-culture) (Ramphele 2001; 
Abbink  2001),  and  political  scientists  point  to  the  institutional  context,  in  terms  of 
weakness of criminal justice systems (widespread impunity and corruption), state violence, 
weak  democracies,  discourses  around  violence  and  crime,  the  presence  of  drug-related 
criminal organisations, the availability of firearms, and structural violence (Keane 1996; 
Pécault 1999; Galtung 1969; Bourdieu 1989; Pearce 2010). Psychologists focus on deviant 
or  pathologic  behaviours  and  insist  on  the  learning  process  that  leads  an  individual  to 
become violent (McIlwaine 1999:457), as opposed to biologists and neuroscientists who 
accept the idea that some individuals are born more predisposed to violence than others, 
and  look  into  nutrition  and  the  brain  development  to  suggest  possible  neurobiological 
factors  for  violent  behaviours  (Restak  2009;  Kerns  and  Prinz  2002).  Urban  planners, 
geographers and demographers  link  rapid  urbanisation,  migration  and  the  youth  bulge 
(massive numbers of people arriving in cities that could not offer jobs, housing or basic 
services, forcing them to survive in minimal conditions) (Rotkers 2002; Caldeira 2000; 
Beall  2009)  to  explain  increases  in  crime  and  violence  (see  also  Briceño-León  2002; 
Concha-Eastman  2002;  Moser  et  al.  2005;  Pécault  1999;  Koonings  and  Krujt  1999; 
Fajnzylberg et al. 1998). Gender specialists and feminist scholars point to the structural 
inequality between men and women, patriarchal ideologies and the patriarchal system that 
legitimises domination of some women and men over other women and men, along with 
traditional  gender  identities  that  tend  to  link  masculinity  with  force  and  violence  and 
femininity with weakness and victimhood (Hume 2004; Heise 1994, 1998; Prise 2005; 
Larraín 1999; Bott et al. 2005). Epidemiologists follow a public health methodology to 
identify  risk  and  protective  factors  that  together  increase  the  propensity  for  violence 
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14 Sociologists highlight the consequence of a history of conflict (legitimisation of the use of force to resolve 
conflict),  the  phenomenon  of  anomie  (inadequacy  between  expectations  and  potentialities  in  an  unequal 
society) (Hein 2010), inequality and discrimination (economic, racial, sexual or gender-based), and social 
control (positive or negative connection with institutions, from family to the school or the State). 	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(Londoño and Guerrero 2000; Duque et al. 2008; WHO 2002; PAHO 2001; Guerrero and 
Concha-Eastman  2000).  Among  others,  they  identify  the  use  of  alcohol,  carrying  of 
firearms,  etc.,  and  underline  the  link  between  different  levels  of  causality  (individual, 
family,  community  and  society),  what  is  currently  referred  to  as  the  ecological model 
(WHO  2002;  Turpin  and  Kurtz  1997,  see  below).  Different  schools  of  criminologists 
favour varying combinations of theories used by other disciplines, but most discuss the 
deterrence effects of sentencing (Sherman et al. 2002). Finally, because of the high costs of 
violence and crime on societies and their long-term consequences, experts in development 
aim  to  make  the  synthesis  of  previous  explanations  and  adopt  a  development  lens  by 
focusing on inequality and mal-development. They show the link between development and 
violence, in particular through high rates of poverty, inequality and structural issues, such 
as low quality education systems, high youth unemployment rates, weak institutions and 
weak law enforcement, and insalubrious built environment (Cunningham et al. 2008; World 
Bank 2007, 2010, 2011).  
2.3.2 The ecological model as a tool to disentangle multiple, context-based risk 
factors for violence 
To make the synthesis of each discipline’s contribution while having a coherent framework 
of analysis, the WHO, in its World Report on Violence (2002), has promoted the use of the 
ecological model. The ecological model follows a contextual, epidemiological approach, 
and identifies violence-prone risk or protective factors at different levels. Risk factors are 
factors that tend to increase the probability for an individual to behave violently. Protective 
factors,  on  the  contrary,  increase  the  resiliency  of  individuals,  and  make  them  more 
resistant to violence, both as victims and perpetrators. Researchers consider that enhancing 
protective factors is more effective than reducing risk factors (Naudeau et al. 2008). The 
ecological  model  presents  a  combination  of  risk  and/or  protective  factors  that  varies 
depending on the context and are grouped in four levels: individual, relationship (family 
and  friends),  community  (school,  neighbourhood),  and  society  (Figure  2  for  main  risk 
factors
15). Today, there is an increasing consensus among academics, policymakers, and 
development partners on the multi-causality of violence and the ecological model is largely 
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endorsed in the development community, in particular because it shows the links between 
violence and development (Buvinic and Morrison 1999; WHO 2002; Moser and Shrader 
1999; Buvinic, Alda and Lamas 2005; UNODC and World Bank 2008; World Bank 2005, 
2007, 2011, 2013; Cunningham et al. 2008; Imbusch, Misse and Carrión 2011) (see Section 
2.4.) 
 
Figure 2: Ecological model with examples of risk factors 
 
Source: WHO 2002. 
2.4 Violence as a development challenge 
 
Violence and development are intertwined both in their causes and in their consequences. 
Many of the risk factors associated with violence, as highlighted in the ecological model, 
such  as  weak  institutions,  corruption,  exclusion  and  inequality  are  linked  to  mal-
development. Violence also hinders development efforts through its enormous costs and 
negative  long-term  consequences.  Buvinic,  Morrison  and  Shifter  (1999)  talk  about 
violence’s ‘social and economic multiplier effects’ that can affect not only individuals, but 
also communities, and the society at large with consequences that can last for decades.
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There are numerous ways in which violence negatively affects development.
 Moser and 
Shrader (1999:7) show how violence erodes different types of capital, understood as ‘stocks 
of assets’. Violence erodes human capital (that includes investments linked to education, 
nutrition  and  health),
16  when  child  maltreatment  and  bullying  hinder  children’s 
development  through  consequences  such  as  low  self-esteem,  mental  health  disorders 
(anxiety,  depression),  low  capacity  of  concentration  at  school,  aggressive  behaviours, 
isolation, and a higher probability to reproduce violent behaviours when adolescent and 
adult  (Willman  2009;  Cunningham  et  al.  2008;  Naudeau  et  al.  2008).
17  Similar 
consequences are found common for children witnessing violence, in particular in their 
home (Willman 2009; Willman and Makisaka 2010; WHO 2002).
18 Other human capital-
related costs include lower self-esteem and less productivity, especially for women victims 
of intimate partner violence (Buvinic, Morrison and Orlando 2005; WHO 2013). Injuries 
caused by violence might also lead to disabilities, both mental and physical.  
 
In  terms  of  social capital  (defined  as  the  rules,  norms,  obligations  and  trust  in  social 
structures and relations), violence dissuades people from organising when gangs control 
territories, or when fear is widespread and citizens are afraid of retaliation on themselves or 
their family. Such situations enhance a ‘culture of silence’ (Pécault 1999; Rotkers 2002). 
Rubio (1997) has shown how violence also builds ‘perverse social capital’, which is the 
bonding, solidarity and ‘esprit de corps’ among gang members. It is perverse not only 
because  those  groups  are  violent  towards  others,  but  also  because  they  employ  violent 
practices within the group. Their codes and rituals are intrinsically linked to violence, and 
so is their identity and solidarity as a group. At the macro institutional level, violence also 
affects political stability and legitimacy, through widespread citizens’ distrust in public 
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16 Health and nutrition determine the capacity to work and education the skills or preparation to work; labour 
being a fundamental asset in human capital.   
 
17 Anthropological studies confirm this when they relate life histories of pandilleros who explain they escaped 
from a violent home and took refuge on the streets where they began a new, violent life (see for instance 
Salazar 2001; Rocha 1999; Hume 2009; Rubio 2007). 
 
18 It is noteworthy to clarify that there is no causal link. What researchers have pointed out is that most of 
adults who behave violently had themselves experienced or witnessed violence as a child. This does not mean 
that all children victims or witnesses of violence will become violent adults. 
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institutions, in particular those related to the criminal justice system, lack of collaboration 
with  the  police,  privatisation  of  security,  as  well  as  social  cleansings  (Caldeira  2000; 
Winton 2004; Kliksberg 2006). Citizens then consider they can take justice into their own 
hands because the State is overwhelmed, corrupted, or simply does not respond effectively 
to  the  situation.  This  tends  to  increase  tolerance  towards  the  use  of  violence  to  solve 
problems  and  conflicts,  and  feeds  a  ‘culture  of  violence’  (Taussig  1992;  Kruijt  and 
Koonings 1999; Bourgois 2002; Torres-Rivas 1999; Scheper-Hughes 1992). Ultimately, 
this also weakens democracies (Koonings and Kruijt 1999; Rotkers 2002; Pearce 2010).  
 
Finally, in economic terms, the costs of violence are enormous. Depending on the method 
used,
19 economists have estimated that they could represent between 5 and 15 per cent of 
the GDP in countries worst affected by violence (Londoño and Guerrero 2000; Concha-
Eastman 2002; Soares and Naritomi 2010). This includes justice-related costs and direct 
costs to health (health-related costs for injuries, disabilities, or traumas) and mortality, and 
costs to the business climate (reduction in tourism, private security costs, firm protection 
measures, etc.). As mentioned in Chapter 1, 15 per cent of GDP is nearly three times the 
public expenditure as a percentage of the GDP dedicated to Education in countries like 
Brazil or Mexico.
20 In terms of life, some regions, like the Caribbean, loose nearly one-
fourth  (24  per  cent)  of  years  of  healthy  life  due  to  violence,  according  to  WHO’s 
estimations  (as  calculated  in  Disability-Adjusted  Life  Years  or  DALYs)  (UNODC  and 
World Bank 2007:56).
21  
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19 According to UNODC and the World Bank, there are at least six different methodologies to assess the costs 
of  violence:  (i)  assessing  specific  costs;  (ii)  adding  up  total  costs  using  an  ‘accounting  approach’;  (iii) 
estimating total cost or ‘willingness to pay’, using econometric methodologies; (iv) calculating the Disability-
Adjusted Life Years (DALYs) lost due to violence; (v) estimating effects on economic growth through cross-
country regressions; and (vi) measuring the marginal willingness-to-pay for reductions violence (UNODC and 
World Bank 2007: 42).  
 
20 Respectively, 5.1 and 4.8 in 2007, World Bank EdStats (2010). 
 
21 Some studies also suggest that people who have been victimised are 5 to 10 per cent more likely to be less 
satisfied  with  life  (UNODC  and  World  Bank  2007:56).  Other  indicators  include  willingness  to  pay  for 
security or business climate (disincentives for private and foreign investment because of extra costs generated 
by high rates of violence in terms of private security, higher insurance costs, loss in infrastructure, lower 
productivity, or ‘rentas’ (taxes) by mafia-type organised crime, etc.) (World Bank 2007, 2010, 2011). 
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The very high monetary and non-monetary costs as well as the multi-causality of violence 
have  made  the  link  between  violence  and  development  increasingly  apparent.    As 
previously discussed when defining violence (see Section 2.1), Galtung (1969) had already 
argued that violence was the result of structural injustices. It is not until the end of the 
1990s, however, with a sharp increase of violence in LAC in particular, that international 
development economists began studying the relationship between violence and poverty and 
other economic variables. They found that more than poverty in absolute terms, it was 
inequality that explained differences in violence across countries (Ayres 1998; Fajnzylber, 
Lederman and Loayza 1998, 2000).
22 More recently, the United Nations Office for Drugs 
and Crime (UNODC) has shown that countries with low human development have the 
largest share of homicides, and those with high levels of income inequality have rates four 
times higher than ‘more equal’ countries (UNODC 2011:10). 
 
In sum, violence feeds mal-development by hindering investment and weakening human, 
social and economic capital, and asset accumulation. It is intertwined with inequalities and 
structural  injustices  linked  to  class,  gender,  age  and  ethnicity,  and  as  such,  is  also  the 
product  of  mal-development.  By  reinforcing  each  other,  mal-development  and  violence 
feed a ‘perverse cycle’ (Buvinic and Morrison 1997), a cycle that is highly gendered. 
2.5 Gender dimensions and the gendered continuum of violence: questioning 
patriarchy as a root cause for violence 
 
2.5.1 Violence, a ‘young male syndrome’? 
Violence is often characterised as a ‘young male syndrome’ (Abbink 2001). This arises 
because young males are the main victims and perpetrators of homicides everywhere in the 
world (UNODC 2007, 2011, 2014),
23 because violence is mainly measured in terms of 
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22 Those economists worked for the World Bank. Similar efforts were taking place at the IADB as well. See 
Lora 2000 for example.  
 
23 The WHO has estimated that the homicide rate for youth aged 10-29 was 36 per 100,000 in LAC (WHO 
2002). In countries with high homicides rates, the ratio male-female victims of homicides can reach 1:15 
(Waiselfisz 2008). Young males are also considered the main perpetrators of homicides. However, reliable 
information is often missing because the majority of homicides and violent crimes are not solved (Imbusch, 
Misse and Carrión 2011). Therefore, generalisation on perpetrators’ profiles must be treated with caution, in 
particular regarding their age. 	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homicides  (Section  2.2),  and  because  of  the  visibility  of  youth  gangs, debates  around 
violence are generally biased towards males.  
 
Youth gangs, in particular, tend to embody ‘the problem of violence’. In Latin America and 
the Caribbean, youth gangs, also called pandillas, usually share four characteristics: (i) they 
are territorial groups; (ii) they are male-dominated, even though females are also linked to 
gangs either as members or girlfriends, and there are also some female-led gangs; (iii) their 
members tend to come from low-income neighbourhoods in urban areas; and (iv) they tend 
to be young people, in general below 25 or 30 years old (Rodgers 1999; Moser and Winton 
2002; Imbusch, Misse and Carrión 2011). However, beyond these four general traits, youth 
gangs encompass a wide variety of phenomena, as they diverge by structure, size, motive, 
and  practice  across  countries,  cities,  and  even  territories.  They  span  from  informal 
gatherings of a few youth who commit delinquent acts or incivilities, to maras that are 
structured as large criminal organisations (with thousands of members) and carry out cruel 
practices (Rodgers 1999; Moser and Winton 2002). Their motives and practices go from 
identity searching, petty crime and fights (Rocha 2000; Sosha and Rocha 2001; Rocha and 
Rodger 2008; Baird 2011),
24 to extortion, including ‘rentas’ (a form of taxation) in public 
transportation or small businesses for protection in the case of maras (Rubio 2006; WOLA 
2006). Nevertheless, available statistics in most countries suggest that youth gangs are not 
responsible for the majority of homicides or other violent crime. Even maras in Central 
America (mainly present in Honduras, El Salvador and Guatemala) do not appear in studies 
as the main perpetrators of homicides, even though they are generally considered as the 
main violent threat (Imbusch, Misse and Carrión 2011).
25 The link between youth gangs 
and drug trafficking is also unclear. Many of them consume drugs (marijuana, cocaine and 
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24 In general against another pandilla leading at times to destruction in neighbourhoods, for they use stones 
and other artisanal cocktails Molotov, etc. However, anthropological studies have shown that in a number of 
countries,  pandillas’  practice  has  evolved:  while  for  years  they  tended  to  protect  their  neighbourhoods, 
researchers have reported that they now rob and steal the inhabitants of their own ‘barrio’ (see Rocha and 
Rodgers 2008). 
 
25 Studies are inconclusive but suggest that in Guatemala only 14 per cent of homicides are attributed to gang 
activities;  in  Honduras,  studies  are  less  precise  and  estimate  that  less  than  5  per  cent  of  homicides  are 
committed by youth under 18 years old; and in El Salvador, 60 per cent of homicides are attributed to maras 
(see Imbusch, Misse and Carrión 2011: 106). 
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crack), and increasingly distribute them at a smaller or larger scale. However, the extent to 
which youth gangs are connected to drug cartels is not clearly established (opcit). Despite 
these uncertainties, youth gangs’ presence and visibility, as well as the way some media 
portray and focus on them, tend to make young poor males scapegoats of the problem of 
violence. The risk of such shortcuts is to essentialise all young poor males, when only a 
minority behave violently. At the core of such risk lies the question of gender identities.  
2.5.2 Gender identities as overlooked risk factors for violence 
Anthropologists and sociologists have shown how a certain model of masculinity based on 
domination,  competition,  power  and  respect-seeking  attracted  male  adolescents  to  join 
gangs (Rodgers 1999, 2006, 2007; Briceño-León and Zubillaga 2000; Rocha 2000; Sosha 
and Rocha 2001; Salazar 2002; Rubio 2007). When young males enter adolescence (age of 
identity seeking) there is a range of conditions that can result in violence becoming a way 
to affirm one’s identity (Briceño-León and Zubillaga 2000; Briceño-León 2002; Parkes 
2007; Moser 2009; Baird 2011). These conditions include the lack of positive role models 
(because of absent or unknown fathers, siblings or fathers that have been gang members) 
(Ramphele 2001), difficulties in school, no attractive economic opportunities, and/or they 
live in communities where youth gangs already exist. Sociological studies have also shown 
how belonging to a violent group, such as a pandilla in Latin America, gives young males a 
sense of belonging, an identity of a ‘real man,’ and a more active sexuality (Rubio 1997, 
2007), 
26 as if there was only one way to be a ‘real’ man, and this way necessarily involved 
violence and power. Decades of feminist research have denounced such essentialist views 
around  masculinity  and  femininity,  showing  the  difference  between  sex  (biology)  and 
gender  (identity),  and  demonstrating  how  gender  identities  were  socially  constructed. 
Carrigan,  Connell  and  Lee  (1985)  have  called  ‘hegemonic  masculinity’  the  model  of 
masculinity based on domination to which young gang members aspire when they seek to 
prove themselves as ‘real men’. Such ‘hegemonic masculinity’ is constantly reaffirmed 
through  the  media  and  other  social  means,  and  supported  by  structural  inequalities,  as 
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26 As previously mentioned, Rubio (2007) has developed the concept of ‘perverse social capital’ to refer to it. 
See also Parkes and Conolly (2013) for the case of young males and peer dynamics in the UK. 
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Bourdieu has argued,
27 but is seldom acknowledged as a risk factor to be addressed when 
designing  strategies  to  prevent  violence.  And  yet,  dominant  models  of  masculinity  can 
evolve, as has been the case in many European countries (Bannon and Correia 2006), and 
in the particular case of youth gangs in Latin America, studies have shown that events 
linked  to  perceptions  of  and  changes  in  gender  identities,  such  as  having  a  girlfriend, 
getting married, or becoming a father, were catalysers of change and motives to leave the 
gang (Rodgers 2005). Such events also confirm the false dichotomy between public and 
private spheres, as shown through the gendered continuum of violence.  
2.5.3 The gendered continuum of violence 
The focus on homicides and young males tends to sideline other forms of violence, and 
generally results in overlooking how different forms reinforce each other to reproduce the 
perverse  cycle  of  violence  (Whitzman  2008).  In  particular,  domestic  violence  has 
traditionally  been  disregarded  in  public  debates,  and  in  some  countries,  still  remains  a 
‘public secret’ as Hume (2004, 2009) has argued in the case of Central America. Yet, 
domestic  violence  and  street  violence  are  interrelated  and  evolve  along  a  gendered 
continuum of violence.  
 
Several scholars have used the concept of continuum of violence to show the relationship 
among forms of violence. Bourgeois (2004) argues that different levels or types of violence 
as  described  by  different  authors  (mentioned  in  parenthesis)  exist  along  a  continuum: 
political,  structural  (Galtung  1969),  symbolic  (Bourdieu  1998),  and  everyday  violence 
(Scheper-Hughes  1992).  Moser  and  Shrader  (1999)  establish  the  same  interconnection 
among different motivations of violence: economic, political, social, and institutional (see 
also Moser and McIlwaine 2004; Moser 2006). Kelly (1988), a feminist scholar, focuses on 
the  continuum  of  sexual  violence,  and  along  with  other  authors  (in  particular  feminist 
researchers  working  on  politics)  challenged  the  dichotomy  between  private  and  public 
violence,  showing  how  both  forms  are  often  intertwined.  More  generally,  Nordstrom 
(2004) speaks about a continuum through the violence of tomorrow, beyond the immediacy 
of  the  violent  act,  i.e.  pointing  out  its  reproduction  and  lasting  consequences.  These 
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27 Bourdieu (1998, 2004) explains that patriarchy is a form of symbolic violence; see Section 2.1 and Chapter 
3. 
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different versions of the continuum of violence are all drawing attention to the same idea: 
the transmission of violent habits and landmarks through space and time, as summarised by 
Pearce (2010:288). Building upon the previous discussion on the male-biased focus, gender 
identities  as  overlooked  risk  factors,  and  the  irrelevant  dichotomy  between  public  and 
private spheres, it is useful to place the continuum in a gender perspective to highlight the 
gendered  mechanisms  at  stake  in  the  reproduction  of  violence.  This,  in  turn,  uncovers 
patriarchy as one of root causes enabling this reproduction. Figure 3 highlights the gender 
dimensions throughout the ecological model, and Figure 4 translates this analysis into a 
gendered continuum of violence.  
 
Figure 3: Gendered dimensions of risk factors in the ecological model 
 
Source: Adapted from WHO 2002. 
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Figure 4: The gendered continuum of violence 
 
 
Source: Own graphic translation based on sources cited in text and own analysis.  
 
2.5.4 Patriarchy as a root cause of violence 
The gendered continuum of violence reveals how key dynamics in the reproduction of 
violence are embedded in unequal gender relations where power is based on domination. In 
that regard, Bourdieu (1998) has explained how the subtle objectification of masculine 
domination  and  the  correlated  model  of  masculinity  based  on  dominating  power  are 
imposed and constantly reinforced through symbols and beliefs that impregnate bodies and 
minds,  and  thus  go  beyond  clear  consciousness.  For  Bourdieu,  the  patriarchal  system 
legitimises itself through ‘schemes of perception, appreciation and action that constitute 
habitus’, and therefore make appear normal and natural what is indeed constructed through 
incessant efforts (both by agents and institutions) (Bourdieu 1998: 58-59-own translation). 
As mentioned in Section 2.1, this is what he refers to as ‘symbolic violence’.  If, as this 
research argues, the gendered continuum of violence reveals that key dimensions (domestic 
and  gender-based  violence)  are  embedded  in  unequal  gender  relations  and  dominating 
gender identities (hegemonic masculinity), then the patriarchal system might appear to be 
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one of the root causes of urban violence. Not questioning more systematically gender when 
addressing  urban  violence  might,  as  a  result,  be  explained  in  reference  to  Bourdieu’s 
symbolic violence: through a subtle objectification of the link between violence and power, 
power and masculinity, and therefore violence and masculinity, the patriarchal system and 
its symbolic violence make it appear counterintuitive to question gender when analysing 
and addressing what appears a straightforward masculine reality.  
 
Understanding  the  gendered  continuum  of  violence  has  concrete  implications  in  public 
policies.  When  gendered,  the  continuum  of  violence  from  the  home  to  the  streets  and 
through generations supports the idea that separating domestic violence from other forms of 
urban violence into different strategies fails to acknowledge key mechanisms of violence 
transmission. More broadly, it shows that creating and sustaining conditions for peaceful 
societies  requires  more  than  punctually  addressing  impunity.  It  requires  challenging 
embedded injustices that feed the perverse cycle of violence, gender inequality, and mal-
development, as discussed in the next section. 
	 ﾠ
2.6 Implications for policy: Rationale and challenges for multi-sector, gender-
sensitive violence prevention policies in practice 
	 ﾠ
The  policy  debate  around  violence  has  traditionally  opposed  partisans  of  prevention  to 
partisans of control strategies. The first draw attention to the need for work on root causes 
of violence, understood as a learned behaviour that can be unlearned or not learned in the 
first place (Buvinic and Morrison 1997; Guerrero and Concha-Eastman 1997; Torres-Riva 
1999;  World  Bank  2011).  The  second  consider  that  lack  of  punishment  is  the  most 
important issue to be addressed both as a remedial and dissuasive approach (Ayres 1998; 
see also Imbusch, Misse and Carrión 2011:116, 122). These debates reflect the different 
theories put forward by the multiple disciplines that study violence (see Section 2.3.1), but 
in part only. Ideology and more or less well-informed understanding of the phenomenon 
have fixed these debates, despite progress in research and a growing consensus on the 
multi-causality of the issue.  
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Authors have argued that opposing prevention to control was misleading because control 
comprises of prevention through impeding an individual or group of individuals to commit 
further  violent  acts  (Buvinic  and  Morrison  1999;  Arriagada  and  Godoy  2000;  among 
others).  In  fact,  tertiary  prevention  targets  offenders  and  includes  programmes  and 
interventions to prevent them from recidivism (see different levels and types of prevention, 
Box 2). However, such a standpoint is valid only to the extent that control or criminal 
justice strategies focus on preventing violence through improving relationship between the 
police and communities, police performance, equal access to timely justice, fair sentencing, 
rehabilitation of offenders and their reinsertion into society. When control strategies solely 
focus on repression and punishment, with severe human rights issues regarding arrests, 
sentencing and detention, and little or no rehabilitation of offenders, they loose their focus 
on root causes and thereafter the preventive perspective.  
Box 2: Different levels of prevention 
Preventing violence refers to developing a set of actions for violence not to happen in the first place, or not to 
happen again. There are three levels of prevention that target different groups of beneficiaries.  
 
Primary prevention targets the general population, i.e. before any violence occurs;  
Secondary prevention targets population at higher risk of committing an act of violence or a crime, such as 
youth-at-risk, pandilleros, drug or alcohol consumers, or high-risk parents; and  
Tertiary prevention aims to prevent recidivism through rehabilitation and supervision of offenders.  
Source: WHO (2002). 
 
Table 2 summarises different policy approaches based on the initial Moser and Shrader 
(1999)’s categorisation and its development (Moser and Winton 2002; Moser, Winton and 
Moser  2005).
28 The  multiplicity  of  approaches  translates  different  cognitive  frames  on 
violence and their causes that in turn lead to favouring different categorisations of violence 
and lenses to develop policies and programmes (see Sections 2.1.3 and 2.2.2). For instance, 
social prevention focuses on groups of potential perpetrators and/or victims of different 
forms of violence, while situational prevention focuses on places where violence occurs to 
make  it  more  difficult  to  happen.  Criminal  justice  focuses  on  crime  (with  or  without 
violence), and on the enforcement of the law, etc. Different approaches also show different 
treatment of gender issues, with social prevention more prone to be gender-sensitive, for it 
focuses  on  people  and  their  relations.
29 The  main  limitation  of  these  sector-specific 
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
28 See Appendix A for a detailed explanation for each policy approach.  
 
29 Though this is not guaranteed if a gender perspective is not explicit. 	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approaches is that they focus on certain risk factors and can, as a result, only offer partial 
solutions,  if  any  given  the  interrelation  among  different  factors  at  different  levels  (see 
Section 2.3). They are also usually developed in siloes, which tends to leave forms of 
violence unattended and gendered continuum of violence ignored.  
 
To respond to these limitations, multi-sector
30 approaches have been developed (see Table 
2 and Appendix A). They seek to translate the multi-dimensionality and multi-causality of 
violence through addressing different risk factors in a coordinated fashion. They typically 
combine social and situational prevention with criminal justice reforms, in particular to 
improve  police  efficacy  and  police-community  collaboration  (Moser  and  Shrader  1999; 
Moser and Winton 2002). As such, they target different groups of beneficiaries, from the 
general population (primary prevention) to high-risk groups (secondary prevention) and 
offenders (tertiary prevention) (see Box 3). They also seek to strengthen the institutional 
capacity of institutions working in violence prevention at the national and local levels, and 
to  strengthen  data  collection  analysis  for  a  sounder  policymaking  (Moser  and  Winton 
2002). When multi-sector strategies are gender-sensitive, they acknowledge the gendered 
continuum  of  violence  and  include  in  the  same  strategy  domestic  and  street  violence 
(Whitzman  2008;  Pearce  2010).  They  also  build  on  the  fact  that  gender  identities  are 
historically and socially constructed, and therefore can be influenced and changed (Moore 
1994).
31  More  generally,  multi-sector,  gender-sensitive  strategies  adopt  a  gender 
perspective in their diagnostic, interventions, and result frameworks, and as such, in theory, 
seem to best respond to the complexity of violence. 
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30 Multi-sector  approaches  imply  coordination  among  actors  and  sectors  that  contribute  to  enhancing 
protective factors and lessening risk factors. They are also referred to as ‘integrated approaches’. MDBs in 
particular favour this term. I chose to use the expression ‘multi-sector approaches’ to avoid confusion with the 
use of ‘integration’ in regard to mainstreaming, as I explain in Section 3.2.3 in Chapter 3.	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31 In that respect, empirical work with men, in particular in the health sector such as Programa H in Brazil 
and Mexico, provides concrete examples as to how the hegemonic masculinity can be challenged. Barker 
(2006)  and  others  (for  example  Bird  et al.  2007)  have  shown  how  programmes  can  support  alternative 
masculine models, emphasising fatherhood and cooperative behaviours with women.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
49 
Table 2: Policy approaches to violence 
Policy 
approach 
Sector  Focus  Types of intervention  Institutions /Actors in 
charge 
Social 
prevention 
seeks to 
address a 
combination 
of risk factors 
that together 
form the 
social root 
causes of 
violence 
Public health 
/ Epidemio-
logical 
approach 
Reducing risk 
factors, 
enhancing 
protective factors 
- Epidemiological and geographical mapping 
of violence 
- Educational campaigns 
- Alcohol sales restriction 
- Arms wear permits restriction 
- Promotion of behavioural change 
Mayor, University, 
Police, Media, NGOs, 
Hospitals 
Education / 
Conflict 
resolution 
Strengthening 
human capital 
and resilience 
- Prevention of bullying in school 
- Conflict resolution training 
- Prevention of teen dating violence 
- Citizenship competencies 
- Control of anger and emotions 
- Cultural and recreational activities 
- Leadership training and team play 
- Positive parenting 
- Lifeskills training 
Schools, Parents 
associations, NGOs, 
Ministry of Education, 
Mayors 
Youth 
develop-
ment 
Strengthening 
human capital 
and resilience 
- Vocational training 
- Gender and sexual education, masculinities 
and femininities 
- Drug prevention 
-Mentoring/role models 
-Lifeskills training 
Schools, University, 
Training Institutes, 
Mayors, Private Sector, 
NGOs, Media 
Community 
organisation 
Building social 
capital, trust, 
social cohesion 
- Safety marches 
- Community activities 
- Community policing 
- Recreational and cultural activities 
- Campaign 
- Victims services 
- Youth services 
- Domestic violence prevention 
- Reinsertion of ex-offenders/ restorative 
justice 
- Parenting programs 
- Citizenship culture  
 
Communities, Mayors, 
NGOs, Justice, Police, 
Schools, Hospitals/ 
(Youth) Clinics 
Situational 
prevention  
(use of the 
built 
environment 
and how 
people 
interact in 
places to 
identify risky 
situations) 
Urban 
planning/ 
CPEDT 
Modifying urban 
settings to reduce 
opportunities for 
violence and 
increase natural 
surveillance 
- Safety marches 
- Cut trees and vegetation  
- Increase human presence 
- Develop economic activities 
- Focus on the whole journey from home to 
work through public transportation 
- Focus on markets, bus stops, school 
entrances and where people use to gather 
- Focus on places where people are afraid 
and/or violence happens  
State, Mayors, Private 
Sector, Architects/Urban 
Planners, 
Communities/Communit
y Leaders (both women 
and men) 
Criminal 
justice (the 
most 
traditional 
Police  Deter and control 
violence through 
higher arrest  
- Police reform 
- Hot spot policing 
- Community policing 
- All-women police stations 
Police, Ministry in 
charge, Mayors 	 ﾠ
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approach and 
includes the 
police, the 
justice, and 
the 
penitentiary 
system) 
Justice  Deter and control 
violence through 
higher 
conviction rates 
- Judicial reform 
- Alternative dispute resolution mechanisms 
- Accessible justice systems 
- Mobile courts 
- Alternative sentencing 
-Adult and juvenile drug courts 
Courts, Ministry in 
charge, Mayors 
Rehabilita-
tion 
Rehabilitate 
offenders to help 
them reinsert 
society upon 
completion of 
their sentence 
-Psychotherapy for victims 
-Restorative justice 
 
Penitentiary systems, 
Ministry in charge, 
Mayors 
Multi-sector 
(for multi-
dimensionalit
y and multi-
causality of 
violence) 
Citizen 
security/  
Safer cities 
National and 
municipal 
strategies 
All of the above  Prime Minister, 
Ministries, Mayors, 
Multiple agencies and 
NGOs at local and 
neighbourhood levels, 
Police, the Media 
Source:  Adapted  and  enhanced  from  Moser  and  Shrader  (1999),  Moser  and  Winton  (2002),  and  Moser, 
Winton and Moser (2005).  
 
However, today, multi-sector strategies are little understood in practice. The multiplicity of 
target  groups,  types  of  interventions  and  actors  make  them  particularly  complex  (OVE 
2013,  2014).  Moreover,  the  ecological  model  and  the  gendered  continuum  of  violence 
imply a ‘shared responsibility’ between actors and sectors that still needs to be translated 
into coherent and effective policies and programmes. In other words, the operationalisation 
of the ecological model, its gender dimensions, and its goal as a policy still need to be 
better understood to ensure a sound translation of theory to practice. This is particularly 
important considering the multi-fold constraints in developing countries, the overall lack of 
evidence available (Sherman 2012)
32, and the lack of continuity that characterises most 
policies dealing with violence.  Even more so, when we take into consideration the need to 
work across levels of government and across sectors, with a particular emphasis at the local 
level where constraints are usually the greatest, and with a gender perspective for an issue 
dominated by male-chauvinist considerations (see Section 2.4).  
2.7 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has shown how violence is a complex development challenge whose gender 
dimensions are often overlooked. In particular, the gendered continuum that shows the 
interrelation between different forms of violence helps uncover deeply ingrained causes 
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based on exclusion and patriarchy. Such analysis suggests that preventing violence in a 
sustainable way and creating the conditions for peaceful societies requires rethinking about 
how violence is dealt with. In particular, it argues for transforming traditional approaches to 
violence prevention and promoting, developing, and implementing multi-sector, gender-
sensitive  strategies.  Among  the  challenges  for  developing  such  strategies  to  prevent 
violence are building a common cognitive frame for all stakeholders in all sectors, focusing 
on  strengthening  the  theories  of  change  implied  in  the  shared  responsibility  and  the 
operationalisation  of  the  gendered  ecological  model,  clarifying  goals  in  particular 
considering that structural injustices and the patriarchal system participate in perpetrating 
the cycle of violence and better understanding operational considerations and mechanisms 
through learning from the experience of other transversal issues, and of course, through 
‘informed trials and errors’ on the ground (Sherman 2012). To contribute to this enterprise, 
in Chapter 3 I develop the concept of mainstreaming inclusive violence prevention, and 
discuss  key  analytical  categories  for  its  prioritisation  and  institutionalisation  in  the 
development agenda.  
 
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ  	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
52 
Chapter 3: Conceptual Understandings of Mainstreaming 
 Inclusive Violence Prevention 
	 ﾠ
 
‘We need something between unfounded optimism and hopeless pessimism.  
The middle way is called strategy.’ 
 
Sara Hlupekile Longwe
33 
 
If, as Chapters 1 and 2 have argued, violence is one of the main contemporary development 
challenges and is multidimensional, multi-causal and evolves along a gendered continuum, 
then  the  question  is  how  to  translate  this  transversality  into  sustained  change  within 
organisations and in the life of women, men and children in developing countries.  
 
The  need  for  continuity  and  for  operationalising  the  shared  responsibility  for  violence 
discussed in Chapter 2 led me to the notion of mainstreaming. However, mainstreaming is 
not an easy concept. In fact, it has been widely criticised both in theory and in practice. 
Nonetheless,  in  the  search  for  solutions  to  a  challenge  as  pressing  as  violence  in  the 
developing world, we cannot afford to discard options for their complexity or operational 
difficulty without first undertaking a sincere and serious effort to analyse it. This is what 
this chapter, and more broadly this thesis, are about.  
 
Mainstreaming has become a familiar concept for transversal issues in policy and planning. 
It was first referred to for the inclusion of handicapped children within regular classrooms 
(Harrison and Phillips 1978), and since then, has been used for issues as diverse as gender, 
the  environment,  human  rights,  governance  and  anti-corruption,  ethnicity,  disaster 
management,  intercultural  relations,  among  others.  More  recently,  climate  change 
mainstreaming has received a lot of attention in the development community. But among 
all  issues,  gender  equality  is  probably  the  most  advanced  process  of  mainstreaming  in 
development and at the global level (Gupta 2010). 
 
One lesson from the thirty years of gender mainstreaming is that mainstreaming is often 
misunderstood  and  sometimes  subverted.  It  is  useful  to  retrace  briefly  the  history  of 
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mainstreaming  through  the  lens  of  gender  equality  to  understand  the  specificity  of 
mainstreaming as opposed to integration, and define the value added of the process that 
would justify adapting it to violence prevention. 
 
Gender  mainstreaming  appeared  in  the  1990s  and  was  formally  adopted  at  the  Beijing 
fourth World Conference on Women (1995) as a strategy for development partners and 
governments  worldwide  to  promote  gender  equality.  Before  gender  mainstreaming, 
integrationist movements sought, in the 1970s and 1980s, to include women’s interests and 
needs in the development agenda. Nonetheless, such integration rapidly became sidelined 
as ‘women’s issues’, and feminist scholars and practitioners increasingly raised their voice 
saying  that  transformation  could  not  happen  as  an  ‘add-on’  to  ‘business  as  usual’,  i.e. 
without  challenging  unequal  power  relations  deeply  ingrained  in  most  governments’ 
policies  and  practices  that  development  agencies  were  financially  and  technically 
supporting (Jahan 1995; Longwe 1994, 1997; Rao 1995; Goetz 1995; Elson and McGee 
1995; Levy 1992, 1996). If we were to achieve gender equality, we needed to ‘transform’ 
existing rules, they were arguing (opcit). As a result mainstreaming emerged in the early 
1990s. It was conceived as a political process aiming to transform unequal gender relations. 
Instead of including women and ‘adding and stirring’ (Moser 1989), gender mainstreaming 
would produce a paradigm shift of how development and political and social life in general 
were planned by addressing gender inequality in all sectors at all levels (Rao 1995; Razavi 
and Miller 1995; Walby 1997; Council of Europe 1998).  
 
Since Beijing, virtually all development agencies and most governments in the world have 
adopted  a  mainstreaming  strategy  to  achieve  gender  equality.  Yet,  progress  in 
implementation has been slow and the political dimensions have often disappeared behind 
technical or technocratic considerations. This made making mainstreaming a technocratic 
process more similar to integration than to mainstreaming as it was conceived in the 1990s. 
Part  of  the  issue  lays  on  the  lack  of  clarity  in  concepts  and  strategies  (Hannan  2000; 
Jackson 2002; Daly 2005; Moser and Moser 2005; Rao and Kelleher 205). Nonetheless, 
despite  wide  critiques  and  polemics  surrounding  gender  mainstreaming,  significant 
progress in terms of gender inclusion in the development agenda has been made, albeit 
insufficient,  and  a  number  of  transversal  issues  have  sought  to  adopt  a  mainstreaming 	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approach for their own sake. This is probably because ‘we have not found anything better 
so  far’  (to  use  Hannan’s  expressions,  2000)  for  addressing  multi-causal  and  multi-
dimensional  issues  that  intersect  with  class,  gender  and  other  structural  injustice  in 
development, and require changing mindsets. Yet, the challenge is to make it work. 
 
To develop the concept of mainstreaming inclusive violence prevention, I combine three 
interlocking  bodies  of  literature:  mainstreaming,  priority  setting  and  donor-recipient 
relations.  As  there  is  an  evident  need  to  clarify  theoretical  positioning,  concepts  and 
strategies, I first build upon lessons from a rich body of literature on gender mainstreaming 
in  its  different  aspects.  Then,  because  violence  prevention  is  relatively  new  on  the 
development agenda, I combine mainstreaming research with priority setting, to identify 
what makes an issue emerge as a priority. This is particularly pertinent in the context of aid, 
where multiple issues compete with each other for visibility and space within an overall 
context of resource constraints and ‘mission creep’. Finally, as the analysis focuses on 
development  agencies,  there  is  also  the  need  to  look  at  donor-recipient  relations  when 
discussing key variables that would guide the analysis towards identifying opportunities 
and constraints to mainstreaming inclusive violence prevention in the development agenda. 
 
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.1 discusses the theoretical underpinnings of 
mainstreaming  inclusive  violence  prevention.  Section  3.2  proposes  a  definition  for  the 
concept. Section 3.3 clarifies the goal of mainstreaming inclusive violence prevention and 
looks  into  conceptual  debates  surrounding  the  process,  as  found  in  the  gender 
mainstreaming literature. Section 3.4 builds on and proposes a synthesis of five frameworks 
that  study  priority  setting  and  mainstreaming  to  develop  a  four-pronged  analytical 
framework.  These  variables  will  serve  as  keys  of  understanding  to  empirically  analyse 
opportunities  and  constraints  to  mainstream  inclusive  violence  prevention  in  the 
development agenda of MDBs in LAC, as the conclusion highlights in Section 3.5. 
3.1 Theoretical underpinnings: Social Constructivism and Collective 
Empowerment 
 
Mainstreaming inclusive violence prevention (MiVP) is grounded in social constructivism 
and  collective  empowerment.  Social  constructivism  understands  reality  as  socially 	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constructed and impermanent, and therefore changeable by the women, men and children 
that interpret and build it. As such, it denounces essentialist views that too often lead to 
fatalism. It acknowledges that violence can be understood through multiple frames and 
sheds light on the importance of building a common understanding of the issue and its 
solutions as a first step to create lasting conditions for change. But for this to happen, a 
certain level of consciousness, collective action and a certain understanding of power are 
needed. Thus, the MiVP also builds on collective empowerment, for it seeks to transform 
the way violence is traditionally dealt with by bringing to practice the shared responsibility 
for violence in all its forms, and ultimately redefining power as potentiality. 
3.1.1 Social Constructivism 
Social constructivism emerged in opposition to naturalistic views around race and gender 
inherited  from  the  XIXth  century  (Keucheyan  2012).  Social  constructivists  sought  to 
challenge assumptions, such as those that stated that black and white persons did not have 
the same abilities because of race, which in turn justified differential treatments. This was a 
case in debate at a lawsuit in the United States in the first half of the XXth century. Then, 
social scientists had to ‘deconstruct’ social beliefs that would justify differential treatment 
among people of different colours based on biological or essentialist traits, in this case the 
prohibition for black people to undertake tertiary studies (see Lawsuit Sweatt vs. University 
of  Texas,  1946,  cited  in  Keucheyan  2012:67-68).    Through  a  similar  exercise  of 
‘deconstruction’,  De  Beauvoir  (1946)  highlighted  the  difference  between  being  female 
(biological sex) and being a woman (constructed social identity) that would open the door 
for the feminist movement to expand and denounce unequal gender relations. Since then, 
social  constructivism  has  underpinned  all  major  intellectual  movements  against 
discrimination, including race, class and gender.  
 
Social constructivists consider reality as a process that is socially constructed, as opposed to 
an object that would pre-exist. For them, social reality constantly changes and depends on 
the agents’ representations (Keucheyan 2012:67-68). Structuralists criticise such views as 
too relative, and consider that social reality must be understood through a combination of 
forces  and  rules  that  are  imposed  on  the  agents,  despite  their  conscience  and  will 
(Wacquant 2012:200-201). That is, social constructivists focus on the agent’s experience 	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and representations and denounce all forms of essentialism, while structuralists seek to 
uncover  the  set  of  relations  at  play  that  ‘determine’  individuals’  representations  and 
behaviours.  
 
In  the  case  of  violence,  social  constructivism  helps  disentangle  the  different  cognitive 
frames surrounding violence and its causes as I have discussed in Chapter 2. In particular, it 
questions the fact that violence is a given and some people are born violent, as opposed to it 
being a learned phenomenon. That is, a social constructivist perspective denounces the risk 
of  essentialising  poor  young  males  as  inherently  violent,  and  seeks  to  deconstruct 
deterministic  views  on  violence  by  looking  into  the  different  meanings  of  the  issue  in 
different settings. It seeks to disentangle the causes of violence, and fundamentally supports 
the idea that violence is learned and embedded in a complex network of relationships that 
move, shape and are shaped by individual and societal experiences. As such, it focuses on 
the violent acts or behaviours, and moves away from generalising groups as violent. It does 
not  fall  into  pure  relativism  either.  In  particular,  when  intertwined  with  gender  and 
development,  it  helps  uncover  patriarchy  and  exclusion  as  root  causes  of  violence, 
otherwise left largely unquestioned outside of feminist scholarship (see Chapter 2).  
 
Social constructivism also sheds light on the importance of framing for social change. As 
early as 1967, Berger and Luckmann, the fathers of social constructivism, have explained 
that  ‘the  analyses  of  objectivation,  institutionalisation  and  legitimation  [were]  directly 
applicable to the problems of the sociology of language, the theory of social action and 
institutions’ (Berger and Luckmann 1967:185). Thereafter, Goffman (1974) developed the 
‘Frame Theory’. He explained that there were two main levels of frames: internal and 
external. Internal frames refer to how individuals interpret their reality; external frames to 
how an issue is portrayed by a larger public. Both influence each other. In fact, the public 
portrayal of an issue as relayed in the media influences how women and men, girls and 
boys interpret their reality. This is the case for example when people report high levels of 
feeling unsafe in relatively safe countries.
34 On the other hand, women, men and children 
interpret public messages also based on their own reality. As such, there is a subtle and 
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undefined interaction between internal and external frames. Goffman also highlights the 
fact that frames are often unconscious, but when competing frames exist, they can become 
conscious  and  influenced  (opcit).  These  are  fundamental  theoretical  fulcrum  for  social 
change.  Actually,  ‘in  the  social  movements  literature,  individuals  overcome  collective 
action problems by developing shared frames about their predicament and agreeing on the 
best course of action.’ (Chong and Drukman 2007:120) Among others, Benford and Snow 
have used Goffman’s analytical tools of frames and frameworks to highlight three functions 
of  framing  in  collective  action:  diagnostic,  i.e.  the  definition  of  a  social  situation; 
prognostic. i.e. the anticipation of consequences of an action, and of transformation of this 
situation; and motivation (rationale) that gives reasons and justifications for action (Snow, 
Trom  and  Cefaï  2000:  158).  Many  authors  studying  gender  mainstreaming  have  also 
highlighted the importance of framing and have linked it to social change (Razavi 1997; 
Daly 2005; Verloo 2005; Eveline and Bacchi 2005; UNEP 2006; Razavi 2009; Parkes, 
Eslop, Oando et al. 2013) as I discuss further in Section 3.2.  But to change or influence 
frames towards action, we first need awareness, which leads us to collective empowerment. 
3.1.2 Collective Empowerment 
At  the  core  of  empowerment  theories  are  the  questions  of  power,  consciousness,  and 
collective action. Batliwala (1994, 2007), Kabeer (1994, 2001) and Rowlands (1997) have 
studied and defined empowerment in relations of gender inequality.
35 Batliwala (1994:130) 
defines  empowerment  as  ‘the  process  of  challenging  existing  power  relations,  and  of 
gaining  greater  control  over  the  sources  of  power.’  She  highlights  the  importance  of 
consciousness-raising of the subordinated, in particular women, through education, and the 
need  to  challenge  unequal  power  relations  through  mobilisation  and  collective  action. 
Batliwala starts with the experience of women and their self-awareness, and puts at the core 
of  empowerment  the  power  to  make  decisions,  in  particular  through  the  control  over 
different  resources  (material,  intellectual  and  ideological).  She  sees  empowerment  as  a 
political process leading to transformation of the patriarchal system and its apparatus that 
sustains oppression and subordination. Along with Batliwala, Kabeer (1994, 2001, 2005) 
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35 See Ruiz Castro (2009), Empowerment and Gender in the Workplace: Experiences in Accounting and IT 
Firms in Mexico, PhD Thesis, DPU, UCL, London, for an extended discussion on collective empowerment.  
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has also focused on self-awareness and has insisted on the ‘self-determination’ of women, 
that is, the capacity of women to take their life and destiny into their hands. As Kabeer 
(2001:21) explains, agency implies ‘a much wider range of purposive actions, including 
bargaining, negotiation, deception, manipulation, subversion, resistance and protest as well 
as the more intangible, cognitive process of reflection and analysis.’ As such, she agrees 
with Batliwala on the importance of consciousness-raising and collective action, and also 
defines empowerment as a political process leading to transformation. Rowlands (1997) 
follows  in  that  direction.  Studying  women  in  Honduras,  Rowlands  proposes  to  refine 
empowerment  by  identifying  core  values,  and  facilitators  and  inhibitors  of  the 
empowerment process. In terms of core values, Rowlands identifies self-confidence and 
self-esteem at the personal level; the ability to negotiate and communicate at the level of 
close  relationships;  and  group  identity  and  self-organisation  at  the  collective  level. 
Batliwala,  Kabeer  and  Rowlands  see  a  continuum  from  self-awareness  to  collective 
mobilisation and action towards transforming unequal power relations. All three feminist 
scholars  emphasise  consciousness  and  identify  at  least  three  levels  of  empowerment: 
immediate, intermediate and deeper, as Kabeer name them, or personal, close relationships 
and collective in Rowlands’ words.  
 
In  the  case  of  inclusive  violence  prevention,  collective  empowerment  responds  to  the 
double  disempowerment  of  violence.  Violence  in  itself  disempowers  and  patriarchy 
amplifies this disempowerment for women who have too often been reduced to a role of 
victims (see Section 2.5.4 in Chapter 2). As such, collective empowerment refers to re-
creating and re-organising space (including through transforming how organisations work) 
for women and men, girls and boys to act upon their individual and collective power to 
address risk factors for violence and break free from the vicious cycle of violence that feeds 
fear, distrust and a general feeling of disempowerment.  
 
Authors have often highlighted how empowerment had commonly been misunderstood, in 
part  because  of  different  understandings  of  power  (Batliwala  1994;  Hannan  2000). 
Empowerment  does  not  necessarily  imply  a  ‘zero  sum’  result,  i.e.  whoever  becomes 
empowered  takes  power  away  from  others.  This  has  often  been  a  source  of  concern 
regarding women’s empowerment, which was seen as automatically ‘disempowering’ men 	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(Batliwala  1994).  Empowerment  can,  on  the  contrary,  be  creative  and  expands  power 
instead of dividing it. This has a lot to do with the definition used for power. In that regard, 
Arendt (1958) and then Pearce (2007) have proposed to define power as ‘potentiality’.   
 
Power as potentiality is creative and unlimited, and helps reframe the challenge of violence 
and  its  intersectionality  with  gender  and  development.  If  power  is  understood  as 
potentiality and not domination, then using violence becomes the result of powerlessness, 
not power. Redefining power as potentiality enables opening windows of opportunity for 
more equal and cooperative gender identities, in particular masculinities that have been 
identified as risk factors for violence (see Chapter 2, Section 2.5.2). As Pearce points out, 
‘Arendt’s view of power [...] is very similar to some contemporary and feminist views of 
power as generative and about capacity of action’ (Pearce 2007:23). This capacity of action 
is embedded in social relations and requires cooperation and solidarity to emerge. As such, 
the transformative potentiality of power is more likely to be realised if the focus is on 
questioning gender identities and gender relations. Such transformative action is at the core 
of the concept of mainstreaming inclusive violence prevention that builds on empowerment 
of  women  and  men  as  agents  of  their  own  individual  and  collective  destiny.  If 
empowerment  comes  from  within,  ‘outsiders’  can  nevertheless  play  an  important 
facilitating  role  (Hannan  2000:  267).  Such  role  is  what  is  at  stake  when  discussing 
mainstreaming inclusive violence prevention in the context of development agencies.  
3.2 Defining inclusive violence prevention mainstreaming 
 
The concept of inclusive violence prevention mainstreaming builds on the definitions and 
discussions  on  mainstreaming  inherited  from  other  experiences,  in  particular  gender 
mainstreaming, adapts them to the case of violence prevention from a gender perspective, 
and locates the discussion in the organisational context of development agencies. 
3.2.1 Definition 
Gender  scholarship  usually  refers  to  one  of  the  following  two  definitions  for  gender 
mainstreaming: the United Nations (UN) Economic and Social Council’s definition, and 
the Council of Europe Group of Experts on Gender Mainstreaming’s one. 	 ﾠ
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 ‘Mainstreaming a gender perspective is the process of assessing the implications 
for  women  and  men  of  any  planned  action,  including  legislation,  policies  or 
programmes, in all areas and at all levels. It is a strategy for making women’s as 
well  as  men’s  concerns  and  experiences  an  integral  dimension  of  the  design, 
implementation,  monitoring  and  evaluation  of  policies  and  programmes  in  all 
political, economic and societal spheres so that women and men benefit equally and 
inequality is not perpetuated. The ultimate goal is to achieve gender equality.’ (UN 
Economic and Social Council, 1997: 28)  
 
 ‘Gender  mainstreaming  is  the  (re)organisation,  improvement,  development  and 
evaluation of policy processes, so that a gender equality perspective is incorporated 
in all policies at all levels at all stages, by the actors normally involved in policy 
making.’  (Council  of  Europe  Group  of  Experts  on  Gender  Mainstreaming, 
1998:15).  
 
It is noteworthy that neither of the definitions refers to the participation of women and men 
in the process. As such, they do not acknowledge the need for collective mobilisation and 
action highlighted in the discussion on empowerment. The same can be said of definitions 
of other mainstreaming processes. Table 3 presents such definitions for climate change, 
environment, and natural disaster. 	 ﾠ
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Table 3: Examples of mainstreaming definitions 
Type of 
mainstreaming  Definition  Reference 
Climate change 
mainstreaming 
Mainstreaming  of  climate  change  into  development  and/or 
development  cooperation  is  the  process  by  which  development 
policies, programmes and projects are (re)designed, (re)organised, and 
evaluated  from  the  perspective  of  climate  change  mitigation  and 
adaptation. It means assessing how they impact on the vulnerability of 
people (especially the poorest) and the sustainability of development 
pathways  –  and  taking  responsibility  to  redress  them  if  necessary. 
Mainstreaming implies involving all social actors – governments, civil 
society,  individuals  and  local  communities  –  in  the  process. 
Mainstreaming calls for changes in policy as far upstream as possible. 
Gupta and Van Der 
Grijp (2010:207-209) 
Environmental 
mainstreaming 
Environmental mainstreaming means to integrate poverty-environment 
linkages  into  national  development  planning  processes  and  their 
inputs,  such  as  Poverty  Reduction  Strategy  Papers  (PRSPs)  and 
Millennium  Development  Goals  (MDG)  strategies.  It  involves 
establishing the links between poverty and environment – including 
climate change- and identifying the policies and programmes to bring 
about  better  pro-poor  environmental  management.  It  is  targeted  at 
influencing  national  plans,  budget  processes,  sector  strategies  and 
local  level  implementation  –  reflecting  the  need  to  integrate  the 
valuable  contribution  of  environmental  management  to  improved 
livelihoods, increased economic security and income opportunities for 
the  poor.  The  overall  aim  is  to  establish  enduring  institutional 
processes within government, from national to local levels, and within 
the  wider  stakeholder  community,  to  bring  about  environmental 
mainstreaming that is focused on the government bodies responsible 
for poverty reduction and growth policies, and that strengthens the role 
of environmental agencies and non-governmental actors. 
UNEP-UNDP (2007) 
Disaster 
mainstreaming 
Disaster  mainstreaming  implies  taking  into  consideration  risks 
emanating from natural hazards in medium-term strategic frameworks 
and  institutional  structures,  in  country  and  sectoral  strategies  and 
policies  and  in  the  design  of  individual  projects  in  hazard-prone 
countries.  Mainstreaming  requires  analysis  of  how  potential  hazard 
events  could  affect  the  performance  of  policies,  programmes  and 
projects and of the impact of those policies, programmes and projects, 
in turn, on vulnerability to natural hazards. This analysis should lead 
to  the  adoption  of  related  measures  to  reduce  vulnerability,  where 
necessary,  treating  risk  reduction  as  an  integral  part  of  the 
development process rather than as an end in itself. 
Brensons and Twigg, 
(2007:5), cited in 
Gupta and Van der 
Grijp (2010:75-76) 
Source: Author’s compilation. 
 
Based  on  those  definitions,  seven  elements  characterise  mainstreaming.  First,  it  is  a 
process, or it influences a process; second, it deals with planning and policy making; third, 
it covers all areas at all levels at all stages; fourth, it has a clear goal or vision; fifth, it 
concerns all actors involved in policy making, from design to implementation; sixth, it has 
specific tools; and seventh, it is monitored and evaluated. 
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Given  these  characteristics  and  building  upon  existing  definitions  of  mainstreaming,  I 
define inclusive violence prevention mainstreaming as:  
‘The  process  that  acknowledges  the  multi-dimensionality,  multi-causality  and 
gendered dimensions of violence, and aims to operationalise and institutionalise a 
shared  responsibility  for  its  sustained  prevention  through  planning,  design, 
implementation, monitoring and evaluation of all policies, programmes and projects 
in  all  areas  and  at  all  levels.  It  involves  the  development  of  specific  tools, 
methodologies and training, and a participatory, gendered and diversity approach. 
The ultimate goal is to achieve peaceful and inclusive societies, where low levels of 
inter-personal  violence  (including  domestic  and  community  violence)  would  be 
compatible  with  the  wellbeing  of  women  and  men,  girls  and  boys  in  all  their 
diversity, and with sustainable development.’  
 
A  short  version  complements  this  long  definition:  ‘Mainstreaming  inclusive  violence 
prevention is the institutionalisation of the prevention of violence from a gender perspective 
throughout the development agenda so as create lasting conditions for peaceful, inclusive 
societies, communities, families and individuals in all their diversity.’ 
 
In these definitions, institutionalisation is defined as ‘a process whereby social practices 
become sufficiently regular and continuous to be described as institutions’, that is ‘social 
practices that are regularly and continuously repeated, are sanctioned and maintained by 
social norms, and have a major significance in the social structure’ (Abercombie et al. 
1988: 124 cited in Levy 1998: 255). In other words, ‘institutions are social structures that 
have  attained  a  high  degree  of  resilience’  (Scott  2001:48),  they  are  ‘the  rules-in-use’ 
(Hannan 2000). In the context of development agencies, institutionalisation largely refers to 
the  organisational  culture.  As  such,  mainstreaming  aims  to  change  the  organisational 
culture of development agencies to make them not only violent-free environments, but also 
agents  of  change  of  the  development  agenda  by  making  the  inclusive  prevention  of 
violence a central, embedded goal and practice.  For this, it is useful to clarify the different 
dimensions and levels of mainstreaming.  	 ﾠ
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3.2.2 Dimensions and levels of mainstreaming inclusive violence prevention 
	 ﾠ
Mainstreaming inclusive violence prevention implies first and foremost to not heighten 
conditions for violence (‘do no harm’) and then involves a dual mainstreaming approach. 
Not  creating  or  heightening  conditions  for  violence  means  systematically  analysing 
potential changes in situations and power relations as a result of a policy, programme or 
project through violence prevention lenses. This implies first to undertake such analysis 
before the policy, programme or project’s approval and to eventually redo the analysis once 
the policy, programme or project is in place, which in turn requires enough time, financial 
resources, capacity and clarity about risk factors for violence at different levels. MiVP also 
combines  violence  prevention  mainstreaming  and  gender  mainstreaming.  That  is,  the 
concept  implies  understanding  violence  and  its  solutions  from  a  gender  perspective  as 
discussed in Chapter 2. It thus seeks to improve women’s safety within urban violence 
prevention strategies, as Whitzman (2008) and Moser (2009) have argued, and includes 
domestic and gender-based violence within overall strategies to prevent urban violence (as 
opposed  to  silo-type  approaches),  and  takes  it  a  step  further:  it  seeks  to  change  the 
paradigm  of  how  violence  is  understood  and  dealt  with.  As  previously  mentioned,  the 
objective  is  to  make  violence  systematically  understood  in  relation  to  a  gendered 
understanding  of  development,  and  to  make  its  prevention  normally  perceived  as  the 
responsibility of all, and as such, to be truly ingrained in the development planning and 
practice (the question of the goal is further discussed in Section 3.2.3). As such, MiVP has 
three dimensions as expressed through policies, programmes and projects that: 
-  do not heighten conditions for violence; 
-  adopt a gender perspective and include domestic and gender-based violence within 
overall strategies to prevent urban violence; and 
-  acknowledge the intersectionality between violence, gender and development, and 
seek to address root causes for violence through a redefinition of power, gender 
roles and relations, and development processes based on participation and inclusion. 
The  definition  also  evokes  a  transversal  approach  at  all  levels.  In  the  context  of 
development  agencies,  they  include  two  levels  on  the  policy  side  and  one  on  the 
organisational side. In policy, mainstreaming inclusive violence prevention includes the 
inter-sector and intra-sector levels.  	 ﾠ
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-  The inter-sector level aims to strengthen protective factors or reduce risk factors 
associated  with  each  sector.  For  example,  drop  out  of  school  in  the  Education 
Sector, or alcohol consumption in the Health Sector, or aggressive driving in public 
transportation.  
-  The  intra-sector level  seeks  to  prevent  violence  within  each  sector.  That  is,  to 
prevent  bullying  at  school  or  improve  school  climate  for  safe  schools  in  the 
Education Sector, or to prevent harassment and inappropriate behaviours for safe 
buses or subways in public transportation.  
-  The organisational level refers to preventing violence for female and male staff 
members in all their diversity within the organisation. This includes violence at 
work such as verbal or sexual harassment among staff members at all levels of 
hierarchy; violence during work duty, in particular for staff members in country 
offices or staff members on mission visiting high violence neighbourhoods; and 
domestic violence for staff members and their family.  
Figure 5 shows the triple level of mainstreaming processes.  
Figure 5: Inclusive violence prevention mainstreaming 
	 ﾠ
Source: Own analysis. 
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A fourth level, not graphically represented here but nonetheless fundamental, is the country 
level. Mainstreaming is a mean to an end, as Hannan (2000: 289) recalls, and as such, what 
matters is the goal of mainstreaming: peaceful inclusive societies, communities, families, 
women and men, girls and boys. Such deep changes cannot happen if mainstreaming as a 
political goal is not supported and implemented at the country level. 	 ﾠ
3.2.3 Clarifying goals and examining conceptual debates on mainstreaming: 
technocratic integration versus political transformation 
The  goal  of  mainstreaming  inclusive  violence  prevention  appears  in  the  theoretical 
underpinnings and the definition discussed in the previous section: it aims to transform how 
violence and its solutions are understood and treated, to ultimately lower the tolerance and 
risk  factors  contributing  to  violence,  and  to  enhance  conditions  for  peaceful  societies, 
communities, families and individuals in all their social diversity. That is, mainstreaming 
inclusive violence prevention is a political process, as is gender mainstreaming, and seeks 
to produce a paradigm shift.  
 
Transformation as a goal has been at the core of debates in the gender mainstreaming 
literature. Following the experience of the 1970s and 1980s that sought to include women’s 
interests and needs in the development agenda and was denounced for leading to sidelined 
results (Longwe 1994, 1997), Jahan (1995) proposed that a distinction be made between 
two  types  of  mainstreaming:  integrationist  and  agenda  setting.  Integration  refers  to  the 
incorporation  of  the  issue  (gender  and  violence  prevention  in  this  research)  within  the 
current  understanding  and  practices  of  development  issues.  Agenda  setting  seeks  to 
generate  a  paradigm  shift  of  how  policymaking  is  done.  In  other  words,  it  aims  to 
‘transform  the  mainstream’,  as  Walby  (2005)  summarises  it.  This  transformation-based 
goal refers to the need for collective consciousness and empowerment of women and men, 
so as to deeply modify gender relations, as discussed in Section 3.1.   
 
Nonetheless,  the  integrationist  perspective  is  probably  the  most  common  form  of 
mainstreaming  in  the  development  community  (Hannan  2000;  Gupta  2010;  Moser  and 
Moser  2005).  It  focuses  on  technical  aspects  of  mainstreaming  aimed  to  facilitate  its 	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operationalisation and reduce resistance. Under this perspective, integrationists argue that 
the issue to be mainstreamed would enhance the effectiveness of the sector. By doing so, 
they adhere, consciously or unconsciously, to the dominant frame of the organisation in the 
context  of  development  effectiveness.  For  example,  adopting  a  gender  perspective  in 
sectors such as public transportation would imply adapting the service and the routes to the 
demand by gender, which would increase overall users satisfaction (one of the indicators 
used in many countries to measure the sector’s performance). A transformation alternative 
would imply rethinking the design and implementation of public transportation so that it 
takes into account gender interests and needs from the beginning and adopts an inclusive 
violence prevention lens for the planning of public transportation, which might lead to 
different transport provision and safer use of public space (see Levy 2013 on the ‘deep 
distribution’ of urban transport systems and its potential for transformation towards the just 
city).  
 
Feminist scholars have criticised the priority given to technical aspects because it makes 
mainstreaming an instrumentalist process, and ultimately, depoliticises it (Longwe 1994, 
1997;  Hannan  2000;  Daly  2005;  Walby  2005;  Rao  and  Kelleher  2005;  Verloo  2005).  
Loosing sight of the political goal can be problematic, for it can lead to the marginalisation 
or invisibilisation of the issue, which becomes a technical ‘add-on’, an additional thing to 
do  without  necessarily  understanding  why,  therefore  missing  to  generate  the  pursued 
change (Longwe 1994; Daly 2005). The focus on integration can also be the result of a lack 
of  consciousness  of  those  pursuing  change  regarding  the  integrationist/transformatory 
differentiation, as it can be the result of resistance, which might lead a transformatory 
process to become integrationist (see for instance Moser and Moser 2005; Rao and Miller 
2005 for the case of gender mainstreaming). In this respect, the distinction, developed by 
Molyneux (1984, 2001) and then operationalised by Moser (1989), between practical and 
strategic gender interests and needs constitutes a useful conceptual tool. While strategic 
gender needs seek to address unequal gender relations and formulate concrete alternatives 
to  the  subordination  of  women,  practical  gender  needs  only  respond  to  the  immediate 
situation of women in order to help them perform their traditional triple roles (reproductive, 
productive  and  community-managing  roles),  i.e.  without  seeking  to  change  the  gender 
division  of  labour  (Molyneux  1984,  2001;  Moser  1989).  Following  this  conceptual 	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differentiation, an integrationist perspective usually focuses on practical gender needs only, 
for they do not challenge existing assumptions regarding gender roles and identities. In 
contrast, a transformative agenda can focus on key practical gender needs in order to reach 
more strategic gender needs that would then aim to transform unequal gender relations and 
empower women and men equally. 
 
Many denounce the failure of mainstreaming as a transformatory process highlighting the 
little and differential impact in countries and organisations (Daly 2005; Moser 2005). In the 
mid-1990s, Longwe (1994, 1997) already drew the attention to the risk of evaporation of 
gender  mainstreaming.  Following  Longwe  (1994;  1997),  Moser  then  categorised  three 
major  risks  that  explain  the  difficult  implementation  of  gender  mainstreaming  in 
development  agencies:  ‘evaporation,  invisibilisation  and  resistance’  (Moser  2005:11). 
Evaporation refers to well intended policies that have yet failed to implement gender in 
practice;  invisibilisation  deals  with  monitoring  and  evaluation  procedures  that  do  not 
capture ‘what is occurring on the ground,’ while resistance directly points out political 
barriers that block gender mainstreaming (opcit). These organisational backlashes show the 
complexity  and  difficulty  of  the  mainstreaming  process  to  change  habitus.  However, 
denouncing  its  ineffectiveness  might  not  sufficiently  take  into  account  that  structural 
change,  as  is  at  stake  when  dealing  with  gender  equality  (and  inclusive  violence 
prevention), takes time and iterative efforts, as Hannan (2000) among others have pointed 
out.  The  criticisms  surrounding  gender  mainstreaming  echo  the  frustration  of  feminist 
scholars and advocates because injustices are always unbearable, and thus reversing them is 
always pressing. Nonetheless, as Walby (2005) has argued, we should also remember that 
mainstreaming is a process. And today gender equality as a goal has reached mainstream of 
development studies (even though the goal is at times misunderstood), is acknowledged as 
an important issue in the discourse of most development agencies, and a growing body of 
related  research,  expertise  and  tools  exist  in  a  diversity  of  contexts.  If  gender 
mainstreaming has not yet produced a radical change, the process nonetheless exists and is 
still the primary strategy of most development actors, albeit the diversity of practices. The 
embedded intersection of gender mainstreaming with development and other societal issues 
surely makes the process leading to structural change uncertain and incredibly complex. 
However, the option to discard mainstreaming because it has not produced quick enough or 	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radical enough results might be counterproductive, in particular because so far there is no 
credible alternative and the core of the issue is not related to the concept itself but to its 
implementation.  That  is,  the  question  is  more  how  to  make  it  work  better  given  the 
uncertainties  and  complexity  highlighted.  This  leads  to  the  transition  from  theory  to 
practice, and the traditional and core question of strategy, as discussed in Section 3.3.   
 
3.3 Strategy for mainstreaming inclusive violence prevention in development 
agencies’ practice 
 
Bridging the gap between ideas and change in the daily life of women, men and children, 
i.e.  translating  theory  into  practice  is  always  the  most  challenging  stage  in  the  policy 
continuum. However, it is also what keeps us from ‘unfounded optimism’ and ‘useless 
pessimism’  as  Longwe  (as  cited  in  Hannan  2000:264)  reminds  us.  In  the  case  of 
mainstreaming inclusive violence prevention, it is important to build on previous work that 
has explored the issues of priority setting and mainstreaming. Looking at priority setting is 
pertinent  in  the  present  research,  for  violence  prevention  is  relatively  new  in  the 
development agenda (see Chapter 1). Then, the question is how to maintain a high enough 
level of priority to make the institutionalisation process possible, which would then produce 
the conditions that could lead to the desired deep change in the way violence prevention is 
understood and treated in the practice of development agencies. 
 
To analyse these strategy-related questions, I build on three interlocking bodies of literature 
(mainstreaming,  priority  setting,  and  aid)  and  I  combine  five  frameworks  that  seek  to 
explain how an issue becomes important enough to be institutionalised in the development 
agenda. I chose them for their complementary in the context of this research. All of them 
pinpoint  similar  elements,  but  with  particular  perspective,  which  enriches  a  deeper 
comprehension  of  the  most  salient  factors  and  makes  a  finer  synthesis  possible.  The 
different categories used in the frameworks reflect different articulation and expression of 
power in the organisation, or different ‘sites of power’ as Levy name them (Levy 1996:4). 
The five frameworks are the following (they are named by their authors and presented in no 
chronological order, following instead the characteristics that make them complementary): 	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Shiffman and Smith (2007) (followed by Shiffman 2009); Levy (1996); Rao and Kelleher 
(2005); Razavi and Miller (1995); and Hannan (2000).  
 
Shiffman and Smith (2007), and then Shiffman (2009), focus on understanding the variance 
in political priority for health initiatives in the global arena. In other words, they seek to 
explain why an initiative gains political priority on the global agenda, while others do not. 
It  is  very  relevant  to  the  case  of  inclusive  violence  prevention  because,  as  previously 
highlighted, violence prevention is fairly new on the development agenda, thus the need to 
better understand how to create space for an issue to emerge and then become a priority 
(see Table 4). 
Table 4: Shiffman and Smith (2007) and Shiffman (2009) analytical framework for priority setting	 ﾠ
 
 
Then, Levy’s web of institutionalisation helps us take a step further to understand how to 
transform this priority into the day-to-day routines of the organisation. Through the four 
spheres (political, organisational, delivery, and citizen) of her web, Levy (1996) shows 
what conditions are necessary for change to happen and be sustained at the meso level (see 
Table 5).  
Categories Elements Description
Policy'community'cohesion:'the'degree'of'coalescence'among'the'
network'of'individuals'and'organisations'that'are'centrally'involved'
with'the'issue'at'the'global'level
Leadership:'the'presence'of'individuals'capable'of'uniting'the'policy'
community'and'acknowledged'as'particularly'strong'champions'for'the'
cause
Guiding'institutions:'the'effectiveness'of'organisations'or'coordinating'
mechanisms'with'a'mandate'to'lead'the'initiative
Civil'society'mobilisation:'the'extent'to'which'grassroots'organisations'
have'mobilized'to'press'international'and'national'political'authorities'
to'address'the'issue'at'the'global'level
Internal'frame:'the'degree'to'which'the'policy'community'agrees'on'
the'definition'of,'causes'of,'and'solutions'to'the'problem
External'frame:'public'portrayals'of'the'issue'in'ways'that'resonate'with'
external'audiences,'especially'the'political'leaders'who'control'
resources
Policy'windows:'political'moments'when'global'conditions'align'
favourably'for'an'issue,'presenting'opportunities'for'advocates'to'
influence'decisionmakers
Global'governance'structure:'the'degree'to'which'norms'and'
institutions'operating'in'a'sector'provide'a'platform'for'effective'
collective'action
Credible'indicators:'clear'measures'that'show'the'severity'of'the'
problem'and'that'can'be'used'to'monitor'progress
Severity:'the'size'of'the'burden'relative'to'other'problems,'as'indicated'
by'objective'measures'such'as'mortality'levels
Effective'interventions:'the'extent'to'which'proposed'means'of'
addressing'the'problem'are'clearly'explained,'cost'effective,'backed'by'
scientific'evidence,'simple'to'implement,'and'inexpensive.
Actor2
Ideas
Political2contexts
Issue2
characteristics
The'strength'of'the'individuals'and'organisations'
concerned'with'the'issue
The'ways'in'which'those'involved'with'the'issue'
understand'and'portray'it
The'environments'in'which'actors'operate
Features'of'the'problem	 ﾠ
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Table 5: Levy (1996)’s web of institutionalisation	 ﾠ
 
 
Rao and Kelleher (2005) build on Levy’s web and propose a framework that focuses on 
international bureaucracies, which is directly pertinent to the object of this research. Rao 
and  Kelleher  propose  a  web  of  five  spheres  of  power  (politics,  organisational  politics, 
institutional  culture,  organisational  process,  and  programmatic  interventions)  to  explain 
how change occurs in development organisations (see Table 6).  
 
Categories Elements Description
Policy3sphere Resources:)political)commitment)needs)to)be)translated)into)resources)
to)support)policy.
Mainstreaming)implies)the)use)of)existing)budgets)but)
in)a)gender)aware)way.)New)and)sustained)resources)
for)the)promotion)and)mainstrenance)of)gender)
mainstreaming)are)also)crucial.
Political)Commitment:)through)lobbying)or)direct)action)by)political)
constituencies)and)representatives)of)political)structures.)The)form)of)
the)policy,)its)content)and)the)process)of)implementing)it)matter.
Key)question:)'To)what)extent)has)the)gender)specific)
policy)addressed)other)sectoral)D)and)where)
appropriate)D)other)crossDsectoral)policy?'
Policy/Planning
Organisational3
sphere
Mainstream)location)of)responsibility:)the)allocation)of)resources)and)
the)organisation)of)policy)for)gender)integration)depend)on)the)location)
for)responsibility.
A)key)element)is)the)clarification)that)the)responsibility)
for)women)and)men)involved)in)any)Ministry)or)
organisation)is)its)responsibility.)This)challenges)
organisational)culture)and)processes)of)intervention)by)
members)of)an)organisation.)
Procedures:)'routinised'daily)activitie)associated)with)different)points)of)
the)programme)cycle)or)the)rules)governing)actions)within)or)between)
organisations)and)individuals.
They)include)terms)of)reference,)memorandum)
formats,)guidleines,)manuals.)Procedures)are)essential)
for)gender)to)be)institutionalised)in)a)bureaucracy.)
Staff)development:)training)in)gender))policy)and)planning)skills)for)all)
professionals,)and)equal)opportunities)for)women)and)men)as)workers)
In)the)organisation.
Trainig:)imparting)skills)helps)translate)awareness)into)
concrete)practice.)The)actual)treatment)of)women)on)
an)equal)basis)to)men)in)organisations)reflects)the)level)
of)integration)of)gender)in)the)organistaion.)
Delivery3sphere Methodology:)clear)rationale)for)the)integration)of)gender)into)
development)practice)and)tools)for)operationalising)gender)issues)in)
the)work)of)practitioners.
Methodology)for)training)is)not)methodology)for)
education.
Theory)building:)around)gender)as)a)variable)in)development)policy)and)
planning.)
This)interDrelates)with)the)development)of)
methodology.
Delivery)of)programmes)and)projects:)which)meet)the)needs)of)women)
and)men. Ultimate)condition)for)success)of)the)institutionalisation)
of)a)gender)perspective)in)development)activities.)
Research:)both)participatory)and)applied)research)reinforce)the)
institutionalisation)processes)through)deeper)knowledge.)
Participatory)research)can)reinforce)the)ownership)of)
programmes,)and)applied)research)contributes)to)the)
accumulation)of)knowledge)about)mainstreaming.
Citizen3sphere Pressure)of)political)constituencies:)mobilisation)and)consciousnessD
raising)amongst)women)and)men)can)inititate)collective)action)around)
particualr)gender)interets)forming)new)or)existing)political)
constrituencies)
Women)and)men)act)in)their)constituency)politics)role
Representatives/)political)structures:)collective)action)in)the)political)
arena
Women)and)men)need)to)elect)and)/)or)actively)engage)
with)representative)political)structures)within)the)
formal)political)system
Women)and)men's)experience)and)interpretation)of)their)reality:)own)
interpretation)of)their)life.
The)role)of)power)relations)in)the)process)must)be)
acknowledged.)	 ﾠ
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Table 6: Rao and Kelleher (2005) analytical frameworks for gender mainstreaming in the context of aid	 ﾠ
 
 
Razavi and Miller (1995) building upon Kardam (1993, 1995) also focus on mainstreaming 
in international organisations. They adopt a three-pronged framework focusing on external 
pressures  and  influences;  organisational  mandate,  ideology  and  procedures;  and  the 
existence and capacity of internal advocates and entrepreneurs. As such, they study the 
same  object  but  offer  a  different,  yet  complementary  perspective  to  Rao  and  Kelleher, 
which makes possible comparisons, and thereafter, a richer synthesis (see Table 7).   
 
Table 7: Razavi and Miller (1995) analytical frameworks for gender mainstreaming in international 
organisations 
	 ﾠ
 
Finally, because of critiques on mainstreaming as a technocratic process and the call for its 
re-politicisation to keep the agenda-setting goal in sight (Sandler and Rao 2012; see Section 
3.2), I include Hannan’s holistic approach. Hannan does not develop a framework as such, 
Categories Elements Description
Politics Pressure&from&within&(Donors,&Boards&of&Directors)
External&pressure&(women's&organisations,&political&pressure)
Within&the&organisation,&access&to&power,&ability&to&bargain,&and&skillful&
use&of&power
Outside&constituency&with&strong&voice
Policy&(programmes,&projects&and&policies)
Procedures&and&resources
Knowledgeable&people&(skills&and&knowledge)
Institutional4
culture
Culture&of&the&organisation,&i.e.&the&unstated&rules&of&the&game:&what&is&
valued&
Is&there&a&culture&of&openness&and&dialogue?
Applied&research
Continuous&learning
Attention&to&power&dynamics
It&is&assumed&that&without&enough&pressure&the&
organisation&will&not&act.&
Power&comes&from&position,&coalitions,&clarity&of&
analysis&and&purpose,&and&assets&(including&senior&levels&
and&the&value&added&they&offer&through&information,&
resources&and&expertise).&
Organisational4
politics
Organisational4
process
&The&development&of&new&methodologies&and&applied&
research&must&make&a&difference&and&add&value&on&the&
ground.&
Programmatic4
interventions
Categories Elements Description
Donor%governments%within%governing%body%
Governments%through%Trust%Funds
international%NGOs%through%consultative%status%and%lobbying%
governments
Easy%fit%with%the%organisational%mandate%
Organisational%procedures%in%place%(including%staff%skills,%decisionA
making%structure)
Analysis%and%tools%(social%analysis/costAbenefit%analysis,%guidelines,%
checklists,%gender%inputs%in%project%design%and%evaluation%forms)
Diffusing%responsibility%for%gender%throughout%the%organisation
Presence%of%staff%willing%and%able%to%promote%a%new%issue%and%equipped%
with%skills%(technical,%analytical,%brokering,%bargaining)
Policy%entrepreneurs%(inAhouse%experts,%those%who%have%the%knowledge%
of%the%issue%to%be%mainstreamed)
Advocates%(those%who%promote%the%issue%without%having%necessarily%the%
technical%knowledge)
Women%in%senior%positions
Organisational2
mandate,2
ideology2and2
procedures
The%organisation's%degree%of%independence%from%
external%pressures
External2
pressures2and2
influences
Existence2and2
capacity2of2
internal2
advocates2and2
entrepreneurs	 ﾠ
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but  describes  three  spheres  that  are  complementary  and  important  to  change  the 
mainstream. Through a ‘consequence analysis’, she in fact reverses the analysis: instead of 
looking for ways to make the issue enter the organisation, she asks ‘how can the agency 
best organise and work to attain this goal?’ (Hannan 2000:364). In particular, she argues 
that ‘the aspects of institutions and organisational culture are the missing links in most 
frameworks  for  promoting  mainstreaming’  (opcit:291).  As  such,  Hannan’s  analysis 
complements previous frameworks by focusing on what influences organisational culture 
(see Table 8).  
Table 8: Hannan (2000) holistic approach on gender mainstreaming	 ﾠ
 
 
I build on the five frameworks’ similarities as well as on my own experience working in 
international  development  to  develop  a  four-pronged  analytical  framework  geared  at 
analysing opportunities and constraints to mainstream inclusive violence prevention in the 
development agenda. This framework places the emphasis on cognitive frame, actor power, 
operational  knowledge,  and  organisational  treatment.  Donor-recipient  relations  are 
embedded in the framework as a transversal theme, for the research takes place in the 
context of aid. These categories are sites of power and can be seen as sources of resistance, 
but also sources of possibility for change. 
Categories Elements Description
Substantive5level Fit$of$the$agency$to$the$goal$of$gender$equality$(rather$than$the$other$
way$around)$in$terms$of$ideology,$vision,$goals,$mandate,$policies$and$
strategies
Which$kind$of$analyses?$Which$type$of$data?$How$to$
collect$and$analyse$them?$Which$kind$of$consultation$
with$whom?$(level$of$participation)$Partnership$
development$based$on$sound$knowledge$of$gender$
equality$and$the$situation$in$the$country Structural5and5
procedural5level
Development$agency's$organisation/structure$(sectorally$and$
geographically)
Type$of$hierarchy$(steep$or$flat)
DecisionEmaking$process
Competency$development$programme$for$all$staff
Staff$development$linked$to$gender$equality
Procedures$and$processes
Action$plan$for$each$department$within$the$agency$to$describe$how$
they$are$contibuting$to$gender$equality
Organisational5
culture
Identification$of$$sources$of$power$and$distribution$of$power$within$the$
organisation
Analysis$of$the$history$and$mission$of$the$organisation,$including$its$
sectors$and$products
Development$of$new$attitudes$and$behaviours$on$the$basis$of$new$
information$and$cognitive$redefinition$(motivation$to$change)$by$
focusing$on$changes$in$key$individuals
Strong$management$commitment
New$recruits$be$given$thorough$grounding$in$gender$equality
Feedback$mechanisms$to$personnel
This$includes$working$at$three$levels:$symbols,$practice$
and$values,$and$implies$acknowledging$that$change$is$a$
multiEstaged$process$based$on$negotiations.	 ﾠ
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3.3.1 Cognitive frame 
The first category of the framework is the power of cognitive frame, or the extent to which 
there is a common understanding of the issue, which is the focus of change. In the context 
of development agencies, cognitive frames play out at two levels: on the issue itself (how 
do development agencies’ staff members and counterparts at the country level understand 
violence prevention?); and in relation to the mission of the organisation (to what extent do 
staff members and counterparts acknowledge violence prevention as relevant to the mission 
of development organisations?).  
 
Cognitive frame on violence 
Inter-personal violence is traditionally and commonly perceived as a ‘security’ issue for 
which  the  police  are  primarily  responsible  (see  Chapter  2,  Section  2.1.3).  Even  when 
academic research argues for other frames (such as those linking violence to development), 
the conjunction of personal experiences (either direct or indirect that build internal frames 
to  use  Goffman’s  concept,  see  Section  3.1.1)	 ﾠ with  messages  from  the  media  (usually 
generating fear and stereotypes, influencing external frames) tends to reinforce dichotomist 
understandings of violence based on moralistic conceptions of bad and good persons. This 
makes  it  particularly  challenging  to  influence  a  common  understanding  of  violence 
prevention  as  a  gendered,  development  issue  for  which  a  multiplicity  of  stakeholders 
should take responsibility (see discussion on the ecological model in Section 2.3.2 and 
2.5.3 in Chapter 2).   
 
Cognitive frame on the relevance of violence to the mission of development agencies 
Internal and external frames also influence the understanding of the issue in relation to the 
mission  of  the  organisation.  In  the  context  of  aid,  this  refers  to  the  extent  to  the 
development  agency’s  management,  staff  and  counterparts  find  legitimate  that  the 
organisation  work  on  the  issue.  There  might  be  competing  frames  among  actors.  For 
instance, among staff members, different specialists might interpret violence in different 
manners depending on their own experience and training, which in turn will condition the 
way they find it relevant to the mission of their organisation. The same is true at the country 
level, with external cognitive frames varying from country to country.  
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Shiffman and Smith (2007) and then Shiffman (2009), in their priority-setting framework, 
underscore the importance of cognitive frame through the category of ‘Ideas’ (see Table 4). 
Shiffman even suggests that ‘the rise and fall of a[n] […] issue may have less to do with 
how ‘important’ it is in any objective sense than with how supporters of the issue come to 
understand and portray its importance. Specifically, those issues that attract attention may 
be ones in which policy community members have discovered frames – ways of positioning 
an  issue  –  that  resonate  with  global  and  national  political  elites,  and  then  established 
institutions that can sustain these frames’ (Shiffman 2009:608). Hannan (2000) and Rao 
and  Kelleher  (2005)  also  highlight  the  importance  of  frame  (outcome)  and  framing 
(process) in their analysis, pointing out how ‘a lack of clarity endangers implementation of 
gender mainstreaming strategies’ (Rao and Kelleher 2005:61). This refers both to the issue 
to  be  mainstreamed,  and  to  the  mainstreaming  process  itself.  Cognitive  frames  also 
underpin all the elements in Levy’s web of institutionalisation. In the web, framing relates 
to the discursive practices that affect how the actors concerned understand each element. 
Other authors in the gender mainstreaming literature have also joined in to underscore the 
importance of cognitive frames (see for instance, Eveline and Bacchi 2005). 
 
Frames are often unconscious, but can be influenced and changed, as Goffman himself 
specifies (Section 3.1.1). The question then is to determine what makes a frame resonate 
and how to orient the framing process towards a large and diversified enough public so that 
it can become and stay a priority leading to change. In that regard, Benford and Snow 
(2000)  propose  two  parameters  to  explain  the  resonance  of  frames  in  public  policy: 
credibility and salience. ‘Credibility has to do with how truthful people perceive the frame 
to be; salience with how central it is to their lives’ (Benford and Snow 2000:609). For 
Benford and Snow (2000), credibility is simultaneously influenced by frame consistency 
(congruency between claim, beliefs, and action), empirical credibility (can the claim be 
empirically verified?), and trust in actors who support the frame. Salience is influenced by 
centrality  (to  what  extent  the  issue  is  central  to  the  life  of  the  audience),  experiential 
commensurability  (congruency  with  everyday  experience),  and  narrative  fidelity  (the 
closeness with dominant culture and beliefs) (Benford and Snow, 2000: 619-621). In other 
words,  for  development  agencies  to  mainstream  inclusive  violence  prevention  it  is  not 	 ﾠ
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enough to build a common understanding on the issue and its solutions, it needs to be 
‘credible’ and ‘salient’.  
 
In the context of aid, this credibility and salience must be understood in relation to the 
situation in countries that adds an extra layer of complexity towards building a salient and 
credible common frame. Stone (1989), in fact, shows how the political dimension of causal 
stories heightens the dichotomy between research and politics. While research tends to 
emphasise the complexity of causes, the political arena constantly seeks to simplify it: 
‘Complex causal explanations are not very useful in politics, precisely because they 
do not offer a single locus of control, a plausible candidate to take responsibility for 
a  problem,  or  a  point  of  leverage  to  fix  a  problem.  Hence,  one  of  the  biggest 
tensions between political science and real-world politics. The former tends to see 
complex causes of social problems, while the latter searches for immediate and 
simple causes’ (Stone 1989:289).  
 
These immediate and simple causes might contravene the need to understand violence as a 
complex, gendered phenomenon where multiple risk factors intervene at different levels 
and  reinforce  each  other.  Within  such  understandings,  there  are  no  scapegoats,  but  a 
deconstruction  of  causes  and  assumptions  that  requires  time,  effort,  and  collaboration.  
Finding  a  powerful  frame  that  would  be  simple  enough  to  fit  ‘real  politics’  while  not 
denaturing the complexity at stake and the need for time and continuity is surely a real 
challenge for development agencies. More generally, it is important to understand that the 
way violence and its causes are politically framed can influence the legitimacy or relevance 
of development’ agencies’ role in that respect, as interpreted by both counterparts and the 
agencies’  staff  and  management.  The  questions  surrounding  cognitive  frames  lead  to 
examine the power of the actors that hold, interpret, and eventually change them.  
3.3.2 Actor power  
	 ﾠ
The second category of the framework examines the power of the actors that support the 
issue  to  give  it  visibility  and  institutionalise  it  within  the  organisation.  Unsurprisingly, 
authors  studying  priority  setting  and  mainstreaming  systematically  emphasise  the 
importance of actors. All five frameworks identify ‘actors’ as key variables for priority 	 ﾠ
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setting  and  mainstreaming.  The  expression  ‘actor  power’  is  actually  borrowed  from 
Shiffman and Smith (2007). This is unsurprising because women and men in their different 
capacity bring organisations to life. But what are the characteristics of the actors that matter 
most in making an issue a priority and creating space for its institutionalisation? Based on 
the review of the five frameworks, I identify four groups that are all necessary to produce 
lasting change in the context of development agencies: (i) Supportive political leadership; 
(ii) Legitimate champions; (iii) Critical mass of in-house experts; and (iv) Interested local 
and national Government counterparts. 
 
Supportive political leadership 
Political leadership refers to the vision given by an individual or group of individuals in an 
organisation. Given that development organisations are often hierarchical, this vision is 
often held at the top, that is, at the highest hierarchical instance in the organisation. They 
are the shareholders, presidents, or managing directors. Their support opens the door for the 
organisation  to  work  on  an  issue  and  facilitates  catalysing  forces  to  implement  the 
mainstreaming process.  
 
Shiffman and Smith (2009) cite the example of former Director of the United Nations for 
Children (UNICEF), James Grant, as a political leader who embodied the issue of child 
survival. From Levy’s identification of political commitment to donor government within 
governing bodies in Razavi and Miller (1995), to donors and boards of directors in Rao and 
Kelleher  (2005),  all  emphasise  the  need  for  strong  political  will  from  the  top  of  the 
organisations. As Hannan (2000:295) summarises: ‘strong political commitment is required 
which includes explicit senior management support.’ Beyond the five frameworks, Sietz, 
Boschütz and Klein (2008) and Gupta (2010) in the literature on mainstreaming climate 
change also highlight the need for the organisation’s commitment and leadership. As such, 
there is a consensus on supportive political leadership as a key variable for mainstreaming 
to happen. 
 
Shiffman and Smith (2007), Levy (1996) and Razavi and Miller (1995) take a step further 
and discuss how this supportive political leadership can be pressured by external bodies to 
act.  These  include  international  NGOs  through  consultative  status  and  lobbying  donor 	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governments (Razavi and Miller 1995), but also a wider policy community as a network of 
individuals and organisations that are centrally involved with the issue at the global level 
(Shiffman and Smith 2007). In that respect, Shiffman and Smith (2007) draw attention to 
how the fragmented structure of a policy community with competing organisations, no 
formal coordination, and moving priorities can affect priority setting.  When there are many 
voices for the same sector with none of them having the legitimacy to lead, priority setting 
and institutionalisation becomes more uncertain and confusing. What Shiffman and Smith 
describe  for  public  health  is  very  similar  to  the  situation  for  violence  prevention. 
Competing organisations deal with the issue (WHO, UN-Habitat, UNODC, UNDP, MDBs, 
UNIFEM and UNICEF) and none has a clear mandate to lead on violence prevention. More 
generally, the extent to which a strong and coherent external policy community exists might 
act as a lever or a constraint to influence political leaders within development agencies 
towards  pushing  the  issue  forward  in  the  development  agenda.  In  any  case,  political 
leadership itself is not enough, unless we adopt a very top-down autocratic understanding 
of how organisations work, which is not the case in this research. For an issue to emerge 
and then be institutionalised, it also needs to be embodied by legitimate champions.  
 
Legitimate champions 
Champions are those that push for the issue, develop a vision, articulate cognitive frames in 
a way that resonates with the organisation’s mandate and staff members’ interests. In other 
words, champions are those that ‘make the case’ of the issue so that it will rise high on the 
agenda and stay there to produce change. They are the internal advocates par excellence. 
Champions need to be legitimate for the advocacy work to be effective. By legitimacy, I 
mean professional respect (in terms of seniority, expertise and /or experience).  
 
Razavi  (2009:145)  supports  the  importance  of  senior  advocates  to  advance  the 
implementation of mainstreaming when she recalls how ‘many studies […] show that little 
can be achieved when junior staff members with little or no resources at their disposal and 
few specialised skills are given the task of gender mainstreaming (in addition to their other 
responsibilities that remain unchanged).’ In a recent study making the synthesis of an e-
discussion among gender practitioners and experts, Sandler and Rao (2012) also highlight 
that  a  key  parameter  to  push  forward  the  agenda  of  mainstreaming  is  to  support 	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‘transformational leadership and the work of internal ‘change agents’ - that is, individuals 
who  make  change  happen.’  They  also  highlighted  two  dimensions  to  the  issue  of 
leadership: the willingness to transgress norms and values and ‘the price to be paid for this’ 
(Sandler and Rao 2012: 555). In the case of violence prevention, this might imply that an 
organisational  leader  be  selective  in  the  kind  of  projects  the  organisation  supports  and 
eventually refuse to do some projects that are not in line with the positioning of the agency 
in terms of inclusive violence prevention, despite organisational and recipient pressures. 
This might also imply putting on hold the promotion of staff members who are investigated 
for  perpetration  of  violence  in  its  various  dimensions  either  in  the  home  or  in  the 
workplace. Such organisational leaders willing to take those risks are needed, according to 
Sandler and Rao (1012) to change organisational culture. However, on their own and even 
with political leadership, these champions cannot implement the mainstreaming process by 
themselves. They need a critical mass of in-house experts. 
 
Critical mass of in-house experts 
A vision must be translated into practice to gain credibility, survive and expand. For this, 
staff members must be interested and knowledgeable enough to translate this vision into 
policies,  programmes  and  projects.  For  mainstreaming  to  take  place  and  produce  a 
paradigm shift on how violence prevention is understood and dealt with in the development 
agenda, it requires professionals in each sector to take the issue on board in their sector 
agenda. As Sandler and Rao (2012) have pointed out, this requires double and even triple 
expertise in the case of inclusive violence prevention, for staff members need to know 
about their sector, violence prevention, and gender.  
 
Razavi and Miller (1995) and Hannan (2000) explicitly discuss this variable (existence and 
capacity of internal advocates and entrepreneurs). Razavi and Miller in particular highlight 
the importance of staff ‘willing’ to promote a new issue and ‘able’ to do it. That is, a 
critical  mass  of  staffs  needs  to  be  equipped  with  relevant  skills  (technical,  analytical, 
brokering,  bargaining)  and  knowledgeable  about  mainstreaming  and  the  issue  to  be 
mainstreamed. These policy entrepreneurs are the ones who are able to actually do the work 
at  different  levels  of  the  organisation  and  in  different  sectors,  and  primarily  at  the 
operational  level.  They  are  also  the  ones  who  engage  in  policy  dialogue  and  technical 	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discussions with governments. These governments and their interest in engaging on the 
issue are essential for the mainstreaming process to take place. This is the fourth variable of 
actor power. 
 
Interested national and local Government counterparts 
Development agencies fundamentally depend on the dynamics of donor-recipient relations; 
as such, the demand from governments is incontrovertible. If counterparts do not express 
interest  in  working  with  development  agencies  on  an  issue  like  inclusive  violence 
prevention, the mainstreaming process will be more difficult to implement, if at all. In fact, 
change  occurs  through  practice,  and  practice  in  the  context  of  aid  depends  on  donor-
recipient relations and their operational collaboration. This operates at the planning level 
through negotiations with the Ministry of Finances or Planning that have an overview of 
the  country’s  development  strategy,  which  is  essential  to  support  a  mainstreaming 
approach. It also occurs at the sector level, in specific ministries where collaboration might 
take place to mainstream the issue within sectors.  At the local level, counterparts’ interest 
is also crucial, for implementation happens when local actors have the corresponding will 
and  capacity.  National  government,  local  government  and  citizens  complicate  donor-
recipient relations, for they imply triangular dynamics between the donors, governments (at 
different levels) and citizens (also referred to as beneficiaries). Levy (1996) has underlined 
the importance of donor-recipient relations in the web through two dimensions: policy and 
citizen spheres. In the policy sphere, Levy highlights the need for political commitment, 
policy and planning at the country level, while the citizen sphere refers to women and 
men’s needs and interests that need to be voiced through political constituencies, and heard 
and  advocated  for  at  the  political  level  to  lead  to  scaled-up  change.  Rao  and  Kelleher 
(2005) mention the pressure from women’s constituencies who push for the issue at the 
country level, and Shiffman and Smith (2007) argue that strengthening the link between the 
initiative and grassroots movement generates more support at the national and local level, 
therefore  increasing  or  maintaining  the  momentum  on  political  leaders  (both  in 
governments and in development agencies), as it was for the case for AIDS for example. 
This shows the interrelation among the different variables in the actor power category. 
These actors and their respective power also need operational knowledge to act, for ‘deep 
change requires practice’ (Rao and Kelleher 2005:64).  	 ﾠ
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3.3.3 Operational knowledge 
Operational knowledge refers to one of the necessary conditions to make the organisation 
‘able to intervene’ (Rao and Kelleher 2005:61). The category of the operational knowledge 
is probably the most developed in the mainstreaming literature and the less controversial. 
Nonetheless,  it  is  worth  clarifying  a  few  points  regarding  three  specific  dimensions  of 
operational  knowledge  in  addition  to  the  development  of  tools,  methods,  toolkits  and 
handbooks.  Indeed, all five frameworks and other authors (Moser 1993; Kabeer 1994, 
1997; Verloo 2005; Walby 2005; Moser and Moser 2005; Sietz, Boschütz, Klein et al. 
2008; Razavi 2009) abundantly agree on their necessity. 
 
Three  types  of  operational  knowledge  need  to  be  available:  knowledge  regarding 
effectiveness (what works in general and in each sector); context-based knowledge linked 
to implementation (what elements must be taken into consideration when designing and 
implementing a programme effective elsewhere; what conditions have been identified as 
conducive  of  successful  implementation  in  a  diversity  of  contexts);  and  knowledge 
regarding measurement and data (which indicators can meaningfully capture the impact of 
the  project  or  a  specific  intervention  towards  the  issue).  Absence  of  such  elements  of 
operational knowledge might lead to resistance and block the mainstreaming process, and 
change will not happen.  
 
Available knowledge on effectiveness	 ﾠ
Knowledge on effectiveness refers to identifying ‘what to do’ based on available evidence 
on outcomes (whether or not an intervention or policy has reached its goal). Shiffman and 
Smith (2007) argue that an issue whose characteristics include the availability of effective 
interventions, i.e. solutions that are cost-effective, evidence-based, simple, and cheap to 
implement are more prone to gain political priority. This variable is self-evident: if we do 
not know what works, it is difficult to push the agenda forward, at least immediately. In 
fact, the state of knowledge regarding effectiveness leads to the need to examine whether 
there is an active research agenda, as Levy (1996) points out in her web. This research 
agenda needs to be coherent and consistent with the goal of mainstreaming as reflected 
through the types of knowledge selected, and the kind of interventions evaluated. In fact, 
the  issue  regarding  effectiveness  is  twofold.  First,  there  needs  to  be  enough  rigorous 	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evidence to identify what works to prevent certain forms of violence. Often times, this 
evidence is available in siloes as it comes from different disciplines and bodies of research 
(see Chapter 2). Efforts must thus focus on identifying available evidence, and compiling it 
across  disciplines  in  order  to  identify  eventual  gaps.  It  also  mainly  comes  from 
industrialised countries, thus raising questions on their relevance and replicability in the 
context of developing countries. Second, the question of effectiveness deals with how to 
assess multi-sector strategies, which is linked to context-based knowledge for successful 
implementation and meaningful indicators.  
 
Context-based knowledge for successful implementation 
 Effectiveness-related  knowledge  helps  identify  the  type  of  interventions  that  have 
generated positive results in a specific context, usually in industrialised countries where 
research is more abundant. To enhance the probability for success in other contexts, often 
characterised by accrued challenges such as scarcity of financial, human, and technical 
resources, and overall institutional weakness as is the case in most developing countries, 
understanding the conditions under which such programmes or interventions have worked 
is  equally  important.  For  instance,  in  the  case  of  violence  prevention,  knowing  that 
parenting  programmes  are  effective  to  reduce  risk  factors  for  child  maltreatment  is  an 
important  first  step  that  nonetheless  must  be  completed  with  practical  information  on 
conditions such as the type of methodology followed, the number of hours and length of the 
programme,  the  exposure  time  of  beneficiaries,  the  gender  of  parents  who  attend,  etc. 
Without this operational and context-specific implementation-based knowledge, and given 
the  fact  that  ‘implementing  partners  might  lack  capacity’  (Rao  and  Kelleher  2005:61), 
resources might be unwisely invested, and success might not happen on the ground. As 
success  breeds  success,  these  elements  are  crucial  to  enhance  conditions  for 
institutionalising an issue.  
 
As implementation-based knowledge concretely refers to the ‘how to’, it directly deals with 
the operationalisation of the ecological model as discussed in Chapter 2. This includes 
pacing of reforms, i.e. sequencing of interventions to maximise and prioritise resources 
towards higher impact. These are fundamental questions missing so far. Today, there is in 
fact very little knowledge to guide policymaking on cost-effectiveness of interventions to 	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prevent violence, as well as on what to do first in a context where scarcity of resources 
governs choices, or how to combine interventions so that the overall impact is maximised. 
There is also a lack of visibility of the kind of coordination and accountability mechanisms 
that make multi-sector, gender-sensitive strategies implementable and sustainable. These 
knowledge gaps are all the more important for development agencies that are increasingly 
pressured to show results, which leads us to the question of indicators.    
 
Meaningful indicators 
In  the  context  of  development  effectiveness,  indicators  play  a  crucial  role  in  the 
development of sound diagnostic (scope of the issue), monitoring and evaluation policies, 
programmes  and  projects  that  together  would  contribute  to  change.  Indicators  refer  to 
monitoring  and  evaluation  that  are  fundamentally  linked  to  the  other  two  variables  of 
knowledge: do we know what works in developing countries, and do we know under which 
conditions it works? Both are possible only if meaningful indicators capture in a rigorous 
and pertinent manner the information that would then provide evidence that investment is 
worth the risk. In that sense, indicators are powerful variables for mainstreaming the issue 
on  the  development  agenda:  if  interventions  can  be  measured  and  are  successful,  this 
arguably increases the probability to create and sustain mobilisation within the organisation 
and in country to continue the programmes. However, it must be recognised that not all 
indicators are valuable for a mainstreaming process aiming at structural change, and hence 
the focus on ‘meaningful’ and the capacity of the indicators to measure change.  
 
Diagnostics  assess  the  severity  of  the  issue  at  stake  (Shiffman  and  Smith  2007).  The 
meaningfulness of indicators and data here refers to how and whose needs are measured. In 
fact, an issue is a problem when the challenge is severe and the needs to respond to this 
challenge  are  not  addressed.  The  introduction  of  needs  is  important,  for  it  sparks  the 
question  of  who  (whose  needs),  that  pinpoints  the  analysis  towards  gender.  This  is 
particularly salient in the case of violence. As explained in Chapter 2, there is a recurrent 
and worldwide bias towards addressing violence that occurs on the streets where men are 
more prone to be victims, versus violence that occurs in the home, where women, children 
and the elderly are overwhelmingly victims. The selection of indicators thus refers back to 
framing and cognitive frames, or the particular understanding of the issue (Section 3.3.1).  	 ﾠ
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Of course, indicators also depend on the availability and reliability of statistics, and in 
many countries there are real and significant constraints (UNODC and World Bank 2007; 
Chapter 2). Nevertheless, it is important to acknowledge that the selection of indicators 
tends  to  vary  according  to  what  needs  to  be  shown,  what  affects  the  imaginary  of 
constituents or donors, who measures, and who would be held accountable for the issue.
36  
 
The question of measurement also refers to the types of methods used to measure progress 
towards change. As Rao and Kelleher (2005:63) have pointed out in the case of gender 
mainstreaming, ‘measurement systems need to be developed that can capture the full range 
of gender equality outcomes, both tangible and intangible.’ That is, qualitative assessments 
must  complement  ‘how  much’  and  ‘how  many’  type  of  indicators  (Hannan  2000:297; 
Sandler  and  Rao  2012).  The  challenge  at  stake  is  not  to  be  undermined.  As  Rao  and 
Kelleher (2005) and then Sandler and Rao (2012) explain:  
‘At a deeper level, is the problem of measuring the intangibles that are at the root of 
social change of any sort. This is the change in consciousness of women and men, 
the change in community norms, or the change in attitudes. Incremental changes 
must be perceived and understood as valued results, knowing that gender equality is 
a long-term goal.’ (Rao and Kelleher 2005:61) 
 
‘Our challenge as feminists involved in the project of social transformation is how 
to assess our strategies for ending discrimination and furthering women’s rights, 
and how to measure the results of our struggles. How do we judge if what we do 
now has transformatory potential for the future? How do we assess whether what 
we  have  done  has  actually  effected  transformation?  What  prism  will  accurately 
reflect whether these incremental modifications of the underlying structures of a 
social  system  and  its  mechanisms  of  social  reproduction  [can]  cumulatively 
transform the system?’ (Sandler and Rao 2012: 550)  
 
In fact, the question of attribution is particularly pertinent to MiVP: how to build a solid 
theory of change with a results framework that would capture the impact of the programme 
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or  the  intervention  in  terms  of  violence  prevention?  Which  forms  of  violence  are  we 
targeting? Which victims or perpetrators? How do we measure the preventive impact? Do 
we have enough reliable data to compare and measure? In addition to these difficulties, 
economists  that  tend  to  govern  development  agencies  might  show  resistance  towards 
qualitative methods, often referred to as ‘anecdotal’. The bias towards quantitative methods 
and  simplified  result  frameworks  is  certainly  a  challenge  for  developing  meaningful 
indicators, and refers back to the risk of evaporation and invisibilisation highlighted by 
Longwe (1994, 1997) and Moser (2005).  
 
Ultimately, the question of indicators underscores the debates on how to assess the success 
of  the  mainstreaming  process.  Sandler  (1997)  and  Verloo  (2005)  remind  us  that 
mainstreaming  is  in  fact  a  process,  and  as  such,  talking  about  success  or  failure  is 
inappropriate (also see Moser and Moser 2005). Other authors have nonetheless tried to 
provide guidance on how to assess the progress of mainstreaming or what success would 
mean  (Daly  2005;  Moser  2005;  Moser  and  Moser  2005).  In  the  case  of  gender  and 
participation, Levy (1996) clarifies that success means that ‘the incorporation of a gender 
perspective in a participatory way becomes a regular part of the practice of all development 
practitioners’  (Levy  1998:265).  Similarly,  a  successful  agenda-setting  mainstreaming 
process for the inclusive prevention of violence in the development agenda would mean 
that strategies, programmes and projects would be conceived and designed with violence 
prevention  and  gender  lenses  with  the  overarching  goal  of  peace  and  social  inclusion 
embedded in development practice. In that regard, the organisational treatment particularly 
matters, for it can create conducive conditions for this goal to be translated and sustained in 
practice. 
3.3.4 Organisational treatment 
How the organisation ‘treats’ the issue in terms of allocation of resources, mainstream 
location of responsibility, and incentives for staff development shows in tangible ways the 
extent to which the issue is considered as priority to be mainstreamed.  
Resources allocation 
Resources allocated to the issue are an important indicator of the priority given to it beyond 
discourses and political declarations. Resources here are mainly financial resources (i.e. 	 ﾠ
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budget), but they also refer to the hiring of new recruits. This was a point Hannan (2000) 
insisted on to facilitate cultural change within the organisation towards a transformatory 
process. The importance of resource allocation cannot be over-emphasised in the context of 
scarcity of resources both at the organisational (budget restriction) and at the country or 
local levels. Resource allocation can have multiple sources and expressions. For instance, 
in the case of development agencies, the organisation can commit itself to push an issue 
forward on its agenda through redistributing its own budget to match new organisational 
priorities,  and  through  allocating  special  funds  to  undertake  research,  policy  dialogue, 
conferences, or other initiatives. It can also show the priority by developing the number of 
projects  on  the  issue,  as  a  share  of  the  overall  activity  of  the  organisation.    Resource 
allocation  can  also  be  ad-hoc  and  come  from  funding  sources  outside  the  mainstream 
funding of the organisation, for example, trust funds. Donors supporting the organisation 
can channel additional funding to push for the issue, as Razavi and Miller (1995) pointed 
out. In the web’s organisational sphere, Levy (1996) linked the importance of resource 
allocation to the mainstream location of responsibility. In fact, both dimensions underscore 
the question of accountability. 
 
Mainstream location of responsibility 
A  recurrent  question  in  the  mainstreaming  literature  deals  with  where  to  locate 
responsibility for the new issue. In a government for example, the question would be which 
ministry would lead the mainstreaming process, and with which authority and resources. 
The question is often posed: is it better to locate the mainstreaming responsibility in the 
Ministry  of  Finances  or  Planning,  among  numerous  other  responsibilities  and  then 
throughout the government, or have a specific ministry that could focus on it but also risk 
being  sidelined?  Razavi  and  Miller  (2005)  and  Daly  (2005)  among  others  argue  for 
spreading responsibility throughout the organisation. The relevance of having special units 
for mainstreaming is in fact largely discussed in the literature. It is often argued that a 
special unit or bureau is contradictory to the mainstreaming process whose responsibility 
should be spread across the organisation (opcit). Nonetheless, the experience of gender 
mainstreaming shows how when ‘everyone’ is responsible, it easily turns out that ‘no-one’ 
is responsible when effective accountability mechanisms are not in place. Yet, as Hannan 
(2000:292)  already  pointed  out  fifteen  years  ago,  even  though  ‘there  is  […]  general 	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agreement  that  accountability  is  crucial,  […]  [there  is]  still  too  little  development  of 
effective methods of mechanisms to achieve it’. This is the case for staff members across 
sectors throughout the organisation but also for management. Hannan concludes that central 
units are in fact necessary and should support a network of focal points and advocates (thus 
reinforcing the variables in actor power). This has proven to be effective in development 
agencies like Sida that implemented gender mainstreaming in the 1990s through a focal 
points system with central units ‘provided responsibility lies in management and the central 
units  provides  support  and  policy  coherence’  (Hannan  2000:293).  Moreover,  since 
development agencies have usually privileged a dual approach to promote a transversal 
issues (i.e. mainstreaming combined with specific stand alone projects) (Hannan 2000), 
having a unit in charge of designing and monitoring those projects and be accountable for 
them gives the issue an institutional existence. Shiffman and Smith (2007) also insist on the 
fact that ‘initiatives must build their own institutions if they are to survive. This means 
having a strong guiding institution with the mandate to lead and implement the initiative.’ 
This could take the form of a Task Force [or a unit] specifically dedicated to the issue. The 
important point here is to sustain the priority by locating it within the organisation so as to 
give it institutional visibility and accountability. However, this mainstream location also 
needs to be influential. In the context of development agencies in particular, the unit or 
special  bureau  responsible  for  the  mainstreaming  process  should  be  able  to  influence 
country  strategy,  a  key  entry  point  for  mainstreaming  to  happen  in  the  dialogue  with 
countries and the development agenda in general. It should also be able to influence staff 
members within the organisation. In fact, the questions of responsibility and accountability 
are closely linked to incentives for staff to promote and sustain the motivation to change 
their habits to embrace the issue in their daily routine.   
 
Incentives for staff 
How  to  create  incentives  to  ‘motivate’  the  majority  of  staff  members  in  a  given 
organisation to embrace change is a recurrent question in public administration. There are 
two broad categories of motivation: intrinsic and external. Intrinsic motivation refers to the 
personal  motivation  of  staff  members  who  would  adopt  an  issue,  for  example  gender 
equality or violence prevention, because they believe in such goals. The organisation would 
thus need to hire new recruits taking intrinsic motivation into account, or provide training 	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to  increase  such  motivation  as  Hannan  (2000)  has  argued.  Nonetheless,  scholars  have 
sought to empirically test those assumptions. Alonso and Lewis (2001), for instance, have 
shown in the context of civil servants in the United States, how intrinsic motivation alone 
was not necessarily linked to performance. In fact, traditional monetary incentives and even 
credibility  in  linking  performance  to  career  progression  might  be  as  effective  in 
bureaucratic contexts. These findings are important in the case of mainstreaming within 
development agencies (international bureaucracies), for they suggest that transparent and 
credible rules linking career progression to mainstreaming might be effective in pushing the 
agenda forward.   
 
Other incentives include training and staff development. Levy (1996) explains how staff 
development  and  methodology  point  to  the  condition  that  the  organisation  provides  or 
facilitate training in the new area. Training is in fact directly related to the priority that the 
organisation gives to the issue and to the conditions for its institutionalisation.  
3.3.5 Analytical framework for the research  
Based  on  the  above  discussion,  the  analytical  framework  to  understand  and  examine 
opportunities  and  constraints  to  mainstream  inclusive  violence  prevention  in  the 
development agenda is four-pronged and builds on the categories of cognitive frame, actor 
power, operational knowledge, and organisational treatment. In the context of aid, donor-
recipient relations are embedded in the analysis of each analytical category. In total, the 
framework includes 12 variables as summarised in Table 9.  	 ﾠ
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Table 9: Analytical framework for MiVP in the development agenda 
Analytical category 
  Factors enabling priority setting and mainstreaming 
 
Cognitive frame  On the issue 
 
On the relevance of the issue to the organisation's mission 
Actor power  Supportive political leadership  
   Legitimate champions 
   Critical mass of in-house experts 
   Interested national and local Government counterparts 
Operational knowledge  Available knowledge on effectiveness 
 
Context-based knowledge for successful implementation 
 
Meaningful indicators 
Organisational treatment  Resources allocation 
   Mainstreaming location of responsibility 
   Incentives for staff 
 
3.4 Conclusion 
 
The concept of mainstreaming inclusive violence prevention seeks to operationalise the 
shared  responsibility  for  violence  in  all  its  forms  and  clarify  the  goal  of  the  process: 
building lasting conditions for peaceful and inclusive societies, communities, families and 
individuals in all their social diversity by transforming the development practice. The new 
paradigm acknowledges the intersectionality between violence, gender and development, 
and adopts violence prevention and gender lenses throughout the development cycle from 
policy  dialogue  to  project  design  to  implementation,  and  monitoring  and  evaluation.  It 
builds its foundation in social constructivism and collective empowerment, for sharing a 
powerful cognitive frame on violence that would resonate with actors within development 
agencies and their counterparts is a crucial link in the transformative process of collective 
action.  Mainstreaming  inclusive  violence  prevention  builds  on  lessons  from  previous 
mainstreaming experiences, in particular gender mainstreaming. It also builds on priority 
setting for it is important to understand how an issue, controversial and relatively new in 
development can climb the ladder of priorities in development agencies’ agenda. Based on 
five complementary frameworks that use different categories of power to study priority 
setting,  institutionalisation  and  mainstreaming,  this  research  proposes  four  analytical 
categories to study the opportunities and constraints in the emergence and evolution of 
mainstreaming inclusive violence prevention in the development agenda. They deal with 
cognitive frame, actor power, operational knowledge, and organisational treatment. The 	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concepts and this strategic framework both contribute to current conceptual discussions on 
mainstreaming and on violence prevention. In the first instance, it suggests a synthetic 
approach for mainstreaming new and complex issues in development agencies; in the latter, 
it  develops  a  policy  option  that  has  been  understudied  so  far  despite  having  been 
acknowledged in the specialised literature and by development agencies themselves. The 
reminder of the thesis empirically tests these analytical categories in the case of the two 
largest MDBs in LAC. Before this, Chapter 4 presents the epistemological stance and the 
methodology with which this research has been conducted.  
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Chapter 4: Epistemological Stance and Research Methodology  
 
 
This chapter presents the epistemology and the methodology used to conduct this research. 
The  chapter  is  divided  in  four  sections.  Section  4.1  presents  the  interpretivist 
epistemological  stance  adopted  for  this  thesis.  Section  4.2  outlines  the  main  research 
questions,  hypotheses,  and  sub-research  questions.  Section  4.3  details  the  case  study 
methodology, selection criteria and study population, research design to collect primary and 
secondary data, and methods of analysis. Finally, Section 4.4 discusses criteria of validity 
and reliability of the research, its ethics, and its limitations.  
4.1 An interpretivist epistemological approach 
 
The epistemology refers to the theory of knowledge, or the way in which knowledge is 
built.  Della Porta and Keating (2008:19-39) distinguish four major epistemologies in social 
sciences:  positivist,  post-positivist,  interpretivist  and  humanistic.  While  the  first  two 
consider  social  reality  as  an  independent  object  for  knowledge,  the  last  two  see  social 
reality as always dependent on interpretation. Each epistemology engages to a different 
degree with this stereotypical ‘truth’, along a continuum going from pure objectivity to pure 
subjectivity.  
 
Within this spectrum, the interpretivist approach acknowledges that social events depend on 
the  context  and  on  who  interprets  them.  It  builds  on  information  and  seeks  the 
interpretation of this information with the actors involved. As such, it combines objective 
and subjective approaches, but does not aim to uncover an absolute truth.  It seeks, instead, 
to better understand what is at stake and accepts the relativity of findings. As Della Porta 
and Keating explain, ‘since human beings are ‘meaningful’ actors, scholars must aim at 
discovering the meanings that motivate their actions rather than relying on universal laws 
external to the actors’ (Della Porta and Keating 2008:24-25). 
 
This research adopts an interpretivist epistemological stance, for it seeks to reconstruct the 
process leading development agencies to give priority (or not) to an issue as important and 
complex as violence prevention, and to better understand opportunities and constraints for 	 ﾠ
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such organisations to mainstream the inclusive prevention of violence in their own agendas. 
The research therefore focuses on interpretations of events, the interpretations being those 
of actors at different levels of the organisations, counterparts (‘clients’), and key informants 
(international experts and partners in the field). The research also draws from my own 
experience as former staff member and consultant of both organisations under study (see 
Sections 4.2 and 4.4). The objective is to propose explanations and not to reach a universal 
law of causality.   
4.2 Research questions and hypotheses   
 
An interpretivist epistemology leads to the use of a qualitative methodology (Della Porta 
and  Keating  2008)  and  to  a  process  of  interpretation  through  the  research  itself.  The 
framing  of  the  questions  became  clearer  and  the  analytical  framework  was  refined 
throughout  the  research  process.  Since  the  choice  of  the  methodology  depends  on  the 
questions to be answered (Yin 1994), I present the research questions and hypotheses first, 
and then the choice of the methodology. 	 ﾠ
 
This thesis seeks to answer three main research questions:  
•  Why  has  violence  prevention  remained  marginalised  in  MDBs’  agenda  despite 
violence’s socio-economic multiplier effects on development?  
•  What  are  the  opportunities  and  constraints  to  mainstream  inclusive  violence 
prevention in MDBs’ agenda?  
•  How do national and local counterparts perceive the potential for mainstreaming 
inclusive violence prevention and MDBs’ relevance in this regard?  
The main hypotheses for this research are that violence prevention has slowly and with 
difficulty,  albeit  differently,  entered  MDBs’  development  agenda  for  a  combination  of 
factors, including competing cognitive frames regarding violence prevention, and violence 
and  gender,  the  presence  of  leaders  in  the  organisation  pushing  for  the  issue  (or  lack 
thereof), and contradictory incentives embedded in the intrinsic contradiction between the 
development mission and the banks’ survival imperatives. These reasons have led to a lack 
of clarity and vision for the role those banks could play in violence prevention and the link 	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with gender. This explains why mainstreaming inclusive violence prevention has not been 
pursued so far, despite the responses it might offer to actual challenges in policymaking. 
 
Based on the above hypotheses and the conceptual framework developed in Chapter 3 
whose key variables were identified from the beginning but were refined throughout the 
research process, the thesis sets out to test four sets of variables to respond to the main 
research questions and explain differences between the MDBs. In addition, in the context of 
aid, donor-recipient relations become a transversal set of variables that makes the analysis 
of the other variables more complex and subtle. Below each set of variables, I include 
corresponding sub-research questions (SRQ).  
 
•  Cognitive frame:  Understanding  of  violence  prevention  through  transversal,  gender-
sensitive, development lenses versus law-and-order/national security lenses both within 
MDBs and within countries; understanding of the link between violence prevention and 
MDBs’ mandate and organisational culture both within the organisations and in client 
countries. 
 
SRQ1: To what extent has a common understanding of violence and its prevention 
emerged and evolved in MDBs working in LAC? To what extent is such understanding 
shared at the country level? How has violence and its prevention been interpreted in 
relation to MDBs’ mandate? And to what extent do client countries consider MDBs 
relevant in violence prevention? 
 
•  Actor  power:  Political  leadership  that  supports  the  issue  within  the  organisations; 
emergence  and  longevity  of  in-house,  legitimate  champions  who  define  inclusive 
violence  within  the  particular  structure  and  content  of  the  development  agenda; 
availability  of  in-house  experts  as  critical  mass  of  staff  members  who  are  able  to 
develop projects and initiatives and push the agenda forward in different sectors; local 
and national Governments’ explicit demand for MDBs support.   
 
SRQ2:  To  what  extent  have  MDBs’  political  leaderships,  through  their  respective 
Board and President, supported the issue so that it enters and gains legitimacy within 	 ﾠ
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the banks’ development agendas? To what extent does the presence of internal leaders 
explain  the  emergence,  treatment,  and  institutionalisation  of  violence  prevention  in 
MDBs? To what extent does the in-house capacity matter in that respect? How and to 
what  extent  does  demand  from  countries  influence  the  emergence,  treatment,  and 
institutionalisation of the issue in MDBs’ agenda?  
 
•  Operational knowledge: Availability of rigorous regional evidence on the effectiveness 
of policies, programmes and interventions dealing with inclusive violence prevention 
(what works and what does not in multi-sector, gender-sensitive strategies and sector by 
sector);  availability  of  implementation-oriented  knowledge  (implementable  context-
specific  programmes  and  projects;  ‘how-to’);  and  availability  of  credible  data  and 
meaningful indicators. 
 
SRQ3: To what extent does the available regional evidence on effectiveness influence 
the emergence, treatment and institutionalisation of inclusive violence prevention in the 
organisations and at the country level? How does the available implementation-oriented 
knowledge influence the emergence, treatment and institutionalisation of the issue? To 
what extent does the availability of credible data and meaningful indicators explain the 
evolution of the issue in the organisations’ agendas and in countries’ strategies? 
 
•  Organisational  treatment:  Financial  resource  allocation  for  the  issue;  mainstream 
location  of  responsibility  in  development  agencies  and  in  countries  (relationship 
between  sector  divisions,  multi-sector  operations  and  mainstreaming);  and  factors 
influencing staff development, including incentives and accountability mechanisms. 
 
SRQ4: What do financial resources allocated to the issue by the organisations reveal 
regarding  the  emergence,  treatment  and  institutionalisation  of  inclusive  violence 
prevention? Where is the issue located within the organisations, and how does this 
location influence its treatment and its institutionalisation as a transversal issue? To 
what  extent  do  incentives  related  to  staff  development  influence  the  emergence, 
treatment and institutionalisation of the issue?  
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4.3 Research methods 
	 ﾠ
The choice of the methodology is based on the scope of the research and the questions it 
seeks  to  answer.  Since  the  research  takes  an  interpretivist  stance  and  aims  to  better 
understand the emergence and strategy surrounding violence prevention in general, and 
violence prevention and gender in particular, qualitative methodology matches best such 
objectives.  Qualitative  methodology  enables  an  in-depth  understanding  of  complex 
phenomena drawn into why and how questions that quantifiable or positivist methodology 
cannot satisfactorily explain.  
4.3.1 Comparative case study analysis and selection criteria 
Among  qualitative  methods,  case  studies  allow  for  a  detailed  study  of  settings, 
organisations, events, groups, communities or individuals (Berg 2004). In particular, they 
have become a common method to study organisations (Gellner and Hirsch 2001) that are 
the  main  objects  of  analysis  of  this  thesis.  They  imply  a  systematic  collection  of 
information regarding the object of analysis, and the immersion of the researcher so as to 
gain a deep understanding of the dynamics at stake through observation, interviews, and 
documents analysis (Gellner and Hirsch 2001). As such, case studies and ethnographic 
studies share similarities, for the ethnographer immerses herself or himself into the context 
under study.  
 
I chose to undertake a comparative case study analysis. The use of case studies has been 
criticised for its limitations to a single context, and lack of generalisation of the findings 
(Bell  1993).  Such  criticisms  resonate  with  the  debate  of  positivist  versus  interpretivist 
approaches. As previously mentioned, an interpretivist approach does not aim to reach a 
universal truth, but gain an in-depth understanding of a particular question or setting. In that 
respect, case studies provide useful methods to reach the pursued depth. As the context of 
the present research is Latin America and the Caribbean and the investigation focuses on 
MDBs, I compared the IADB and the World Bank, the two main MDBs working in the 
region (see Box 1 in Chapter 1). The comparative analysis makes it possible to identify the 
dynamics at stake in such big development organisations that could usefully inform other 	 ﾠ
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development agencies. It does not however eliminate the specificity of each organisation 
and the limitation of generalisation of the findings.  
 
The choice of case studies in qualitative research is also informed by the interest of the 
cases per se more than the search for universalising the findings as in positivist research. 
This  was  clearly  the  case  in  this  research  as,  from  the  beginning,  I  was  interested  in 
understanding violence prevention at the IADB and the World Bank that share a series of 
characteristics  I  found  worth  studying  in  the  case  of  violence  prevention,  as  I  have 
indicated in Section 1.2 in Chapter 1. Those characteristics include:  
(i)   Multi-sectorality: MDBs work in virtually all sectors of development, which gives 
them  a  comparative  advantage  over  sector-specific  aid  agencies,  as  regard  to 
operationalising the shared responsibility for violence prevention.  
(ii)   Multilateral status: As compared with bilateral aid agencies where political interests 
govern the development agenda, the multilateral status of development banks implies 
negotiations and coalition reducing but not dissolving, direct political interests.  
(iii)   Continuity: MDBs have a continuous dialogue with governments independently of 
who  is  in  power,  placing  their  interventions  in  the  long  term.  The  projects  they 
finance have an average lifetime of four to ten years. This creates some continuity, 
facilitates  bridging  over  changes  in  administrations  and  allows  evaluations,  when 
other initiatives struggle to do so. 
(iv)   Influential voice: Although their direct power on policy making is debated and might 
be reduced in middle-income countries (Box 2 in Chapter 1), their voice through 
studies and conferences is still widely influential and often serves as reference.  
 
In  addition  to  these  comparative  case  studies,  I  designed  a  country  case  study  to  test 
variables related to donor-recipient relations. In fact, MDBs are partners in development 
and their clients are governments. MDBs maintain a policy dialogue with governments, and 
negotiate portfolios that would determine the scope and content of the assistance, be it 
through loans, grants, or technical assistance. Both parties are mutually dependent to reach 
an agreement and make the partnership work. I decided to select a country in LAC to 
interview counterparts of the IADB and the World Bank, and balance what would have 	 ﾠ
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otherwise been a one-sided story. Among the 42 countries in LAC, I chose Colombia for 
three main reasons:   
(i)  Pioneer  in  the  field  of  violence  prevention:  Colombia  was  avant-guardist  in 
successfully designing and implementing multi-sector violence prevention policies. In 
Cali  for  instance,  as  early  as  1992,  Mayor  Guerrero  adopted  an  epidemiological 
approach to violence that focused on preventing and reducing risk factors. This led to 
the halving of homicide rates in one of the most violent cities in Colombia. In Bogotá 
and Medellin, similar principles based on multipronged prevention strategies led to 
remarkable results that few other countries have experienced (McIlwaine and Moser 
2001, 2004).  
(ii)  Large  portfolio  of  MDBs’  projects:  Both  for  the  IADB  and  the  World  Bank, 
Colombia is among the top four countries that have the largest portfolios in LAC
37, 
showing  that  even  as  an  upper  middle-income  country  with  promising  economic 
conditions, Colombia considers both banks as relevant enough to partner with them 
on a wide range of development issues. Furthermore, in the specific case of violence 
prevention,  Colombia  was  the  first  country  to  negotiate  and  implement  a  citizen 
security project with the IADB at the end of the 1990s. At this same time, the World 
Bank published its first participatory studies on violence, with Colombia being one of 
the few countries selected. 
(iii)  Knowledge and experience on violence:  Colombia’s  long  history  of  violence  has 
generated a large pool of experts (even creating a field of study called ‘violentologia’) 
as well as numerous initiatives to address urban violence. This local and national 
knowledge and experience is outstanding for the research because they reduce the 
importance of variables that might be found in other countries (lack of knowledge at 
the country level, lack of national experts, lack of trained professionals at the local 
level, lack of financial resources, passive civil society). The high level of preparation 
of Colombian technical, ministerial staff as well as civil society organisations and 
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37 At the IADB, Colombia has the fourth largest portfolio (out of 26) in terms of total yearly and cumulative 
approval  (USD  872.9  million  in  2013  and  USD  18,124.1  million  over  the  period  1961-2013),  which 
corresponds to respectively 7.8 per cent and 9.12 per cent of total lending (IADB’s Annual Report 2013). At 
the World Bank, Colombia has the third largest portfolio (USD 600 million in 2013 and 4,963 million for the 
period 2008-2013), which corresponds to respectively 11.53 per cent and 9.62 per cent of total IBRD and IDA 
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academics  also  enabled  educated  and  informed  conversations,  which  was  very 
valuable to get the most out of the findings from counterparts.  
4.3.2 Secondary data collection and methods of analysis 
I  reviewed  two  categories  of  secondary  data:  the  IADB’s  and  the  World  Bank’s 
institutional strategies, and documents related to their investment loans explicitly financing 
violence prevention over the period 1998-2011. Institutional strategies include institutional 
statements,  policies,  and  guidelines.  These  documents  contain  the  rhetoric  of  MDBs 
regarding  the  importance  given  to  the  issue  and  their  respective  positioning.  All 
institutional  statements  were  collected  through  online  searches  in  the  organisations’ 
respective external websites.  
 
As  for  investment  loans  documents,  they  reflect  the  practice  of  both  banks  regarding 
violence prevention.  MDBs are ultimately banks, and investments are their core business. 
They financially support governments by providing loans, grants, and technical assistance 
to  design,  implement,  or  evaluate  policies,  programmes  and  projects.  The  project 
documents reviewed included project documents (POD) and operational plans that describe 
the  project  (diagnosis,  components,  budget  and  result  framework)  for  the  IADB;  and 
project appraisal documents (PAD) and intermediate completion reviews (ICRs) for the 
World Bank. It was easier to retrieve World Bank’s project documentation than IADB’s, 
for  the  World  Bank’s  database  is  available  online,  systematic  and  well  maintained.  It 
provides an excellent basis for the basic information of each project, even though all details 
of the implementation are not captured. As regard to the IADB, project documents were 
harder  to  find  and  far  less  systematic.  The  IADB  has  a  renewed  policy  for  public 
information that now makes the availability of all project documents mandatory (as is the 
case for the World Bank, both policies having been renewed in 2011). Despite this new 
policy, I found very unequal access to project documents. This was not an issue for citizen 
security projects (projects explicitly targeting violence prevention as a main objective), for 
the  universe  of  projects  is  still  relatively  small  (16  projects,  see  Chapters  1  and  6). 
Nonetheless,  this  was  an  obstacle  to  build  a  systematic  database  of  projects  spanning 
several sectors across countries, as I intended doing for both banks to assess the extent to 
which  inclusive  violence  prevention  was  taken  into  account  and  addressed  in  projects 	 ﾠ
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beyond those explicitly targeting the issue. Later, as I joined the Office of Evaluation at the 
IADB (see Section 4.4), I found that such an exercise was only possible with internal 
access to documents and intranet. However, even then, findings were incomplete and not 
systematic. I therefore decided not to use such mappings. That is, I did not use POD and 
PAD documents in projects and programmes other than those explicitly targeting violence 
prevention.  
4.3.3 Primary data collection 
I  collected  primary  data  through  semi-structured,  in-depth  interviews  with  two  study 
populations:  staff  members  of  both  MDBs,  and  local  and  national  counterparts  in 
Colombia. I also conducted in-depth interviews with international experts and partners who 
were key informants to verify findings. For each category of interviewees, I present the 
objectives  of  the  interviews,  the  selection  criteria,  the  method  to  contact  persons,  the 
method to record data, and the questions asked. This detailed description aims to strengthen 
the reliability of the research (see Section 4.4).  Appendices B.1 present the main questions 
asked by study population. 
 
Semi-structured interviews with MDBs’ staff members 
From February to April 2011 and then in July 2011, I travelled to Washington, D.C., where 
the headquarters of the Inter-American Development Bank and the World Bank are located. 
Thereafter, in 2012, I completed interviews with staff members at the IADB while working 
for  the  organisation  (see  Section  4.4.).  I  conducted  85  interviews  (42  at  the  IADB, 
comprising 23 during the field work and 19 carried out in 2012, and 43 at the World Bank), 
including all major actors directly involved in the history and present of the issue in both 
organisations  (see  Table  10).  The  interviews  with  staff  members  of  the  IADB  and  the 
World  Bank  aimed  at  reconstructing  the  process  that  led  each  bank  to  adopt  violence 
prevention  within  its  own  development  agenda,  questioning  internal  debates  about  the 
rationale, the best approach to choose, and how gender was taken into consideration at 
different levels of each organisation, as well as identifying opportunities and constraints for 
a  mainstreaming  approach  to  violence  prevention.  I  contacted  staff  members  with  the 
following characteristics:  	 ﾠ
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(i)  Operational Specialists working in Violence Prevention/ Citizen Security in LAC, and 
at the Anchor for the World Bank;
38   
(ii)  Specialists working in LAC in the following sectors: Gender, Education (including 
Early Childhood Development), Urban Development (including Transportation and 
Slum Upgrading), Social Protection and Health, Youth, and Justice;   
(iii)  Specialists  and  Managers  of  Gender  and  Youth  Units  at  the  central  level  (World 
Bank’s Anchors);  
(iv)  Management/Regional and Sector decision makers: Vice-Presidents (VPs) or previous 
VPs, Country Directors (CDs) or previous CDs (World Bank), Country Managers, 
Sector Managers and Advisers (World Bank), Division Chiefs (IADB); and   
(v)  Board members: Executive Directors (EDs). 
Table 10: Study population in MDBs 
 Sector  IADB  World Bank 
Citizen Security / Violence Prevention  19*  13** 
Gender  3  3 
Education  4  3 
Transportation/ Urban development  1  5 
Social Protection and Health  1  3 
Youth  1  3 
Human resources/ TFs  1  3 
Social safeguards  1  0 
Justice  ***  2 
Management       
Board members  9  4 
Vice-Presidents  1  1 
Managers/Country Directors  1  3 
Total interviewees  42  43 
Notes: * Out of 27 identified - these interviews were carried out in 2012  
** Out of 17 identified  
*** Justice is included in citizen security at the IADB 
 
Access  to  the  study  population  was  facilitated  by  my  previous  work  experience  as  an 
international consultant. Each meeting led to others quite easily. In addition, to identify 
additional Specialists, Division Chiefs and Board Members at the IADB, and Executive 
Directors, Vice-Presidents and Country Directors at the World Bank, I searched on the 
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external website for names. I kept a very detailed excel table where I recorded all the 
persons contacted, the dates of meeting, or when to follow up. This method was very useful 
and has proven to be effective as most of the persons contacted responded. I include a list 
of interviewees at the IADB and at the World Bank in Appendices B.2.1 and B.2.2. 
 
The interviews were conducted in English, Spanish or French. They lasted from 35 minutes 
to 2.5 hours, with the majority of them lasting 1-1.5 hours. I chose not to tape-record the 
interviews to ease the dialogue and enhance a genuine and relaxed conversation. At the 
beginning of each meeting, after recalling the scope and objectives of the research (I had 
previously sent emails explaining the request for meeting), I asked the person if he/she 
agreed  that  I  take  notes  during  our  conversation.  All  of  them  agreed.  I  also  asked 
permission to include their title in a list of interviewees to be placed in the Appendices of 
the thesis, indicating that I would not quote them by name directly in the text.  
 
To  ensure  the  smoothest  and  most  honest  discussion  possible  as  well  as  to  get  the 
possibility to adapt to the personality, reactions, and availability of the interviewee, I began 
by  asking  open-ended,  general  questions.  I  then  allowed  the  conversation  to  evolve, 
depending on the kind of responses I was getting. This was important, first not to bias the 
answers  by  suggesting  my  own  interpretation  of  facts,  and  then,  to  avoid  putting  the 
interviewee in a defensive position. More specific questions were introduced during the 
conversation after the dialogue was going on and the interviewee showed willingness to 
reflect and respond sincerely about the issues at stake. This was the case for the large 
majority of participants. When on rare occasions, the interviewee answered too generally or 
expressed some irritation or other signs of discomfort, I broadened back the questions or 
just thanked  them  for their time, but never pushed  too much to get answers when the 
interviewee clearly did not want to offer them. Appendices B.1 include the questions asked. 
As  soon  as  possible  following  each  meeting,  I  would  write  the  transcript  in  English 
(therefore translating myself when the meeting was held in Spanish or French) based on my 
written  notes  and  immediate  memory.  This  method  was  used  in  similar  research 
(Satterthwaite  1999;  Gulrajani  2005).  All  meetings  therefore  led  to  a  written  transcript 
(from  two  to  eleven  pages)  that  includes  an  overall  impression,  keywords,  and  the 
conversation.  	 ﾠ
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Semi-structured interviews in Colombia 
From May 1 to June 30, 2011, I went to Colombia to interview MDBs’ counterparts, at 
both the local and the national levels, as well as experts and practitioners. As mentioned in 
the  selection  criteria  for  the  country  case  study,  going  to  Colombia  aimed  to  better 
understand  the  contextual  opportunities  and  constraints  as  regard  to  mainstreaming 
inclusive violence prevention, and to check the consistency with what development banks’ 
staff  were  telling  me.  It  also  served  to  better  understand  how  counterparts  perceived 
development banks’ work in relation to the issue: their contribution so far, their relevance, 
their power or influence, and what would be needed from these development organisations 
as regard to inclusive violence prevention.  
 
I  decided  to  undertake  interviews  in  different  cities  of  Colombia  to  diversify  sources, 
experiences, and gather a grounded understanding of the following aspects: urban violence 
contexts beyond the capital; the limitations and needs of decision makers, practitioners, and 
activists at the national and local level; their appreciation of development banks, and what 
is or could be their comparative advantage when dealing with urban violence. I undertook 
fieldwork in Barranquilla, Bogotá, Medellin, and Cartagena, but did most of the interviews 
in  Barranquilla  and  Bogotá.  Barranquilla  is  the  third  largest  city  in  Colombia  and  has 
developed  very  rapidly  under  the  last  Administration  of  Mayor  Alejandro  Char  (2008-
2011), working both with the World Bank and the IADB on different aspects of economic, 
social and urban development. Both banks were therefore actual partners with the local 
government, and also worked with the Governor at the department level. The city faces 
challenges in terms of violence in all its forms that go beyond the limits of the district. The 
Governor  of  the  department  of  Atlántico  and  the  Mayor  of  the  largest  city  in  the 
department,  the  two  main  decision  makers,  do  not  share  the  same  position  regarding 
strategies to tackle violence (preventive-oriented versus repressive-oriented). This context 
is ideal to better understand margins of manoeuvre and constraints to implement policies 
and projects in the field. I also went to Bogotá, where the Ministries and most of the experts 
were located, and to Cartagena and Medellin mainly because I followed key informants for 
the research. The interviews in the latter two cities proved to be very informative as I was 	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able  to  observe  different  parts  of  each  city,  and  therefore  understand  more  easily  and 
visualise what policymakers and practitioners were referring to. Observation is, in fact, a 
common method used in ethnography and other social sciences studies to facilitate the 
immersion of the researcher in the context under study (Gellner and Hirsch 2001). 
 
Given the objectives of the field research in Colombia, I chose to interview two main study 
populations:  
(i)  local and national governmental staff both at technical and decision-making levels in 
the  seven  sectors  I  chose  for  this  research  (Citizen  Security/Violence  Prevention, 
Gender,  Education,  Transportation/  Urban  Development,  Social  Protection  and 
Health, Youth, and Justice). By mirroring the selection of sectors in the MDBs, I not 
only ensure consistency in the research design, but also made sure to interview actual 
or potential counterparts of development banks; and  
(ii)  experts and practitioners in urban violence, gender, and sectors relevant to violence 
prevention.   
In  total,  I  interviewed  71  persons  in  Colombia:  37  counterparts  and  34  experts  and 
practitioners, as summarised in Table 11.   	 ﾠ
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Table 11: Study population in Colombia 
Colombian Institutions  Number of 
Interviewees 
National Government    
DNP  4 
Ministry of Social Protection  7 
Ministry of Education  2 
Ministry of Transport  1 
Ministry of Interior and Justice  1 
Acción Social  1 
ICBF  4 
ICFES  1 
Local Governments    
Municipality of Bogota  1 
Municipality of Barranquilla  4 
Municipality of Medellin  4 
Municipality of Cartagena  4 
Gobernación of Atlántico   3 
Total Counterparts at National and 
Local Levels  37 
Civil Society and Experts 
  NGOs and Think tanks  17 
Chambers of Commerce  2 
Academics/ Experts  9 
International Organisations/Partners  4 
Forensic Medicine   2 
Total Experts and Practitioners  34 
Total Interviewees in Colombia  71 
 
 
All  interviews  were  conducted  in  Spanish,  lasted  between  one  and  three  hours,  and 
followed  a  similar  conversational  approach  as  for  the  development  banks.  A  list  of 
interviewees in Colombia is provided in Appendix B.2.3.  At the national level, I met with 
decision makers (level of Directors of Division and Directors of Department) and technical 
staff (below the level of Directors but who were in charge of a particular issue) in the 
ministries indicated in Table 11. At the local level, I met with local mayors, secretaries, 
sub-secretaries, and technical staff working in secretaries of Government, Gender Affairs, 
Youth-at-risk,  Economic  Development  and  Treasury,  and  Citizen  Security.  At  the 
departmental level, I interviewed technical staff in charge of the departmental violence and 	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crime observatory, human rights, and citizen security.  The experts I interviewed in these 
four cities were academics, practitioners, directors of civil society organisations (local and 
national NGOs focusing on youth, childhood and gender issues, including masculinities and 
violence prevention), experts in think tanks and consulting firms (specialised in violence 
prevention, citizenship culture, and urban transport), managers in chambers of commerce, 
and specialists in development agencies other than MDBs.  
 
I began my field research in Barranquilla. I initially did a research on the Internet to contact 
different secretaries. I sent many emails and followed up, but did not receive any answer, 
which surprised me. In the end, I was able to interview them when I showed up at their 
office.  I  contacted  the  District  of  Barranquilla,  the  Gobernación  of  the  Atlántico 
(Department of the Atlantic), NGOs, and academics at UniNorte (the best ranked university 
in the department). I proceeded in a practical way as I asked the people with whom I met if 
they might suggest other persons and eventually give me their phone numbers. I found 
incredible kindness and support as many of them decided to call colleagues to make sure I 
would obtain an appointment. In other cases, I decided to go directly to offices introducing 
my  work  and  asking  in  person  for  an  appointment.  This  strategy  worked  as  well  in 
Cartagena.  In Bogotá and Medellin, all contacts were done by emails, with some follow-
ups  by  phone.  I  was  either  introduced  by  Colombian  friends  who  knew  Directors  in 
Ministries, which then converted into ‘snowballing’, one contact leading to another. In 
addition, most organisations, be they public, private, or non-for-profit, now have a website 
that often provides an email, even a general one, that I used to dig further and ask for the 
resource person relevant to my research. This worked well, even though recommendations 
were always more efficient and (numerous) follow-ups were in most cases necessary.  
 
Interviews of international experts 
The interviews with international experts and partner organisations of the IADB and the 
World Bank sought to:  
(i)  better  understand  how  both  organisations  were  perceived  in  the  field  of  violence 
prevention;  
(ii)  provide an additional check about what development banks were saying in terms of 
challenges related to urban violence in countries and existing constraints;  	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(iii)  better understand how international partnerships worked and what partners expected 
from development banks;  
(iv)  better understand the comparative advantage of development banks and how they 
could contribute the most to inclusive violence prevention in LAC; and  
(v)  identify  opportunities  and  constraints  for  inclusive  violence  prevention 
mainstreaming.  
From the literature review, I identified think tanks, foundations, NGOs, and international 
organisations in the field of violence prevention and gender. Similarly to interviews with 
other populations, ‘snowballing’ was an effective approach, as one interview led to another, 
in particular considering that the sector is still quite narrow and most of the experts know 
each  other.  I  interviewed  eleven  international  experts  based  in  Washington,  the  list  is 
provided in Appendix B.2.4 and Table 12 provides a summary by type of organisations. 
The interviews were either in English or Spanish, and lasted between one and two hours. I 
used  similar  conversational  style  and  recording  techniques  as  for  the  interviews  with 
development banks. 
Table 12: Key informants from subject expert organisations and partners (by type of organisations) 
Type of 
organisations 
Name 
Think Tanks  Brookings Institute 
  ICRW 
  WOLA 
Foundations  Open Society Foundations 
International 
Organisations 
PAHO 
OAS 
UN Women 
NGOs  Promundo 
   Man Up 
 
4.3.4 Method of analysis for primary data 
I combined different methods to analyse the content of the interviews I conducted. I did not 
use  statistical  programs  to  analyse  the  data,  but  instead  systematically  reviewed  all 
transcripts to identify most salient elements following a specific objective for each type of 
interviews. First, for interviews with MDBs’ staff members or counterparts who directly 
worked  (and  for  some  are  still  working)  on  the  issue,  or  who  were  decision  makers 	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(Management and Board members), I employed a method called ‘process tracing’. That is, I 
used the interviews to reconstruct the storyline and the reasons behind the evolution of both 
banks as regard to violence prevention. As Venesson (2008:233-234) explains: 
‘Process  tracing  allows  the  researcher  to  look  for  the  ways  in  which  [a]  link 
manifests itself and the context in which it happens. The focus is not only on what 
happened, but also on how it happened. It becomes possible to use process tracing 
to  examine  the  reasons  that  actors  give  for  their  actions  and  behaviour  and  to 
investigate the relations between beliefs and behaviour […]. Process tracing is a 
fundamental element of empirical […] research because it provides a way to learn 
and  to  evaluate  empirically  the  preferences  and  perceptions  of  actors,  their 
purposes, their goals, their values and their specification of the situations that face 
them.’ 
With this method, I used interviewees’ responses to test the variables identified through the 
literature review and the conceptual framework, which in turn allowed for a refining of the 
framework  throughout  an  iterative  research  process.  Second,  for  interviews  with  staff 
members  of  the  IADB  and  the  World  Bank  from  other  sectors,  I  analysed  the  content 
through a triple perspective: how different sectors perceived their own role to contribute to 
preventing violence in cities; what were the constraints to do it and what would be needed 
for it; and whether or not there was a specificity to violence prevention as regard to gender 
in  comparison  with  other  sectors.  Thanks  to  this  approach,  I  was  able  to  assess  the 
opportunities and constraints to adopting a mainstreaming approach to violence prevention 
from  a  gender  perspective.  Finally,  I  reviewed  the  interviews  with  counterparts, 
practitioners and experts to identify how development banks were considered in the field of 
violence prevention, how their contribution was considered, and what would be needed 
from them. I also identified which constraints were most referred to by these stakeholders 
in terms of design and implementation of multi-sector, gender-sensitive approaches, and in 
relation to the adoption of a proactive mainstreaming approach for the inclusive prevention 
of violence.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
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4.4 Validity and reliability, ethics, and limitations  
4.4.1 Validity and reliability criteria 
The validity of the research consists in its trustworthiness. I used three strategies to ensure 
its highest quality and reliability (Yin 1998: 32-36). First, I collected data from multiple 
sources of evidence, combining secondary and primary data, and diversifying the sources 
for primary data. This technique serves to validate the construct of the research, for it 
implies a triangulation in the data collection.  Second, I used consistency checks between 
responses  of  informants,  as  well  as  with  my  own  experience  and  with  informal 
conversations with consultants and staff from both organisations. I had worked for nearly 
five years at the World Bank before undertaking the PhD thesis (see Section 4.4.2 on ethics 
and positionality). This experience was very valuable as a way to immediately react to 
responses, asking for further explanations when I was surprised by the answer and making 
it possible to deepen the conversation more quickly. Since the IADB has a similar mission 
and structure as the World Bank, and thanks to previous informal conversations with IADB 
staff  and  consultants,  I  benefitted  from  a  similar  additional  check  for  the  information 
acquired from interviews at the IADB. Thereafter, I joined the IADB as staff member - 
after having completed the data collection for this thesis. I worked at the IADB for two 
years and a half, and then decided to take a leave of absence to be able to complete my 
dissertation. The revision of the thesis therefore benefitted from this additional experience. 
Finally, the detailed description of the protocol of the research, including identification and 
contact of resource persons, way to record data, and questions asked, aimed to minimise 
biases in the research and to provide enough guidelines so that another researcher could 
reproduce the same study and reach similar findings. 
4.4.2 Research ethics and positionality 
The ethical standards of the research consisted in asking for permission to take notes at the 
beginning of the interview, guaranteeing the informant’s anonymity (never quoting them by 
name in the text), asking permission to include their name or title in the list of interviewees, 
and  of  course,  answering  any  questions  regarding  the  research.  Ethical  conduct  also 
entailed  transcribing  the  interview  as  quickly  as  possible  after  each  meeting  to  ensure 
accuracy and precision. When notes were unclear and I could not remember precisely, I 
always mentioned it in the transcript.  	 ﾠ
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Another key ethical consideration that relates to my unique positionality in this research 
dealt with my work experience in both MDBs, in particular with the IADB that I joined 
during the course of the PhD. As previously mentioned, I had worked for five years at the 
World Bank, mainly in the Human Department of the Africa Region, when I decided to 
apply  for  a  PhD.  During  that  time,  I  designed  a  project  to  support  women  victims  of 
violence in Colombia, called the ‘Golondrina project’ that received a USD one million 
grant from the Japanese Trust Fund. My research for this project reinforced a long-standing 
reflection on the main challenges and injustices in the developing world and motivated me 
to embark on the PhD journey, for I wanted to research in more depth what major aid 
agencies like MDBs could do to push the agenda forward in violence prevention from a 
gender perspective.  I thus left the World Bank to go to the United Kingdom to begin the 
Doctorate.  After  I  had  completed  the  coursework,  passed  the  upgrading  seminar  and 
conducted all the interviews in the United States and in Colombia, I received an offer to 
join  the  IADB  as  a  Young  Professional.  Aware  that  such  positions  were  rare  and 
prestigious, and in consultation with both of my supervisors at the Bartlett Development 
Planning Unit (DPU) at University College London (UCL), I accepted the offer. I declared 
my  research  during  the  recruitment  process  and  upon  arrival,  and  informed  the  Ethics 
Office of the IADB. I also informed the Director of the Office of Evaluation and Oversight 
to which I had been assigned. After six months, I received an offer to become Specialist at 
the  IADB.  At  the  Office  of  Evaluation  and  Oversight,  I  first  co-led  an  evaluation  on 
implementation  processes  of  five  citizen  security  projects  in  Central  America  and  the 
Caribbean, and then led a thematic evaluation on citizen security at the IADB looking at its 
contribution in relation to major challenges in the sector. Both evaluations were in line with 
my research but did not overlap. The first study involved five case studies and looked at 
implementation variables that facilitated the execution of particular projects.  The second 
evaluation focused on looking at how the IADB had responded to the complexity, risks, 
and knowledge gap that characterise citizen security in the region. My PhD research has fed 
and is enriched by this work on citizen security at the IADB. It has fed it because my 
research gave me a solid understanding on violence prevention and the role of MDBs in 
that respect, understanding that is reflected in my analysis in both studies. It has also been 
enriched because I spent the past two years working on citizen security and getting to know 	 ﾠ
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from the inside the operational and strategic discussions surrounding the issue. During that 
time, I interviewed all Citizen Security Specialists at the IADB. This unique positionality as 
PhD researcher and MDB staff highlights key ethical questions in the research process and 
data analysis. I build upon a rich body of feminist literature that reflects on power relations 
and the particular positionality of the researcher, and subscribe to England’s words when 
she argues that ‘the researcher’s positionality and biography directly affect fieldwork and 
fieldwork is a dialogical process which is structured by the researcher and the participants’ 
(England 1994:80). In the particular case of my research, I am aware interviewees might 
have responded differently to the Evaluation Officer and to the PhD researcher. I thus used 
the  knowledge  gained  through  the  19  interviews  undertaken  in  2012  as  background 
information  only.  With  the  agreement  of  my  Director  and  the  Human  Resources 
Department at the IADB, I decided to take a leave of absence to complete my dissertation. 
As such, my role as a researcher and an Evaluation Officer has always been transparent and 
fully  disclosed  throughout  the  process.  Beyond  the  question  of  transparency,  it  is 
undeniable  that  the  final  thesis  is  the  result  of  this  dual  positionality  and  a  dialogical 
process  constructed  in  an  iterative  manner  between  the  researcher  (myself)  and  the 
researched,  with  the  specificity  that  some  of  the  ‘others’  being  researched,  as  England 
(1994:87) name them, were sharing and reflecting part of my own experience as former 
MDB staff member. 
4.4.3 Research limitations 
This research presents three main limitations. These limitations do not affect the validity of 
findings and could serve as the basis for future research. First, the research does not present 
a  detailed  mapping  of  interventions  in  the  six  sectors  (in  addition  to  Citizen  Security/ 
Violence  Prevention)  where  interviews  were  conducted.  I  started  such  a  mapping, 
systematically examining more than 150 projects at the World Bank in six sectors to assess 
the  extent  to  which  violence  prevention  and  gender  were  explicitly  referred  to  in  the 
diagnostic, components, and result frameworks in projects documentation. When I began 
doing a similar exercise for the IADB, I quickly realised I would not be able to undertake a 
similar  analysis  and  compare  results,  for  lack  of  access  to  information.  As  Evaluation 
Officer, I then commissioned such an analysis during my work at the IADB, but results 
were still unsatisfactory because of varying levels of available information across projects. 	 ﾠ
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Even at the World Bank, interviewees pointed out how project documentation only partially 
reflected the interventions developed in countries and how levels of detail regarding those 
interventions varied significantly PAD to PAD. I thus stopped the mapping exercises. I 
considered  them  interesting  pieces  of  analysis  and  information,  but  they  were  not 
indispensable to conduct the research and reach meaningful findings. In fact, none of the 
banks  has  officially  adopted  a  mainstreaming  approach  to  violence  prevention.  What 
mattered was to collect and analyse participants’ responses about the opportunities and 
constraints affecting the mainstreaming of inclusive violence prevention.  
 
The second limitation of this research lies in the single country case study.  As mentioned 
in Section 4.3.1, single case studies have been criticised for the lack of generalisation of the 
findings (Bell 1993). In the present case, and in the context of aid, case studies in other 
countries might have found different results, for donor-recipient relations vary with the 
level of economic development of the country and the political position of Governments 
towards MDBs. As such, findings from the Colombian case do not aim to be generalised. 
They are nonetheless interesting for the characteristics highlighted in the selection criteria 
for Colombia, in particular in terms of readiness of the context for mainstreaming inclusive 
violence prevention and levels of reflectiveness on the role of MDBs in that respect. 
 
Finally, this research shares a common limitation to all research projects relying principally 
on data collected through in depth interviews: findings depend on the particular experience 
of interviewees in the study populations. Even though I contacted as many staff members, 
managers, and Board members in both MDBs as I could, I am aware that I might have 
missed relevant resource persons either because I did not identify them, they did not reply, 
or they were not in Washington when I was there. Not having done these interviews does 
not  jeopardise  the  findings  of  the  research.  In  fact,  in  most  cases,  I  interviewed  other 
persons who had a similar position. I intentionally contacted as many persons as I could 
identify, aware of the fact that in any research project there is always a number of persons 
who cannot or are not willing to participate, above all considering the time constraints of a 
PhD field work. All the interviews were conducted in depth and their number were equal or 
higher compared to those undertaken in other thesis similar in scope (Satterthwaite 1999; 
Gulrajani 2005). They also covered a wide range of positions, sectors, and experience that 	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allowed me to gain an extended understanding of both organisations from an internal and 
external perspective, and test all the hypotheses and variables of the research. Another 
limitation of primary data lies in the semi-structured format of the interviews. I chose to 
adopt a conversational approach to collect as much information as possible and obtain the 
genuine interpretation and perception of staff members. This technique facilitated contact 
and brought a wealth of informative anecdotes to the research, but I could not always ask 
all the questions I would have liked. This was nevertheless the exception rather than the 
rule, and I consider it as the price for opting for flexibility instead of rigidity. 
4.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has described the interpretivist stance and the qualitative methodology used to 
conduct  the  research.  The  findings  are  presented  in  the  following  chapters.  Chapter  5 
provides the context in which to interpret the results from the in-depth interviews with 
MDBs’  staff  members,  managers  and  Board  members,  and  the  country  case  study.    It 
presents the situation of violence in LAC with a special focus on Colombia, and identifies 
the main challenges in policymaking to prevent violence from a development and gender 
perspective in LAC. Chapter 6 presents the findings from the process tracing analysis. It 
reconstructs the evolution of violence prevention at the IADB and the World Bank from 
1998 to 2011. Chapters 7 and 8 analyse responses from MDBs’ interviewees to explain 
why violence prevention has only emerged slowly in the agenda of both banks. For this, it 
discusses  the  analytical  categories  developed  in  the  conceptual  framework.  Chapter  9 
presents  the  findings  form  the  case  study  in  Colombia,  and  Chapter  10  concludes  by 
reflecting on the main findings and proposing directions for future research.  
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Chapter 5: Violence and Violence Prevention Policies in LAC 
with a Special Focus on Colombia 
 
High, persistent rates of violence in Latin America and the Caribbean, the complexity of the 
situation  and  the  challenges  to  design,  implement  and  sustained  multi-sector,  gender-
sensitive violence prevention policies motivated this research. This chapter grounds the 
analysis of MDBs as regard to violence prevention in the context of the region. Section 5.1 
provides an overview of the situation in terms of trends and rates of different forms of 
violence in LAC, with a special focus on Colombia, the case study for this research. Section 
5.2 then looks into explanations and discusses the main risk factors for violence at the 
regional level and in the Colombian context. Finally, Section 5.3 examines policy responses 
to violence. It first discusses the main characteristics of public policies related to violence 
in the region, and then examines the specific case of Colombia’s latest national policy 
framework to prevent violence. This analysis contextualises findings from interviews in 
Colombia that I discuss in Chapter 9. 
5.1  Violence  in  Latin  America  and  the  Caribbean  with  a  special  focus  on 
Colombia 
 
High rates of violence in Latin America and the Caribbean represent a severe development 
challenge for the region. As explained in Chapter 2, this challenge is particularly complex, 
for it is multi-faceted, multi-causal, and context-specific. It also involves strong gender 
dimensions that are often overlooked. This section provides an overview of the multiple 
forms of violence first at the regional level, and then in Colombia. It ends with a discussion 
on risk factors following the ecological model described in Section 2.3.2 in Chapter 2. 
5.1.1 Violence in LAC in historical and geographical perspective: homicides 
and other forms of violence  
	 ﾠ
The legacy of violence 
The specialist literature often links contemporary violence in LAC to the dictatorships and 
authoritarian regimes that marked the region’s XX
th century. In the Southern Cone and the 
Andean countries in particular, those regimes institutionalised the use of violence to control 	 ﾠ
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power and political opponents, often through brutal means (disappearances, torture, rapes, 
death squads, kidnappings, ethnic discrimination, etc.) (Koonings and Kruijt 1999).
39 In 
Central America and Colombia, civil wars and guerrilla warfare have led to decades of 
internal conflicts (see Section 5.1.2 for the case of Colombia). This long-standing political 
violence has contributed to the formation of a ‘culture of violence’, and to what Koonings 
and Kruijt (1999:2) have called ‘a legacy of terror, of violence, of fear’. 
 
Since the end of the 1970s, Latin America has experienced important economic, social, and 
political  changes.  Most  countries  have  moved  towards  democracy  and  legitimate  civil 
governance,  but  the  region  has  also  experienced  economic  crises,  and  continued  to 
experience internal social and political conflicts (Koonings and Kruijt 2009). In the 1990s, 
many countries benefitted from economic recovery while consolidating their democracy. 
The democratic transition has delegitimised the use of State-led violence, even though it 
has not eliminated it (Koonings and Kruijt 1999; Pécaut 1999; Basombrío and Dammert 
2013). However, authors have argued that the neo-liberal economic reforms undertaken 
during dictatorships have left divided societies in many countries, leading criminal, social, 
and anomic violence to replace political violence as the predominant forms of violence 
(Imbusch, Misse and Carrión 2011:95). Criminal or economic violence rose very quickly 
also because of changes in the drug trafficking business (Levitt and Rubio 2000). As such, 
the  main  perpetrators  of  violence  were  not  anymore  public  authorities,  State 
representatives, or political groups, but individuals and criminal organisations more or less 
linked to illegal trafficking, in particular drug, firearms, and human trafficking (Imbusch, 
Misse and Carrión 2011). 	 ﾠ
 
Very high, historical and contemporary regional homicide rates with significant variations 
across and within countries 
In 2010, homicide rates in Latin America and the Caribbean were among the highest in the 
world, above 20 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants (hphti), about three times the world’s 
average (6.9) (UNODC 2011:19-21). Only Southern Africa had higher homicide rates (32 
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39 Bureaucratic-authoritarian  military  regimes  were  different  throughout  the  region.  Yet,  they  shared  the 
characteristic  of  defending  internal  order,  ‘national  interests’,  or  ‘permanent  national  objectives’,  and 
considered communists or radicals as threats or internal enemies (see Kroonings and Kruijt, 1999: 10-11). 
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hphti).  Since  the  1970s,  homicide  rates  have  increased  throughout  the  region,  but  at 
different pace. In Colombia, Peru, and Trinidad and Tobago, they multiplied by four to five 
times  between  1970s  and  1990s,  whereas  in  Brazil,  they  doubled,  and  increased  more 
moderately in Argentina, Chile and Uruguay (Imbusch, Misse and Carrión 2011).  Since the 
1990s, the situation has been particularly worrisome in Central America and the Caribbean 
where homicide rates have continued to increase, whereas in most other regions in the 
world they were decreasing, including in countries in South America such as Colombia. 
Since  the  1990s,  the  Pan-American  Health  Organisation  (PAHO)  talks  about  a  ‘social 
pandemic’ when referring to LAC levels of violence (PAHO 1997),
40 and more recently, 
the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has warned that the situation is 
reaching a ‘crisis point’ in Central America and the Caribbean (UNODC 2011:10).
41   
 
Latin America and the Caribbean are very diverse, and countries and cities show major 
differences  (Figure  5).  On  the  upper  side  of  homicide  rates,  Honduras,  El  Salvador, 
Venezuela, Jamaica, Guatemala, Colombia and Brazil are among the most violent countries 
in the region,
42 whereas Chile, Argentina, Uruguay and Costa Rica are closer to levels 
found in the United States (data of 2010).
43 Country averages also hide major differences 
between cities. For instance, while Mexico has an average homicide rate of 25.6, Ciudad 
Juarez  has  nearly  six  times  this  rate  (147.7  hphti).  San  Pedro  Sula  in  Honduras  is 
considered one of the most violent cities in the world with 158.8 hphti, double an already 
very high national average (82.1 hphti). Within Brazil, Recife (with almost 160 hphti) faces 
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40 The PAHO refers to pandemic levels when homicide rates are above 10 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants 
(see Cesar Chelala, 1997).  
41 UNODC defines homicide as unlawful death purposefully inflected on a person by another person, and uses 
a variety of national and international sources of data based on criminal justice and/or public health systems. 
 
42 With respectively 82.1, 66, 49, 52, 41, 33.4 and 22.7 hphti in 2010; and 2009 for Brazil and Venezuela 
(UNODC 2011). 
 
43 With respectively 3.7, 5.5, 6.1 and 11.3 in 2010; 2009 for Chile and Argentina (UNODC 2011). Within 
sub-regions, variations exist as well. For instance, in Central America, Nicaragua and Honduras are two 
extremes in terms of homicide rates, with 13.2 hphti for the former and 82.1 hphti for the latter (UNODC 
2011). Jamaica’s homicide rate of nearly 60 hphti is the highest in the Caribbean, one and a half times 
Trinidad and Tobago’s (40) and three times Guyana’s (20). In South America, the situation in terms of 
homicides in Uruguay or Chile is closer to that of the United States (4.6 hphti) with respectively 3.7 and 6.1 
hphti, than to Brazil (22.7) or Venezuela (49) (UNODC 2011 using latest year available).  
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challenges  significantly  higher  than  São  Paulo  (60  hphti),  Rio  de  Janeiro  (60  hphti), 
Brasilia (40 hphti) and Salvador de Bahia (40 hphti)
44 (see Figure 5). In general, big cities, 
cities on the border, or in the route of drug trafficking are usually the most affected by 
violence (UNODC 2011).  
	 ﾠ
Figure 5: Homicide rates in Latin America and the Caribbean: most versus least violent countries and 
selected cities, 2010 
 
Note: Year of reference: 2009 for Brazil, Venezuela, Chile and Argentina. 
Source: UNODC 2011; Imbusch, Misse and Carrión 2011 for Brazilian cities. 
 
LAC’s multi-faceted violence that affects women and men differently 
The WHO estimates that for every homicide, 20 to 40 other non-fatal acts of violence that 
require medical interventions are committed (WHO 2002, 2004).
45 This does not include 
those that are not officially reported and do not need immediate medical attention. Various 
forms of violence are indeed seriously under-reported, and victimisation surveys are used to 
complement  official  statistics  (police  and  hospitals  records)  (see  Chapter  2).  In  Latin 
America and the Caribbean, about 33 per cent of households have been victims of a crime 
over the period 1995-2011, and about 18 per cent of crime was committed with violence 
(Lagos and Dammert 2012).
46 If young males are the main victims of homicide (37 per cent 
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44 Figures for Brazilian cities come from Imbusch, Misse and Carrión 2011. 
 
45 In this contextual chapter, I only present a few forms of violence, focusing on the victims to highlight the 
gender dimensions of violence, but other categorisations exist as discussed in Chapter 2.  
 
46 Violence patterns do not follow the level of victimisation, for countries with similar levels of victimisation 
show very diverse situations in terms of use of violence. For instance, Ecuador, Brazil and Venezuela have 
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of  victims  were  aged  18-25  years  old  and  36  per  cent,  26-40),  women  and  men  were 
equally  victims  of  crime  (data  from  Latinobarómetro  aggregate  all  crime,  ‘delito’  in 
Spanish, with or without violence) (Lagos and Dammert 2012:28) (see Figure 6). 
 
Figure 6: Victims of homicides, intimate partner homicides, and crime/offense (victimisation), by 
gender, 2011 
 
Source: Lagos and Dammert (2012) using data from Latinobarómetro 2011.  
 
Women are disproportionately victims of intimate partner violence and sexual violence. A 
2013 WHO report shows that intimate partner violence is considerably higher in LAC than 
in other regions of the world (between 40.6 per cent and 27.4 per cent compared to world 
average 26.4 per cent). Only Southern Latin America (23.7 per cent) is lower than the 
world average (WHO 2013:47) (see Figure 7).
47 Men are also victims of homicides in their 
home,  but  at  a  much  lower  rate  than  women  (UNODC  2011:9;  Lagos  and  Dammert 
2012:28)  (Figure  6).
48   Sexual  violence  (including  rapes,  sexual  assaults  and  sexual 
offences against children) is also alarming in many countries of the region, in particular in 
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similar levels of victimisation (32 per cent), but diverge in terms of violence with crime committed with 
violence representing 56 per cent, 12 per cent and 16 per cent, respectively (Lagos and Dammert 2012:28).    
 
47 This  does  not  include  sexual  and  psychological  violence  such  as  forced  sex,  threats,  or  controlling 
behaviours.  
 
48 Domestic violence against men is another issue that often remains invisible. Surveys in Medellin indicate 
that men are victims of psychological and physical violence in similar proportions as women (Duque et al. 
2007).  The  main  differences  between  men  and  women  victims  of  intimate  partner  violence  are  the 
consequences on the victims. They tend to lead to more hospitalisation and deaths in the case of women. Also 
men tend to report less because of shame and stereotypes. Domestic violence also happens in same-sex 
relationships. More surveys are needed to have a more precise and accurate picture of the current situation at 
the regional level.  
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the Caribbean: the Bahamas, Grenada, and Saint Kitts and Nevis show the highest rates of 
sexual violence with 138.2, 143.6, 118.3 acts per 100,000 inhabitants, compared to 36.1 for 
El Salvador, 30.1 for Mexico and 10.4 for Colombia (UNODC, figures of 2011, using 
police-recorded offences).
49  
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Figure 7: Prevalence of intimate partner violence by Global Burden of Disease region 
 
Source: WHO 2013.  
Note: WHO groups the prevalence data by the 21 regions used in the 2010 Global Burden of Disease 
(GBD) Study. Here are just included a subset of regions, focusing on Latin America and indicating 
the world average and regions with the highest and lowest rates as benchmarks (Appendix 2, WHO 
2013).  
 
Child maltreatment is also frequent according to qualitative data and surveys, despite the 
lack of systematic quantitative data. Studies have suggested that up to six million children 
in the region were victims of severe maltreatment (Knaul and Ramírez 2005).
50 School 
violence (including bullying among students and violence between teachers and students in 
both ways) is another widespread source of violence. For instance, in Brazil, 
 70 per cent of 
12,000  students  surveyed  in  143  schools  in  six  states  said  they  had  been  victims  of 
violence. In Colombia, a 2006 survey of 
 82,000 students in more than 1,000 schools in 
Bogotá showed that 32 per cent of students were victims of physical abuse from fellow-
students  within  their  school.  In  Jamaica,  22  per  cent  of  students  in  eleven  schools  in 
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49 These  figures  are  conservative  since  rape  and  other  sexual  offences  are  notoriously  under-reported 
everywhere in the world. 
 
50 This does not include child trafficking and child prostitution organised by criminal organisations. 
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Kingston declared having suffered violence from other students, and 22 per cent having 
attacked  teachers  and  staff;  90  per  cent  of  them  were  worried  about  school  violence 
(different studies cited in World Bank 2008). 
51  Surveys on elder abuse remain rare and are 
found only in some countries. In Colombia for instance, estimates indicate that 10,000 elder 
people were abused from 2004 to 2011, with older men slightly more affected than older 
women (Medicina Legal 2013).
52  
5.1.2 Special focus on violence in Colombia in the XX
th and XXI
st centuries 
	 ﾠ
Within this regional context, Colombia presents similarities and specificities. The Andean 
country has long been associated with violence and today’s situation remains complex in 
many respects. This section presents a brief history of violence in Colombia, followed by 
the  main  trends  in  terms  of  homicides,  domestic  violence,  child  maltreatment,  sexual 
violence,  and  other  forms  of  inter-personal  violence.  This  Colombian  focus  clearly 
illustrates the complexity of violence at the country level. 
 
Violence in Colombia in the XX
th century 
A succession of very violent episodes has marked the	 ﾠXXth century in Colombia. After 
Independence  from  Spain  (1819),  political  opposition  within  the  elite  increased,  and 
eventually led to the Thousand Day War (1899-1902), the 1932-33 civil war, and twenty 
years of quasi-civil war known as ‘La Violencia’ (1946-1964). The two main parties that 
fought each other were the Liberals and the Conservatives. Both were elite parties (the 
Liberals representing the industrial and mercantile bourgeoisie, and the Conservatives, the 
large landowners). They were in opposition on questions such as the abolition of slavery, 
centralism, and the role of the Church in public life. The Liberals defended the abolition of 
slavery,  a  federal  model  for  governance  and  the  separation  of  State  from  Church;  the 
Conservatives,  the  contrary  (Rudqvist  2003;  Pécaut  1999).  In  1946,  a  mass  movement 
began, entitled the Gaitanista, named after its leader the liberal politician Jorge Eliecer 
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51 Other studies have described the phenomenon of bullying at the university level as worrisome but not 
dramatic (Hoyos et al. 2009 for a survey in Barranquilla for example). 
 
52 Colombian Forensic Medicine Statistics, available at:  
 http://medicinalegal.gov.co/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=363:urge-visibilizar-la-
violencia-al-adulto-mayor&catid=9:publicaciones&Itemid=9 
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Gaitán.  The  movement  advocated  for  expanding  social  and  economic  rights,  and  civil 
liberties.  Conservatives  and  some  of  the  Liberals  fiercely  opposed  it.  Gaitán  was 
assassinated in 1948, a Conservative President won the elections, and political violence 
became widespread. ‘La Violencia’ had begun (Rudqvist 2003). 
 
In 1964, a peace agreement officially ended ‘La Violencia’, through a division of power 
between the two parties (known as ‘the National Front’), but soon after, rebellious groups 
emerged. They opposed the National Front that did not leave political space for opposition 
in a context of increasing inequalities and growing popular discontent (Rudqvist 2003). The 
latter denounced the lack of land reforms that maintained the concentration of land and 
capital  in  the  hands  of  a  few  families  (Gutiérrez  2013).  The  FARC  (Fuerzas Armadas 
Revolucionarias de Colombia, ‘Revolutionary Armed Forced of Colombia’, in English) and 
the ELN (Ejercito de Liberación Nacional, ‘National Liberation Army’) were the two main 
guerrilla groups, on the extreme left wing that emerged in the 1970s, and really expanded 
during the mid-1980s. In 1997, it was estimated that guerrilla groups were present in 600 
municipalities out of 1075
53 (Levitt and Rubio 2000). Paramilitaries also developed on the 
other extreme of the political arena (ultra-conservative). They replaced vigilante groups 
formed by landowners to protect their lands and properties from guerrilleros. The main 
paramilitary group was and still is the AUC (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia, ‘United 
Self-Defence  Forces  of  Colombia’).  At  the  same  time,  drug  cartels  expanded  their 
activities, in particular in Medellin and Cali. In the 1980s and 1990s, drug cartels were 
identified as main perpetrators of violence (Rubio and Levitt 2000). Finally, the ‘Bacrim’ 
(Bandas  Criminales,  ‘Criminal  Groups’)  grew  as  non-political  criminal  groups,  often 
intertwined with drug trafficking and other illegal activities, such as human trafficking, 
extortions, etc.   
 
This multitude of armed groups fought each other and the National Government for years to 
control parts of the national territory and primary production (drug production, such as coca 
and poppy, but also coffee, banana, emeralds and petroleum). In fact, Colombia has the 
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53 Today, there are 1098 municipalities in Colombia (PND 2010-2014); the figure here mentioned referred to 
1997. 
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largest coal reserves in Latin America, produces 90 per cent of the world’s emeralds, and 
has  large  petroleum  reserves  (Gutiérrez  2013).  According  to  Pécaut  (1999),  politically 
motivated  conflicts  merged  with  criminal  activities  and  blurred  the  distinction  between 
political and criminal violence, and organised and unorganised violence. Indeed, it became 
more and more difficult to isolate motives and practices, for guerrillas got involved in 
criminal activities such as kidnappings, ransoms, and drug production, while drug cartels 
got involved politically, mainly by corrupting the judiciary and political systems (Pécaut 
1999).
54 In addition, groups were very diverse and permeable (drug cartels in Medellin, 
Cali, Bogotá and the Atlantic Coast are loose coalitions of small groups and the FARC 
gather  more  than  60  groups).  ‘This  situation  produced  a  fragmentation  of  Colombia’s 
national territory in response to the relative strength of the various actors involved’ (Pécaut 
1999: 145).   
 
Homicide rates in Colombian history have always been high, but increased considerably in 
the 1980s. During ‘La Violencia’, homicide rates stayed around 20 homicides per 100,000 
inhabitants (hphti). In the late 1980s and early 1990s, they multiplied by four, and rose to 
80 hphti, before decreasing to around 60 hphti in the mid-1990s, and decreasing again in 
the  2000s  to  reach  the  actual  level  of  33.4  hphti  (year  of  2010,  UNODC  2011).  The 
decrease in the 1990s was mainly associated to the dismantlement of the Medellin and Cali 
drug cartels (Levitt and Rubio 2000).  
 
During the 1980s and 1990s, Colombian citizens were hostages of ‘daily terror’ (Pécaut 
1999). Armed groups entered villages and raped, killed, and imposed racket protection on 
peasants and landowners in many parts of the country. Citizens were left without protection 
or margins of manoeuvre. According to Taussig (2004), this situation led to a culture of 
silence and distrust among the population, and a destruction of social capital. The military 
was  also  seen  as  part  of  the  problem,  for  it  did  not  distinguish  between  civilians  and 
guerrilleros  and  drug  traffickers,  and  left  the  population  abandoned  to  the  mercy  of 
guerrillas. Hundreds of thousands of people were forced to flee their homes. And many 
young people were forced to join either group. This resulted in a ‘banalisation of terror and 
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54 Only a minority of homicides was due to political violence (7 per cent in 1987 according to a study cited by 
Pécaut 1999:143; 15 per cent according to Rodgers 2003; 23 per cent according to Imbusch et al. 2011). 	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violence’,  a  discredit  of  public  institutions,  and  a  lack  of  popular  mobilisation  (Pécaut 
1999).  
 
Violence in Colombia in the XXI
st century
55 
Since 2002, homicide rates started to decline and are now around 34 hphti (33.4, figure of 
2010, UNODC 2011) (see Figure 8). This still places Colombia above the LAC average (22 
hphti) and four times higher than the world average (6.9 hphti), but the decrease has been 
significant over the past decade. 75 per cent of homicides happen in urban settings, with 
Cali  and  Medellin  being  the  cities  where  the  probability  to  be  killed  is  the  highest 
(respectively 83.1 and 69.7 hphti in 2011) (Instituto Nacional de Medicina Legal 2011). In 
terms of characteristics, 91 per cent of victims are males and the majority are young (37.4 
per cent were 20-29 years old). Nearly half of homicides happened in public spaces, and 10 
per  cent  happened  in  the  home.  78  per  cent  of  homicides  were  by  firearms.  As  for 
perpetrators, nearly half had primary education, and another half had secondary education; 
13 per cent had no occupation
56 (Ricaurte Villota 2011).  
 
If homicide rates have declined over the years, interpersonal violence has increased. The 
rates of interpersonal violence went from 260 in 2002 to 332 acts per 100,000 inhabitants in 
2011 (Mendoza 2011). In Colombia, interpersonal violence includes all acts of violence 
perpetrated by non-family members that lead to injury or negatively impact the health of 
the victims, but not death (opcit)
57 (see Figure 9). Victims are principally men, but at a 
lesser proportion than for homicides (66 per cent males and 34 per cent females), and 
mainly young (the average age is 30 years old, and 19 per cent of victims are between 20 
and 24 years old). In terms of circumstances, fights, vengeance and alcohol consumption 
were the main motives (47.5 per cent in 2011), followed by kidnappings, terrorism, crime, 
and other acts committed by criminal groups. 12 per cent of cases have no information. In 
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55 Appendix D.1 summarise the main contemporary sources of statistics related to violence in Colombia. 
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56 These figures refer to those for whom data is available, i.e. 67 per cent for education and 32 per cent for 
occupation. 
 
57 As explained in Chapter 2, the WHO includes domestic violence in interpersonal violence. Differences in 
definitions are common in violence, thus the need to systematically define the object of analysis and question 
definitions.  	 ﾠ
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the majority of cases, the victim knew the perpetrator. Bogotá is the city where most of 
interpersonal violent acts occur (Mendoza 2011). 
	 ﾠ
Figure 8: Homicide rate per 100,000 inhabitants in 
Colombia, 1997-2011 
 
	 ﾠ
Figure 9: Interpersonal violence rate per 100,000 
inhabitants in Colombia, 2002-2011 
 
Source: Medicina Legal, 2011. 
 
In terms of intra-family violence, numbers are on the rise since 2002. Intra-family violence 
includes intimate partner violence, child maltreatment, and elderly abuse. In 2011, there 
were 89,807 acts known to forensic medicine, more than 25,000 more than in 2002 (when 
the number of intra-family acts was 64,619) (see Figure 10). These figures are probably 
underestimated, for intra-family violence is underreported everywhere in the world (WHO 
2002). Women form the overwhelming majority of victims (about 80 per cent). 65 per cent 
of cases are from intimate partners, 18 per cent are from relatives, 15 per cent against 
children, and 2 per cent against the elderly (Carreño Samaniego 2011). In terms of intimate 
partner violence, permanent partners are the main perpetrators (43 per cent), followed by 
spouse  (22  per  cent).  Victims  are  generally  young  (25-29  years  old),  have  completed 
secondary education, and are housewives (opcit). Violence against children and the elderly 
have increased over the years. Men are most affected by this last form of intra-family 
violence (see Figure 11). Bogotá, D.C., Cundinamarca, and Antioquia are the departments 
were most intra-family violence acts are reported (Valle del Cauca is also important for 
elderly abuse). 
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Figure 10: Number of intra-family violence acts (2002-2011) 
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Figure 11: Intra-family violence acts by gender (2011, 
Colombia) 
 
Source: Medicina Legal, 2011 
Note: The bars for elderly abuse are nearly at the same level, with the male bar (804 acts in 2011) a 
bit higher than the female one (764 acts). 
 
Sexual violence is also on the rise in Colombia. About 49 acts per 100,000 inhabitants were 
reported to forensic medicine in 2011 (there were 35 per 100,000 inhabitants in 2002). 72 
per cent were sexual abuse and 15 per cent were sexual assaults, the rest is undetermined. 
The ratio of men to women was 1:5 (Vergel 2011). Finally, as previously mentioned in 
Section  5.1.1,  school  violence  is  of  serious  concern  in  Colombia  (see  also  De  Zubiría 
Samper 2008; Hoyos et al. 2009). 
 
In summary, even though homicide rates have decreased in Colombia over the past decade, 
violence  in  its  multiple  forms  remains  worrisome  and  is  even  on  the  rise  in  multiple 
instances. Different forms of violence affect different groups differently. Women are the 
main victims of intimate partner violence and sexual violence (both on the rise), and men 
are mainly victims of homicides (with decreasing trends). Child maltreatment and elderly 
abuse affect both genders relatively equally (with both forms having ascending trends). It is 
important  to  keep  in  mind  the  differences  in  trends  at  the  time  of  analysing  policy 
responses, so as to question levels of priority among forms of violence and to assess their 
gender-sensitiveness (see Section 5.3).  
5.2 Explaining high rates of violence in LAC and in Colombia 
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Violence is a very complex phenomenon everywhere in the world, as I have explained in 
Sections  2.1  to  2.5  in  Chapter  2.  In  LAC,  the  complexity  is  intrinsically  linked  to 
development challenges at the regional level. Following the ecological model, this holistic 
analysis makes it possible to have a comprehensive understanding of the phenomenon in a 
particular  context.  It  also  highlights  the  numerous  difficulties  at  stake  at  the  time  of 
designing responses to violence. Here, I briefly present the main risk factors at the regional 
level, and focus on a more detailed analysis of the Colombian situation. Based on this 
analysis, the following section will discuss policy responses (see Section 5.3). 
5.2.1 Risk factors for violence in LAC 
Multiple risk factors contribute to explaining high violence rates in LAC. At the regional 
level,  i.e.  in  aggregate  terms,  it  is  only  possible  to  present  societal  factors  within  the 
ecological model. Scholars studying violence in LAC and seeking to understand what made 
it the most violent region in the world (along with Southern Africa) underscore a series of 
factors. I list them here and provide specific regional data and references in Table 13. The 
risk factors most commonly cited in the specialist literature include: a high rate of exclusion 
and inequality; high prevalence of corruption and weak institutions; the presence of drug 
trafficking in the continent; a large number of available firearms; widespread impunity; a 
history of conflict leading to a culture of violence and the acceptance of violence as a way 
to resolve conflict; high rates of domestic violence and child maltreatment; a dominant 
model of masculinity based on domination and patriarchy;  a rapid urbanisation; the loss of 
traditional structures at times linked to the phenomenon of anomy; and popular medias 
conveying messages of violence.  
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Table 13: Societal risk factors for violence in Latin America and the Caribbean 
Risk factor  LAC-specific explanation / data 
Exclusion 
and 
inequality 
LAC’s Gini coefficient
58 is about 0.5, very high compared to other regions in the world, and rates 
of youth unemployment are also very high in some countries (30 to 50 per cent of the unemployed 
in the Caribbean when youth represent 20-30 per cent of labour force, ECLAC 2004). 
Corruption 
and weak 
institutions 
The majority of the countries in the region score below 4 on a 10 points scale (10 being no 
corruption) in the 2011 perception corruption index of Transparency International. According to 
UNODC,  countries  where  homicide  rates  have  increased  over  the  past  15  years  have  weak 
institutions,  whereas  those  that  have  achieved  to  strengthen  their  rule  of  law  have  shown  a 
decrease in homicide rates (UNODC 2011: 10). 
Drug 
trafficking 
Latin American countries produce an estimated 900 tones of cocaine annually with a market 
worth USD 60 billion (Imbusch, Misse and Carrión 2011:101). The cocaine business dominated 
by the Colombian cartels used to go from Colombia to the US by air. Now, the Mexican cartels 
use maritime roads, along Central America and the Caribbean. In addition, Mexico, Colombia and 
Guatemala now produce heroin and export to the US. The Caribbean are geographically located 
between the producers and consumers of drugs, with a number of small islands and kilometres of 
coasts  that  are  difficult  to  control.  In  Brazilian  favelas,  drug  trafficking  has  also  a  strong 
explanatory power, in particular in terms of recruitment of poor young people. Milicias (type of 
paramilitary groups formed by ex-policemen military or other security forces, including private 
security guards) have emerged in the favelas as a new source of violence, for they often ‘charge’ 
residents for protection, transport, etc. (Imbusch, Misse and Carrión 2011).   
Availability of 
firearms  
About 74 per cent of homicides are perpetrated with a firearm, compared to 21 per cent in Europe 
(UNODC 2011:10). It is also estimated that 500,000 firearms are legally registered in Central 
America and 800,000 are unregistered (Imbusch, Misse and Carrión 2011:106). 
Impunity  Above 95 per cent in some countries (Rotkers et al. 2002). In Venezuela, for instance, authors 
have estimated that seven per cent of violent reported deaths were solved, and only one per cent 
of perpetrators was sentenced (Imbusch, Misse and Carrión 2011:112). 
History of 
conflict 
leading to a 
culture of 
violence  
Many countries have suffered from civil wars, guerrillas, or authoritarian regimes in the XX
th 
century that have institutionalised the use of violence leading to a culture of violence and fear that 
remains until now. Authors have also argued that such past had led to an overall acceptance of 
violence as a way of resolving conflict. See for instance: Hein 2010; Briceño-León 1999, 2001, 
2002; Rubio 2000; Rotkers 2002; UNODC and World Bank 2008; UNDP 2013.
 
Rates of intra-
family 
violence  
See Section 5.1.  
A dominant 
model of 
masculinity 
based on 
domination  
Anthropologists and sociologists have emphasised how a certain model of masculinity based on 
domination, competition, power and respect attracted male adolescents to join gangs. See for 
instance  Rodgers  1999,  2006,  2007;  Salazar  2002;  Briceño-León  and  Zubillaga  2000;  Rocha 
1999; Rubio 2007. 
Rapid 
urbanisation  
79 per cent of the LAC population lives in urban areas and this proportion is increasing. 
Loss of 
traditional 
structures 
and alcohol 
consumption  
In particular of the traditional family leading to a phenomenon of anomy. See for instance: Hein 
2010; Buvinic, Alda and Lamas 2005; Briceño-León 2002. As for alcohol consumption, see for 
instance:  Briceño-León  2002;  Zubillaga  2009;  World  Bank  2007,  2009,  2011;  Koonings  and 
Kruijt 2009; Imbusch, Misse and Carrión 2011; Rotker 2002; UNDP 2013. 
Exposure to 
violent 
medias 
See for instance: Briceño-León 2002; Zubillaga 2009; World Bank 2007, 2009, 2011; Koonings 
and Kruijt 2009; Imbusch, Misse and Carrión 2011; Rotker 2002; UNDP 2013. 
Source: Author’s compilation based on several authors as cited in the table. 
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58 The Gini coefficient measures levels of income inequality in a country. 0 means perfect equality while 1 
means perfect inequality. The Gini coefficient of the region has risen in the 1990s and reached 0.53 before 
declining in a majority of countries in the 2000s. It is now at 0.49 (Gasparini and Lustig, 2011). 
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5.2.2 Risk factors for violence in Colombia 
Because  violence  is  context-specific,  I  present  the  specificity  of  risk  factors  in  the 
Colombian context following the four levels of the ecological model (see Section 2.3.2 in 
Chapter 2). 
 
At the macro or societal level, general risk factors include exclusion and inequality levels 
(including poverty levels and youth unemployment), corruption, drug trafficking, firearms 
availability, widespread impunity, rapid urbanization, and a higher social tolerance towards 
violence, among others.
59 Colombia is among the most unequal countries in LAC, and even 
the world. Colombia’s Gini indicator belongs to the ten highest in the world (0.572 in 1995; 
0.594 in 2002; 0.578 in 2009) (World Bank 2011). This means that the richest 10 per cent 
earned 60 times more than the poorest 10 per cent of the population in the 2000s; the ratio 
was 40:1 in the 1990s (Rudqvist 2003:13).  If poverty levels have decreased in Colombia, 
they  remain  high  for  an  upper  middle-income  country.  As  the  World  Bank  puts  it, 
Colombia is ‘not a poor country, but it is a country with a lot of poor people’ (2011:75). 
The World Bank estimates that poverty has decreased from 60 per cent to 45.5 per cent 
from  1995  to  2009,  mainly  because  of  growth,  when  in  other  countries  of  the  region 
poverty  decreased  through  a  combination  of  growth  and  redistribution  policies  (World 
Bank 2011). Among the 45 per cent of Colombians living in poverty, about 17 per cent 
suffer from extreme poverty. Unemployment is also very high, in particular for the youth 
and the poor (overall 12 per cent in 2009, 22 per cent for the youth and 35 per cent for the 
poor) and the informal sector represents 50 to 60 per cent of the labour force (World Bank 
2011:5). There are significant challenges in terms of provision of social services and basic 
infrastructure  for  the  poor,  including  access  to  safe  water,  nutrition,  early  childhood 
development and quality of education, and health services (opcit: 5).  
 
Colombia  suffers  from  structural  corruption.  In  particular,  in  the  2012  Transparency 
International ranking on corruption perception index, Colombia had the worse score in ten 
years with 94 compared to 57 in 2002 (Gutiérrez 2013:1). At the time of my research, the 
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59 This  review  of  risk  factors/main  explanations  does  not  aim  to  be  exhaustive.  I  cite  here  the  main 
characteristics that together form a conveying context for high levels of violence and crime, as found in the 
literature. Nonetheless, there is an abundant body of research on the causes of violence and crime that exceeds 
what is summarised here. A complete review is beyond the scope of this chapter.  	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scandals of corruption that drew the highest attention included the investigation of two of 
the last four Presidents and 25 per cent of the Congress for political misconduct and abuse 
of  power,  and  the  suspension  from  office  of  the  Mayor  of  Bogotá  for  irregularities  in 
awarding contracts (Gutiérrez 2013:3). Linked to corruption are money laundering and the 
infiltration of drug traffickers and paramilitaries. Authors have even called the latest wave 
of crimes as ‘narco-paramilitaries’ (opcit). 
 
Drug trafficking is the most cited explanation for high levels of violence in Colombia. For 
instance, Levitt and Rubio (2000) argue that drug trafficking and high impunity rates are 
mainly  responsible  for  high  homicide  rates  in  Colombia.  Colombia  is  one  of  the  main 
producer  and  distributer  of  cocaine,  and  more  recently,  heroin.  The  drug  trafficking 
generates violence because of its illegal nature: violence is the only way to impose power 
over  and  order  within  the  market  (Levitt  and  Rubio  2000).  In  the  1990s,  a  decline  in 
homicide rates coincided with the dismantling of the Medellin and Cali drug cartels, two of 
the three cities that had the highest concentrated of homicide rates in the country (opcit: 23) 
(see Section 5.1.2).  
 
There are also a high number of firearms circulating in Colombia. Currently more than 
700,000 licensed firearms in the hands of Colombian, according to the Office for Firearm 
Control and Trade of the Ministry of Defence, and more than 40,000 firearms have been 
confiscated each year from 2002 to 2004, which suggests a very high number of illegal 
arms  in  circulation,  even  though  estimations  are  difficult  to  establish  in  this  respect 
(Aguirre et al. 2009).  
  
In terms of impunity and the overall efficiency and effectiveness of the criminal justice 
system, impunity rate is estimated at 80 per cent in Colombia (Erazo 2012:4). Nonetheless, 
prisons are already overcrowded by 40 per cent (opcit). Impunity regards crime differently. 
In particular, authors have estimated that the probability for a homicide to be sentenced is 
lower than three per cent; it is 20 per cent for the other types of crime (Rivera and Barreto, 
2007). Regarding the efficiency of the justice system in general, the Colombian criminal 
justice  system  is  the  third  slowest  in  LAC  and  the  sixth  slowest  in  the  World  (Erazo 
2012:4). Colombia ranked 154 out of 185 in terms of judicial efficiency (as measured in 	 ﾠ
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terms of ease to enforce contracts, following the World Bank Doing Business methodology, 
World  Bank  2013:86).  At  the  same  time,  studies  suggest  that  700  judges  have  been 
threatened and five have been killed because they attempted to investigate corruption cases 
of powerful persons (Gutiérrez 2013:7).  
 
Colombia also faces challenges related to its high urbanisation. 75 per cent of Colombians 
live in the five largest cities (Bogotá, Cali, Medellin, Barranquilla and Cartagena), and the 
growth of urban centres has faced challenges regarding quality of services, in particular in 
terms of land management and low-income housing for the poor (World Bank 2011:8). The 
problem has worsened with a constant wave of displaced persons forced to flee their land 
because of armed groups (guerrillas, paramilitaries, and others), who arrive in cities without 
economic and social opportunities. In 2010, 3.5 millions of persons were displaced because 
of the armed conflict (NDP 2010-14:443). Bogotá, Medellin, Santa Marta, Sincelejo and 
Cali are the main receptor cities (opcit: 444).
 60 
 
Finally, as previously mentioned, authors like Taussig or Pécaut have highlighted a higher 
social tolerance towards violence leading to a ‘banalisation’ of violence (Pécaut 1999), or a 
‘culture of violence and terror’ (Taussig 2004). This led to distrust not only towards public 
institutions, but also among neighbours, and weakened social capital.  
 
At  the  community and relationship levels,  youth  gangs  (pandillas)  are  often  cited  as  a 
source  of  violence  and  insecurity.  In  a  participatory  study  in  nine  communities  in 
Colombia, for example, pandillas were identified as the most important violence-related 
problem in five of them (Moser and McIlwaine 2001, 2004). Rodgers (2003) estimates that 
there  are  about  400  youth  gangs  in  the  country.  Those  are  often  called  parches
61 in 
Colombia, and are very different among themselves in terms of structure, age and activities 
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60 There is also a blurred distinction between rural and urban violence, since Bacrim for example have their 
base in rural areas and often commit violent acts and crime in urban settings. There is also the use of sicarios 
(professional killers) in urban settings, at times commanded by guerrillas or other criminal groups (DNP 
2001).  
 
61 Parches is a general term that refers to groups of people. Groups of friends not necessarily violent can refer 
to themselves as parches. The term is commonly used for youth gangs in Colombia.  
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(Rodgers 2003:117). In particular, there is a significant difference between bandas
62 that 
are organised criminal groups, whose main motive is economic, and parches, which are 
small groups of young males (under 25 and most under 20 years of age) that gather and 
share a common identity around a territory (at times very small: one or two blocks in a 
neighbourhood). Their delinquent activities are often spontaneous, and again characterised 
by diversity (from street mugging to armed robberies) (Rodgers 2003:118). Parches or 
pandillas’ group identity is not only linked to the protection of a territory, but also to a 
model of masculinity similar to the hegemonic masculinity described by Carrigan (1985), 
which in turn refers to a male chauvinist culture (machismo) at the societal level. This 
masculinity  is  based  on  the  use  of  violence,  risk  taking,  and  a  very  active  sexuality 
(tendency of considering females as sexual objects) (Rodgers 2003; Rubio 2007; Perea 
Restrepo 2007), and very much linked to patriarchy (Bourdieu 1998) (see Section 2.5 in  
Chapter 2). Here, we see how societal and community risk factors are interrelated.  
 
Finally,  at  the  individual  level,  life  histories  of  pandilleros  or  parcheros  suggest  that 
consumption of alcohol and drugs, difficult histories within the family (in particular intra-
family  violence),  hyper  and  early  sexuality,  and  dropping  out  of  school  are  important 
factors  that  characterise  young  people  who  join  gangs.  All  these  characteristics  were 
reported in the case of Colombia (Rubio 2007; Rodgers 2003; Moser and McIlwaine 2001, 
2004; Duque et al. 2008; Salazar 1999; Perea Restrepo 2007; among others). Statistics in 
terms  of  child  maltreatment  and  school  violence  suggest  high  levels  of  conflict.    In 
addition,  restricted  access  to  public  services,  in  particular  health  and  early  childhood 
development,  as  well  the  high  food  costs  suggest  that  poor  people  face  enormous 
challenges to ensure children’s healthy development (World Bank 2011).  
5.3  Examining  policy  responses:  main  characteristics  and  challenges  of 
violence-related policies in LAC with a special analysis of Colombia’s latest 
policy framework 
 
The scope and trends of different forms of violence and the numerous risk factors show the 
amplitude of the challenge that policymakers and their partners face to develop responses to 
violence. Despite increasing consensus on the need for multi-sector approaches, criminal 
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62 Banda in Spanish is translated as band, group, or criminal group in English.  	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justice-centred strategies still prevail in LAC. The case of Colombia, through its latest 
policy framework, illustrates the difficulties at stake even in one of the most favourable 
contexts for multi-sector, gender-sensitive strategies to happen.  
5.3.1 Violence-related policies in LAC: a persistent tendency to rely on 
criminal justice-centred strategies 
A few cities in the region have adopted multi-sector strategies and achieved extraordinary 
results in terms of violence reduction, but they remain the exception rather than the rule. 
Bogotá  and  Cali  in  Colombia  are  probably  the  most  famous  examples,  for  the 
municipalities  succeeded  in  halving  homicide  rates  in  less  than  a  decade  (1994-2000) 
(Guerrero and Concha-Eastman 1997; Mockus 2001). Diadema, in Brazil, is another well-
known experience, with a reduction of 44 per cent in homicide rates (Duailibi et al. 2007). 
At the community level, the prevention programme Fica Vivo in Belo Horizonte, also in 
Brazil, led to a reduction of 68 per cent in homicides (Silveira et al. 2010). They have all 
combined  multi-sector  strategies,  with  a  strong  emphasis  on  preventing  risk  factors. 
Nonetheless, those examples still need to be better understood to serve as benchmarks. In 
fact, even though these experiences have inspired other strategies in the region (with the 
support of international development agencies), those have failed to be implemented (OVE 
2013).  
 
In  many  countries  of  the  region,  policymaking  still  gives  priority  to  punitive  criminal-
justice-centred approaches that are often disconnected or untargeted to the actual profile of 
violence (Moser and McIlwaine 2006; Imbusch, Misse and Carrión 2011:125). In Mexico, 
for instance, researchers point out how the country lacks an integrated vision that includes 
violence prevention (Imbusch, Misse and Carrión 2011:104). Among others, Azaola (2008) 
shows how Mexico has systematically increased penalties and sentences, but has failed to 
simultaneously reduce impunity rate.
63 Azaola calls it ‘penal populism’, and contrasts it 
with the estimation that only seven per cent of the inmate population serve sentences for 
violent crime, the large majority being incarcerated for pre-trial during investigation, or for 
minor, non-violent offences. This situation is not specific to Mexico and has been observed 
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63 As  Beccaria  (1738-1794)  has  once  argued,  in  his  Des délits et des peines,  that  is  not  the  cruelty  of 
punishment, but its certainty that is dissuasive (see Vautrelle 2009:61).   
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in  most  countries  in  the  region  (Imbusch,  Misse  and  Carrión  2011).  In  the  Caribbean, 
Harriott (2002) shows how policymaking is biased towards the criminal justice approach, 
with little space for approaches that have a more direct social and situational preventive 
focus. In Central America, iron-fist (mano dura) policies in Honduras, El Salvador and 
Guatemala have been contrasted to more social prevention strategies in Costa Rica and 
Nicaragua, with the former leading to an escalation of violence (UNDP 2013).  
Analysing LAC’s policy responses to violence, researchers usually call attention to the fact 
that  iron-fist  policies  are  expensive,  ineffective,  counterproductive,  and  biased  towards 
males  (Thale  2006;  Aguilar  2007;  Basombrío  and  Dammert  2013).  In  many  countries, 
citizens  do  not  trust  the  police  because  of  their  brutal  past,  but  also  because  of  the 
widespread corruption and lack of professionalism (Hinton 2006; Newburn and Hinton 
2009). Many strategies of repression have also led to an escalation of violence, with a series 
of human rights violations (Arriagada and Godoy 2000). More generally, such policies fail 
to address many root causes of violence, and only focus on the symptoms through heavy-
handed crackdowns on youth gangs (Aguilar 2007; Basombrío and Dammert 2013) and by 
filling up prisons with individuals in pre-trial or petty crime offenders. This in turn results 
in high prison over-population and the incapacity of most penitentiary systems to focus on 
inmates’ rehabilitation (UNDP 2013).
64 Repressive mano dura policies also suggest how 
violence is considered a men’s issue for targeting young males, ignoring other forms of 
violence such as domestic violence, and leaving unquestioned dominant gender identities 
(Hume 2009; Whitzman 2008).  Given these shortcomings, why are such control-focused 
strategies still the norm in LAC despite a widespread call from researchers and experts for 
multi-sector, gender-sensitive strategies to prevent violence?
65 
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64 Many countries in LAC face serious issues related to prison over-population. As the UNDP recalls, prison 
density higher than 120 per cent is considered a serious problem. Over population can reached enormous 
levels, such as in El Salvador with 298 inmates per 100 places (UNDP 2013: 124). 
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65 Imbush, Misse, and Carrión summarise: ‘Even though there is widespread agreement about the need for 
preventive measures to deal with violence, and even though integrative programmes  are  generally  given 
preference […], strategies of social control have been employed with greater frequency […], [and] strategies 
of repression by the police and the military have invariably been used when the task was to combat violence 
or crime directly and to arrest criminals or perpetrators of violence.’ (Imbusch, Misse, and Carrión 2011:125) 
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5.3.2 Analysis of the latest policy framework for violence prevention in 
Colombia 
For all the characteristics described in Chapter 4 (see Section 4.3.1 on selection criteria for 
the country case study), Colombia is arguably a favourable context for multi-sector, gender-
sensitive policies to be developed. Examining the evolution of political understandings of 
violence in Colombia and its latest policy framework helps to illustrate the complexity at 
stake when developing violence prevention policies even in propitious contexts.  
 
Evolution of Colombian Governments’ understandings of violence  
For  the  past  fifteen  years,  Colombian  Governments  have  acknowledged  violence  as  a 
constraint to development. However, violence was principally understood in reference to 
the internal conflict. More recently, public authorities have recognised that violence was 
also due to unequal development. This is the case in the current National Development Plan 
2010-2014. 
 
In previous administrations, Governments focused on re-establishing peace and recovering 
State control over those parts of the country occupied or ruled by guerrillas, paramilitaries, 
and drug cartels. In the early 1990s, the Medellin and Cali drug cartels were dismantled 
with  US  support  and  a  hard  line  anti-drug  policy.  Drug  trafficking  was  not  eradicated 
though. On the contrary, the end of the monopoly of drug cartels led to a multiplicity of 
actors  involved  in  the  drug  trafficking  business.  They  include  guerrillas  groups 
(narcoguerrillas), paramilitaries and Bacrim (Bandas Criminales), as well as individual 
delinquents and youth gangs (parches or pandillas) (see Section 5.1). Some authors even 
argue  that  the  dismantling  of  the  drug  cartels  had  the  unintended  consequence  of 
strengthening the guerrillas, in particular the FARC (Peceny and Durnan 2006:101-105). 
The Medellin cartel was indeed one of the main opponent of the FARC, so by dismantling 
it, the guerrilla movement expanded and got more control on the drug trafficking by raising 
taxes.  The  Cali  Cartel  opted  for  paying  those  taxes  instead  of  fighting  the  FARC.  Its 
dismantling under the Samper Administration (1994-1998) led to a fragmented and small-
scale drug industry that eased FARC taxation on drug revenues (opcit:104-106). At the end 
of the 1990s, the Pastrana Administration (1998-2002) concentrated efforts on negotiating 
peace  with  the  guerrillas,  before  finally  dropping  the  unsuccessful  negotiations.  When 	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Álvaro Uribe became president in 2002, the FARC and ELN had expanded their control 
over  the  national  territory.  To  respond  to  the  situation,  President  Uribe  (2002-2006) 
developed the concept of democratic security upon entering into office. Uribe’s democratic 
security aimed to restore internal security not only by increasing military capacity, but also 
by  strengthening  the  political  system,  the  criminal  justice  system  and  the  rule  of  law 
(Mason 2003).  The diagnosis was that part of the country was lawless (under guerrillas and 
paramilitaries control), and the State needed to restore its presence while respecting human 
rights  and  civil  liberties  (opcit).  With  unprecedented  US  support,  the  policy  was 
aggressively implemented through a ‘massive military presence, the re-staffing of police 
posts,  roadblocks,  curfews,  restrictions  on  movement,  house-to-house  searches,  and 
detention  powers’  (Mason  2003:397).  Throughout  the  eight  years  of  the  Uribe 
Administration (2002-2006 and 2006-2010), the strategy achieved the weakening of FARC 
and the ELN, and resulted in the demobilisation of part of the paramilitaries. Violence in 
both rural and urban areas decreased in terms of homicides, kidnappings and extortions. In 
particular, national homicide rates nearly halved during the period (from about 60 hphti to 
about 34-36). Yet, the strategy was also criticised for not implementing the democratic 
component,  for  enhancing  vigilante  groups  and  other  private  security  forces,  and  for 
violating human rights (opcit).  
 
The 2010-2014 National Development Plan and violence prevention  
Building upon an improved situation in terms of violence and crime, but also in economic 
terms, President Santos (who was President Uribe’s previous Minister of Defence) geared 
his Administration’s strategy towards reducing inequalities and ensuring ‘prosperity for 
all’. The 2010-2014 National Development Plan (Plan Nacional de Desarrollo, PND for its 
acronym in Spanish) provides the roadmap for the Government to achieve this goal through 
three main pillars: sustainable growth, equal opportunities, and peace consolidation. The 
PND gives a special importance to the issue of citizen security and adopts a multi-sector 
approach  to  violence  prevention.  President  Santos  also  nominated  a  High  Presidential 
Counsellor on Coexistence and Citizen Security, showing the importance given to the issue. 
The PND’s approach to violence prevention still focuses on consolidating peace (i.e. in 
relation to the internal conflict that was officially recognised as such by President Santos), 
but now gives more importance to urban violence prevention, or citizen security (see Box 3 	 ﾠ
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for definitions). The plan also explicitly acknowledges the multiplicity of forms and causes 
of violence, and expressively links poverty and inequality reduction to violence prevention.  
Box 3: Colombia's definitions of coexistence and citizen security 
The  Colombian  Government  uses  the  expression  ‘coexistence  and  citizen  security’  to  refer  to  violence 
prevention. It defines citizen security as ‘the universal protection of citizens from those crime and offences 
that affect their dignity, personal safety and property, and from fear of insecurity.’ Coexistence is defined as 
‘the promotion of citizens’ attachment and support to a civic culture based on the respect of the law, others, 
and basic behavioural and social coexistence norms’. 
Source: Own translation, PND 2011:1-2.
66 
 
The  2010-2014  National  Development  Plan  adopts  a  multi-sector  approach  to  violence 
prevention. It acknowledges the shared responsibility for the issue among ministries, levels 
of government and stakeholders.
67 In particular, it seeks to enhance the participation of civil 
society  and  the  private  sector.  Two  chapters  within  the  PND  are  directly  relevant  to 
violence prevention: Chapters 4 and 5. Chapter 4 deals with Equality of Opportunities for 
Social Prosperity (Igualdad de oportunidades para la prosperidad social), and includes an 
integral  development  and  social  protection  policy  for  early  childhood,  childhood, 
adolescence and youth, and culture, among others; policies for displaced population as a 
result of violence; as well as differentiated policies for ethnic groups, gender, and disability.  
Chapter 5 aims to consolidate peace (Consolidación de la paz) with a focus on security 
both as public order and as citizen security and coexistence. The PDN does not explicitly 
consider  violence  prevention  as  a  transversal  issue,  like  it  does  with  gender,  ethnicity, 
disability,  poverty  reduction,  human  rights,  anti-corruption,  or  youth  development. 
Nonetheless,  the  PND  opens  the  doors  for  a  mainstreaming  approach  (at  least  an 
integrationist one) within key sectors (Early Childhood Development, Education, Health, 
Culture,  Sports  and  Recreation,  Urban  Development),  in  particular  through  targeting 
vulnerable  or  at-risk  population.  Appendices  D.4  and  D.5  complement  Table  14  and 
presents PND’s strategic guidelines and programmes that either directly refers to violence 
prevention or supports the National Citizen Security and Coexistence Policy.  
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
66   In  Spanish:  ‘Se entiende por seguridad ciudadana la protección universal a los ciudadanos frente a 
aquellos delitos y contravenciones que afecten su dignidad, su seguridad personal y la de sus bienes, y frente 
al temor a la inseguridad. La convivencia, por su parte, comprende la promoción del apego y la adhesión de 
los ciudadanos a una cultura ciudadana basada en el respeto a la ley, a los demás y a unas normas básicas 
de comportamiento y de convivencia social’ (PND 2011: 1-2). 
 
67 See Appendix D.2 for the demography, geography and territorial administration in Colombia and Appendix 
D.3 for the composition of the Colombian Government in 2011. 	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
135 
Table 14: Colombian PND strategic axes 
Strategic axis  Objective  Implementation measures 
First axis:  
social  
and  
situational 
prevention 
To promote sexual and reproductive rights; 
prevent  early  pregnancies;  promote 
responsible paternity; develop programmes 
for  parenting  training  to  prevent  intra-
family violence and sexual abuse; promote 
peaceful  conflict  resolution,  including  for 
parents  and  teachers;  reduce  school 
desertion,  and  more  generally,  strengthen 
the link between children and youth and the 
school system; among others.  
To  be  implemented  in  collaboration  with 
other  line  ministries  and  in  support  or 
complement  to  other  governmental 
programmes, as outlined in PND’s Chapter 
4. However, the policy is not explicit on 
how  the  coordination  will  take  place 
beyond  the  dialogue  and  negotiation 
among levels of government. 
To  integrate  violence  prevention  criteria 
within  urban  development  plans  and 
housing  programmes  (which  is  what  most 
resembles to a mainstreaming approach). 
(DNP 2011: 15-17) 
Second axis: 
police 
presence and 
control 
To  develop  community  policing  and 
strengthen the National Plan for Community 
Vigilance  through  Cuadrantes  (Plan 
Nacional  de  Vigilancia  Comunitaria  por 
Cuadrantes). 
To be implemented within the framework 
of  Safe  Departments  and  Municipalities 
Programme  (Programa  Departamentos  y 
Municipios Seguros), launched in 2004.   
Third axis: 
justice, 
victims and 
rehabilitation 
To improve the criminal justice system for 
adults and adolescents, in particular through 
better  investigation  and  alternative 
resolution  modalities,  rehabilitation  of 
adolescents  in  conflict  with  the  law 
(construction of new centres, separation of 
youth  by  type  of  crimes  committed,  and 
educational programmes), and assistance of 
victims,  following  the  example  of  Bogotá 
and Buracamanga’s centres for attention to 
victims  (Centro  de  Atención  a  Victimas) 
that  provide  integrated  support  to  victims 
(psychological, medical and legal). 
 
Fourth axis: 
legality and 
coexistence 
culture 
To  promote  respectful  behaviours  among 
citizens, citizens’ respect towards the law, 
and respect of life in general. It includes the 
adoption of a new Coexistence Code.   
 
Fifth axis: 
active and 
responsible 
citizenship 
To  promote  community  participation  and 
civil  society  involvement  in  violence 
prevention,  crime  reporting,  information 
sharing  and  solidarity,  through  the 
strengthening  of  Local  Security  Fronts 
(Frentes  de  Seguridad  Local),  and 
Coexistence  and  Citizen  Security  Schools 
(Escuelas  de  Convivencia  y  Seguridad 
Ciudadana). It also includes working with 
the medias to promote peaceful coexistence 
and  legality  culture,  among  others  (DNP 
2011: 25-26).   
A  transversal  effort  to  strengthen 
information systems (in particular violence 
observatories  and  consolidation  of 
different  sources  of  data)  and  develop 
studies related to public policy in violence 
prevention, complements the five axes. As 
do relevant normative developments, such 
as the new 1452 Law on Citizen Security, 
the new Code of Civic Coexistence, or the 
reform  of  the  Penitentiary  Code  (DNP 
2011: 29).
68 
Source: Own analysis based on PND 2010-2014 (DNP 2011). 
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68 I could not retrieve information regarding budgeting, which is a key parameter to assess the feasibility of 
the policy and its implementation at the local level. 
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The 2011 National Policy for Citizen Security and Coexistence and its limitations towards 
a multi-sector, gender-sensitive treatment of violence prevention 
In  2011,  the  Colombian  Congress  approved  the  Citizen  Security  and  Coexistence  Law 
(Law 1452), which provides the legal framework for the National Policy for Coexistence 
and  Citizen  Security  (DNP  2011).  This  policy  is  the  result  of  several  months-long 
negotiations with multiple stakeholders at the local and national levels, led by the High 
Presidential Counsellor for Citizen Security and Coexistence, and the National Planning 
Department (Departamento Nacional de Planeación, DNP for its Spanish acronym). The 
Director of the Justice, Security and Government Direction at the DNP (DNP-DJSG)
69 
interviewed  for  this  thesis  explained  that  the  leadership  of  the  High  Counsellor  was 
decisive to give legitimacy to the participatory process,
 70 which was in turn considered 
essential to the success of the new policy. The Government’s intention was to develop a 
policy that would go beyond the traditional criminal justice system, and respond to the 
multi-causality  of  violence;  thus,  the  need  to  dialogue  and  engage  with  multiple  line 
ministries,  local  governments,  and  experts  (Interview  DNP,  Bogotá,  June  2011).  The 
Foundation Ideas para la Paz, a think tank specialised on violence prevention and citizen 
security, accompanied the DNP in the process, with the IADB’s support.  
 
Main features of the 2011 Colombian policy to prevent violence 
The  policy  clearly  reflects  the  above-mentioned  intention  as  it  adopts  a  multi-sector 
approach  to  prevent  violence.  It  builds  on  five  principles,  four  of  which  deal  with 
coordination, and ten criteria for the policy’s implementation (see Box 4).   
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69 The Direction for Justice, Security and Government at the DNP is in charge of guiding and promoting the 
formulation, monitoring and evaluation of policies, plans and programmes in the sectors of Justice, Defence 
and National Security (following the National Development Plan’s Chapter 5: Peace Consolidation). 
 
70 It is noteworthy that the High Presidential Counsellor for Citizen Security did his doctoral thesis on public 
policies  to  prevent  violence,  with  a  special  focus  on  youth  violence.  The  policy  document  refers  to  the 
doctoral thesis and reflects a balanced approach in line with current knowledge on multi-causality of violence 
and a priority given to prevention. See Lloreda, Francisco (2010). Public policies for reducing violence with 
particular reference to youth violence in Colombia. Doctoral thesis. Oxford: Oxford University. 
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Box 4: Colombian 2011 National Policy for Citizen Security and Coexistence: Guiding principles and 
criteria for implementation 
Colombia’s  most  recent  policy  to  prevent  violence  builds  on  five  principles,  four  of  which  deal  with 
coordination: co-responsibility (with local governments that are those primarily in charge of ensuring citizen 
security in territories);  coordination  nation/territory;  territorial  autonomy;  articulation  of  programmes and 
projects within the State; and safeguards of liberties and individual rights. 
 
The policy also states ten criteria that should gear the implementation of the policy: (i) long-term vision; (ii) 
focused integration; (iii) determining factors (known risk factors); (iv) territorial specificity (context-based); 
(v) at risk population (secondary and tertiary prevention); (vi) adolescents and youth as priority (12-26 years 
old); (vii) prioritisation of crime (based on impact, interrelation with other crime and incidence on security 
perception);  (viii)  lessons  learnt  from  successful  experiences  (evidence-based  interventions  or  promising 
interventions); (ix) adequate incentives (opportune, relevant and strategic for enhancing protective factors or 
reducing risk factors); and (x) monitoring and evaluation. 
Source: DNP 2011:10-13. 
 
The policy translates the five priority axes for action put forth in the PND (see Table 14 and 
Appendix  D.4)  and  provides  a  general  framework.  The  detailed  strategies  need  to  be 
negotiated and adapted at the local level depending on the context and the coalition of 
actors.  As  such,  the  policy  only  presents  what  the  National  Government  is  willing  to 
support.  The  policy  prioritises  twenty  municipalities  that  experience  the  highest 
concentration  and  proportion  of  violent  crime  in  Colombia,  as  measured  in  terms  of 
homicides, robberies and personal injuries. These forms of violence were selected for their 
high impact, interrelation with other crimes and incidence on perception of security (DNP 
2011:11).  Through  this  prioritisation,  the  National  Government  aims  to  facilitate  the 
implementation by providing technical assistance and other support for the development of 
local diagnostics and plans (following the three principles of decentralisation), thereafter 
ensuring a greater impact on the national average in terms of violence and crime reduction 
(Interview  DNP-DJSG,  Bogotá,  June  2011).  The  implementation  begins  with  a  local 
diagnosis to identify the territorial specificities in terms of violence and crime. Then, the 
municipality  together  with  the  DNP  proceeds  with  a  prioritisation  exercise  to  select 
activities and programmes, priority areas, beneficiaries and indicators. 
 
Limitations to the current treatment of violence prevention from a multi-sector, gender-
sensitive perspective 
Despite its multi-sector approach, the policy does not explicitly aim to mainstream violence 
prevention,  in  the  sense  of  systematically  including  violence  prevention  lenses  to 	 ﾠ
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governmental  policies  and  programmes.  It  adopts  a  practical  approach  that  tries  to 
encompass multiple risk factors for violence through a multi-sector focus. This could be 
seen as a preliminary stage to mainstreaming violence prevention, at least in the design of 
the policy and from an integrationist perspective (see Chapter 3, Section 3.2.3). 
 
In  terms  of  implementation,  the  policy  shows  limitations  in  terms  of  coordination  and 
prioritisation. With regard to coordination, the policy mentions, but does not elaborate on, 
the coordination with other national entities that would help develop social and situational 
programmes. In particular, no mention is made on how sectors are supposed to collaborate, 
or  which  coordination  mechanisms  need  to  be  in  placed  at  the  local  level.  This  is 
particularly  important  for  small  municipalities  where  services  would  mainly  depend  on 
departments or the direct provision from the State. A clear collaboration or coordination 
mechanism by type of municipalities would have given greater credibility to the multi-
sector approach to violence prevention, beyond a series of juxtaposed options.  
 
In  terms  of  prioritisation,  focusing  on  twenty  municipalities  might  indeed  facilitate  the 
implementation and logically impact the most the national average, but also leave out those 
municipalities that probably need it the most. Colombia has in fact 1098 municipalities of 
different  sizes,  capacity  and  resources.  The  DNP  explained  that  the  targeted  twenty 
municipalities might serve as examples for the others (Interview DNP, Bogotá, June 2011). 
However, if the others do not have capacity, knowledge, tools, or means to develop their 
own diagnostic and strategy, this will arguably not happen. The policy is also loose on the 
rationale for each axis and how they respond to specific risk factors.
71 This is reflected in 
the choice of indicators. The DNP explained that they would be negotiated at the local level 
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71 Some bilaterals and multilaterals have been concerned with the theory of change. The policy would have 
been stronger by developing the rationale and theory of change at the macro level, and requiring this theory 
for change to be explicit in local plans. The Centre for Theory of Change (which is an NGO dedicated to 
promoting a sound use of theory of change) provides the following definition: ‘A theory of change defines all 
building  blocks  required  to  bring  about  a  given  long-term  goal.  This  set  of  connected  building  blocks–
interchangeably referred to as outcomes, results, accomplishments, or preconditions is depicted on a map 
known as a pathway of change/change framework, which is a graphic representation of the change process. 
Built  around  the  pathway  of  change,  a  Theory  of  Change  describes  the  types  of  interventions  (a  single 
programme or a comprehensive community initiative) that bring about the outcomes depicted in the pathway 
of a change map. Each outcome in the pathway of change is tied to an intervention, revealing the often 
complex web of activity that is required to bring about change.’ (http://www.theoryofchange.org/what-is-
theory-of-change/#1) 
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depending  on  the  diagnostic  and  the  agreed  priorities.  They  would  nonetheless 
systematically include the main indicators included in the policy (homicides, robberies and 
personal injuries). It is noteworthy that widespread and increasing forms of violence, such 
as domestic and sexual violence (see Section 5.1.2), are not prioritised in the policy, and the 
link  between  forms  of  violence  is  not  clearly  recognised  (i.e.  gendered  continuum  of 
violence, Chapter 2). When asked why, the Director of Justice, Security and Government at 
the DNP explained that they had to focus on those crime and forms of violence that had the 
greatest social impact, and be humble about what could be achieved in a four-year period: 
‘We need to be realistic about what could be done. Indicators should reflect this. If 
we can reduce a bit the homicide rates, we would be very happy.’ (Interview DNP-
DJSG, Bogotá, June 2011) 
 
The difficulty of implementation in a decentralised context and the pressure to show results 
at  the  national  level  in  a  short  period  of  time  explain  why,  according  to  the  DNP,  no 
indicators  on  intra-family  violence  or  sexual  violence  were  included.  The  DNP  further 
mentioned issues related to the availability of indicators. For instance, the ICBF in charge 
of child maltreatment prevention does not have a proper information system that would 
allow monitoring and evaluating progress on this particular form of violence. Nonetheless, 
the  National  Institute  for  Forensic  Medicine  does  report  statistics  on  those  forms  of 
violence in a disaggregated manner at the municipality level and on a yearly basis. The 
same  is  true  for  other  forms  of  intra-family  violence  and  sexual  violence.  In  fact,  the 
Ministry of Social Protection does monitor the evolution of gender-based violence, for it is 
responsible to implement the 1257 Law on domestic and sexual violence. So, while the 
National Development Plan acknowledges the need to deal with intra-family and sexual 
violence  within  the  citizen  security  framework  (PND  2010-2014:503),  those  forms  of 
violence were not given priority in the national policy, as assessed through the selection of 
indicators.  This reminds us how negotiations and participation take time, while public 
administrations are pressured to show quick results.  But it also suggests that different 
forms of violence are still dealt with separately (even though they reinforce each other and 
happen along a gendered continuum), and that a gender-biased hierarchy among forms of 
violence does exist, as feminist scholars have long pointed out (see Chapter 2, Section 
2.5.2). 	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
140 
 
5.4 Conclusion 
This  chapter  has  examined  the  context  in  which  MDBs  operate  in  terms  of  scope  and 
challenges surrounding the multi-dimensionality, multi-causality and context-specificity of 
violence, as well as in terms of country-specific challenges for designing and implementing 
multi-sector,  gender-sensitive  violence  prevention  policies.  As  the  case  of  Colombia 
illustrates, even in contexts where those general challenges are lesser than in other countries 
of the region in particular in terms of understanding the phenomenon of violence through 
development  and  transversal  lenses  and  the  availability  of  high  capacity  and  expertise, 
challenges remain evident. In particular, questions related to implementation mechanisms 
such as coordination, prioritisation and choice of indicators appear to be weak links in the 
development  of  the  2011  National  Policy  on  Citizen  Security  and  Coexistence.  I  will 
further  explore  those  questions  when  discussing  opportunities  and  constraints  to 
mainstream inclusive violence prevention both within MDBs (Chapters 7 and 8) and at the 
country  level  (Chapter  9).  In  the  next  chapter,  Chapter  6,  I  retrace  the  emergence  and 
evolution of violence prevention at the IADB and the World Bank.  
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Chapter 6: Tracing the History of Violence Prevention at the 
IADB and the World Bank (1998-2011) 
 
Chapter  6  retraces  the  emergence  and  evolution  of  violence  prevention  at  the  Inter-
American  Development  Bank  and  the  World  Bank  over  the  period  1998-2011.  Before 
going further, I must first clarify the terminology that will be used in this chapter. The 
IADB and the World Bank use different terms to refer to violence prevention. Even in each 
bank, the vocabulary changes relatively often. This is more so at the IADB than at the 
World Bank. At the IADB, the following terms coexist and seem to be interchangeable: 
violence and crime reduction, violence prevention, citizen security, public safety, citizen or 
civic coexistence. At the World Bank, the term most frequently used until recently was 
violence and crime prevention. The World Bank now increasingly refers to citizen security. 
I use citizen security for the IADB, and violence and crime prevention for the World Bank, 
for these are the terms most frequently employed by each respective MDB.  
 
The IADB was the first international financial institution to approve stand-alone loans
72 
with  the  explicit  and  principal  objective  to  prevent  violence  in  Latin  America  and  the 
Caribbean. The loans were approved in 1998 for two countries: Colombia and Uruguay. 
Since then, the IADB has remained the MDB with the largest violence prevention-related 
portfolio in the region. The World Bank has followed a different path. While the IADB was 
preparing and approving the first citizen security projects and opted for a ‘learning by 
doing’ approach, the World Bank was publishing studies that would slowly open the door 
to include violence prevention in its mandate. The World Bank’s Latin America and the 
Caribbean Region then took the lead and started to include violence prevention components 
within  Urban  Development  projects.  Recently,  the  World  Bank  has  developed  policy 
dialogue  on  the  issue  with  some  of  its  clients  and  has  approved  budget  support  with 
components  to  prevent  violence.  The  recent  World  Development  Reports  (WDRs)  on 
Conflict and Security (2011) and on Gender (2012)
73 also mark a shift in the World Bank’s 
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72 A  stand-alone  loan  consists  in  a  self-contained  operation  with  its  own  objectives,  components  and 
indicators,  as  opposed  to  a  mainstreaming  process  or  safeguards  (for  example  gender,  environmental 
sustainability or indigenous rights) that are supposed to be included in most projects to improve the quality 
and sustainability of the operation, independently of its main objective.  
 
 
73 WDR 2011: Conflict, Security, and Development and WDR 2012: Gender Equality and Development. 	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position  towards  violence,  at  least  in  terms  of  institutional  acknowledgement  of  the 
importance of the issue for development. 
 
 How did the IADB and the World Bank get involved in violence prevention? How has the 
issue evolved within both banks over the years? And, what has been their contribution in 
terms  of  operational  work  during  the  fourteen-year  period  under  review?  This  chapter 
answers these questions by presenting the findings from a process tracing undertaking that 
combines a stock taking exercise of projects and other major initiatives approved by both 
banks and interviews with MDBs’ staff members and key informants. The stock taking 
exercise  focuses  on  projects  explicitly  targeting  violence  prevention.  As  such,  for  the 
IADB, it concentrates on the area of citizen security and does not include the work done by 
the  organisation  in  other  sectors  such  as  Education,  Social  Protection,  Justice,  Urban 
Development, or Gender (see Chapter 4, Section 4.3.2). However, for the World Bank, it 
includes  Urban  Development,  as  this  was  the  approach  explicitly  chosen  by  the  latter 
organisation.  The  stock  taking  exercise  ends  in  2011,  the  year  when  interviews  were 
conducted.  
 
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 6.1 presents, in a comparative fashion, the 
stock  taking  findings  for  the  IADB  and  the  World  Bank’s  involvement  in  respectively 
citizen security, and violence and crime prevention. Section 6.2 retraces the institutional 
evolution  of  the  IADB  with  regards  to  citizen  security.  Section  6.3  does  the  same  for 
violence and crime prevention at the World Bank. Section 6.4 concludes.  
6.1 The IADB and World Bank’s operational portfolios in violence prevention 
(1998-2011) 
 
The operational portfolios for the IADB and the World Bank include specific investment 
loans and/or budgetary support loans (see Tables 15 and 16).
74 The IADB has chosen to 
finance citizen security projects relatively early in comparison with the World Bank. Even 
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74 The operational portfolio includes also technical assistance/technical cooperation operations (TAs or TCs). 
TCs are usually grants that can take the form of studies, consultancies, evaluations, or workshops/events. Due 
to issues in information availability in both banks, I could retrieve only a partial list of TCs/TAs. Moreover, 
staff members could not verify this list. As a result, I present here only the lending portfolio. 	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before the first stand-alone citizen security projects were approved in 1998, the regional 
bank  approved  a  project  to  reform  the  justice  system  in  El  Salvador  that  included  a 
component on citizen security (OVE 2014).
 75 Nonetheless, over a period of fourteen years, 
the regional bank has approved only sixteen projects, with six of them during the last two to 
three years. The World Bank decided to proceed differently. It opted first to finance studies 
and capacity building, and then incorporated the issue in a handful of Urban Development 
projects. In the past two years, it has developed policy dialogue and included violence 
prevention within Development Policy Loans (DPLs).
76  
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75 As  early  as  1994-96,  the  IADB  began  working  on  violence  prevention  through  a  series  of  regional 
conferences and studies on gender-based violence prevention. The Justice Reform project for El Salvador was 
also approved in 1996 (OVE 2014). 
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76 In addition to these projects, the World Bank has financed a Learning and Innovation Loan (LIL) on Peace 
and Development in Colombia. This is a unique experience because of the context of Colombia. The first LIL 
was approved in 2000 and has had three tranches of funding so far. It was showcased internationally as a 
successful  experience  on  how  to  develop  social  and  economic  activities  in  zones  affected  by  conflict. 
Colombia’s Peace project is, however, a single experience in Latin America. It targets rural areas, but the 
World Bank has been discussing ways to adapt it to urban contexts. However, to date, these considerations 
have not materialised. 	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Table 15: List of IADB's approved projects in citizen security (1998-2011) 
Country  Title (a)  Amount 
(USD 
million)  
Approval 
date 
Status 
Colombia 
Support for Peaceful Coexistence and 
Citizen Security  57  1998  Closed 2007 
Uruguay 
Program for Citizen Safety: Crime and 
Violence Prevention  17.5  1998  Closed 2005 
Jamaica  Citizen Security and Justice Program   16  2001  Closed 2009 
El Salvador  Project to Support the Social Peace Program  27.9  2002  Cancelled 
Honduras 
Peace and Citizen Coexistence Project for 
the Municipalities of the Sula Valley  14  2003  Active 
Chile   Program Safer Chile  10*  2003  Closed 2010 
Nicaragua  Citizen Security Program  7.2**  2004  Closed 2010 
Guatemala  Violence Prevention Program  29  2006  Reformulated 
Guyana  Citizen Security Program  19.8  2006  Active 
Panama   Integral Security Program  22.7  2006  Active 
T. and T.  Citizen Security Program  24.5  2008  Active 
Belize  Community Action for Public Safety  5  2010  Active 
Costa Rica 
Violence Prevention and Social Inclusion 
Promotion Program  132.4  2011  Active 
Jamaica  Citizen Security and Justice Program II  21  2009  Active 
Argentina  Citizen Security and Inclusion Program  25  2009  Active 
Ecuador 
Citizen Security Program for Social 
Cohesion  10  2011  Active 
Total 
16 loans: 9 active, 5 closed, 1 cancelled, 1 
reformulated (as of 2011)  439.01 
   
 
Total - cancelled/reformulated  380.031 
    Notes: T. and T.: Trinidad and Tobago; * 1.929 cancelled; **0.15 cancelled; (a) Titles are kept in original US English. 
Source: IADB’s operations portal: http://www.iadb.org/en/projects/projects,1229.html, accessed Nov 12, 2011. 
 
 
Table 16: List of World Bank's approved projects specifically aiming to prevent violence (1998-2011) 
Country  Title  Amount       
(USD million) 
Approval 
date 
Status 
Brazil  Bahia Poor Urban Areas Integrated 
Development-Viver Melhor II  19.45 [Total 49.3] 
 
2005 
 
Active 
Honduras  Barrio Ciudad Project  1        [Total 15]  2006  Active 
Jamaica  Inner City Basic Services for the Poor 
Project  3.9     [Total 29.3]  2006  Active 
Total 
 
3 loans with components specifically 
targeting violence prevention   24.34     
Source: World Bank operational portal: www.worldbank.org, accessed at different dates in 2011 
Note: Amounts indicated are estimates of the component targeting violence prevention in the projects. 
 
In terms of country targeting, the IADB’s projects span many countries, with 81 per cent of 
projects almost equally distributed between Central America (43.5 per cent) and South 	 ﾠ
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America (37.5 per cent), and with the remaining 19 per cent in the Caribbean (as of 2011) 
(see Figure 12). Only Jamaica has had two projects approved in citizen security over the 
past fourteen years. Since the World Bank has financed only five projects that in some way 
address  violence  prevention,  the  distribution  is  marginally  less  representative,  but  still 
similar to the IADB’s distribution: 40 per cent for Central America (Honduras), 40 per cent 
for South America (Brazil), and 20 per cent for the Caribbean (Jamaica only) (see Figure 
13). 
 
What is common between both banks is that they have only recently developed an agenda 
on citizen security/violence and crime prevention.  Six projects out of sixteen financed by 
the IADB (38 per cent) for the fourteen-year period have been approved in the last three 
years (2008-2011) of the period under review (see Figures 14 and 15). These six operations 
account for nearly 50 per cent of the total financial investment.  This is due to the large 
Costa Rica project (which accounts for 30 per cent of the citizen security loans during the 
period). Costa Rica is still an exception but is symptomatic of a will to increase IADB’s 
lending in citizen security.
77 The majority of the projects are nevertheless situated between 
USD 10 and 25 million. A year later, in 2012, another project was approved in Honduras 
(USD 63.8 million), and four others were in preparation (El Salvador: Support for Citizen 
Security Strategy (USD 36 million); Jamaica: Second Expansion of the Citizen Security 
and Justice Program II (USD 11.5 million); Brazil: Prevention of Youth Violence in Rio 
Grande State (USD 61 million); Brazil: Social Inclusion and Opportunities for Youth in Rio 
de Janeiro (USD 100 million)). 
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77 IADB specialists in charge of designing the Costa Rica project explained that the amount was even larger 
during negotiations and corresponded to what the Government asked. There were no limits from the IADB’s 
side. On the contrary, the approved amount USD 132 million is in line with a general trend to approve larger 
loans since the realignment. 
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Figure 12: Approved amount (in USD million) in citizen 
security at the IADB, by country 
 
Note: Countries are presented in chronological order, Colombia 
being the first project to be approved and Ecuador the last one.  
Source: Project Loan Documents, available at the IADB 
operational website: www.iadb.org, accessed August 2011. 
 
 
Figure 14: Number of IADB's projects in citizen security 
(yearly approvals), 1998-2011 
	 ﾠ
 
Source: IADB’s operational portal, available at the www.iadb.org, 
accessed August 2011. 
 
Figure 13: Approved amount (in USD million) in 
violence prevention at the World Bank, by country 
 
Note: The amounts included are those of the 
components that explicitly target violence prevention.  
Source: Loan Documents of projects, available at the 
World Bank operational portal, www.worldbank.org, 
accessed August 2011. 
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Figure 15: Number of WB projects financing 
violence prevention components (yearly approvals), 
1998-2011 
 
Source: World Bank’s operational portal, available at 
www.worldbank.org, accessed August 2011. 
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The IADB projects adopt a multi-sector approach. They usually combine two to four of the 
following components: (i) Institutional strengthening of local and national institutions in 
charge of citizen security, including improving support to strategy making/evidence-based 
public  policies,  capacity  building,  information  systems  and  crime  observatories;  (ii) 
Community  policing,  mainly  through  capacity  building/training  and  equipment;  (iii) 
Community services, including community mobilisation, social services (domestic violence 
prevention/attention,  youth-at-risk  services,  educational,  vocational  and  recreational 
activities, youth employment) and situational prevention; (iv) Justice, mainly strengthening 
of  criminal  justice  system;  (v)  Rehabilitation/reinsertion  of  young  offenders;  and  (vi) 
Communication and social awareness, mainly through campaigns.
78, 79 Appendix C presents 
IADB’s citizen security projects with their respective objectives and components. The Unit 
of the Modernization of the State (whose name and acronym since 2007 is the Institutional 
Capacity of the State, ICF/ICS) prepared all projects with the participation of specialists 
from Social Development, Health, Social Protection, and/or Education Units. Chile is an 
exception since the Social Development Unit prepared the proposal.
80  
 
At the World Bank, the first three loans that included components on violence and crime 
prevention were Urban Development projects. The approach was to incorporate measures 
to target the most vulnerable population, to provide them with basic services in terms of 
infrastructure,  to  improve  their  immediate  environment  following  Crime  Prevention 
Through  Environmental  Design  (CPTED)  principles,  and  to  develop  social  services  to 
address risk factors, such as youth idleness, lack of support for domestic violence, lack of 
training  or  opportunities.  The  approach  was  deliberately  ‘humble’  (as  the  World  Bank 
presents it itself), and focused on neighbourhood-level initiatives (barrios). The objective 
was  to  develop  ‘synergies’  (mainly  at  the  municipal  level)  through  comprehensive 
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78 Compilation based on loan documents of all citizen security projects.  
 
79 In its 2010 evaluation of Citizen Security projects, OVE, the IADB’s independent Office for Oversight and 
Evaluation  classified  the  components  in  four  categories:  (i)  institutional  capacity;  (ii)  educational;  (iii) 
community participation; (iv) situational prevention (OVE 2010:11-13). 
 
80 This is due to the organisation of the IADB until 2007, which was divided into regions. As explained later 
in the chapter, citizen security was led by the ICF/ICS team in two out of three regions and by the Social 
Development team in the third region.  
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interventions  that  would  focus  on  prevention  (both  situational  and  social)  and  would 
complement  efforts  by  the  police  (but  without  being  part  of  the  latter),  and  involve 
partnerships with other levels of government, civil society organisations and the private 
sector. The interventions include diagnoses (mapping, victimisation surveys, willingness to 
pay for safety, community-based and situational diagnoses), situational prevention (mainly 
through  CPTED  methodology  and  urban  renewal),  capacity  building  and  technical 
assistance  (all  stakeholders),  grants  for  complementary  investments  and  activities 
(additional  activities  not  funded  by  the  project  but  to  which  the  community  has  given 
priority), community organisers (to coordinate the work and liaise with other stakeholders), 
and  monitoring  and  evaluation  (advanced  sampling  and  evaluation  methodologies  with 
control groups).
81 The two recent Development Policy Loans (DPLs) (2011 Rio and 2011 
Honduras) adopt a wider perspective, for they aim to support national strategies to promote 
citizen  security  in  each  country.  In  Brazil  (Rio),  the  DPL  still  focuses  on  urban 
development and the component of crime and violence combines situational and social 
prevention methods (in a similar pattern as for the previous Specific Investment Loans, 
SILs), while in Honduras, the DPL spans from the reform of taxation and pensions to 
citizen  security  and  education.  Bank  support  in  violence  and  crime  prevention  targets 
institutional  strengthening  of  the  new  coordinating  agency  in  charge  of  the  issue  and 
finances social prevention interventions. So far, none of the above-mentioned projects have 
addressed criminal justice reforms. They refer to them and acknowledge the need for such 
measures, but do not finance them.  
 
Before analysing the variables that explain the evolution of violence prevention within both 
MDBs (Chapters 7 and 8), it is important to understand the institutional context in which 
this evolution has taken place. Sections 6.2 and 6.3 review such contexts for first the IADB, 
and then, the World Bank. 
6.2 Citizen security at the IADB: learning by doing?  
	 ﾠ
The emergence and evolution of citizen security at the IADB can be summarised in four 
chronological sequences. 
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81http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/LACEXT/EXTLACREGTOPURBDEV/0,,
contentMDK:21084425~pagePK:34004173~piPK:34003707~theSitePK:841043,00.html accessed throughout 
2011, last visit January 11, 2012. 	 ﾠ
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6.2.1 The beginning (1996-2001): standing up to respond to countries’ needs 
	 ﾠ
In  the  1990s,  violence  and  crime  were  very  serious  concerns  in  many  parts  of  Latin 
America and the Caribbean (see Section 5.1 in Chapter 5). The issue then began to emerge 
in countries’ discussions with donors. At that time, with the eighth General Capital Increase 
(GCI-8) that took place in 1995, the IADB had become the largest MDB in LAC with more 
than  50  per  cent  of  multilateral  financing.
82 The  regional  bank  then  took  the  lead  in 
consultative groups with other donors in many countries in the region. In the same year 
(1995),  violence  appeared  in  negotiations  for  a  loan  in  El  Salvador.  However,  internal 
resistance within the IADB led to a restructuring of the loan into a Justice Reform project. 
It was eventually approved in 1996, and nonetheless included a citizen security component. 
That was the first lending component explicitly targeting violence prevention, but it was 
somehow hidden within a less controversial Justice Reform operation (OVE 2014).  
 
At the same time, in Colombia, public authorities manifested their will to reach out to the 
international community to respond to violence. As described in Section 5.1.2 in Chapter 5, 
at  the  end  of  1990s,  the  Andean  country  faced  high  homicide  rates,  with  important 
differences  among  cities.
83  The  experience  of  Bogotá  under  the  first  Mockus 
Administration (1995-97) showed that preventive and multi-pronged interventions could be 
effective,  with  a  reduction  in  homicides  rate  from  58.8  to  47  homicides  per  100,000 
inhabitants between 1995 and 1997.
84 The Colombian Government wanted to pursue and 
expand  the  experience,  and  implement  it  in  other  cities.  The  National  Department  for 
Planning  (Departamento Nacional de Planeación)  worked  together  with  the  three  main 
cities of the country (Bogotá, Medellin and Cali) to develop local strategies to address 
violence. They organised consultations with experts, academics and donors, including the 
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82IADB, Review of the Inter-American Development Bank’s Ordinary Capital and Fund for Special 
Operations Requirements, March 10, 2009: 1, 4, available at: 
http://IADBdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=2019020, accessed June 17, 2012. 
 
83 There were, for example, 248 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants in Medellin and 112 in Cali in 1995 
(IADB 1999:1). 
 
84 Mockus,  A.  (undated).  Advancing  against  violence  in  Bogota,  Creating  Civic  Agency  and  ‘Cultural 
Change’:  The  Case  of  Bogotá,  available  at:  http://www.paho.org/english/ad/fch/ca/BogotaViolence.pdf, 
accessed June 2012. 
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IADB and the World Bank. They eventually raised the question as to who would be willing 
to finance the strategies. The IADB stood up to support the initiative despite the novelty of 
the loan and resistance within the Bank.
 85 In fact, the reputational risks associated with 
working on violence were considered to be very high for a development organisation (see 
Section  7.1  for  a  detailed  explanation).  The  then  IADB  President,  Enrique  Iglesias, 
however, supported the initiative. His frequent travels to the region made clear to him how 
important the issue was, and the multi-pronged, negative impact it had on development.
86 In 
1999, President Iglesias declared:
87 
‘Violence is not inevitable, but to reduce it we need to act right away. Governments 
should  take  the  initiative  and  work  in  a  concerted  effort  with  civil  society,  the 
private sector, and the mass media to assure the rights, health and economic welfare 
of citizens. The IADB supports these efforts.’ 
 
But  even  with  the  support  of  IADB’s  President,  approving  the  first  loan  on  violence 
prevention had not been easy according to the IADB’s staff (Interview, Washington, D.C., 
July 2011). Senior Managers advised the President to let the Board decide on whether or 
not to approve the loan. The Colombia project was therefore presented to the Board that 
eventually approved it in 1998. The voting majority at the Board belonged to the Latin 
American and Caribbean countries
88 that were more sensitised to the issue because most 
countries in the region faced challenges in terms of violence and crime (Interview with 
IADB Executive Directors, Washington, D.C., June 2011, see Section 7.1 in Chapter 7 for 
further analysis). They therefore supported the initiative. A door was opened. 
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85 When capitalised, ‘the Bank’ is a common appellation used within both the IADB and the World Bank to 
call their own organisation. It is used as such in the text. Without capital letters, the bank or the banks refer to 
the generic name, i.e. the short version of multilateral development banks. 
	 ﾠ
86 Interview with an Executive Director at the IADB who was very close to President Iglesias (Washington, 
D.C., July 2011). 
 
87 IADB  News  Release:  Initiative  to  support  citizens’  security  and  peaceful  coexistence,  July  30,  1999, 
available  at:  http://www.iadb.org/en/news/news-releases/1999-07-30/IADB-presents-video-and-statistics-on-
violence-in-latin-america,355.html, accessed June 17, 2012. 
 
88 Voting powers are determined by the amount of shares each member country holds. See Section 7.1 for 
further explanation and details regarding voting powers in MDBs.  
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Following  the  Colombia  project,  another  loan  was  approved  the  same  year,  1998,  for 
Uruguay. Both projects took an average of two years to prepare. The IADB facilitated 
access to international experts
89 to support national teams to design the operations, but as 
one adviser in Colombia recalled, the in-house expertise was weak on violence prevention 
and the IADB’s technical contribution to the first projects was minor (Interview, Medellin, 
May 2011). According to interviewed staff members, IADB’s position was to ‘learn by 
doing’ and to support the clients, even with lack of knowledge of what would work and 
what would not in developing countries. All the interviewees I met in Colombia generally 
acknowledged this: all of them appreciated the courage of the organisation to take the risk 
to support the initiative, but also highlighted that the IADB did not have enough technical 
capacity  to  provide  substantial  contribution  to  the  design  of  the  first  citizen  security 
projects  (see  Chapter  9  for  the  case  study  on  Colombia  and  further  discussion  on 
counterparts’ perception on MDBs’ relevance in violence prevention).  
 
Following  these  projects,  a  group  of  Colombians  inside  the  Bank  decided  to  take  the 
principles applied in Colombia (as reflected in IADB’s project in Colombia) and adapt 
them to other contexts, in particular to Central America and the Caribbean where violence 
and crime were most severe, and where the IADB played a leadership role among donors. 
In  2001,  IADB’s  Board  approved  the  first  Jamaican  Citizen  Security  and  Justice 
Programme  (CSJP).  Based  on  these  examples  (Colombia,  Uruguay,  Jamaica),  demand 
increased from other countries in the region (see Table 15). Such demand led IADB’s 
Management to ask for greater clarity on how the Bank could effectively support its clients 
in improving efforts to confront the challenge of violence and crime. At the same time, the 
third  Summit  of  the  Americas  strongly  called  for  Multilateral  Development  Banks  to 
support Governments of the region to develop strategies to prevent violence and crime.
90 
All  those  external  and  internal  messages  converged,  resulting  in  the  preparation  of  the 
Preliminary Guidelines for IADB Violence Prevention projects.  
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89 Until then, public policies had been developed more on a political basis than on a scientific and evidence-
based one, according to an adviser who contributed to the design of the Medellin project. (Interview, in 
Medellin, Colombia, May 2011) 
 
90 http://www.summit-americas.org/eng-2002/quebeccity-summit.htm,  accessed  December  25,  2011.  See 
Chapter 1, Section 1.2. 
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6.2.2 Trying to operationalise a preventive, multi-sector approach (2002-2007) 
Following the first projects and considering the region’s situation in terms of violence and 
crime,  IADB’s  Management  and  operational  staff  asked  for  guidelines  in  the  area  of 
violence  prevention.  In  2002,  the  IADB  approved  the  ‘Preliminary  Guidelines  for  the 
Design  of  Violence  Reduction  Projects  (Document  CP-2190-9)  (thereafter,  2002 
Guidelines or Preliminary Guidelines). The Social Department prepared them,
91 with inputs 
from the Modernisation of the State team (ICF/ICS for its acronym). Their objective was to 
clarify IADB’s scope of interventions and to provide operational guidance to teams with 
little or no experience in violence prevention. The 2002 Guidelines specifically mentioned 
that they were ‘preliminary’ and would evolve along with the knowledge gained by the 
organisation from both operational experience, and in-house and external research:   
‘These guidelines are a work in progress; they must evolve and incorporate more 
best practices and lessons learned specific to the Bank and the region, as the Bank 
progressively gains more experience in this area’ (as cited in IADB 2009:3). 
 
There too, the approach described was clearly ‘learning by doing’ with the implication that 
it was the responsibility of the Bank to support its client countries to find solutions to this 
complex issue (Interview, Washington, D.C., April 2011). Since the Bank approved the 
Colombia project in 1998, debates on the rationale for its engagement were intense within 
the organisation (opcit). The Preliminary Guidelines then focused on making the case for 
IADB’s relevance in violence and crime prevention, emphasising costs and consequences 
in terms of development. The 2002 Guidelines also mentioned the political mandate given 
by Heads of State and Government gathered in the 2001 Quebec Summit of the Americas 
(IADB 2002:4; see quote in Section 1.2 in Chapter 1).  
 
The Preliminary Guidelines emphasised a multi-sector approach with a strong focus on 
prevention as justified by its cost-effectiveness. Gender, through domestic violence against 
women, is present throughout the document, but issues of masculinities or cultural change 
are not mentioned. The Preliminary Guidelines proposed that the IADB follows a mixed 
approach of stand-alone operations and components in projects of other sectors, such as 
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91 At the time, one unit within the IADB centrally prepared all institutional guidelines. 
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Health, Education, Justice and Urban Development. Such an approach could have led to a 
mainstreaming approach in the longer term, but the Preliminary Guidelines did not develop 
further on how to concretely implement this dual approach, nor did they adopt an explicit 
gender perspective to the issue. Instead, the Preliminary Guidelines focused on defining 
three broad priority areas: (i) public policy planning; (ii) violence prevention; and (iii) 
certain  selected  activities  related  to  control,  criminal  justice  and  rehabilitation  (IADB 
2002:3). They included work on police and prisons, with limits mainly left to the discretion 
of operational teams. In fact, the Preliminary Guidelines provided minimal guidance and 
left decisions to be made on a case-by-case basis. Some prohibitions are stated based on the 
Articles of Agreement: the IADB could not finance arms and drugs, and could not get 
directly involved in political matters. However, the rest of the guidance was broad and 
open.  
 
Following the Preliminary Guidelines, six projects were approved, including five in Central 
American countries (the sixth being Chile in 2003) (see Table 15). At that time, in 2002-
2006, the IADB was organised in three regions.
92 The group of Colombian specialists who 
designed the first projects worked in the Central American region. The scope of the issue 
and the sensitivity of the IADB team working in Central America explain to a large extent 
why  the  projects  concentrated  efforts  in  this  region.  The  design  was  a  mix  of  social 
interventions  to  prevent  violence  combined  with  institutional  strengthening  and  police 
reform, and at times, justice sector reforms (see Appendix C). The team then changed 
following Bank’s realignment initiated by the new IADB President.  
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92 From 1994 to 2007, the IADB was structured in three geographic regions: Regions 1, 2 and 3 with each 
region having its own departments, such as Sustainable Development (SDS), Trade and Integration (INT), and 
the  Private  Sector (PRI). With the realignment  that  occurred  in  2007,  the  structure  shifted  to  four  vice-
presidencies  that  report  directly  to  the  President  and  the  Executive  Vice-President  of  the  IADB:  Vice-
Presidency of Countries; Vice-Presidency of Sectors and Knowledge; Vice-Presidency of Private Sector and 
Non-sovereign  Guaranteed  Operations;  and  Vice-Presidency  of  Finance  and  Administration.  (IADB 
Restructuring:  ‘What  Does  It  Mean?  Risks  and  Opportunities  Based  on  Current  Available  Information’, 
January 22, 2007, Washington DC, available at: http://www.bicusa.org/en/Article.3096.aspx, accessed June 
2012). 
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6.2.3 Going back to criminal justice? (2007-2009) 
In  2005,  Luis  Alberto  Moreno  succeeded  Enrique  Iglesias  as  IADB’s  President.  With 
President Moreno, the regional bank began a process of deep reform and realignment. The 
realignment took place in 2007.
93 The objective was to bring the organisation closer to the 
countries’ needs, and make it more effective and efficient with greater accountability on the 
development impact of its interventions.
94 This entailed profound changes in institutional 
organisation  and  in  staffing.  Instead  of  having  virtually  three  banks  operating,  the 
realignment would centralise and harmonise the work. The three regions were merged and a 
new matrix was adopted. Citizen Security used to belong to the ICF/ICS in Regions 2 and 
3, and to the Social Department in Region 1. In parallel, many Senior Managers either left 
or changed position. For Citizen Security, this meant that many of the staff working on this 
issue left the IADB (many of them joined the World Bank, or retired).
95 A new centralised 
team was formed (as the division by region disappeared), the Institutional Capacity of the 
State (ICF/ICS), with the mandate to work on citizen security for the whole LAC. Three 
projects were approved in 2008 and 2009 following the realignment: Panama, Argentina 
and Jamaica II (see Table 15). In this new organisational context and with serious issues of 
violence and crime persisting in the region, new operational guidelines were prepared.  
	 ﾠ
In 2009, IADB’s Board of Directors approved the ‘Operational Guidelines for Programme 
Design  and  Execution  in  the  Area  of  Civic  Coexistence  and  Public  Safety’  (GN-2535 
06/OCT/2009)  (thereafter,  Operational  Guidelines  or  2009  Guidelines),  superseding  the 
preliminary  ones  approved  seven  years  earlier.  The  new  guidelines’  objective  was  to 
‘provide staff with the overall operating approach to the civic coexistence and public safety 
sector’ (IADB 2009:4). They adopt a new terminology ‘civic coexistence and public safety’ 
as compared to ‘violence reduction’ in the Preliminary Guidelines, but do not reflect on this 
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93 The realignment was agreed at the annual meeting in Belo Horizonte and approved in December 2006. 
 
94 Document AB-2582, The realignment to date: main achievement as of March 2008, p. 1-4. 
 
95 According to several IADB interviewees in Washington (Interviews, April and July 2011). Some of them 
even suggested that almost all staff members working in citizen security changed following the realignment 
(except two including the actual coordinator who got promoted as such for this same reason), but I could not 
verify this information. 
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shift in vocabulary. This shift is also not clearly translated into the three ‘priority target 
areas’ that include a broad list of activities without being prioritised: 
(i)  The  first  component  refers  to  ‘public  policy  planning’  and  includes  government 
policies,  comprehensive  analysis  of  citizen  security,  institutional  capacity  building,  and 
strategic knowledge for decision-making.  
(ii)  The  second  component  deals  with  ‘prevention  activities’.  This  includes  a 
multidimensional focus, activities specifically targeted at vulnerable and at-risk minors and 
youth, prevention of domestic violence, sexual violence and gender violence, activities to 
improve  social  interaction  within  communities,  situational  prevention  activities,  and 
support for the prevention of organised crime.  
(iii)  The  third  component  is  entitled  ‘activities  relating  to  prevention,  criminal  and 
alternative justice and rehabilitation from a preventive perspective’. This includes policy 
frameworks  and  administrative  cultures,  support  for  policing  and  penitentiary  systems, 
support for the criminal and alternative justice sector, and support for social rehabilitation 
(opcit).  
In other words, the Operational Guidelines provide an ample catalogue of interventions that 
the  IADB  could  support.  There  is  no  prioritisation,  i.e.  no  analysis  of  comparative 
advantage of the Bank on where it could contribute the most (based on staff expertise, 
experience and resources availability). As for gender, it is mentioned only in relation to 
domestic and gender-based violence. That is, the Operational Guidelines solely focus on 
gender practical needs, and do not question the connection between violence and gender 
inequality, nor do they acknowledge the gendered continuum of violence (see Chapter 2, 
Section  2.5.3).  The  Operational  Guidelines  still  refer  (as  did  the  2002  Preliminary 
Guidelines) to what the IADB should not finance because of the high reputational risk 
linked to the risk for abuse to human and civil rights and the interference in countries’ 
political affairs they entail. Here again, the final decision is left to the judgment of the 
operational teams. The Operational Guidelines also include some mitigation mechanisms 
for potential risks in working with the police and the penitentiary systems, such as the 
collaboration with other specialised bodies, where the expertise called upon lies in other 
agencies. However, no criteria are mentioned to apply such mitigation mechanisms.  
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In terms of approach, the Operational Guidelines still mention the possibility of including 
components to prevent and reduce violence within other sectors (which could lead to a 
mainstreaming approach to violence prevention as previously considered in the Preliminary 
Guidelines, see Section 6.2.2), but do not provide a roadmap, or even a clear call for the 
Bank to implement such an approach. When the Operational Guidelines were approved in 
2009,  the  IADB  was  preparing  the  ninth  General  Capital  Increase  that  was  considered 
necessary for the organisation to be able to support the region’s needs for the next decade. 
This new funding replenishment marks a milestone in the recent history of the IADB as, for 
the first time, the Governors conditioned their additional financing on compliance with a 
result framework, which had 2015 as time horizon. The result framework includes citizen 
security indicators and gives clear incentives towards increased lending.  
6.2.4 Renewing priority to citizen security but without clarity in goal or 
strategy (2010-2015) 
During the recent period, the IADB reaffirmed the importance given to citizen security. 
This appears through a combination of institutional statements and operational documents. 
In 2010, the ninth General Capital Increase (GCI-9) took place with a report outlining the 
roadmap for the Bank for the next five years (2010-2015). For the preparation of the GCI-9, 
the IADB organised a survey of over 3000 representatives of civil society organisations. 
The objective was to identify the comparative advantage of the Bank in the region and the 
areas  that  should  be  prioritised  looking  forward.  Among  the  top  challenges  identified, 
citizen  security  ranked  third,  following  quality  education  and  social  security  (IADB 
2011:27). This gave a clear signal to IADB’s Management and Board of Governors. As a 
result,  the  GCI-9  report  includes  citizen  security  in  its  result  framework.  The  output 
indicator that the Bank should reach by 2015 was to assist 32 cities in the region with 
citizen security programmes. The baseline indicator was the rate of homicides (27.5 per 
100,000 inhabitants),
96 but no target was set for 2015. As mentioned earlier, the GCI-9 sets 
the roadmap agreed by the Governors, the highest body and owners of the IADB.  As such, 
the fact that citizen security was included in the result framework clearly indicates the 
importance given to the issue by the organisation. Yet, the chosen indicator is vague, and 
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96 It is not clear whether this figure is for 2009 or 2010, Strategy GN2587-2 (IADB 2011:34). 
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the  strategy  of  the  Bank  to  affirm  a  comparative  advantage  in  the  sector  is  undefined 
beyond the Operational Guidelines that are themselves broad and vague (see Section 6.2.4).  
 
Following the GCI-9, the IADB approved new sector strategies. Among them, two directly 
relate  to  violence  prevention:  the  Sector  Strategy  Institutions  for  Growth  and  Social 
Welfare and the Strategy on Social Policy for Equity and Productivity. Citizen security is 
part of the first, while youth-at-risk, gender-based and domestic violence are included in the 
second, even though both documents refer to each other regarding those matters. The sector 
strategy on Institutions selected its priority areas based on the combination of regional 
development challenges, potential demand from clients and IADB’s comparative advantage 
(IADB 2011:9).
97 Within the identified priorities, citizen security stands out as a ‘niche’ for 
the  regional  bank  (opcit:5).
98 It  is  formally  part  of  the  third  priority  area  that  aims  to 
improve the enabling environment for growth and social welfare.
99 In a similar fashion as 
for  the  2009  Operational  Guidelines,  the  strategy  provides  three  broad  directions  for 
IADB’s involvement in citizen security.
100, 101  
 
Other institutional statements and documents show the growing importance given to the 
issue of citizen security at the IADB. The framework for Sustainable Cities includes a 
component  on  citizen  security  as  safe  cities.    IADB’s  President  Moreno,  a  Colombian 
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97 The  strategy  specifies  that  the  comparative  advantages  of  the  IADB  involve  ‘enough  expertise  and 
knowledge  and  capacity  to  effectively  add  value  to  policymaking  in  borrowing  countries.  […]  The 
comparative  advantages  of  the  Bank  were  assessed  on  the  basis  of  an  internal  analysis  of  institutional 
mandates and limitations relative to other development organisations, prior operations, methodological tools 
and in-house knowledge.’ (IADB 2011:9)  
 
98 A 2009 study by Reyes on the niches for the IADB states that 80 per cent ‘of the total financial flows from 
multilateral organisations in support of citizen security projects come from the IADB.’ (Reyes 2009 cited in 
GN2587-2 (IADB 2011:5). Latinobarómetro and FLACSO surveys also show that citizens put citizen security 
in the top priorities for development in the region. 
 
99 The three priority areas for the Institutions strategy are: (i) improving innovation and productivity for 
growth and social welfare; (ii) improving the provision and utilisation of resources for growth and social 
welfare; and (iii) improving the enabling environment for growth and social welfare. 
 
100 Which is unsurprising since the same team wrote both texts.  
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101 The three directions for IADB’s support in citizen security are: (i) Supporting public policy planning and 
implementation;  (ii)  Preventing  crime  and  violence,  with  a  focus  given  on  multi-dimensionality  of  the 
problem addressing several risk factors and targeting at-risk population; and (iii) Criminal and alternative 
justice and rehabilitation from a preventive perspective (IADB 2011: 27-28). 
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national, in his book A decade for Latin America: a real opportunity (2010), insists on the 
importance of citizen security for the region and includes it as a key area for IADB’s 
assistance  in  the  coming  years.  The  Office  of  Oversight  and  Evaluation  (OVE),  the 
independent evaluation unit of the Bank that reports directly to the Board of Directors, 
included the issue in its work programme for the period 2010-2014 (three evaluations in 
three years),
102 which shows the importance of the issue both for the organisation and the 
region. In terms of operational translation of the importance given to citizen security, since 
2009 and until 2011, the Bank approved three projects in citizen security (see Table 15 and 
Figure 14) and a major Citizen Security Initiative with up to 20 million US dollars in grants 
to  facilitate  cooperation  and  disseminate  knowledge  in  the  region  (IADB  2012).  New 
Country Strategies
103 also included violence prevention as major components for the four 
years  going  forward.  Uruguay  is  a  recent  example  with  its  Country  Strategy  stating 
violence prevention as a priority.  
 
The set of institutional and operational documents shows how the IADB considers violence 
and  crime  as  a  development  issue  and  a  priority  for  the  region,  and  gives  it  the 
corresponding importance for the organisation, at least in rhetoric given the relatively small 
but increasing number of citizen security projects approved so far. The process tracing also 
reveals an evolution in terms of the preferred solutions to the issue with a greater emphasis 
on traditional criminal justice interventions in recent years, in contrast to the beginning of 
the  period  when  the  IADB  really  pushed  forward  the  social  and  situational  prevention 
agenda. Overall, what seems to be missing is a firm standpoint for the regional bank, that 
is, a clear goal and the corresponding operational strategy that sets priorities and provides 
concrete  tools  and  staffing  to  implement  the  multi-sector  approach  set  forth  in  both 
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102 In 2010, OVE did an evaluation of Citizen Security projects approved until 2009, mainly focusing on the 
evaluability of Citizen Security projects. In 2012, OVE prepared a comparative project review that aimed to 
provide operational recommendations on the design of Citizen Security projects. In 2013, OVE undertook a 
comprehensive sector evaluation of crime and violence. 
	 ﾠ
103 The Country Strategies are very important since the programming needs to be planned within and in 
accordance with the Strategy. However, in terms of operational importance, Country Programming (done 
yearly) is the key instrument since it is when projects are included in the portfolio (or not). Teams depend 
therefore on Country Programming to prepare and propose investment loans to the Board. It can happen that 
Country  Programming  includes  loans  in  sectors  that  are  not  included  in  the  Country  Strategy  when  the 
situation changes and the Government specifically asks for the assistance on a particular issue.  
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guidelines approved to date. The gender dimension also appears limited to the mention of 
domestic and gender-based violence, and do not explicitly acknowledge the link between 
gender  inequality,  patriarchy  and  the  reproduction  of  violence.  Such  acknowledgement 
would have given a clear stance for the organisation in its understanding of violence. The 
following section examines these questions in the case of the World Bank.   
6.3 Violence and crime prevention at the World Bank: a cautious and selective 
LAC-driven evolution  
 
The evolution of violence and crime prevention at the World Bank follows a different 
dynamic to the IADB’s. The emergence and development of the issue, both in the Latin 
American  and  Caribbean  Region  (commonly  called  LAC)  and  at  the  Anchors,
104 is 
summarised in five periods.  
6.3.1 Opening the door through analytical work (1998-2002) 
In  the  mid-1990s,  the  World  Bank’s  Chief  Economist  for  LAC,  Guillermo  Perry,  a 
Colombian national, led a study on the econometric determinants of violence and crime 
with a cross-country analysis. In 1998, the ‘Determinants of Crime Rates in Latin America 
and  the  World:  An  Empirical  Assessment’  was  published  (Fajnzylber,  Lederman  and 
Loayza 1998). In 2000, followed ‘Crime and Victimisation: An Economic Perspective’ 
from  the  same  authors.  These  publications  made  the  case  for  violence  and  crime  as  a 
development issue. They showed that inequality, more than poverty alone, was correlated 
to  higher  levels  of  violence  and  crime.  These  studies  formally  opened  a  space  for 
discussion on the issue at the World Bank.
105 In the same period, the Anchor of Social 
Development published the first studies on violence and crime at the country level, first in 
Jamaica (Moser and Holland 1997), and then in Colombia and Guatemala using urban 
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104 The World Bank is organised in Sectors, Regions and Anchors. The Anchors are central units that aim to 
provide the policy guidance and the institutional positioning of the Bank in central issues of development. 
They provide also technical support to the Regions. 
 
105 The first studies dealing with violence focused on gender-based violence in 1993. However, dialogue on 
violence as a development issue within the World Bank really began to gain visibility with Fajnzylberg et al. 
studies, according to all interviewees at the World Bank. This might suggest how gender-based violence was 
considered at the periphery of the issue of violence and crime.  
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appraisal techniques (Moser and McIlwaine 2001).
 106 These studies were undertaken under 
the leadership of Caroline Moser, who had then joined the LAC Social Development Unit. 
Moser developed a research agenda on violence in collaboration with UK academics. This 
included a series of literature reviews useful to clarify the state of knowledge on issues the 
Bank was not accustomed to work on (for instance, on violence as a development issue 
(McIlwaine 1999); youth gangs (Rodgers 1999); gender-based violence (Moser and Moser 
2003); and urban violence (Winton 2004)). When Moser left the World Bank, no one took 
over  the  issue,  and  the  World  Bank  remained  without  specialists  in  charge  of  urban 
violence for the following four years (Interview, Washington, D.C., March 2011).  
6.3.2 Clarifying the Bank’s positioning on violence prevention in LAC (2003-
2008) 
Given the importance of the issue of violence and crime in the LAC region, the need to 
develop  in-house  responses  became  clearer  and  clearer.  In  2003,  the  LAC  Urban 
Development unit called upon the person who previously worked with Moser to develop 
municipal  strategies  to  urban  violence  and  crime.  The  objective  was  to  operationalise 
responses to a very complex issue that was largely misunderstood at that time (Interview, 
Washington, D.C., March 2011). The agenda took a three-pronged approach:  
(i)  Development  of  the  analytical  basis  with  the  Poverty  Reduction  and  Economic 
Management  Vice-Presidency  (PREM)  through  Economic  Sector  Works  (ESW)  on 
violence  and  crime.  The  objective  was  to  strengthen  the  rationale  for  the  Bank  to  get 
involved in the issue and to internally make the case for it to Management and Country 
Directors. Three ESWs were published.
107  
(ii)  Capacity building through the development of a training course, first face-to-face, and 
then online (now fully managed by the World Bank Institute, WBI).
108 The Bank mobilised 
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106 These studies were very important in showing the perspective of women and men, girls and boys who 
suffered the most from violence. Through participatory techniques, community members in disadvantaged 
and highly violent neighbourhood expressed what they needed and considered would be effective to prevent 
violence. However, these studies did not translate into operations.  
 
107 ESWs included one in Brazil (2006), another in the Caribbean with the United Nations Office on Drugs 
and Crime (UNODC) (2008), and a last one in Central America (published in 2011). 
 
108 The original course was held in Spanish in 2006. It was then adapted to the World Bank-TEC platform (of 
the TEC de Monterrey, in Mexico –ITESM) that delivers the course in collaboration with the World Bank. It 
is called ‘Diplomado Ciudad Segura’ and approximately 2000 persons have been trained through this course 
(informal data given by one of the course designer, June 2012). In 2009-2010, the course was developed in 	 ﾠ
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international  experts,  in  particular  from  South  Africa  and  Latin  America,  to  develop 
training courses and guides. The focus was mainly on situational and social prevention, 
with three resource guides published.
109 
(iii)  Operational  work,  with  an  approach  choosing  to  include  violence  prevention 
components  in  Urban  Development  projects.  The  idea  was  to  take  advantage  of  the 
expertise  of  the  Bank  in  Urban  Development  and  to  include  CPTED  and  social 
development  activities  within  those  projects  (see  Table  16).  The  position  to  opt  for 
components instead of stand-alone projects was mainly due to the resistance within the 
Bank  to  embark  on  violence  prevention  (Interviews,  World  Bank,  Washington,  D.C., 
February and April 2011) (see Section 7.1 in Chapter 7 for further analysis). The LAC team 
thus advanced very cautiously, pedagogically explaining that the components would be 
limited to preventive interventions at the community level.  
 
This became the strategy on violence and crime prevention that the World Bank would 
slowly develop over the years. Again, the approach was to convince, both internally and 
externally, by developing tools, methods and studies. Contrary to the IADB that did not 
prioritise or select among possible interventions, the World Bank clearly delimited its scope 
of intervention: the Bank could only offer situational and social prevention programmes, no 
police-related  or  prison-related  interventions.  Most  of  World  Bank  staff  interviewed, 
former and actual, considered this limited and specific positioning as an advantage. For 
them, the lack of major limitations at the IADB led the regional bank to finance too risky 
police-related  reforms.
110 This  perception  of  advantage,  however,  began  to  change  later 
with new staff in charge of the issue (see Section 6.3.4). During the period, three projects 
were approved (see Table 16). The Honduras ‘Barrio Ciudad’ project took two years to 
prepare. According to World Bank staff interviewed, the discussion with the Government 
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English, with a special focus to the Caribbean and African countries. The pilot for this course was held in 
March-May 2011 (37 participants), then a first promotion took the course in September-December 2011 (44 
participants) and a second promotion in March-June 2012 (49 participants) (data given by e-course designer, 
June 2012). 
 
109 The resource guides included: ‘Municipal Capacity Building Course on Crime and Violence Prevention’; a 
toolkit on school-based violence prevention; and a toolkit on public private alliances for citizen security. 
 
110 Section 7.1 in Chapter 7 discusses the respective interpretation of both banks of their own Articles of 
Agreement in relation to what could be done or not in violence and crime prevention, in particular in terms of 
getting involved in police-related and other criminal justice matters. 	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was focused on finding solutions to very disadvantaged and violent neighbourhoods, and 
the concern came from the President of Honduras himself who took part in the discussions 
with the World Bank on these issues. In Jamaica, the discussions on violence prevention 
were  embedded  in  the  urban  poverty  discussions,  which  also  focused  on  most  violent 
neighbourhoods. In Brazil, the Bank team suggested the inclusion of violence prevention 
elements in the Slum Upgrading project of Bahia. So for this latter project, the Bank took a 
proactive  role  as  regard  to  incorporating  a  violence  prevention  scope  (Interview, 
Washington,  D.C.,  April  2011).  The  development  of  the  agenda  went  through  a  slow 
process because the team was very small (two to three persons including only one staff 
member, the others being consultants). Convincing the Bank to get involved in violence 
prevention and letting the countries know that the organisation could support them in this 
area took several years. All the activities that made possible the development of the World 
Bank’s violence prevention agenda were funded by Trust Funds. At the same time, the 
Social  Protection  department  developed  an  agenda  on  youth-at-risk.  This  led  to  the 
publication of a regional study on youth-at-risk as well as toolkits to promote operational 
work  on  the  issue.  Both  departments  (Urban  Development  and  Social  Protection) 
collaborated on the issue of violence prevention. The Gender Anchor, on the other hand, 
published some studies on domestic violence, gender-based violence, and masculinities, but 
the priority was clearly given to women’s economic empowerment, and this was even more 
so when, in 2007, the new Director of the Gender Anchor took office (see Section 6.3.4). 
6.3.3 Expanding demand and offer for Bank’s support: LAC’s renewed agenda 
on violence prevention (2009-2011) 
In  2009,  the  responsibility  for  violence  and  crime  prevention  went  from  Urban 
Development to Social Development in the LAC region. The Urban department had many 
issues  within  its  agenda  and  violence  was  getting  very  little  visibility,  for  the  Sector 
Manager did not position it as a central topic (Interview, Washington, D.C., March 2011). 
At the same time, the Social Development department was interested in taking the lead on 
the issue and a Sr. Specialist who had recently joined the department was willing to take the 
lead  as  coordinator  for  violence  prevention  in  LAC.  This  is  how  the  agendas  got 
rebalanced, and the violence and crime leadership passed from the Urban Development 
department to the Social Development one. However, collaboration continued between both 	 ﾠ
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departments, as the projects approved that far were still affiliated to Urban Development. 
Specialists directly involved in violence prevention in LAC perceived the shift differently. 
Some argued that it disadvantaged the importance given to violence and crime, as Urban 
Development is a ‘more prestigious’ unit within the Bank than Social Development, for 
Social  Development  is  more  a  ‘supportive  unit’  than  an  operational  one  (Social 
Development is the unit that develops safeguards and has a very small operational portfolio 
on its own). Others argued that it benefitted the issue since it made more sense to put 
violence  and  crime  under  the  wider  spectrum  of  social  development  to  avoid  focusing 
solely on the infrastructure side of situational prevention. In addition, having the support of 
the  Sector  Manager  was  considered  very  important  for  the  visibility  of  the  issue 
(Interviews, Washington, D.C., July 2011) (see Section 8.2 in Chapter 8 for the discussion 
on the location of responsibility).  
 
The new LAC team in charge of violence prevention decided to renew the agenda in terms 
of what the Bank could offer in violence prevention so as to gain visibility at the country 
level. So far, the World Bank had played a minor role on violence prevention, leaving the 
IADB a quasi-monopoly on the issue (Interview, Washington, D.C., April 2011).  The new 
LAC team thus focused its efforts on developing policy dialogue and development policy 
loans in the largest countries in the region (Mexico and Brazil). They also increasingly 
considered  expanding  the  offer  of  World  Bank’s  support  beyond  social  and  situational 
prevention, as suggested through the Rio DPL that supported the strategy of the city largely 
designed around strengthening Pacifying Police Units (UPP). In parallel, President Zoellick 
visited  Central  America  and  reaffirmed  the  Bank’s  commitment  to  support  Central 
American  countries  in  their  efforts  to  face  common  challenges,  including  security. 
Thereafter, the Bank engaged more proactively in Central America (DPL in Honduras, 
policy dialogue in Guatemala, and contribution to the regional SICA initiative). The Bank 
then approved the Bank first stand-alone in violence prevention in Honduras (2012). This 
renewed priority in LAC also helped to increase the collaboration with the Anchors. 	 ﾠ
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6.3.4 Absence of Bank-wide vision in violence prevention from a gender 
perspective (2009-2011) 
At the central level, violence was part of the Bank’s Urban Strategy until 2009. It then 
shifted to the Social Development Anchor, similarly to what occurred in the LAC region 
(see Section 6.3.3). In 2009, the group in charge of post-conflict situations was split into 
two central units that would complement each other: one called ‘Post-Conflict, Fragile and 
Conflict-Affected Countries Group’ (OPCFC) that would focus on simplifying procedures 
for the Bank to work in those countries; and one called ‘Social Cohesion and Violence 
Prevention’ that would focus on the policy side of the different forms of violence, including 
inter-personal  violence  in  urban  settings.  According  to  World  Bank  interviewees,  the 
creation  of  one  specific  central  unit  on  violence  was  a  response  to  the  LAC  region’s 
demand  for  more  support.  LAC  at  that  time  had  only  three  persons  working  on  urban 
violence (including only one staff member)
111 and could not respond to a growing country 
demand. In an overall context of budget constraint, the need for the Anchor’s cross support 
was heightened (Interview, Washington, D.C., April 2011). However, even at the Anchor, 
human resources were scarce. In fact, the Social Cohesion and Violence Prevention Anchor 
covered  many  issues  that  spanned  from  political  violence  and  civil  war  to  forced 
displacement, urban violence and crime, and youth and gender-based violence, with only 
twelve  specialists  (including  only  two  staff  members)  spread  across  these  issues. 
Nonetheless,  interviewees  considered  the  shift  of  responsibility  from  the  Urban  to  the 
Social Development Anchor coherent, for the urban agenda was crowded with too many 
issues and focused mainly on infrastructure, when ‘violence was much more complex than 
this’  (opcit;  see  Section  8.2  in  Chapter  8  for  further  analysis  on  the  location  for 
responsibility).  
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111 The difference between staff members and consultants has implications in terms of budget, responsibilities 
and continuity. Even though staff members are increasingly contracted for two to five years (instead of open-
ended positions as it was the case until recently), they are considered the core employees of the organisation 
and are the only ones who can lead a project. Consultants are usually employed to support teams and provide 
punctual expertise linked to a product. Nevertheless, MDBs increasingly employ consultants for budgetary 
purposes as their contracts are less protective and the benefits are less than those of staff members. The fact 
that teams have very few staff members gives an indication that the topic is not a priority for the organisation 
(see Section 7.2 in Chapter 7 for the discussion on actor power and the critical mass of its in-house experts). 
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The Anchor in charge of violence prevention did not opt to elaborate its own strategy,
112 
but instead referred to the 2005 Social Development Strategy.
113 In this strategy, violence 
prevention was included only through LAC’s lenses. It referred to two strategic priorities: 
(i)  policy  dialogue  at  the  macro-level,  and  (ii)  investment  lending.  The  first  strategic 
priority included a series of studies, including some (undetermined) on social violence and 
on  gender,
114 whereas  the  second  priority  broadly  referred  to  increasing  own-managed 
Social Development projects in a variety of topics
115 (World Bank 2005:14, 33-34). The 
only reference to violence and crime appears within the Development Economics (DEC) 
agenda to improve the Bank’s research and focused on conflict
116 (opcit:45). Despite the 
shift of responsibility from Urban to Social Development, the 2010 Urban Strategy remains 
the  most  specific  institutional  document  in  terms  of  Bank’s  vision  towards  violence 
prevention in urban settings. The Urban Strategy
117 in fact clearly refers to violence and 
crime as a major challenge for the urbanised world, and includes the issue in the first 
thematic area (‘Area 1: Focusing on the core elements of the city system’).  It identifies the 
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112 It did, however, develop a three-year agenda, similar to the approach initially developed in LAC in the 
2000s.  According  to  the  Director  of  the  Anchor,  the  agenda  consisted  in  three  steps.  First,  develop  the 
analytical base. This led to the publication of the book Violence in the City (2010) that aimed to serve as 
conceptual framework for Bank’s actions in urban violence. They also strengthened the team (including by 
contracting specialists from the IADB who worked on the first citizen security projects), built a network of 
consultants, carried out studies on the costs of violence, and developed a database (mainly on homicides and 
domestic violence). Second, develop work in the regions, particularly in Africa and the Middle East, by 
influencing Country Assistance Strategies (CAS) on how to include urban violence in programming. Third, 
continue the work in regions and push the agenda on youth violence (Interview, Washington, D.C., July 
2011).  
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113 World Bank, 2005. Empowering People by Transforming Institutions: Social Development in World Bank 
Operations, Washington, D.C.: World Bank, available at:  
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTSOCIALDEVELOPMENT/Resources/244362-
1164181732580/SDStrategy-Full.pdf, accessed January 2, 2012. 
 
114 In fact, the Social Development Strategy mentions in general terms: ‘Number of Poverty and Social Impact 
Analysis (PSIAs), Country level analyses and ESWs focusing on Youth and Development (e.g. Argentina, 
Jamaica, Andean Region), Social Violence, Gender, Impact of Migration and Remittances (e.g. Caribbean, 
Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras), Ethnic Minorities, Forced Displaced Population (e.g. Colombia)’ (World 
Bank 2005: 33-34). 
	 ﾠ
115 These topics include indigenous peoples, gender, afro-descendants, youth and violence, etc. (World Bank 
2005: 14, 33-34). 
 
116 They include civil wars; crime/inequality in South Africa; local conflict management in Indonesia (World 
Bank 2005:45).  
 
117 World Bank, 2010. Systems of Cities: Harnessing Urbanization for Growth and Poverty Alleviation: The 
World Bank Urban and Local Government Strategy, Washington, D.C.: World Bank 	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types of activities that the World Bank could finance in supporting local governments to 
address  violence  and  crime,  and  provides  examples  of  existing  programmes  that  have 
shown positive results, but does not provide specific guidance.  
 
In sum, there is no clear Bank-wide vision on violence prevention, but instead a few items 
under the Social Development Strategy to increase the agenda both in policy dialogue and 
in lending in LAC, without any target or specific guidance, and examples of situational 
prevention activities for Bank support under the Urban Strategy. This confirms how the 
multiple  approaches  to  prevent  violence  generate  competing  lenses  and  directions  for 
action, whose strategic synthesis is not evident to find (see Chapter 2, Section 2.1.3; see 
also Chapters 7 and 8 for a more detailed analysis on cognitive frame (Section 7.1) and 
organisational treatment (Section 8.2)).  
 
As for gender and violence prevention, the World Bank’s position focuses on women’s 
economic empowerment, leaving gender-based violence and other gender dimensions of 
the continuum of violence to the Social Development Anchor and the Regions. In 2007, a 
new Gender Anchor Director, Mayra Buvinic, came into office. Buvinic was a leading 
expert on gender equality who had extensive experience at the International Centre for 
Research on Women (ICRW), and then at the IADB where she led the regional bank’s 
agenda on gender and also played a leading role in making the case for the IADB to get 
involved  and  focus  on  violence  prevention  until  IADB’s  realignment.  When  Buvinic 
arrived at the World Bank, she and her team decided to align objectives and strategies with 
the Bank’s organisational culture and comparative advantage, and thus focused on women’s 
economic empowerment. The assumption was that economic empowerment would lead to a 
reduction in gender-based violence. The approach on ‘gender as smart economics’ followed 
an  integrationist-type  mainstreaming  targeting  specific  sectors  such  as  infrastructure, 
transport,  and  economic  development.  As  the  Director  and  Sr.  Specialists  of  her  team 
explained, the rationale behind this selective approach was that lasting change comes from 
making people want it and seeing the benefit of it. That is, convincing a few people in 
traditionally resistant sectors to adopt a gender perspective in their projects would bring 
more lasting results than adopting a large mandatory approach that would be seen as an 
additional burden and might therefore be short-lived (Interviews, Washington, D.C., July 	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2011). The Gender Anchor through its ‘Gender Action Plans’ (GAP- 2006 and 2010)
 118 
thus  chose  not  to  embrace  the  battle  of  gender-based  violence,  domestic  violence,  and 
gender identities linked to power as domination and violence, and justified this choice as 
‘practical and realistic’ (opcit). However, ‘gender advocates’ in the Bank did not always 
understand  this  standpoint.  They  in  fact  criticised  what  they  considered  as  a  focus  on 
practical gender needs, and expressed frustration as the Gender Anchor strategy deprived 
them from the traditional Trust Funds they used to finance initiatives on gender, including 
gender-based violence (Interviews, Washington, D.C., March 2011).
 119 Many regretted a 
lack of more courageous and transformative stance on gender and violence prevention, and 
were  sceptical  on  what  gender  mainstreaming  could  achieve.  Such  scepticism  also 
highlights controversies regarding mainstreaming as a strategy to achieve structural change 
that I discuss in Chapters 7 and 8 (see also debates on mainstreaming in Section 3.2.3 in 
Chapter 3). 
‘At the Bank, the policy on gender changed drastically: before you had some money 
to do gender and it was compulsory to at least write a paragraph on gender, but then 
[…] [the new Director] came and she did not want nothing to do with legal and 
gender-based violence: she focused entirely on economic empowerment of women. 
Then  she  mainstreamed  gender,  so  all  the  financing,  for  example  BNPP  [Bank 
Netherlands Partnerships Programme] that had funding for gender, eliminated the 
gender window because if it is mainstreamed, you don’t need specific money for 
gender  projects.  But  nobody  followed  up  on  the  gender  mainstreaming  thing.’ 
(Interview, Washington, D.C., March 2011) 
 
The Social Cohesion and Violence Prevention Anchor took charge for gender-based and 
domestic violence. The Director of this Anchor considered that the internal sensitisation 
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118 Gender Equality as Smart Economics: A World Bank Group Gender Action Plan (Fiscal years 2007–10) 
(September 2006), PREM World Bank, available at 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTGENDER/Resources/GAPNov2.pdf; and Applying Gender Action 
Plan Lessons: A Three-Year Roadmap for Gender Mainstream 2011-2013, Report 54752, May 2010, PREM, 
World Bank, available at http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2010/05/31/000333037_20100531032151
/Rendered/PDF/547520BR0SecM2101Official0Use0Only1.pdf 
 
119 In many conversations, staff did not know why the Director opted for the strategy and discarded previous 
efforts done until 2005. This indicates, at the very least, a problem in terms of internal communication. 
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was the most pressing step as an effort to make the World Bank less risk-adverse regarding 
embarking on such issues. Convincing Team Leaders and Country Directors to include 
violence  prevention  in  their  projects  or  Country  Strategies,  in  particular  in  Africa,  had 
indeed proven to be a difficult endeavour. As such, the team at the Anchor organised a 
conference  on  gender-based  violence  in  2010  for  the  tenth  anniversary  of  the  United 
Nations  Security  Council  Resolution  1325  on  Women,  Peace  and  Security  (UNSCR 
1325),
120 in  addition  to  multiple  Brown  Bag  Lunches  (BBLs)  aimed  at  the  internal 
sensitisation (Interview in Washington, D.C., April 2011). The Anchor also participated in 
the 2011 WDR on Conflict and Security and the 2012 WDR on Gender, but did not endorse 
any leadership roles.
121 Another important way to clarify Bank’s positioning regarding an 
issue is in fact through WDRs.  
6.3.5 WDRs on Security and Gender: Creating space for greater involvement 
in citizen security? (2011-2012) 
When World Bank’s Presidents come into office, they choose topics that will be developed 
into World Development Reports (WDRs), one of the Bank’s most widely disseminated 
publications. During the period analysed, three Presidents chose topics related to violence 
and its solutions. President Wolfensohn (1995-2005) selected ‘Youth’ as one key topic that 
would eventually be investigated under President Wolfowitz mandate (2005-2007). The 
2007 WDR on Youth included youth-at-risk and youth violence. According to a Senior 
Economist who participated in this WDR, it was very well received outside of the Bank, 
but did not help enhance the Bank’s operational portfolio on key aspects related to youth 
development,  youth-at-risk,  or  youth  violence  prevention  (Interview,  World  Bank, 
Washington, D.C. June 2011).  He further explained that the follow-up of the WDR was not 
effective and the toolkits were not specific enough to serve operational work (opcit). In 
2011, the Children and Youth Anchor was even dismantled.  
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120 http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTSOCIALDEVELOPMENT/0,,contentMD
K:22738521~menuPK:2644098~pagePK:64020865~piPK:51164185~theSitePK:244363,00.html 
 
121 This  is  traditionally  the  case:  an  ad-hoc  team  of  experts  throughout  the  Bank  that  do  not  have  a 
specialisation on the topic write WDRs. Anchors participate through reviews and comments but do not lead 
the efforts. 	 ﾠ
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President Zoellick (2007-2012) chose Conflict and Security, and Gender as two of the five 
development  issues  to  put  forward  during  his  mandate.  The  choice  for  security  was 
influenced by the work of Paul Collier who was Director of the Development Research 
Group and was well respected within the World Bank. Collier published the Bottom Billion 
(2008) and other publications on violence and conflict, and saw the issue as a priority for 
development. When he left the Bank, fragility and conflict were seen as security issues that 
could lead to terrorism. According to high-level staff at the Bank, President Zoellick, an 
American national, was very receptive to such arguments, and decided to take the issue as a 
priority for his presidency (Interviews, Washington, D.C., July 2011). 
 
The World Bank published the WDR on Conflict and Security in 2011, and the WDR on 
Gender in 2012. Both WDRs were well received according to interviewees, both within and 
outside of the Bank. The fact that a WDR on Security included a part on citizen security 
(thus with a shift in expression as compared with violence and crime prevention) might 
help to further open up the space for the issue within the Bank, but this is just a hypothesis 
as urban violence is not at the core of the report. What is noteworthy in the WDR on 
Conflict and Security is that beyond insisting on the importance of institutions and good 
governance (anti-corruption measures), the report insists on the need to work on reforming 
criminal  justice  systems,  both  in  the  judiciary  and  the  police  force.  As  mentioned 
throughout this chapter, the World Bank has never been willing to embark on these issues. 
Therefore a new discussion is opened and might lead to a reconsideration of its initial 
position on the issue (see the discussion on cognitive frame in Section 7.1 in Chapter 7). 
The WDR on Gender includes gender-based violence, which might lead to greater work on 
the issue, but this will mainly depend on the new Director of Gender who succeeded to the 
previously mentioned incumbent in 2012, and on the follow-up given to the WDR. This 
will also depend on the availability of Trust Funds. As of 2011, a new Gender Action Plan 
has  been  approved  that  builds  on  the  previous  one  and  still  focuses  on  economic 
empowerment of women, smart economics, and leaves to one side the cultural and legal 
aspects of gender-based violence.  	 ﾠ
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6.4 Conclusion 
	 ﾠ
This chapter has shown the institutional context in which the emergence and development 
of violence prevention at the IADB and the World Bank has taken place. Findings from this 
process tracing, including a stocktaking exercise and in-depth interviews on the history of 
violence prevention in these two major MDBs, show that violence prevention has been 
largely marginalised within their development agenda, more at the World Bank than at the 
IADB though, and that gender has been dealt with on an ad-hoc basis when dealing with 
domestic and gender-based violence, and more in analytical than in operational terms. The 
findings also show that mainstreaming has been envisioned as a strategy that could be 
relevant for violence prevention in both banks, but none of them has pursued it in proactive 
terms, and none has further developed the concept. Why has it been so difficult for these 
banks  to  give  greater  priority  to  violence  prevention  given  the  inter-relation  between 
violence  and  development,  and  the  socio-economic  multiplier  effects  of  violence,  in 
particular its demining power on other development investment these banks finance? What 
does explain the difference between both banks in regard to the emergence and evolution of 
the issue? Why did gender largely remain sidelined in how violence prevention was treated, 
despite  the  fact  that  specialists  dealing  with  violence  prevention  were  also  gender 
specialists? Based on the findings of this stocktaking and process tracing exercise, Chapters 
7 and 8 empirically analyse the four categories identified in the conceptual framework to 
answer those questions.  
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Chapter 7: Opportunities and Constraints for 
Mainstreaming Inclusive Violence Prevention in MDBs: 
Cognitive Frame and Actor Power 
 
 
Mainstreaming inclusive violence prevention in the development agenda seeks to shift the 
paradigm of how violence prevention and development are understood and dealt with. The 
objective  is  to  support  inclusive,  peaceful  societies,  based  on  the  understanding  that 
violence is the result of a context-based combination of multiple risks factors that intersect 
with class, gender and development, and has deep ideological roots (as discussed in Section 
3.2 in Chapter 3).  
 
Both the IADB and the World Bank have considered mainstreaming violence prevention a 
relevant strategy (Moser and Shrader 1999; IADB 2002), but none of them has proactively 
and explicitly adopted it. As explained in Chapter 6, the IADB has mainly opted for a 
stand-alone  strategy  where  the  multi-sectorality  of  violence  prevention  was  translated 
within  each  operation.  The  World  Bank  has  first  included  a  component  dealing  with 
violence  prevention  in  a  few  Urban  Development  projects,  suggesting  a  beginning  of 
‘incorporation’ into sectors. It has not adopted a mainstreaming strategy as such, and recent 
developments suggest a shift towards specific stand-alone projects and budget support for 
the issue. Moreover, both banks currently lack clarity in goals, which is at the core of a 
successful mainstreaming process.  
 
Yet, in contexts where violence has such negative socio-economic multiplier effects on all 
facets of development, where policymaking faces significant challenges and tends to be 
short-term  and  focus  on  symptoms,  and  where  MDBs  are  willing  to  partner  with 
governments in the search for sustainable solutions to this complex issue of violence, I ask 
the questions: Why have MDBs not acquired a better understanding of how mainstreaming 
could work to prevent violence from a gender perspective in their own agenda? The multi-
sector stand-alone approach suggests an ‘integrationist mainstreaming’ at the country level. 
In other words, it is as if MDBs (above all the IADB) had passed on the challenge of 
mainstreaming  to  countries  without  applying  it  to  themselves.  Even  more,  the  lack  of 	 ﾠ
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results so far and the enormous challenges in implementation (OVE 2013, 2014) indicate 
that they have not thought through the process in any depth and appear to make countries 
implement it without clarity in theory or practice. Nonetheless, MDBs work and gather 
incomparable experience in all sectors relevant to the prevention of violence (see Chapter 1, 
Section 1.2) and could use this knowledge and experience to think through how to make 
mainstreaming  work.  This  inevitably  begins  with  themselves.  So  this  chapter  and  the 
following  one  investigate  why  MDBs  have  not  developed  a  mainstreaming  strategy  to 
prevent violence and identify the opportunities and constraints for such an approach to be 
adopted and to transform the development agenda.  
 
This chapter focuses on the analytical categories of cognitive frame and actor power, as 
described in Sections 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 in Chapter 3. Specifically, the chapter first seeks, in 
Section 7.1, to understand how the issue of violence has been perceived at the IADB and 
the World Bank, how this understanding has evolved over the years, and to what extent this 
understanding has influenced the emergence and treatment of the issue in each MDB’s 
development agenda. It also questions the perception of sector staff towards violence and 
the relevance of the issue for their own work. The chapter then analyses, in Section 7.2, the 
power of different actors within and outside MDBs. Namely, it examines if actors that 
support  violence  prevention  gather  enough  political,  advocacy-based,  technical  and 
legitimacy-based power to push the issue towards a mainstreaming process. Gender and 
donor-recipient relations are analysed throughout the discussions of each variable.  
7.1 Cognitive frame under scrutiny  
As explained in Chapter 3 (Section 3.3.1), cognitive frame refers to two dimensions: the 
way  violence  is  interpreted,  and  the  extent  to  which  violence  fits  the  mandate  of  the 
organisation. This in turn implies looking at how MDBs’ staff understand and internalises 
their organisation’s mandate.  
7.1.1 The interpretation of violence in development 
The link between violence and economic development 
At the end of the 1990s, the IADB and the World Bank published studies making the case 
for violence as a development issue. In 1998, the IADB financed studies to estimate the 
costs  of  violence  (Londoño  1998),  and  in  the  same  year,  the  World  Bank  published  a 	 ﾠ
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milestone study linking violence and crime to development by underlying its costs and the 
link to inequality (Fajnzylber et al. 1999; see Chapter 6, Section 6.3.1). Yet, as McIlwaine 
(1999:453) emphasised, ‘violence and crime [were] not new phenomena in the field of 
development theory and practice.’ In fact, since the mid-1990s, the UK Development for 
International Development (DFID)’s White Paper and the 1995 Corbridge’s Development 
studies:  a  reader  had  already  recognised  violence  as  a  development  issue  (opcit). 
Nonetheless and despite these studies, interviewees explained that violence prevention had 
not been given more priority within the agenda of development banks because economists, 
that  make  up  the  majority  of  the  staff,  did  not  perceive  it  as  an  economic  issue  and 
thereafter, as a development issue. An Executive Director at the IADB further clarified that 
economists  had  not  been  exposed  to  violence  as  a  development  matter  during  their 
education or training, and thus were not trained or familiar with violence, in contrast to 
other issues that entered the mainstream of economics studies such as corruption or even 
gender (Interview, Washington, D.C., July 2011). Actually, in the previous example of the 
1995 Corbridge’s reader, violence was only included in the final section on ‘New directions 
in development studies’ (McIlwaine 1999:454).
122 This might explain why, even though 
both banks had published on the issue and specialists (even economists) within both banks 
were  convinced  and  actively  worked  on  drawing  more  attention  to  violence  as  a 
development  issue,  they  faced  constant  resistance  from  a  large  part  of  the  staff  and 
Management. This is also why formally making the case for violence as a development 
issue was a necessary step to build the rationale for IADB’s and World Bank’s involvement 
in violence prevention (see Chapter 6, Section 6.3.2). They thus chose to do it through 
econometrical studies that were ‘speaking the language’ of MDBs’ Chief Economists, i.e. 
that  ‘resonated’  with  economists’  frames  so  as  to  engage  in  a  dialogue  with  those 
colleagues who were reluctant to take on the idea. This also suggests why, at the World 
Bank, the initial efforts to work on violence were not translated into operations until several 
years later. In fact, the studies in Jamaica, Colombia and Guatemala (Moser and Holland 
1998; Moser and McIlwaine 2001) that used urban appraisal techniques, mainly relying on 
qualitative methodologies such as focus groups and in-depth interviews, were regarded with 
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122 Conflict is, on the other hand, more present in economics studies, which might explain why the focus has 
been more on this form of violence to date, as compared to urban or other forms of inter-personal violence in 
times of peace. 
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scepticism by many World Bank economists who considered such research methods as 
‘anecdotal’ (Interview, key informant, London, September 2010). On the other hand, the 
econometrical studies were too theoretical to become projects financed by the Bank. A 
bridge between both approaches was missing for the World Bank to take the issue onto its 
agenda in the early 2000s. The resistance to alternative cognitive frames on violence was 
not only because violence was not perceived as a development or economic issue. It was 
above all because it was perceived as a security or law-and-order issue, closely related to 
the police and political matters.    
 
Violence as a law-and-order issue? 
Experts  and  MDBs’  staff  often  insisted  on  the  specificity  of  violence:  unlike  other 
development topics, violence is very sensitive, politicised, and largely misunderstood. For 
many years, up until now in many instances, violence was considered a  law-and-order 
issue, that is, a police-related issue, and MDBs’ staffs were no exceptions to this general 
understanding in the field. In fact, many specialists and managers working in LAC in both 
banks come from the region where the association with the criminal justice system largely 
prevails, despite the failure of mano dura policies (Moser and McIlwaine 2006; see Chapter 
5, Section 5.3.1). When citizens are afraid and exasperated, they tend to ask for quick and 
drastic measures to respond to insecurity. The media in many countries increase feelings of 
fear and insecurity through shocking images and alarming headlines. Opposition parties 
tend to use these messages to accuse the party in government of being weak in front of 
criminals. This happens independently of the ideology of who is in power. These contexts 
shape MDBs’ staff and counterparts’ cognitive frames. This is clearly seen through the 
reaction of the Legal departments in both banks when the first projects explicitly addressing 
the issue of violence were negotiated and discussed internally. MDBs’ lawyers opposed 
those projects, for at the time violence was considered the domain of the police, not of 
development  agencies.  At  the  end  of  the  1990s,  for  many  within  both  banks  and  in 
particular for those working in Legal departments, the police represented the corrupt and 
brutal arm of autocratic regimes that abused their citizens’ human rights during most of the 
XX
th century in LAC (Hinton 2006; Newburn and Hinton 2009). By looking at violence 
through  security  or  police  forces  lenses,  Legal  departments  voiced  against  MDBs’ 	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involvement. Not only was violence not included in the mandate of the organisations, but it 
was forbidden according to a certain interpretation of MDBs’ mandate.  
7.1.2 The interpretation of MDBs’ mandate and sector priorities 
Violence and the mandate of MDBs: What do the Articles of Agreement say? 
To justify their opposition, Legal departments referred to the Articles of Agreement. The 
Articles of Agreement are similar to the ‘constitution’ of MDBs. They state the mission and 
define the limits that founding members agreed on when creating each organisation. The 
clause on political matters is the one signalled when mentioning violence. This clause is 
similar  in  both  banks.  It  strictly  limits  the  involvement  of  each  MDB  to  economic 
development, and forbids justifying projects or activities based on political matters. That is, 
economic development and growth in developing countries must be the only criterion to 
justify  support  to  client  countries  in  both  banks  (Article  I  on  the  purpose  of  each 
organisation is similar in both sets of Articles of Agreement). The Articles of Agreement do 
not specify further nor include a detailed list of prohibited activities. As such, they leave 
room for interpretation.  
 
Clause f) of Article VIII (Organisation and Management) of IADB’s Articles of Agreement 
(1959) states:  
‘The Bank, its officers and employees shall not interfere in the political affairs of 
any member, nor shall they be influenced in their decisions by the political character 
of  the  member  or  members  concerned.  Only  economic  considerations  shall  be 
relevant to their decisions, and these considerations shall be weighed impartially in 
order to achieve the purpose and functions stated in Article I.’
123 
 
Clause 10 of Article IV of World Bank’s Articles of Agreement (1945, 1989) deals with 
‘political activity prohibited’. The section says as follows:  
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
123 Article VIII, Organisation and Management. Article I refers to Purpose and Functions, with Section I 
stating the purpose: ‘The purpose of the Bank shall be to contribute to the acceleration of the process of 
economic  development  of  the  member  countries,  individually  and  collectively’,  available  at 
http://www.oas.org/dil/treaties_C-15_Agreement_Establishing_the_Inter-American_Development_Bank.htm, 
accessed January 2012. 
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‘The Bank and its officers shall not interfere in the political affairs of any member; 
nor  shall  they  be  influenced  in  their  decisions  by  the  political  character  of  the 
member or members concerned. Only economic considerations shall be relevant to 
their decisions, and these considerations shall be weighed impartially in order to 
achieve the purposes stated in Article I.’ 
124  
 
Both  sets  of  Articles  of  Agreement  call  for  ‘these  considerations  [to]  be  weighted 
impartially’, but do not explicitly explain what this entails. Hence, it is not surprising that 
different interpretations have been made. Actually, despite a high degree of similarity, each 
bank refers to the Articles of Agreement in a different manner.   
 
At the IADB, the Legal department referred to the Articles of Agreement saying the IADB 
should not get involved in political matters. The cognitive association between violence, 
crime,  and  the  police  (and  thus  the  association  with  political  matters)  predominated. 
However, in the regional bank, this frame was less important than the need to act, for the 
proximity with the region made the seriousness of the situation too salient to be ignored. 
President Iglesias, an Uruguayan national, travelled a lot to the region to better understand 
governments’  preoccupations.  According  to  close  colleagues  of  the  former  President, 
Iglesias  rapidly  understood  that  violence  was  a  development  issue  (Interview,  IADB, 
Washington, D.C., July 2011). In addition, the group of Colombians mentioned in Section 
6.2.1 in Chapter 6 were inspired by Mayor Mockus’ success in Bogotá, which showed that 
prevention could work. They felt the principles applied in Colombia could be adapted to 
other contexts of the region that urgently needed it. This combination of factors (that I 
discuss further in Section 7.2 when examining actor power) might explain why beyond the 
Legal  department’s  resistance,  the  regional  bank  was  nevertheless  responsive  and  very 
much receptive to the urgency of the situation.  
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124 IBRD Articles of Agreement, as amended effective February 16, 1989. Article I sets the purpose of the 
IBRD, while Article IV deals with Operations.   
Available  at:  http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTABOUTUS/Resources/ibrd-articlesofagreement.pdf, 
accessed January 2012. 
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This  was  not  a  smooth  process  though.  After  the  first  projects  were  approved  (1998), 
controversies  still  continued.  In  the  early  2000s,  operational  staff  and  Management 
requested more clarity about what the IADB could and could not do in this complex and 
sensitive  area.  The  2002  Preliminary  Guidelines  and  the  2009  Operational  Guidelines 
intended  to  address  those  concerns  by  including  few  limitations  (arms,  military, 
intelligence)  explicitly  linked  to  the  prohibition  referred  to  in  Article  VIII  Section  f 
(political  matters)  of  the  Articles  of  Agreement.  Yet,  the  2002  and  2009  Guidelines 
explicitly allow the possibility to work with the police and penitentiary systems. As such, 
the interpretation of the Articles of Agreement at the IADB has only limited teams to get 
involved in military and intelligence-related activities, and has left the door opened for a 
broad scope of interventions.  
 
At  the  World  Bank,  the  interpretation  has  been  more  restrictive,  and  as  such,  more 
constraining to taking on violence. In fact, the risks associated with financing police forces 
were considered substantial for the World Bank in case those forces were to be accused of 
political manoeuvres (coup d’Etat, or abuse against opposition parties), or any other kinds 
of  human  rights  abuse  (Interview,  Washington,  D.C.,  April  2011).  As  previously 
mentioned, the cognitive frame associating violence with police explains such restrictive 
interpretation. These concerns were understandable insofar as they referred to the history of 
dictatorship and the role played by the police in some countries that led to human rights 
abuse (Hinton 2006; Hinton and Newburn 2009). However, this interpretation was also 
based on a restricted view of the role of the police in addressing violence and crime (mainly 
discarding their preventive role)
 125 and did not take into account the diversity of situations 
in the region. Operational teams failed to convincingly challenge this dominant frame, and 
instead responded to the Legal department’s concerns with caution and restriction. They 
insisted that the organisation’s involvement would be limited to a few infrastructure and 
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125 The fact that many publications of the World Bank acknowledged the preventive role of the police and 
consider it an important component to any strategy to prevent crime and violence suggests either the difficulty 
of  internal  pedagogy  that  operational  teams  faced,  or  an  accommodation  derived  from  a  restrictive 
interpretation of the Articles of Agreement as the team did not have the expertise nor the will to get engaged 
into police reforms. That is, instead of the risk to work with the police (which shows a limited understanding 
of the role of the police that includes a range of preventive activities), another explanation might be that the 
World Bank does not have (and is not willing for now to build) the expertise for police reform, and then uses 
the Articles of Agreement to avoid dealing with this very complex and risky issue.  
 	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
178 
social development-related activities (see Section 6.3.2 in Chapter 6). In other words, the 
Articles of Agreement were interpreted in such as way that the World Bank could only get 
involved with violence in a very limited and almost apologetic fashion, instead of making 
violence prevention a priority for development. Other politically sensitive and risky issues 
like corruption also awakened significant controversies within the organisation, but in the 
latter case, they did not impede the Bank from intervening and setting corruption as a 
priority for development, suggesting the existence of specific resistance towards violence.  
 
The majority of interviewees at the World Bank supported the restrictive interpretation of 
the Articles of Agreement, and even considered it an opportunity that the Bank ‘could not’ 
finance police-related matters. Most of them acknowledged the importance of reforming 
police forces in many countries, and even mentioned community policing in their studies, 
but did not feel comfortable with the idea of ‘their Bank’ getting directly involved with it. 
They preferred the straightforward message that the Bank could only finance social and 
situational  preventive  interventions.  This  explains  to  a  large  extent  why  the  initial 
interpretation  has  not  been  challenged  over  the  past  decade.
126 Nevertheless,  interviews 
with the actual LAC Coordinator of the Violence and Crime Prevention team (who had 
recently taken office at the time of the interviews as indicated in Section 6.3 in Chapter 6) 
mentioned the need to reinterpret the Articles of Agreement to expand the scope of action. 
He, in fact, sees criminal justice reforms as incontrovertible reforms to really help improve 
the situation to lessen violence and crime in many countries of the region, in particular 
those with the weakest institutions, and to position the Bank as strategic partner for the 
issue (Interview, Washington, D.C., July 2011). The recent Conflict and Security WDR 
goes in the same direction when it refers to the need to work on institutional strengthening 
of the criminal justice systems, and insists on its importance to prevent violence of all 
types, economic, social and political (see Chapter 6, Section 6.3.5 on WDRs).  
 
The dominant interpretation of the Articles of Agreement in both banks relates to their 
respective interpretation of their own mandate, which in turn refers to the composition of 
each bank’s Board of Directors.   
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126 Beyond the fact that the same persons remained in charge of the issue for most of the 2000s (when there 
were persons in charge). 	 ﾠ
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Board composition and the interpretation of each Bank’s mandate 
Interviewees in each bank pointed to the difference in Board composition as a core factor to 
understand the dominant culture, in particular as regard to taking risks, adopting change, 
and engaging in new issues such as violence prevention. The organisational culture in fact 
defines what cognitive frame is salient and credible to MDBs as they interpret their own 
mission as development banks (see Benford and Snow (2000)’s criteria for defining what 
makes a frame resonates as discussed in Section 3.3.1 in Chapter 3).  
 
The  Board  of  Directors  is  a  permanent  body  in  MDBs  and  represents  the  Board  of 
Governors, the highest entity that represents the shareholders and makes all major decisions 
for the organisation.
127 The Board of Directors is in charge of the operations of the banks, 
including the approval of loans, policies and strategies, among other duties. At the IADB, 
the Board of Directors is composed of 14 Executive Directors who represent 48 countries. 
At  the  World  Bank,  the  Board  of  Directors  is  composed  of  25  Executive  Directors 
representing 187 countries. The voting power of the Executive Directors depends on the 
contribution of each country to the capital of each bank.
 At the IADB, Latin American 
countries hold 50.02 per cent of the votes,
128 and at the World Bank, the region holds 8.64 
per cent.
 129, 130 In both banks, Boards’ members are predominantly males. Table 17 shows 
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127 The IADB and the World Bank have a similar organisational structure at least in its higher instances. The 
Governors  are  representatives  of  the  member  countries,  in  general  Ministers  of  Finance  or  Planning,  or 
Presidents of Central Banks, who meet once or twice every year to make the most important policy decisions. 
Each Governor has a voting power proportional to the subscription of his or her country to the capital of the 
banks. During the rest of the year, they delegate their oversight power to the Board of Executive Directors. 
The  President  legally  represents  the  organisation  and  is  responsible  for  managing  the  operations  and 
administration. The Board of Governors elects the President. The President chairs the meetings of the Board 
of Executive Directors but has no vote (except when there are equal votes in favour and against a decision). 
The President also proposes policies to the Board.  
 
128 IADB’s members countries are grouped as follows: Croatia, Japan, Korea, Portugal, Slovenia and UK 
(6.1%), US (30.01%), Canada (4%), Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Norway, Sweden and Spain (4.78%), 
Belgium, Germany, Italy, Israel, Netherland, Switzerland and China (5.09%), Bolivia, Paraguay and Uruguay 
(2.45%),  Brazil  and  Suriname  (10.84%),  Belize,  Costa  Rica,  El  Salvador,  Guatemala,  Honduras  and 
Nicaragua (2.42%), Chile and Ecuador (3.53%). Colombia and Peru (4.39%), Argentina and Haiti (11.18%), 
Panama and Venezuela (6.19%).  
 
129 At the World Bank, and as of January 2012, the countries that have at least 2% of the votes are (in addition 
to  those  earlier  mentioned  in  Table  17):  Saudi  Arabia  (2.68%),  India  (2.68%),  China  (2.68%),  Canada 
(2.68%), Italy (2.68%), The Russian Federation (2.68%), the Netherlands (2.13%) and Brazil (2%). As part of 
the  2010  capital  increase,  the  Governors  of  the  World  Bank  agreed  on  increasing  the  voting  powers  of 
Developing and Transition countries at IBRD (+3.13 percentage point). They now hold 47.19% of the shares 
and voting power (compared to 42.6 in 2008). 	 ﾠ
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the distribution of the main voting power by country or group of countries, and Table 18 
presents the composition of MDBs’ Boards by gender.  
Table 17: Voting power by country, or group of, at the IADB and World Bank 
IADB  World Bank* 
Country  Voting 
power 
Country  Voting 
power 
LAC  50.02%  US  15.80% 
US  30.01%  Japan  9.45% 
European 
countries and 
Japan, Israel, 
Korea and China 
15.97%  Germany  4.63% 
   France  4.40% 
   UK  4.40% 
Canada  4%  LAC  8.64% 
* See footnotes 126 for the balance of voting power at the World Bank. 
 
Table 18: IADB's and World Bank's Boards composition by gender 
  IADB  World Bank 
  ED  Alternate  ED  Alternate 
Female  35.7%  27.3%  20.0%  8.7% 
Male  64.3%  72.7%  80.0%  91.3% 
 
Interviewees  pointed  out  how  Board’s  composition  influenced  MDBs’  organisational 
culture. At the IADB, the fact that LAC countries hold the majority of shares makes the 
regional bank more demand-driven. The regional bank is indeed generally seen and sees 
itself as a ‘friendly bank’ (‘banco hermano’ or ‘banco amigo’in Spanish). As such, it gives 
pre-eminence to responding to countries’ needs (Interviews, Washington, D.C, April 2011). 
This would be the salience element in what makes a frame resonate for the regional bank. 
The World Bank reacts differently and might give more importance to the credibility aspect 
that arguably makes it more risk-adverse.  In fact, it struggles with a higher division of 
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130 The respective voting power for LAC countries at the World Bank are (by alphabetical order): Antigua and 
Barbuda (0.05%), Argentina (1.08%), The Bahamas (0.08%), Barbados (0.07%), Belize (0.05%), Bolivia 
(0.12%), Brazil (2%), Chile (0.43%), Colombia (0.5%), Costa Rica (0.03%), Dominican Republic (0.14%), 
Ecuador  (0.18%),  El  Salvador  (0/02%),  Grenada  (0.05%),  Guatemala  (0.13%),  Guyana  (0.08%),  Haiti 
(0.08%),  Honduras  (0.05%),  Jamaica  (0.17%),  Mexico  (1.13%),  Nicaragua  (0.05%),  Panama  (0.04%), 
Paraguay  (0.09%),  Peru  (0.33%),  St  Kitts  and  Nevis  (0.03%),  St  Lucia  (0.05%),  St  Vincent  and  the 
Grenadines (0.03%), Trinidad and Tobago (0.17%), Uruguay (0.18%), and Venezuela (1.23%).  
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votes  making  it  a  more  cautious  organisation  that  needs  to  build  consensus  on  every 
decision or change.
131  
Differences in organisational culture and frame resonance are clearly illustrated in the case 
of violence. The urgency of the situation in many countries in LAC made IADB Board 
members, at least the borrowing members, acknowledge the importance to get involved, 
and support countries in their search for solutions (conditions for salience were met). In 
comparison, this acknowledgement was more ambiguous at the World Bank where LAC 
countries account only for less than ten per cent altogether and in the absence of rigorous 
evidence to guide interventions (conditions for credibility were not met). However, tensions 
existed in both banks, even at the IADB, also because of the importance played by the US 
in both Boards, and the dominant US cognitive frame on violence and security. As one 
Executive Director at the IADB explained, even in the traditionally demand-driven regional 
bank, it had taken a long time to put violence on the agenda because of the influence of the 
US and their understanding of violence as a law enforcement issue (Interview, Washington, 
D.C.,  March  2011).  Since  the  IADB  and  the  World  Bank  have  their  Headquarters  in 
Washington D.C., and the US holds a large proportion of the shares in each bank, their 
interpretation indeed matters (opcit).  
 
Cognitive frames and mainstreaming: is violence seen as a priority for sectors? 
To mainstream inclusive violence prevention, in addition to a common understanding on 
what is to be mainstreamed (Walby 2005), clarity on the relevance of the issue to each 
sector  and  vice  versa  is  essential.  Among  the  eight  sectors  selected,  all  interviewees 
acknowledged the importance of violence in LAC and its link to development. Specialists 
in Social Sectors, in particular in Education and Social Protection, were those who more 
proactively engaged with the issue. At the IADB, respondents in Education and Social 
Protection sectors mentioned they were working on violence prevention in school as per 
country’s demand and were willing to engage more accordingly. At the World Bank, in 
particular after President Zoellick visited El Salvador, Sector Specialists were mobilised to 
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131 In fact, five countries (US, Japan, Germany, France, and UK) gather 38.68 per cent of voting power and 
weigh comparatively much more than all other regions. Each of these five countries have their own Executive 
Director as well as China, the Russian Federation, and Saudi Arabia. The rest of the countries are grouped and 
elect one Executive Director that would represent them all.  
 	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
182 
work on violence prevention and acknowledged its relevance to the World Bank’s work. 
Nonetheless, interviewees across sectors also insisted on the fact that violence prevention 
was not a priority. Actually, beyond Social Sectors, many were unclear on the relevance of 
the issue to their sector, and all expressed hesitation as to how they could contribute to 
violence reduction through their sector work. Even in Education, Specialists mentioned the 
fact  that  education  systems  in  Latin  America  and  the  Caribbean  were  already  facing 
enormous issues in terms of quality of education and reduction of drop out rates, and their 
list of items to check in weak-institutional capacity contexts was already too long to add the 
contentious and extremely complex task of violence prevention: 
‘In  countries  like  Honduras  where  teachers  are  on  strike  100  days  a  year,  it  is 
difficult to envision how to ask the sector to contribute to violence prevention.’ 
(Senior Education Specialist, World Bank, Washington, D.C., April 2011) 
 
In general, responses paralleled the situation in countries. Team leaders working in upper 
middle-income countries like Mexico, Brazil or Colombia saw much more possibilities 
than those working in LMIC or LICs like Honduras, Nicaragua or Haiti.  
 
Within Social Sectors, it is noteworthy that Health Specialists were the most reluctant to 
include violence prevention as a health issue. At the IADB, they were sceptical regarding 
potential demand from countries for mainstreaming violence prevention (in particular from 
a gender perspective) into health sectors because of the practical consequences of it
132: 
‘You can screen for domestic violence for example, but then what happens if you do 
not have a full route of attention or if there are reprisals against doctors who identify 
abuses?’ (Division Chief, IADB, Washington D.C., April 2011) 
At the World Bank, they explained that the Health Sector focused on health systems and 
did not go into details such as curricula or hospitals guidelines for systematic screening.  
 
Beyond Social Sectors, Specialists working in Urban Transport in both banks immediately 
acknowledged  the  relevance  of  the  issue  to  their  sector,  for  people  often  feel  most 
vulnerable in public transportation. They clearly said the issue was not taken into account 
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132 Their scepticism was corroborated by Colombian counterparts in the Health Ministry as discussed in 
Chapter 9, Section 9.1.1. 	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as of the time of the interviews (2011), except in an ad-hoc basis when local governments 
explicitly asked for it. That was the case for the World Bank in Peru (with cameras in bus 
stations) and Mexico (differentiated buses for women, men and children to avoid sexual 
harassment). But they saw violence prevention and gender as case-by-case issues to be 
dealt with to respond to specific demands from countries, and neither at the IADB nor at 
the World Bank did Urban Transport Specialists see their own organisation taking the lead 
in mainstreaming inclusive violence prevention.  
 
As  for  Urban  Development,  Specialists  interviewed  at  the  World  Bank  were  the  most 
engaged with the issue, but they were also the ones managing the Slum Upgrading projects 
that  included  violence  prevention  components.  In  that  respect,  they  were  not  entirely 
representative. They nevertheless pinpointed key opportunities and bottlenecks for MiVP as 
they  explained  how  they  focused  on  improving  basic  services  in  very  violent 
neighbourhoods and included social activities to recreate social capital, but also emphasised 
barriers in terms of cognitive frame:  
‘I bet you ask three colleagues of mine, all of them will say the Bank cannot do 
anything on violence because we don’t deal with police. Same is true with CDs 
[Country Directors]. In LAC, everybody agrees that violence is a huge concern. The 
issue is not a lack of appreciation or recognition that violence is important, the issue 
is to make clear what the Bank can do about it. Still violence is too often linked to 
police/repression and people retract saying the Bank cannot deal with this.’ (Lead 
Urban Development Specialist, World Bank, Washington, D.C., March 2011) 
 
Sector Specialists responses in both banks suggest that there are margins of manoeuver 
within MDBs to build a common understanding around inclusive violence prevention and 
its  shared  responsibility,  but  this  is  yet  to  be  done.  Most  interviewees  had  a  good 
knowledge  and  experience  in  Latin  America  and  the  Caribbean,  which  made  the  issue 
resonate  with  them.  Some  initially  referred  to  the  need  to  strengthen  criminal  justice 
institutions, and then quickly acknowledged that the issue required also the involvement of 
other sectors. The gender dimension was not systematically perceived though, but often 
acknowledged  throughout  the  conversation.  Findings  also  suggest  that  some  sectors,  in 
particular Education and Social Protection/Youth Development, engage more easily with 	 ﾠ
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the issue and what their sector can contribute to preventing violence. This in turn suggests 
that a sequencing approach to the mainstreaming process might be relevant.  
 
The resistance from other sectors referred more to the comparative advantage of MDBs 
towards the issue. That is, if cognitive aspects on violence were major constraints at the 
beginning of the process when violence had still to emerge on the agenda of MDBs, at the 
beginning of the 2010s, cognitive frames were still a constraint insofar as they were linked 
to being able to imagine what the IADB or the World Bank in general, and each sector in 
particular,  could  bring  to  the  issue.  It  was  therefore  sector  ownership  for  the  shared 
responsibility for violence prevention that was not well established. In other words, the goal 
of the mainstreaming process as inclusive, peaceful societies was not a frame that easily 
resonated with MDBs Sector Specialists, to use Benford and Snow (2000)’s concepts (see 
Section 3.3.1 in Chapter 3). However, as Benford and Snow show, frames can be changed 
to increase their resonance in the target population.  
 
Other cognitive constraints had to do with how mainstreaming itself was perceived. Most 
interviewees across sectors understood mainstreaming in its integrationist perspective, and 
mainly  expressed  resistance  to  the  concept  (see  for  instance  the  quote  on  gender 
mainstreaming  in  Section  6.3.4  in  Chapter  6).  They  considered  mainstreaming  implied 
additional bureaucratic chores to their daily work, and were sceptical about its effectiveness 
as a strategy. We see here how debates surrounding the integrationist approach and its 
technocratic nature still prevail in MDBs (Razavi and Miller 2005; Hannan 2000; Rao and 
Kelleher 1995; see Section 3.2.3 in Chapter 3).  
 
Overall, findings from interviews with EDs, Managers and Specialists working in violence 
prevention and in eight different sectors confirm the relevance of cognitive frames and 
common understanding (or lack thereof) not only to comprehend the process of priority 
setting in MDBs but also to identify opportunities and constraints for mainstreaming in its 
political sense. To take a step further and go deeper into the analysis of current constraints 
and potential opportunities, a corollary question must be asked: with whom do (or should) 
such frames resonate to produce change? That is, the different actors and their respective 
power must now be examined.  	 ﾠ
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7.2 Actor power: who did (or did not) make change happen? 
	 ﾠ
While an organisation may be created with a particular mandate, what it actually does 
primarily depends on the people who give it life. They are those who lead it, manage it, 
work for it, and interact with it. They are those who hold, keep, change or influence internal 
and  external  cognitive  frames,  and  decide  the  destiny  of  an  issue  on  the  development 
agenda. Interview data at the IADB and the World Bank confirm that four groups of actors 
need to come together and use their particular power for the emergence, institutionalisation 
and mainstreaming of an issue to happen. They are supportive political leaders, legitimate 
champions,  a  critical  mass  of  in-house  experts,  and  interested  local  and  national 
Government counterparts.  
7.2.1 The role of political leadership in MDBs 
The role of Presidents 
As Chapter 6 (Section 6.2.1) explained, the political leadership of President Iglesias (1988-
2005) played a decisive role in getting violence prevention on the agenda at the IADB. 
Thereafter, President Moreno (2005-2015) and the Board of Directors recurrently showed 
their support to citizen security and acknowledged its importance for the region (in public 
events and at Board sessions). Nonetheless, no vision in terms of mainstreaming exists, and 
even regarding citizen security as a sector in itself, messages from the top remain general as 
it is unclear where the IADB stands in terms of goals and comparative advantage (OVE 
2014).  
 
In contrast, the lack of explicit political leadership from the highest authority at the World 
Bank might contribute to explaining the long, initial struggle the global financial institution 
experienced before engaging in violence prevention. When President Zoellick took a stand 
for  violence  as  a  development  issue  when  visiting  Central  America  in  2010,  greater 
mobilisation and visibility followed, as well as more access to Trust Funds (Interview, 
World  Bank,  Washington,  D.C,  April  2011;  see  also  Section  6.3.3  in  Chapter  6).  The 
importance  of  political  leadership  also  clearly  appears  at  the  World  Bank  regarding 
domestic violence and its prevention for staff members and their families (see Box 5). In 
terms of mainstreaming, interviewees in the Education and Transport Sectors considered 
that  strong  political  leadership  sending  the  message  that  the  Board  of  Directors  or  the 	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President  would  expect  violence  prevention  to  be  mainstreamed  in  sectors  would  help 
catalyse efforts. A former World Bank Vice-President commented on how climate change 
flourished with high level support, and she affirmed, based on thirty years of experience at 
the World Bank, that ‘you need to send out a vision from the top’ (Former World Bank 
Vice President, Washington D.C., April 2011). However, even after President Zoellick’s 
visit to El Salvador and the publication of the WDRs on Security and on Gender, no signs 
of  clear  political  leadership  are  apparent  that  would  make  violence  prevention  and  the 
development of a corresponding strategy a priority for the World Bank.  
Box 5: Leading by example? The World Bank's domestic violence prevention programme 
Applying  to  yourself  what  you  preach  for  others  is  a  powerful  message.  Domestic  violence 
prevention  programmes  for  Bank’  staff  and  their  families  provides  such  an  example.  It  highlights  the 
importance  of  political  leadership  as  it  shows  how  such  a  chronic  issue  might  gain  or  loose  visibility 
according  to  the  political  support  it  receives.  An  in-depth  interview  with  the  Coordinator  for  Domestic 
Violence Prevention at the World Bank helped retrace the evolution of the programme over the past fifteen 
years.
133  
The  World  Bank  Family  Network  (WBFN)  started  in  1972  as  ‘Wives’,  an  association  of  staff 
members’ wives who gathered to develop activities for families and defend women’s rights in cases of abuse 
or divorce. At the time, the large majority of World Bank staff members were males who brought their wives 
with them and who then entirely depended on their husband in a country where they did not have family 
support. In the 2000s, President Wolfensohn’s wife supported the association, and her husband provided it 
with an annual budget so that it could expand its services. The association then grew and gained visibility to 
reach out and help women victims of domestic violence at the Bank.  
When President Wolfowitz (2005-2007) came to the World Bank, he did not stop the programme, 
but did not support it either, and political leadership disappeared. The same was true with President Zoellick 
(2007-2012) who did not actively support - without blocking - the programme. Only Managing Director 
Ngozi, an African female leader from Nigeria, actively supported it by attending every annual meeting and 
delivering speeches.  More generally, the issue of domestic violence gained some visibility through the 2012 
World Development Report on Gender, but remains a virtually non-existent issue in the Bank’s operational 
work despite being a widespread worldwide phenomenon.  
Today, the World Bank’s internal programme records on average one hundred cases a year. The 
population has diversified, for one third of World Bank staff are now women, and gay partners more openly 
seek out help when needed. One major hindrance for the programme to be truly effective, according to the 
interviewee, is to tie professional advancement to ethical conduct. In fact, people who abuse their partner are 
usually known and nonetheless continue progressing in their career. The World Bank has not taken such a 
major step yet.  
 
The donor community and the development of an external policy community 
In their model on political priority setting for public health initiatives in the global arena, 
Shiffman and Smith (2007) highlighted the need for an external policy community, i.e. a 
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133 The  same  programme  formally  exists  at  the  IADB.  Nonetheless,  the  World  Bank  coordinator  is  the 
reference  for  the  IADB’s  programme,  for  no  in-house  coordinator  is  in  function.  The  IADB  has  some 
information booklets in Washington D.C. and in countries where it has offices, but there is no strong political 
leadership to support the programme.  Such leadership would give an important signal of the importance and 
coherence the regional bank gives to the issue, whose staff mainly come from a region that suffers from 
endemic domestic violence.  
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network of institutions, rules, civil movements, or academics pushing for the issue. Rao and 
Kelleher (1995) and Razavi and Miller (2005) also acknowledged the specific role that 
donors could play within or outside international bureaucracies to push for an issue to be 
mainstreamed (see Section 3.3, Tables 4, 6 and 7 in Chapter 3). The importance of the 
donor  community  was  confirmed  during  interviews  with  staff  members.  Transport 
Specialists at the IADB and the World Bank, for instance, mentioned the fact that road 
safety became mainstreamed in all Transport projects through the mobilisation of the donor 
community. This translated in a special partnership between the World Bank and WHO that 
together published a ground-breaking annual report on road safety. Universal access was 
also mainstreamed in all Transport projects through clear donors priority given to the issue 
in the form of large amounts of funding from Trust Funds and the hiring of specialists 
(Interviews IADB and World Bank, Bogotá and Washington, D.C, May and July 2011).  
 
In the case of violence prevention, a strong and coherent external policy community is only 
emerging. Until 2011, no formal worldwide authority or coalition led concerted efforts on 
the issue. The World Health Organisation played a major role in framing violence as a 
preventable issue following its 2002 World Report. However, only recently did it reach out 
beyond public health to embrace a wider community through the Global Campaign for 
Violence  Prevention.  Nevertheless,  it  must  still  be  considered  as  an  emerging  external 
policy community, for none of the MDBs formally refers to it in their own strategy and 
none has actually officially adopted a public health approach. As for other initiatives, they 
have  been  limited  and  not  coordinated.  The  UNODC  gathers  worldwide  statistics  on 
homicides, but it does not have a mandate on violence prevention as such, nor does it have 
multi-sector  expertise.  In  the  early  2000,  the  Inter-American  Coalition  for  Violence 
Prevention sought to create a policy community by gathering major development agencies 
to share knowledge and build synergies on violence prevention in the region. Nonetheless, 
the  Coalition  has  lost  visibility,  if  not  relevance.  The  fact  that  it  remained  without  a 
coordinator for several months in 2011 seems to confirm this. Other initiatives to build a 
policy community on violence prevention include the regional meetings of Ministers in 
charge of Citizen Security and Public Health in LAC supported by the Organisation of 
American States (OAS), as well as UN-led efforts to give greater visibility to gender-based 
violence (UNIFEM), or push for safer cities (UN-Habitat). Nonetheless, to date, there are 	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no  worldwide  authorities  or  conferences  on  violence  prevention  that  would  enhance  a 
concerted effort on the issue, reconcile different perspectives and try to build a coherent 
global vision.  
 
As per the donor community, even though both MDBs have similar shareholders, they 
mobilised  differently  at  the  IADB  and  the  World  Bank.  At  the  IADB,  because  of  the 
regional status and the smaller number of shareholders, the issue gained more support from 
donors as evidenced through a Special Initiative on Citizen Security amounting to USD 20 
million for a four-year period.
134 So far, this recent initiative is the largest Trust Fund on 
citizen security in the development community. It could be seen as a political agenda from 
donors to push the issue forward in IADB’s development agenda, in a similar fashion, but 
in  no  comparable  scope,  as  what  happened  for  climate  change  or  universal  access  in 
transport. However, the terms of reference of the Special Initiative are vague and do not 
include a clear goal or roadmap as to what the IADB would like to achieve with it, with 
even less clarity on mainstreaming (see also the discussion on organisational treatment in 
Section 8.2.2 in Chapter 8). At the World Bank, unlike other issues such as HIV/AIDS or 
climate change, there is no mobilisation on urban violence. In the former case, the UK 
played a major role to push for the issue, which materialised into a USD 5 billion multi-
donor Climate Change Trust Fund. The international community, and European countries 
in particular, have not mobilised in a similar fashion for violence in LAC, in part because 
they  do  not  directly  suffer  from  the  consequences  of  violence  that  remain  very  local 
(recently though, pandillas from LAC have been identified in the UK, Spain and Portugal, 
which might awaken greater concern from these countries). This is also because donors’ 
attention nowadays mainly focuses on Africa, where the issue of conflict overshadows all 
other issues related to violence (Interview, World Bank, Washington, D.C., April 2011). 
This overall lack of vision is linked to the question of champions in both organisations, or 
the lack thereof, for part of the 2000s and until recently. 
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134 As of 2012, the initiative has financed more than USD 12 million in grants.  
Available  at:  http://www.iadb.org/en/topics/citizen-security/citizen-security,1200.html,  accessed  May  31, 
2014. 
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7.2.2 Were champions legitimate? 
This research shows how the emergence and ups and downs of violence prevention as an 
issue in both MDBs were idiosyncratic, i.e. followed the presence (or lack) of champions 
who embodied the issue. At the IADB, in the late 1990s, Gender Specialists Buvinic
135 and 
Morrison, and Economist Londoño took the lead in making the case for violence prevention 
as a development issue.
136 They did so through a series of studies, similar to what Moser 
and Collier did at the World Bank. When Buvinic, Morrison and Londoño left the IADB in 
the mid-2000s, the issue lost its champions. The lack of in-house champions impacted 
arguably more on quality than on quantity, for it did not stop the issue from expanding. In 
fact, following the realignment, a Cluster (first informal and then formal) was instrumental 
in locating the issue within the organisation, and the demand-driven culture of the regional 
bank helped sustain the issue on the agenda, as I explain further in Section 8.2 in Chapter 8.  
 
Between 1996 and 2002 at the World Bank, Collier in DEC (‘Development Economics 
Vice Presidency’, the Research Department of the World Bank), and Moser, first at the 
Anchor,  and  then  in  the  LAC  region,  created  space  for  dialogue  and  investigation  on 
violence, despite strong internal resistance.
137 DEC formally stopped working on violence-
related issues after Collier had left the World Bank. The paradigm he developed with his 
team on conflict and development remained unchallenged, and the Chief Economists who 
followed had other priorities for their research agendas. As a Lead Researcher explained:  
‘Research  and  priorities  are  very  idiosyncratic  at  the  Bank;  it  all  depends  on 
people’s preferences’ (Interview, Washington, D.C., April 2011).
138  
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135 Buvinic later became the World Bank Director for Gender. 
	 ﾠ
136 I could not retrieve the exact level of seniority and title of these three IADB staff members, but they were 
leading their respective agenda. 
 
137 As explained in Section 6.3.1 in Chapter 6, other  key staff members played major roles: LAC Chief 
Economist  Perry  and  his  team,  and  Lead  Economist  Fajnzylber  who  published  milestone  research  with 
Lederman and Loayza to show the relationship between violence and development (or mal-development), and 
showing that inequality mattered more than poverty per se. 
 
138 As  the  Lead  Researcher  further  explained,  researchers  who  used  to  work  with  Paul  Collier  and  who 
consider the issue of violence important for the development agenda continue working on the issue, but 
informally and during their personal time. So far, there is no institutional support to formally develop research 
on violence and crime (Interview, Washington, D.C., April 2011).  
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In operations, when Moser left the Bank, the issue became orphaned for four years. When a 
small team took back the issue, it took several years for it to gain visibility again, arguably 
and among other reasons, because no legitimate champions supported it. In terms of gender, 
as explained in Section 6.3.4 in Chapter 6, the new Director opted for a strategy focusing 
on ‘smart economics’ rather than violence prevention, and domestic violence and other 
gender dimensions of violence lacked their own legitimate champions.  
7.2.3 Wanted: critical mass of in-house experts 
Along with the change in champions, and lack thereof since the mid-2000s, the lack of in-
house expertise appears as a key factor hindering the emergence and institutionalisation of 
violence prevention at the IADB and the World Bank. Interviewees explained that in a 
context where there are many competing priorities and the relevance of MDBs is open to 
question, in particular in upper middle-income countries (see Box 2 in Chapter 1), in-house 
expertise is essential to push internally for the issue and to show the banks’ capacity to 
effectively respond to potential demand.  
 
At the IADB, the team in charge of citizen security changed several times over the past 
decade  (including  a  major  change  in  2007  with  the  realignment,  and  Division  Chiefs 
leaving the IADB as explained in Section 6.2.3 in Chapter 6). At the time of this research 
(2010-2014), seven staff members in Headquarters and eleven Specialists in country offices 
formed the IADB team on citizen security. However, these specialists were simultaneously 
in charge of all topics related to the ‘Modernisation of the State’. That is, they were not 
experts  in  citizen  security,  but  instead  were  in  charge  of  ‘managing’  loans  and  other 
activities within a broad area that included citizen security. In fact, many interviewees 
raised the issue of lack of in-house expertise, showing, to say the least, a distrust regarding 
the capacity of the team in place to develop a clear strategy on violence prevention. The 
lack of in-house expertise might be a consequence rather than a cause though. It could 
indeed be understood from an opposite perspective: the organisation did not bring or put 
adequate  resources  to  build  a  stronger  and  larger  expertise  because  the  issue  was  not 
considered a priority worth mainstreaming (thus uncovering a gap between rhetoric and 
practice). In the case of climate change for example, MDBs built their expertise or are 
doing it because they consider climate change a key topic for development for the years to 	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come. This was also due to strong external leadership and financial support from European 
countries,  as  previously  discussed  in  Section  7.2.1  on  political  leadership.  Moreover, 
recruiting experts is also a challenge that cannot be underestimated. From my experience of 
working at the IADB, I could witness how the Cluster of Citizen Security struggled to keep 
experts and fill new positions.
139 The alternate strategy to compensate the lack of in-house 
expertise  has  been  to  recruit  external  consultants,  which  is  a  common  strategy  in  both 
MDBs, in particular for budgetary constraints. Nonetheless, consultants cannot replace in-
house  experts  on  which  depends  the  quality  of  policy  dialogue,  in-house  knowledge 
agenda, projects’ negotiations with clients, project design and supervision, and strategy 
preparation (OVE 2014).  
 
As for experts in other sectors at the IADB, a greater collaboration between the Citizen 
Security Cluster and the Gender Division did emerge when Morrison, who was one of the 
initial champions of violence prevention at the IADB in the early 2000, was appointed 
Division  Chief  of  the  Gender  and  Diversity  Division,  confirming  the  importance  of 
legitimate champions in that respect. The IADB’s Education Division hired a Specialist to 
specifically work on violence prevention in school, which arguably shows the growing 
importance of building in-house expertise on the issue in Education. But an Education 
Specialist quickly downplayed such optimism as she declared:  
‘The issue [violence prevention] is clearly not a priority in the sector. In fact, it is 
even not discussed [among us].’ (Interview, Washington, D.C., March 2011) 
 
Moreover, within the pool of Specialists working on Citizen Security at the IADB, none 
had specific sector knowledge, and as such, none of them could support other sectors in a 
mainstreaming  perspective.  This  was  even  less  so  considering  the  lack  of  trust  Sector 
Specialists  expressed  when  referring  to  the  Cluster  of  Citizen  Security.  That  is,  when 
Specialists were not considered knowledgeable professionals, other sectors felt hesitant in 
collaborating with them. We are thus still far from the double, let alone triple, expertise 
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139  In fact, when a Lead Specialist left the IADB (to join the World Bank as long-term expert consultant, i.e. 
not staff member), the position remained vacant several months. At the time I am revising the thesis (2014) 
the position is still unfilled when the Lead Specialist had left a year ago.  
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required  to  mainstream  inclusive  violence  prevention  as  put  forth  by  Rao  and  Sandler 
(2012) (see Section 3.3.2 in Chapter 3). 
 
At  the  World  Bank,  the  team  only  included  one  staff  member  and  two  consultants 
throughout  most  of  the  2000  decade  and  until  2009,  when  the  team  shifted  to  Social 
Development. Under the Social Development department, from 2009 to 2011, the violence 
prevention  LAC  team  included  two  Specialists  and  one  long-term  consultant,  plus 
additional consultants as per needs required and budget allowed (see Sections 6.3.2 and 
6.3.3 in Chapter 6). These three persons were in charge of violence prevention for the 
whole of the LAC region. The Anchor provided additional support with one or two experts. 
Efforts  to  expand  the  critical  mass  of  Specialists  included  training  country  office  staff 
members through the online course provided by the World Bank Institute (WBI), so as to 
enable them to respond to Government’s punctual demand and develop policy dialogue on 
the  issue.  However,  the  World  Bank  violence  prevention  team  remained  understaffed 
considering the importance of violence in LAC and the need to develop both an internal 
and external agenda on the topic, in particular considering that this involved organising 
recurrent events (like Brown Bag Lunches (BBLs) and conferences) and developing studies 
and toolkits, in addition to the operational work. As far as the Anchor was concerned, the 
team had strengthened, even though the twelve persons were in majority consultants, which 
means a greater degree of team precariousness.
140 More importantly, the Anchor included a 
large  spectrum  of  complex  issues,  spanning  political  violence  and  civil  war  to  forced 
displacement, youth and gender-based violence, and urban crime and violence (see Section 
6.3.4 in Chapter 6). So, among the twelve persons, only two or three persons worked on 
interpersonal violence in urban contexts, and were in charge of knowledge products as well 
as cross support to operations in LAC and Africa.
141 As for Specialists in other sectors who 
might have provided expertise on specific aspects of violence prevention, such as gender-
based violence, domestic violence, or bullying at school to cite but a few, they were not 
formally organised. In that respect, the new team in charge of violence prevention took the 
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
140 Consultants might leave or change units more easily than staff members, making institutional memory 
unpredictable and dependent on the good will of predecessors, in particular in absence of training. 
 
141 Of course, understaffing is not specific to violence prevention and is rather common to non-traditional 
topics, as opposed to more World Bank core business ones such as infrastructure or public health.  
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initiative of developing a multi-sector monthly meeting (called BEAM),
 142 so as to identify 
and  engage  specialists  from  other  sectors  interested  in  violence  prevention,  create  a 
network of sector-specific focal persons, and share knowledge.  Interviewees could not cite 
any examples of the outcomes of such meetings though. In contrast, an issue that had a 
critical mass of in-house experts, such as climate change, grew relatively quickly on the 
agenda  of  the  World  Bank.  As  a  former  Vice-President  of  the  World  Bank  explained 
regarding climate change:  
‘You need both top-down and bottom-up. At the bottom, inside the Bank, you had 
people who had been practicing and wanted climate change, above all in Anchors 
where they did a lot of analytical work. They were thinking about the issue and 
were ready.’ (Former World Bank Vice-President, Washington, D.C., April 2011)
143  
	 ﾠ
7.2.4 Is there demand for MDBs’ support in violence prevention from 
Government counterparts?  
Overall, the greater number of IADB’s citizen security projects as well as their visibility in 
the region shows that demand for IADB’s support is greater than for the World Bank’s. 
Yet, as highlighted in Chapters 1 and 6, only sixteen projects in fourteen years for the 
whole region show that demand for the regional bank’s support has been slow, and might 
depend  on  other  factors,  as  I  explain  in  Chapter  9  when  studying  the  case  study  of 
Colombia and counterparts’ perception of MDBs in violence prevention.  
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142 Aware of both the constraints and the necessity for multi-sector work, the team in charge of violence 
prevention at the World Bank developed an initiative to create a space for discussion among specialists of 
different sectors. This took the form of meetings called BEAM. The BEAM meetings gathered focal points 
from a variety of sectors that were interested in the issue of violence prevention. They met once a month to 
share  information  on  what  other  sectors  were  doing  on  violence  prevention.  The  focal  point  was  then 
responsible  for  sharing  this  information  with  their  colleagues  in  their  own  sector.  BEAM  participants 
interviewed had different opinions. While some argued that the chairing should rotate (it was under the Social 
Development sector that was formally in charge of violence and crime prevention) so as to increase the 
mobilisation of other sectors and listen to their perspectives, others considered the BEAM meetings were a 
very positive and useful space to share information and enhance internal pedagogy and communication on 
what could be done in violence prevention. However, none could tell me what the BEAM had produced in 
terms of multi-sector efforts (Interviews, World Bank, Washington, D.C., April and July 2011).  
 
143 The  Director  of  the  Anchor  in  charge  of  violence  prevention  shared  such  analysis,  and  attempted  to 
develop  a  corresponding  strategy,  but  implementing  it  with  such  a  small  team  was,  as  he  stressed,  ‘a 
challenging task’ (Interview, World Bank, Washington, D.C., July 2011). 
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At the World Bank, staff members recurrently emphasised the lack of countries demand for 
violence  prevention  when  commenting  on  the  quasi-inexistent  operational  portfolio. 
According to a World Bank Violence Prevention Specialist, two anecdotes illustrate how 
the Bank was not seen as a potential partner in violence prevention. In Senegal, during a 
conference organised by the European Forum for Urban Security, the above-mentioned 
specialist asked the Country Director about Government’s demand in urban violence. The 
CD replied that this was not an issue in Senegal and that the Government never brought it 
up  in  discussions.  During  the  conference,  the  expert  learned  from  the  Prime  Minister 
himself that he wanted to work with the European Forum on the issue. The World Bank 
was simply not considered a relevant partner in the area and Governments were seeking 
policy  advice  elsewhere.  Another  anecdote  relates  to  a  similar  situation  in  Mexico. 
Although  the  situation  worsened  dramatically  in  terms  of  violence,
144 the  World  Bank 
country office felt reluctant to engage in discussions with the Government on this matter. 
They felt the Bank did not have the capacity, tools or will to support the country in that 
endeavour. It was only when the LAC team engaged in proactive policy dialogue through 
trust-funded workshops and conferences that the issue arose in discussions. Such a priority 
issue for Mexico was ignored for many years in discussions by both parties simply because 
the Government and the World Bank country office did not know how the World Bank 
could help in violence prevention. Instead, Mexico turned to the US and Colombia.  
 
In  terms  of  Gender  issues,  when  I  asked  why  very  few  projects  adopted  a  gender 
perspective or included a component related to gender-based violence, MDBs’ staff and 
Managers in both banks most commonly responded that countries did not request financing 
for gender-based violence. As an IADB Division Chief explained: 
‘All of the countries in the region have laws and often protocols in place, but they 
do  not  ask  for  funding  from  development  banks  to  implement  them  or  develop 
specific activities to address the issue.’ (Interview, Washington, D.C., April 2011).  
 
According to the same Division Chief, when taking a loan on Gender, countries opted for 
general issues, such as childcare and labour-related equality (thus focusing on practical 
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144 Under the last Administration of Felipe Calderón who adopted a frontal fight against narco-traffickers. 
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gender needs),
145 and not gender-based violence that in fact related to culture and deeply 
ingrained norms such as machismo that Ministers themselves might have adhered to (opcit). 
The Gender Anchor at the World Bank also focused largely on economic empowerment of 
women in rhetoric and on practical gender needs in practice. As previously noted (see 
Section 7.1), the same persons were in charge of the Gender agenda first at the IADB and 
then at the World Bank. What is surprising is that while the Chief person at the IADB, a 
Gender Specialist, was very active on domestic and gender-based violence, this activism 
switched to a more economic focus when joining the World Bank. She explained that the 
comparative advantage of the organisation was economic empowerment, and since ‘you 
need to pick your battle’ as she emphasised, issues of domestic violence and gender-based 
violence were not put at the forefront – it was assumed that increased economic power 
might  reduce  violence  against  women.  This  is  actually  a  problematic  assumption 
considering that empirical research has shown that financial programmes targeting women 
had  the  unintended  consequence  of  increasing  domestic  violence  in  the  short  term 
(McCoskey 1996; Kimerly and Baumrind 2004; see also Angelucci 2008; Bobonis, Castro 
and Gonzalez-Brenes 2006),
 146 or had no impact in the long term (Bobonis and Castro 
2010). Beyond debates on the evidence that supported such an approach, the World Bank 
Gender Director also explained that economic arguments were the only way to reach out to 
Ministers of Finance who are the ones who decide on the collaboration with MDBs. As 
such, they decided to adhere to their clients’ cognitive frame, instead of trying to influence 
it.  They  also  tried  to  promote  aspects  related  to  cultural  change,  such  as  positive 
masculinity and paternity, through publications,
147 but admitted that they were difficult to 
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145 IADB’s Ciudad Mujer in El Salvador is an example. Even though improvements of services (practical 
gender needs) for women might improve the bargaining power and social position of women in society, they 
do not openly address the need to change the tolerance towards abusive treatment of women, girls and boys, 
and other male chauvinist cultural patterns (strategic gender needs). 
 
146 Research on conditional cash transfers such as Progresa in Mexico has shown that women who received 
large amounts were more likely to be victims of intimate partner violence, but less likely if amounts were 
small (Angelucci 2006), and in the medium term were more likely to suffer from emotional violence (after 
two to six years after the transfers), but less likely to be victims of physical violence (Bobonis, Castro and 
González-Brenes 2006).  
	 ﾠ
147 See for instance, Bannon, I. and M. Correia, 2006. The other half of gender: men's issues in development, 
The World Bank, Washington, D.C. 
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include in projects (Interviews, Washington, D.C., April 2011). Indeed, none of the loans 
reviewed for this thesis included such interventions.  
 
Counterparts’ national and local capacity 
When  addressing  complex  issues  that  require  coordination  across  sectors  and  levels  of 
government, the level of institutional capacity plays a significant role. As a World Bank 
Lead Urban Development Specialist working in Central America and the Caribbean for 
more than ten years pointed out: 
‘To  achieve  results,  the  most  important  is  your  partner  and  their  capacity.’ 
(Interview, Washington, D.C., April 2011) 
This complicates further the role of MDBs’ staff in designing and negotiating operations 
that could lessen violence, through stand-alone projects or mainstreaming. In fact, multi-
sector stand-alone operations are equivalent to ‘country mainstreaming’ as mentioned in the 
introduction of this chapter. The overall responsibility is passed on to the country with a 
focal point in MDBs to support the whole process without the corresponding multi-sector 
expertise (for no one can be expert in a number of sectors at once). Urban Development and 
Education Specialists in both banks have insisted on the characteristics of the counterparts 
for the mainstreaming process to be effective. In fact, as previously mentioned, if in some 
UMICs  they  considered  there  was  room  for  manoeuver  as  the  Colombian  case  study 
confirms  (see  Section  9.1  in  Chapter  9),  in  other  LMICs  countries,  they  saw  it  as 
unrealistic, given the very high turnover of political and technical staff and the average low 
institutional capacity of governmental and local teams (Interviews, Washington, D.C., April 
and  July  2011).  Such  differentiated  response  suggests  a  sequenced  approach  to 
mainstreaming not only by sector, but also by countries’ characteristics, even though in 
practice such a differentiated approach might be politically difficult to implement.  
 
7.3 Conclusion 
 
Overall, cognitive frame and actor power were key categories of analysis to understand 
inclusive  violence  prevention  in  MDBs,  even  considering  the  differences  between  the 
banks.  It  is  clear  that  what  was  missing  was  a  clear  and  coherent  cognitive  frame  to 
consolidate a common understanding on the issue across sectors within each bank, as well 	 ﾠ
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as on the overall vision and strategy of each bank towards the issue.  Building a critical 
mass  of  in-house  experts  was  the  other  urgent  need  for  both  banks  to  institutionalise 
violence prevention on their agenda. This critical mass needed to expand across sectors 
independently of the strategy followed (stand-alone projects or mainstreaming processes), 
for even in stand-alones double or triple expertise (violence prevention, gender and sector) 
was needed for multi-sector projects and the implementation of mainstreaming approaches 
at the country level. So far, for the eight sectors interviewed, violence did not appear as a 
priority,  which  suggests  that  there  were  little  immediate  opportunities  for  a  political 
mainstreaming for the inclusive prevention of violence, the concept of mainstreaming itself 
being largely misunderstood or understood through an integrationist perspective and widely 
‘feared’  among  Sector  Specialists.  In  general,  the  explanation  regarding  gender  and 
violence prevention was thrown to the side in the rhetoric about lack of demand from 
countries with the recurrent discourse that ‘if they ask for it, we will respond’. Chapter 9 
explores  Colombia’  responses  to  these  allegations.  Before  this,  Chapter  8  looks  into 
operational  knowledge  and  organisational  treatment  categories  to  pursue  the  analysis 
further.  
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Chapter 8: Opportunities and Constraints for  
Mainstreaming Inclusive Violence Prevention in MDBs:  
Operational Knowledge and Organisational Treatment 
	 ﾠ
 
Chapter 8 looks into two practical dimensions of mainstreaming, essential in translating 
theory into practice: operational knowledge and organisational treatment. As the analytical 
framework in Chapter 3 has proposed, to mainstream inclusive violence prevention in the 
development agenda, it is not enough to have strong and resonant frames to convince, 
convey and urge powerful actors to act in different sectors at different levels.   These actors 
also need to know what to do and how to do it (operational knowledge), and incentives and 
organisational rules need to support them in this endeavour (organisational treatment).  
 
Chapter 2 has shown how the gendered continuum of violence and the ecological model 
were yet to be operationalised in practice in most contexts. How did this knowledge gap 
affect the multi-sector treatment of violence prevention in MDBs? More generally, how did 
MDBs respond to knowledge-related challenges in violence prevention? How were gender 
dimensions affected in these considerations? In terms of incentives and organisational rules, 
which incentives are at play and to what extent are they conducive to inclusive violence 
prevention and its mainstreaming? How do resources allocated to the issue and the location 
of responsibility influence its treatment and the opportunities for mainstreaming?  
 
This  chapter  answers  these  questions  in  two  ways.  First,  it  examines  the  operational 
knowledge  in  its  three  dimensions:  effectiveness,  implementation  knowledge,  and 
meaningful  indicators  (Section  8.1).  Second,  it  studies  the  organisational  treatment  of 
violence prevention and gender in both banks in terms of incentives for staff to work on the 
issue,  resource  allocation,  and  mainstream  location  of  responsibility  (Section  8.2).  The 
chapter concludes by reflecting on the main opportunities and constraints found in these 
two categories.  
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8.1 Operational knowledge: when guidance for action is uncertain, what do we 
do? 
 
‘We don’t know what works’ was among the most recurrent answers at the IADB and at the 
World Bank in regard to violence prevention. Executive Directors, Senior Managers and 
Specialists across sectors in both banks highlighted the lack of rigorous regional evidence 
and uncertainties regarding how to develop, implement and measure strategies to prevent 
violence from a multi-sector, gender perspective. These knowledge-based limitations refer 
back to the complexity at stake given the multi-disciplinarity of violence (as discussed in 
Section 2.3.1 in Chapter 2), to the late link between violence and development (see Section 
7.1.1 in Chapter 7), and to the lack of in-house expertise (see Section 7.2.3 in Chapter 7). 
More importantly, they highlight the difficulty in building a vision and a clear strategy 
when knowledge in its various forms blurs instead of guides action in MDBs. 
8.1.1 Regional evidence on effective interventions: do we know what to do?   
For  the  past  fifteen  years,  both  banks  have  stressed  the  lack  of  regional  evidence  on 
violence  prevention  in  most  of  their  publications  and  conferences.  This  was  more 
noticeable  at  the  World  Bank  because  of  its  organisational  culture  and  was  further 
confirmed  when  respondents  at  the  global  financial  institution  explained  that  it  was 
legitimate  not  to  finance  projects  and  interventions  with  very  little  indication  of  their 
potential effectiveness (Interviews, Washington, D.C., April 2011). 
 
However, despite this shared observation on a major constraint, none of the banks had 
followed a systematic and coherent agenda to build the most needed and wanted evidence. 
At the IADB, OVE showed that the first eleven citizen security projects were not evaluable 
(OVE 2010). In fact, they lacked either baselines or specific indicators. In an attempt to 
measure  some  of  the  effects  of  these  projects,  the  Evaluation  Office  conducted  three 
separate ex-post evaluations. Findings showed positive results in the case of Jamaica, Chile 
and Colombia (Cali) (see Table 15 in Chapter 6), and overall, suggested that much more 
could have been learned if more rigorous result frameworks had been developed (opcit). 
Only recently, more efforts have been geared towards developing the knowledge base on 
violence prevention in the region. This was the objective of the new Initiative of Citizen 
Security that was approved in 2012 to finance impact evaluations (see Section 6.2.4 in 	 ﾠ
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Chapter 6). That said, the Initiative was too vaguely defined to allow the development of a 
solid  and  coherent  knowledge  agenda,  which,  if  this  issue  is  not  addressed,  would  be 
another missed opportunity for the regional bank. At the World Bank, none of the three 
projects that included violence prevention as a component had main indicators on violence. 
Evaluations were nevertheless included in seed grants the World Bank provided to NGOs 
working on violence prevention, but such efforts were not commensurate to the challenge 
that most stakeholders had been underscoring for years.  
 
In general, it is also worth noting that if evidence on what works is certainly limited in 
LAC, it is not non-existent either. Major cities in the region have developed strategies that 
have had positive results in terms of violence prevention: Bogotá, Medellin and Cali in 
Colombia, Sao Paulo and Diadema in Brazil, Santiago in Chile to cite but the most famous 
examples  (see  Section  5.3.1  in  Chapter  5).  Individual  programmes  have  also  been 
evaluated.  They  include  ‘Programa  H’  in  Brazil  (Pulitzer,  Barker,  Segundo,  and 
Nascimiento 2006), ‘Fica Vivo’ in Rio de Janeiro in Brazil (Silveira et al. 2010), ‘My Safe 
Neighbourhood’ in the Dominican Republic (Cunningham et al. 2008). Regarding gender 
and  violence,  ‘Programa  H’  in  particular  showed  that  changing  men’s  attitude  towards 
gender-based  violence  could  be  achieved  (Pulitzer,  Barker,  Segundo,  and  Nascimiento 
2006), thus suggesting that operationalising the gendered continuum of violence could be 
further explored.  However, this exploration has not been taken on board by MDBs until 
now. Furthermore, evidence from the US, Europe and Australia has grown over the past 
decades and is now readily available through a series of websites and publications (see for 
instance, the Campbell Collaboration; Sherman et al 1998, 2004; Office of Justice of the 
US Government; San Diego State University and WHO SafetyLit; WHO 2013 for intimate 
partner  violence,  among  others).  The  context  in  industrialised  countries  is  of  course 
different,  and  differences,  particularly  in  terms  of  institutional  strengths,  cannot  be 
overlooked. Nevertheless, there are also a large variety of contexts among Latin American 
countries, and some of them actually provide propitious conditions to replicate evidence 
from the North. As such, partners in development like MDBs could be instrumental in 
financing or disseminating more widely such evaluations. This in turn raises the question of 
knowledge as a public good and the role of MDBs in that respect. Beyond the lack of 
comprehensive  evidence,  which  is  actually  not  unique  to  violence  prevention  among 	 ﾠ
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development  issues  (for  example,  climate  change  or  corruption  whose  evidence  on 
interventions’ effectiveness is limited as well), what interviewees also emphasised was the 
lack of visibility of the conditions for successful implementation.  
8.1.2 Conditions for context-based, successful implementation: do we know 
how to do it? 
In both banks, Managers and Sector Specialists highlighted the need for practical guidance 
on the ‘how to’. At the IADB, a Regional Manager explained that country dialogue was 
hindered not by the lack of interest, but by the lack of clarity on pacing and prioritisation of 
reforms:  
‘In terms of macro economic reforms, you cannot do certain reforms unless you 
have done first a regulatory one, or something like that. If you do not do that, you 
cannot liberalise. What is very important to know is what to do first, how to set 
priorities, on which criteria and why. If you want to do a mainstreaming, where do 
you begin? Which sectors first and why?’ (Interview, IADB, Washington, D.C., 
July 2011) 
	 ﾠ
The same Manager further insisted on the need for more detailed operational knowledge in 
inclusive violence prevention:  
‘What is really missing is an operational action plan, a plan that would describe step 
by step what to do and how to do it. So far, everybody knows that the justice sector 
should be reformed but nobody knows how to do it. At the IADB they refer and use 
a  lot  the  plan  for  security  of  the  European  Commission,  but  it  is  not  detailed 
enough.’ (opcit) 
 
Such  contextual  knowledge-related  constraints  had  concrete  consequences  during  the 
implementation of the IADB’s citizen security projects. As underscored in OVE’s 2013 
evaluation, most projects faced significant difficulties and delays in implementation mainly 
because the context was not sufficiently taken into account in project design (OVE 2013). 
This  in  turn  led  to  the  incapacity  to  implement  the  project  as  initially  conceived,  and 
thereafter, to properly learn from the experience in terms of programme effectiveness (see 
Section 8.1.1).  
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Beyond staffs directly working on violence prevention, other sector specialists also pointed 
out the need to develop such practical knowledge if the mainstreaming process was to have 
a chance to be implemented. In that regard, Urban Development and Social Protection 
specialists  at  the  IADB  decided  to  take  stock  of  existing  evidence  and  operational 
knowledge on their own (that is, independently of the Cluster of Citizen Security). In Urban 
Development  for  instance,  they  included  violence  prevention-related  interventions  in 
projects  in  Mexico  (Habitat  Programme)  and  Brazil  (Favela  Barrios),  and  opted  for 
designing pilots to test methodologies (Interview, IADB, Washington, D.C., July 2011). In 
Social Protection, they published toolkits on youth-at-risk. Those efforts nonetheless faced 
a common shortcoming at the IADB, which was the lack of systematic dissemination. In 
fact, during my research, I found a number of useful studies and initiatives the IADB was 
undertaking, but that few people knew about. In general, the regional bank demonstrated 
deficiencies at disseminating and communicating about what it did, even internally. This 
led to replication, the ‘invisibilisation’ and thereafter, the ‘non-use’ of pertinent in-house 
knowledge. In contrast, the World Bank was much more efficient and better organised in 
terms of knowledge dissemination. Although in violence prevention, this was not always 
the case, as Education specialists working in countries most affected by violence were 
unaware  of  toolkits  prepared  to  facilitate  the  incorporation  of  violence  prevention  in 
schools in the education sector among others. This pinpoints the constant need for targeting 
the internal audience within banks as much as the external ones.  
‘To summarise: is violence a serious issue: yes. Should the Bank work on it: yes. 
Now, the question is how. […] I am an Economist and I would not know how to do 
a violence prevention programme at school.’ [Researcher: Do you know about the 
toolkit on violence prevention in school?] No.’(Senior Education Specialist, World 
Bank, Washington D.C., April 2011) 
 
Specialists in other sectors, in particular in Social Protection, produced manuals on youth-
at-risk, a key group for prevention programmes. However, as a World Bank Senior Social 
Protection Specialist working on youth issues insisted: 
‘These manuals are useful but they do not go enough into details to be useful at the 
operational level.’ (Interview, World Bank, Washington, D.C., March 2011) 
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Such remarks suggest that more reflection is needed on the ‘type’ of tools to be developed 
to  effectively  serve  the  mainstreaming  process.  Among  them,  indicators  were  certainly 
given a high importance by MDBs staff members.  
8.1.3 Meaningful indicators: Do we know how to measure it? 
At the IADB and the World Bank, Education and Transport Specialists pointed out the need 
for indicators to operationalise the shared responsibility for the inclusive prevention of 
violence. Indicators were seen as incentives and accountability mechanisms to ‘motivate’ 
sectors to take the issue into account (Interviews, Washington, D.C., April and July 2011). 
Without  credible  indicators  to  properly  capture  each  sector’s  contribution,  the 
mainstreaming  process  was  deemed  to  fail  (opcit).  As  World  Bank  Senior  Specialists 
insisted, showing how the development effectiveness framework shapes priorities for Team 
Leaders (see also discussion on incentives in Section 8.2): 
‘If you do not have accountability, the mainstreaming effort will not work, because 
sectors will not feel the issue is their own.’ (Interview, Sr. Transport Specialist, 
World Bank, Washington, D.C., March 2011) 
 
‘Now, if you can add things on violence prevention that are easy to do and not 
costly, why not? Like for example make sure that schools have doors that close so 
that nobody enters when the children are in, lights, cleanliness, recreational/sports, 
painting etc. Or if you do curricula reform of teacher training, include something on 
how to deal with youth-at-risk or conflict at school or conflict resolution, etc. You 
could do it, but what about the impact? If you don’t have an indicator on violence, 
you don’t see the impact so it does not count.’ (Interview, Sr. Education Specialist, 
World Bank, Washington, D.C., March 2011) 
 
Specialists  in  fact  were  worried  that  without  convincing  indicators  to  show  sector 
contribution  and  measuring  the  performance  of  the  issue,  violence  prevention  would 
become a bureaucratic add-on in formal documentation that would eventually lead to the 
invisibilisation  of  the  issue,  just  as  gender  scholars  have  shown  in  the  case  of  gender 
mainstreaming (see Section 3.2.3 in Chapter 3). To take a step further in the analysis, I thus 
explored staff members’ perceptions on the possibility to develop compound indicators to 	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create the currently missing accountability at the sector level. Compound indicators would 
include  violence-and-gender-related  indicators  as  sub-indicators  of  overall  sector 
performance or quality. This is what the Government of Colombia did when it included 
competencias ciudadanas (citizenship competencies) in the student tests used to measure 
the overall quality of the Education Sector (see Section 9.1.1 in Chapter 9). Other sub-
indicators in the Education Sector could take into account school climate, given that safe 
learning environments for girls and boys contribute to student achievement, one of the main 
measures for the sector’s performance. Similarly, in Transport, safe public transport, as 
measured  in  terms  of  perception  and  number  of  incidents  by  gender,  could  inform  the 
quality  of  the  service  and  users’  satisfaction.  Actually,  other  sensitive  and  complex 
development issues like corruption gained leverage when they were included in the ‘Doing 
Business’ indicators, an initiative launched in 2002 by World Bank Economists that later 
became a worldwide ranking activity that was followed by many Governments. The ‘Doing 
Business’  indicators  created  incentives  and  accountability  mechanisms  for  countries’ 
performance on corruption, for country performance then became visible to others and was 
included in the overall country ranking. That said, in the case of corruption, efforts to 
develop Doing Business indicators were led by champions under the political leadership of 
President Wolfensohn (1995-2005) who gave particular importance to fighting corruption. 
Such conditions are not currently present in either MDB as discussed in Section 7.2.1 in 
Chapter  7.  Moreover,  despite  interviewees’  evident  interest  and  curiosity  in  compound 
indicators for inclusive violence prevention, some explicitly expressed scepticism that more 
broadly reflected suspicion vis-à-vis mainstreaming processes in general. Such distrust can 
in fact be linked to organisational constraints as discussed in Section 8.2.  
‘Much better if you go with a multi-sector project like the DPL, where you provide 
a line of budget to the country and agree on a series of indicators and reforms - or 
even a SIL [Specific Investment Loan] - instead of doing small things that won’t be 
coordinated  nor  have  indicators  [referring  to  mainstreaming  inclusive  violence 
prevention in sectors] and therefore won’t be assessed. Go for a multi-sector project 
with Education, Transport, Health, etc. You do that in a low-income dangerous 
neighbourhood and then you measure against the effect on crime and violence. Then 
you can have something to show. The main question is a question of accountability. 
That is why you need your indicators and you need to be clear about what you will 	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be  measuring.’  (Interview,  Sr.  Education  Specialist,  World  Bank,  Washington, 
D.C., March 2011) 
8.2 Organisational treatment:  does MDB institutional ‘architecture’ work for 
inclusive violence prevention mainstreaming? 
 
At the meso level, incentives and rules for staff development, the resources allocated to the 
issue, and the mainstream location of responsibility, all provide key indications in terms of 
opportunities and constraints to mainstream inclusive violence prevention.  
8.2.1 Contradictory incentives embedded in the dual status of MDBs 
Levy (1996) and Hannan (2000) pointed out the importance of incentives and clear rules for 
staff development when studying gender mainstreaming (see Section 3.3.4 in Chapter 3). 
This research confirms their pertinence and highlights the coexistence of different, largely 
contradictory,  incentives  at  play  in  MDBs  that  makes  the  process  of  mainstreaming 
inclusive violence prevention all the more complex. In fact, three main types of incentives 
are at play: incentives related to the pressure to increase and simplify the lending portfolio; 
incentives linked to the pressure to show results; and nascent and limited incentives to 
acquire double or triple expertise, and to work across sectors 
 
Incentives related to the pressure to increase and simplify the lending portfolio 
Following severe criticisms on their relevance (see Box 2 in Chapter 1) and uncertainties 
regarding  their  sustainability,  MDBs  have  increasingly  shifted  their  priority  towards 
approving  large  loans,  shortening  project  preparation  time  and  simplifying  design.  The 
objective since the mid-2000s was to quickly increase the lending portfolio for ensuring 
MDBs’  survival.  This  also  aimed  to  show  MDBs’  relevance  to  shareholders  and  other 
stakeholders. That is, if they lent more and larger loans, that would imply they would be 
needed, i.e. there was a demand for them. The emphasis was therefore placed on lending 
large amounts of money with fewer and fewer conditions so as to disburse quickly. Budget 
support  loans  (PBLs  at  the  IADB  or  DPLs  at  the  World  Bank)  were  ideal,  flexible 
instruments to reach these objectives with minimum conditions for the clients. In terms of 
investment loans, traditional infrastructure sectors were privileged, for they usually implied 
large loans. The ‘softer’ sectors, that are often more complex to implement, were not given 	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priority  (Interviews,  IADB  and  World  Bank,  Washington,  D.C.,  April  and  July  2011). 
Violence prevention and gender obviously fit the latter category.  
 
Such  organisational  priorities  geared  towards  financial  survival  somehow  contradict 
MDBs’  development  mission,  if  we  understand  development  as  complex  processes 
requiring participation, negotiation and a deep understanding of the institutional, political, 
social and economic context at the local and national levels. This is even more so for 
inclusive  violence  prevention  for  a  series  of  reasons  described  in  previous  chapters, 
including significant limitations in relevant knowledge in all its forms in LAC (see Section 
8.1), the multi-dimensionality and multi-causality of violence that requires the development 
of multi-sector responses (see Sections 2.2 and 2.3 in Chapter 2), and its gender dimensions 
deeply ingrained in ideology and structural inequality (see Section 2.5 in Chapter 2). How 
then to reconcile these two divergent currents? From one side, there is a powerful push for 
quick, large loans that are easy to disburse; on the other, a development imperative requires 
a slower process that involves initiatives to study it more, and to develop smaller and more 
complex operations where informed trials and errors are considered part of the development 
process. A World Bank Adviser in Public Sector Reform translated these contradictory 
forces  into  concrete  organisational  constraints  and  showed  which  incentives  in  the  end 
shaped decision-making: 
‘The CD [Country Director] is a key person here but his incentives clearly are to 
make the highest number and the biggest loans. Some Directors, if not most of 
them, do not want grants in their portfolios because they take staff time, are small 
(USD 1 million maximum in general), supervision and preparation intensive, do not 
produce much impact, etc. Some CDs agree if you push and get it approved by the 
Minister  of  Finance,  but  most  do  not  like  them.  Same  for  small  projects.’ 
(Interview, World Bank, Washington D.C., March 2011).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
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Incentives linked to the pressure to show results 
Another  set  of  incentives,  as  discussed  in  Section  8.1.3,  comes  from  the  Development 
Effectiveness Framework and the correlated need to show results.  Here too, mainstreaming 
inclusive violence prevention appears as a complex exercise that raises staff disquiet. The 
attribution issue and the need for simplification (that also includes simplification of results 	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frameworks) do not go hand in hand with complex, relational processes implied in violence 
and gender. What is in fact at stake here is the risk of failure to achieve concrete and 
measurable impact through a single project because of the complexity of inclusive violence 
prevention.  Team  Leaders’  performance  is  evaluated  in  terms  of  number  of  projects 
prepared, timely delivery of projects, and increasingly, results frameworks.  The design and 
implementation of complex projects do not enter into the category of quick disbursable 
projects.  This  explains  that  even  advocates  for  violence  prevention  might  lessen  their 
advocacy,  and  within  violence  prevention,  even  specialists  convinced  that  violence 
endorses  strong  gender  dimensions  might  skip  gender  in  design  in  the  search  for 
simplification (Interview, Washington, D.C., March 2011).  
 
As a Lead Urban Specialist at the World Bank further explained, the projects in Honduras 
and Jamaica took two years respectively to prepare and negotiate before being approved. 
This  represents  an  important  investment  and  a  high  risk  for  the  Team  Leader  and  the 
Manager. Even more so in contexts where there are other needs that could be addressed 
through  ‘easier’  projects  (Interview,  World  Bank,  Washington,  D.C.,  March  2011).  In 
addition,  violence  prevention,  be  it  through  capacity  strengthening  or  community 
participation, might not lead to quick or visible results. Prevention takes time to manifest 
results, and depends on a series of factors that often fall outside the control of MDB teams, 
such as political or technical staff changes, unions, shift in priorities by the Government, 
non cooperation of the opposition to pass needed laws, etc. (beyond the question of the 
evaluability of MDBs projects, that remains an issue in itself as underscored in Section 
8.1.1). These aspects are common in development, but might be over-salient in the case of 
violence  prevention  for  the  ideology  attached  to  it  and  the  resultant  high  volatility  of 
political and technical personnel (OVE 2014). Furthermore, the choice of indicators is also 
very complex. As explained in Chapters 2 and 5, data is not reliable in many countries and 
might not be available at the local level on different forms of violence. As such, homicide 
rates are often chosen to measure whether the project has contributed to lessen violence, or 
not. This is of course risky as on the one hand, a single project might not be able to address 
homicide rates, and on the other hand, homicide rates are often only the tip of the iceberg in 
terms  of  violence,  and  might  not  be  the  prime  concern  of  the  people  who  fear  daily 
violence, not to mention the gender implications of such indicators (see Chapter 2, Section 	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2.5.1). Some projects have included changing perceptions in terms of fear or trust to assess 
the impact the projects. This seems to be more reasonable to really apprehend the impact of 
a small project in a complex environment, but might be subject to criticism in terms of 
measurable results to effectively lessen the problem.  
 
The choice of indicators and how to measure multi-sector, gender sensitive strategies is in 
fact  a  fundamental  question  that  still  requires  further  research  (see  Sections  8.1.1  and 
8.1.3),  but  until  then,  their  under-development  plays  as  a  disincentive  for  violence 
prevention in general and mainstreaming inclusive violence prevention in particular. This 
disincentive strongly manifests at the level of Country Managers at the IADB and Country 
Directors at the World Bank, who are in charge of the relationship with the countries and 
prioritise which sectors to push forward in policy dialogue. Country Managers and Country 
Directors receive constant petitions from all sectors while managing complex situations to 
keep MICs interested and willing to borrow (Interview, Washington DC, April 2011). This 
illustrates  how  MDBs’  mission  creep  generates  resistance  to  issues  such  as  violence 
prevention to gain priority. At the IADB, such disincentives arguably affected the quality of 
design, for teams designed overly complex projects in the search for larger loan approvals 
(OVE 2014). At the World Bank, only through recent internal lobbying from the Violence 
Prevention  team  in  LAC  and  at  the  Anchor,  did  Country  Directors  see  the  issue  as  a 
relevant  feature  to  bring  to  the  table  while  discussing  with  Ministers  of  Finance  (see 
Sections 6.3.3 and 6.3.4 in Chapter 6).  
 
The incentives linked to the pressure to show results also led staff members in both MDBs 
to mention conditions and safeguards. Such discussion refers to the procedures element in 
Levy’s web (1996) and would support a differentiated approach mentioned in Section 7.2.4, 
Chapter 7. Urban and Education Specialists working on LMICs, mainly in Central America 
and  the  Caribbean  where  the  issue  of  violence  is  the  most  severe  and  the  institutional 
capacity  the  lowest,  stressed  the  difficulty  associated  with  working  in  sensitive  and 
complex  topics  such  as  violence  prevention  when  there  were  no  conditions  and  no 
safeguards  to  ensure  minimum  conditions  for  the  project  to  be  implemented  and 
beneficiaries’ rights to be protected (Interviews, Washington, D.C, March and July 2011). 
Their concerns would imply that if conditions were not met, then MDBs should not finance 	 ﾠ
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loans, and instead, work with the counterparts on strengthening the institutional context to 
build the foundations indispensable for obtaining results. Yet, in addition to the fact that 
conditionalities have become taboo in MDBs after the 1990s vivid criticisms of structural 
adjustment  and  the  conditions  they  entailed,  there  are  also  significant  constraints  on 
introducing  conditions,  even  though  they  would  have  the  merit  of  clarifying  a  firm 
standpoint  for  MDBs  about  the  inclusive  prevention  of  violence.  Current  constraints 
include  the  political  agendas  of  policymakers  that  might  not  be  receptive  to  such 
progressive and incremental approaches. Moreover, competition among donors does not 
concur with coherence and pragmatism. Finally, pressure for large loans and reduction of 
human and financial resources for project preparation do not converge towards taking more 
time for political dialogue and coordination.  
 
As for how MDBs could push forward a mainstreaming strategy for inclusive violence 
prevention,  a  few  interviewees  suggested  safeguards.  Safeguards  were  seen  as  an 
organisational  procedure  to  accelerate  the  incorporation  of  violence  prevention  from  a 
gender perspective across sectors and countries, adopting an integrationist and mandatory 
perspective (Interview, Washington, D.C. April 2011). The focus then would be to ‘do no 
harm’ by making mandatory a screening on violence prevention, gender and human rights 
before all sector projects come to discussion at the Board of Directors (as has experimented 
in relation to Gender at the IADB since 2012). Such an approach would then overcome 
contradictory incentives and the lack of demand from countries by making it a requirement 
for all MDBs loans. The majority of staff members interviewed nonetheless dismissed such 
a  safeguard  approach  as  ineffective  to  produce  change  and  expressed  concerns  as  this 
would imply other bureaucratic layers to their daily work (Interviews, World Bank and 
IADB, March and April 2011).  
 
Nascent and limited incentives to acquire double or triple expertise, and to work across 
sectors 
Finally,  there  are  concrete  constraints  to  implement  the  shared  responsibility  for  the 
inclusive  prevention  of  violence  in-house:  the  availability  of  specific  training  and  the 
collaboration and coordination across sectors. Both refer to the adequate procedures and 
staff  development  included  in  Levy’s  staff  development  and  methodology  sphere  (see 	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Table 5 and Section 3.3.4 in Chapter 3). In terms of training, both banks have initiated 
efforts towards providing training to staff to facilitate their work in violence prevention. 
The IADB developed clinics of citizen security since 2009 (usually one working week once 
or  twice  a  year)  that  explicitly  sought  to  respond  to  the  lack  of  related  training  of 
Modernisation  of  the  State  specialists.  These  clinics  remained  largely  focused  on  the 
criminal justice sector though. Moreover, they did not seek to reach out to sector specialists 
beyond ICS so as to build double or triple expertise throughout the Bank, which would 
have  facilitated  a  better  design  of  multi-sector  stand-alone  projects  as  well  as  the 
implementation of a mainstreaming process. At the World Bank, efforts concentrated on the 
e-course mentioned in Section 7.2.3 in Chapter 7 The e-course was well designed, but 
provided only basic training on violence prevention (with a stronger focus on situational 
and social prevention than at the IADB) and mainly targeted in external audience.
 148  The 
BEAM  meetings  could  have  played  the  role  of  peer  training,  following  the  strategy 
deployed by the Gender Anchor regarding gender mainstreaming, but as for the interview 
data, this was still not the case at the time of the research.  
 
As  for  collaboration  and  coordination  across  sectors,  most  interviewees  insisted  on  the 
difficulty of multi-sector work within banks and at the country level. Specialists in Health, 
Urban Development and Transport in both banks stressed how MDBs did not know how to 
work across sectors. They explained that incentives were not sufficient to enhance full 
participation of different sectors within a project, or coordination among projects. That is, 
in theory, team members would come from different sectors to participate in a multi-sector 
project,  and  specialists  would  take  the  lead  for  one  component  or  a  specific  set  of 
interventions according to their sectoral expertise and experience. In practice, the challenge 
deals with accountability and the benefit of sector specialists’ involvement in a project that 
‘belongs’ to another sector. The IADB has developed a mechanism to respond to this issue 
called ‘double booking’. This mechanism makes it possible for a particular project to have 
two  Team  Leaders  from  different  Divisions.  As  such,  the  benefit  and  responsibility  or 
accountability for the project success falls under two Divisions that ‘own’ the project in 
their respective portfolio. To date, the double booking mechanism has been approved, but 
more analysis is needed to assess its effectiveness to enhance multi-sector work (OVE 2014 
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on IADB’s realignment). Nonetheless, this is an innovative feature that aims to concretely 
address one major impediment to collaboration among sectors. At the World Bank, such 
double booking mechanisms have not been developed. Team members from other units 
might  participate  or  be  consulted  during  project  preparation.  When  this  happens,  the 
collaboration usually occurs at the stage of review of the project design (‘Concept Note 
Review Meetings’) when experts from other Divisions are asked to comment on the project. 
Even if comments are taken into account and project design is adjusted, nothing guarantees 
that the Team Leader follows up on these adjustments if the team itself does not possess the 
sector expertise. This is a concern that has been raised several times during the interviews 
at the World Bank, and is seen as a concrete impediment of multi-sector projects. This 
difficulty also reflects the complexity of multi-sector work and mainstreaming strategies at 
the country level. For MDBs’ staffs, working with different executing agencies or finding 
one agency able to coordinate the work in multiple sectors at the national or local level is 
surely a challenge (see also the discussion on the mainstream location of responsibility in 
Section  8.2.3;  the  discussion  on  opportunities  and  constraints  for  MiVP  in  the  case  of 
Colombia in Section 9.1 in Chapter 9). Such issues make the implementation of projects 
more complex, and therefore work as counter-incentives for MDBs’ specialists to work in a 
multi-sector  fashion.  As  for  the  coordination  among  sectors,  interviewees  explained  it 
might happen on an ad-hoc basis, but was mostly non-existent. In other words, after the 
Country Strategy is negotiated with all sectors, project implementation mainly remains in 
silos, reflecting what is current practice in Governments. Overall, the question of incentives 
in their triple dimensions also depend on the extent to which MDBs can ‘generate business’ 
with inclusive violence prevention.   
8.2.2 Resources allocation: Can MDBs increase ‘business’ with inclusive 
violence prevention? 
Overall, the operational portfolio in violence prevention in both banks has been extremely 
small. As compared to the 168 loans approved for USD 14 billion in one year alone (2013) 
at the IADB, 16 Citizen Security projects for half a USD billion over a period of 14 years 
do not make violence prevention a major sector for the regional bank. At the World Bank, 
the operational portfolio is even smaller and quasi inexistent (see Section 1.2 in Chapter 1 
and Section 6.1 in Chapter 6).  	 ﾠ
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That said, since 2010, greater investment has been made in both banks. At the IADB, the 
number of loans and the amount per loan has significantly increased, with nearly 40 per 
cent of the portfolio approved since 2010 (opcit). This is due to the Costa Rica project that 
was approved for an amount of USD 132 million, as compared to the other projects ranging 
from USD 15 to 25 million. Interviewees explained that when negotiating the loan for 
Costa Rica, there was no limit to the amount from the side of the IADB. Actually, it was 
initially envisaged to reach USD 300 million (but was eventually reduced to USD 132 
million  because  of  delays  and  other  donor-recipient  negotiations).  This,  in  any  case, 
suggests a clear push from the regional bank to increase lending in the sector. At the World 
Bank, interviewees also clearly acknowledged the need to ‘create big business’ as they 
phrase it, to show that violence prevention could be ‘profitable’ for the Bank (Interview, 
Washington,  D.C,  April  2011).  This  thus  oriented  the  strategy  pursued  through 
Development  Policy  Loans  and  through  more  proactive  policy  dialogue  with  major 
potential clients like Mexico, Brazil or even South Africa outside of the Region (opcit). The 
assumption was that if violence became an attractive entry point for countries to ask for 
DPLs  or  large  investment  loans,  teams  might  then  be  strengthened  and  business  and 
strategies developed further.  
 
In  terms  of  other  sources  of  funding,  such  as  Trust  Funds,  as  explained  in  Chapter  7 
(Section 7.2.1) when analysing actor power and the community of donors, the IADB has 
recently approved a large Special Initiative for Citizen Security that could reach up to USD 
20 million in four years. Such Trust Funds do not exist at the World Bank. The focus on 
Africa and the division among donors at the World Bank made donor mobilisation for 
urban  violence  more  arduous  than  at  the  IADB.  Nonetheless,  the  World  Bank  hosts  a 
number  of  Trusts  Funds  to  which  staff  working  on  violence  prevention  can  apply  to 
develop  policy  dialogue  on  violence  prevention.  According  to  a  Violence  Prevention 
specialist,  such  facilities  were  actually  crucial  to  push  the  agenda  forward  (Interview, 
World  Bank,  Washington,  D.C,  March  2011).  However,  the  same  specialist  also 
highlighted that in absence of a specific Trust Fund for Violence Prevention, the team 
constantly needed to ‘convince’ and apply for ad-hoc funds to develop policy dialogue and 
other activities aimed at making the Bank more visible and credible in the area: 	 ﾠ
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‘In Mexico, the issue of violence was very sensitive: the Bank cannot deal with 
police, drug or trafficking, but thanks to the Trust Fund, it engages in dialogue and 
shows that the Bank has experts and knowledge and tools to help the Government 
develop a strategy. […] This Nordic TF was crucial to initiate the dialogue and give 
some visibility to the Bank in violence prevention. […] In Central America, the 
team got a USD 40,000 BB [Bank Budget] for staff travel and other expenses. 
Zoellick’s visit to El Salvador helped a lot to convince for funding in particular for 
TF application, even though the actual amount allocated was small.’ (Interview, 
Violence Prevention Specialist, World Bank, Washington, D.C., March 2011) 
 
Trust Funds are in fact becoming an increasing source of funding at the Bank. The Nordic 
Trust Fund, for instance, was established in 2008 to ‘mainstream human rights’ within the 
Bank, and was used in practice for financing a variety of pilots more or less directly related 
to human rights. As such, the Violence Prevention Team in LAC and at the Anchor used it 
for a number of pilots and other initiatives in Honduras, Colombia, Mexico and South 
Africa (Interview, World Bank, Washington, D.C., April 2011). Trust Funds in general 
were clearly instrumental in the case of Violence Prevention, also because they made it 
possible  to  hire  consultants  and  term  staff  at  the  Anchor  and  in  LAC.  They  included 
consultants working specifically on gender-based violence and youth violence that, without 
such funding, would probably not have been hired (Interviews World Bank, Washington, 
D.C., April 2011). When I asked the Coordinator of the Nordic Trust Fund how Trust 
Funds  used  for  mainstreaming  were  usually  perceived,  she  had  this  practical  and 
clairvoyant response:  
‘You know, it basically depends on where you sit in the Bank. If you are at the 
Anchor trying to push a topic, to try out pilots to make your case, then TFs are very 
welcome and they would go for it. But if you are a CD [Country Director] trying to 
implement an already complex Country Programme that you need to deliver and 
your staff come and say they want to do 10 TF grant activities, your priority won’t 
be to go for them. The CD will think these grants are to experiment in my country 
when I have already a complex programme to focus on and to implement. In that 
case, it is not because the issues are not important, but it is a matter of priorities. 
The Bank is a huge and complex institution, with some parts that are creative and 	 ﾠ
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others that are more conservative. You need to know well how it works and who 
needs  what.’  (Interview  with  Nordic  Trust  Fund  Coordinator,  World  Bank, 
Washington, D.C., April 2011) 
 
The Coordinator then added, after I referred to several other interviewees who had pointed 
out examples like climate change that climbed the priority ladder quickly in MDBs in part 
thanks to large Trusts Funds, and who underscored the need for resources to create an 
internal space for the issue and the challenge of developing a programme in an overall 
context of budget constraint:  
‘Yes, but the question you have to deal with when you want to mainstream an issue 
is in the end, how do I make people do it with their own budget?’ (opcit) 
 
Such  a  question  clearly  evokes  how  the  institutionalisation  of  an  issue  and  its 
mainstreaming requires the organisation to make it its own. This leads us to examine the 
location of responsibility.  
 
8.2.3 Mainstream location of responsibility: where does inclusive violence 
prevention belong? 
One  first,  clear  observation  is  the  diversity  of  locations  and  different  organisational 
treatment in each MDB. As Chapter 6 has described, Violence Prevention has changed 
institutional situ at the IADB and the World Bank multiple times. The IADB has been more 
stable though, by mainly locating the issue in the Modernisation of the State Division, now 
Institutions  for  Development  Division,  in  line  with  an  interpretation  of  violence  as 
multipronged,  with  nevertheless,  an  important  pre-eminence  given  to  criminal  justice 
solutions. In 2011, a Cluster of Citizen security was formalised within the Division.
149 It is 
still only a group (i.e. it does not have the rank of a Department or a Division), but has a 
clear organisational situ and appears on IADB’s organisation chart. At the World Bank in 
contrast, the issue has been mainly hosted under Urban Development in LAC and at the 
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149 Before this, regions, and in particular the Central American region, were leading the agenda, which was 
mostly placed under Modernisation or Reform of the State. In one region, Social Sectors led the issue (see 
Section 6.2.2 in Chapter 6). 
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Anchor for most of the 2000s, before moving to the Social Development department in 
2010.  World  Bank  specialists,  as  indicated  in  Section  6.3.3  in  Chapter  6,  perceived 
differently the shift in the location of responsibility, as the Social Development department 
is mainly a supportive unit (dealing with safeguards) than an operational one. Nonetheless, 
the shift remains in line with an interpretation of violence prevention through social and 
situational lenses. More importantly, the World Bank has not yet opted for institutionalising 
violence prevention by giving it more organisational permanence and visibility (through the 
creation of an institutional entity like a formal group or a cluster), therefore making it more 
dependent on potential champions to drive the issue. 
 
One characteristic common in both banks is that none of the location of responsibility for 
violence prevention has the mandate to mainstream it. The tensions between the Cluster of 
Citizen Security and other Sectors and Divisions at the IADB even dissuades collaboration, 
and the limited in-house expertise makes having focal points, as Hannan (2000) among 
others had suggested, for now practically impossible.
150 As for the World Bank, despite the 
smaller team and the more precarious organisational existence, the team has tried to reach 
out to sectors, even without a formal mandate or strategy, and has launched initiatives like 
the BEAM as described in Section 7.2.3, independently of the tangible results achieved so 
far. The idea was clearly to identify focal points within sectors. Such focal points would not 
only  mobilise  their  sectoral  colleagues  on  violence  prevention,  and  disseminate  sector 
specific  information  related  to  violence  prevention,  but  also  support  the  Violence 
Prevention  team  for  specific  sector-related  expertise  as  needed  (Interview,  Washington 
D.C, March 2011). 
 
As for the treatment of gender as regard to violence, differences among and within MDBs 
must  be  noted.  At  the  IADB,  over  the  2000s  and  until  2011,  gender-based  violence, 
domestic  violence  and  other  gender  dimensions  of  violence  fell  under  the  Gender  and 
Diversity Division. The Cluster of Citizen Security (or its equivalent in previous years) 
dealt with gender only marginally. Since 2011, greater collaboration between both units has 
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150 Other  Units/Divisions  deal  with  youth-at-risk  (Social  Protection),  bullying  at  school  (Education),  or 
CPTED (Urban Development) with little or ad-hoc collaboration with the Cluster. Interviews indicate that this 
is mainly because of distrust in the technical capacity of Citizen Security Specialists and lack of leadership to 
reach out to other sectors (see discussion on actor power in Section 7.2 in Chapter 7).	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been announced and has materialised with one Gender Specialist dedicated to collaborating 
with  the  Cluster.  Nonetheless,  at  the  time  this  thesis  is  written,  gender  mainstreaming 
within citizen security projects and initiatives has not yet materialised.  
 
At the World Bank, the treatment of gender and violence has been dealt with differently in 
LAC and at the Anchor. In LAC, the PREM Division formally in charge of Gender, took on 
the issue of gender-based violence and other aspects related to gender identities as part of 
its agenda. This mainly translated into conferences and studies. The Violence Prevention 
team worked on gender and violence in an ad-hoc way, and did not mainstream gender into 
its  activities  or  methodologies.  Nonetheless,  interviews  with  staff  directly  involved  in 
violence  prevention  activities  suggested  a  clear  recognition  of  gender  dimensions  of 
violence  and  the  openness  to  embrace  gender  more  proactively.  In  that  respect,  they 
recognised the support provided by the Anchor who had hired consultants and term staff to 
work  specifically  on  gender-based  violence.  The  Anchor  was  the  unit  with  the  clearer 
vision in terms of mainstreaming gender within its own activities; in fact, it embraced the 
issue when the Gender Anchor stepped out of it (see Section 6.3.4 in Chapter 6).  
8.3 Conclusion 
 
Is there a specificity of violence that would explain its late emergence, timid evolution, ad 
hoc gender perspective, and overall lack of mainstreaming in the development agenda? 
Chapter  8  has  first  examined  the  knowledge  factors  implied  in  this  question.  Findings 
confirm the importance of knowledge in terms of effectiveness and implementation, and 
suggests that indicators play a particularly important role as Shiffman and Smith (2007), 
Levy (1996), Razavi and Miller (2005), Rao and Kelleher (1995) and Hannan (2000). had 
pointed out. Knowledge considerations highlight some particularity of violence in the sense 
that limitations are surely significant in terms of effectiveness, implementation knowledge, 
and data and indicators in general and in LAC in particular. These limitations hinder the 
development of mainstreaming inclusive violence prevention, for important elements are 
missing in the operational cycle. More specifically, interviewees have highlighted the need 
for  the  pacing  of  reforms,  prioritisation,  coordination  mechanisms,  and  compound  and 
sector specific indicators as essential links in the chain to operationalise the ecological 
model and the gendered continuum of violence.  But is facing knowledge limitations not 	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intrinsic to development? Is it not common to emerging issues? Examples from climate 
change, corruption, and even gender or poverty, show that in development, we usually not 
know more than we need to be effective. Still, MDBs work on issues whose complexity 
also reflects the complexity and intersectionality of human life. Moreover, in the case of 
violence in LAC, there are a wealth of initiatives that still needs to be discovered, evaluated 
or scaled up.  It is undeniable that a lot of creativity exists and needs to be leveraged. In 
other words, while knowledge-related constraints are certainly not to be undermined, they 
also suggest that there is less specificity to violence than usually implied. These constraints 
also highlight the responsibility of MDBs towards responding to these knowledge gaps as a 
public good, which refers back to the question of the vision, cognitive frames and actors to 
make  it  happen  (see  Chapter  7).  This  also  sheds  light  on  the  importance  of  the 
organisational treatment of the issue, which was also examined in this chapter. In fact, even 
if champions or staff members have such vision, as I have met in both banks, they need to 
be adequately supported by the organisational structure to not only realise it, but also to 
sustain it. Here, the question of incentives certainly appears essential in both banks. In 
particular,  the  case  of  violence  prevention  from  a  gender  perspective  shows  how  the 
mission creep of MDBs tends to play against complex, new development issues, as do 
insufficient training opportunities to develop double or triple expertise, and contradictory 
incentives embedded in the dual status of financial institutions and development agencies, 
that in fact pull in different directions. Until such ingrained contradictions are discussed 
more openly and addressed, they will inevitably hinder the emergence and mainstreaming 
of crucial issues like the inclusive prevention of violence, despite the call for solutions 
expressed  year  after  year  by  citizens  across  Latin  America.  Along  with  incentives,  the 
question of resources also logically plays a two-pronged facilitating role: to give means to 
staff to push the issue forward (with Trust Funds being clearly instrumental), and to show 
that  the  issue  can  actually  ‘generate  business’  for  the  organisation,  which  would 
presumably open the door wider for greater involvement and strategising on the issue, as 
some interviews have suggested. Finally, the location of responsibility shows the extent to 
which the organisation is institutionalising violence prevention in its structure and where it 
locates it. The differences at the IADB and the World Bank reflect the different positioning 
in  terms  of  responses  to  violence,  with  the  IADB  locating  Citizen  Security  under 
Institutions and Modernisation of the State, while the World Bank vacillates between Urban 	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and Social Development. Yet, even though the IADB’s Cluster is more stable in terms of 
organisational situ, the distrust of other sectors as well as its lack of in-house experts make 
it  unlikely  to  become  an  influential  location  for  mainstreaming  inclusive  violence 
prevention with focal points in sectors. At the World Bank, despite more precariousness 
and  a  considerably  smaller  team,  a  few  key  staffs  with  vision  and  experience  are 
developing initiatives in that direction both in LAC and at the Anchor. In particular, the 
fact, that the Anchor embraces gender and all forms of gender-based violence in its agenda 
suggests  a  clearer  vision  as  regard  to  the  gendered  continuum  and  a  potential 
mainstreaming  process  for  inclusive  violence  prevention  than  at  the  regional  bank.  As 
citizens usually look first to their Governments for solutions, and as MDBs are partners in 
development and fundamentally depend on donor-recipient relations, Chapter 9 explores 
counterparts’ ‘side of the story’ in terms of mainstreaming inclusive violence prevention at 
the country level and MDBs’ role in that respect. 
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Chapter 9: Counterparts’ Perspectives on Mainstreaming 
Inclusive Violence Prevention and MDBs’ Relevance:  
The Case of Colombia 
 
MDBs are (only) financers of and advisers to Governments in the developing world. As a 
consequence, they allegedly work on violence prevention to the extent that counterparts
151 
ask them to. Actually, as Chapters 6 and 7 have reported, MDBs’ staff recurrently used the 
argument of lack of country demand for violence prevention to explain its late emergence, 
timid evolution, and ad-hoc integration of gender considerations. They also pinpointed the 
lack of capacity at the national and local levels to implement multi-sector strategies and see 
it as a severe constraint for mainstreaming inclusive violence prevention.  
 
What is Governments’ take on these questions? To what extent is mainstreaming inclusive 
violence  prevention  an  approach  followed  at  the  country  level?  How  do  challenges  in 
policymaking and implementation at the national and local levels impact the mainstreaming 
process?  How  do  counterparts  perceive  MDBs’  role  in  violence  prevention?  Are  they 
relevant and needed? Is there a difference between the IADB and the World Bank? What is 
expected from them as partners in development?  
 
Chapter 9 looks in more depth at donor-recipient relations and answers these questions 
based  on  a  case  study  in  Colombia.  As  Colombia  is  only  one  among  the  26  potential 
borrowing countries in LAC, findings discussed in this chapter do not aim to be generalised 
to the entire region. However, as explained in Chapter 4 (see Section 4.3.1), Colombia 
gathers a series of characteristics that make the case study particularly relevant for the 
research. Among them, Colombia has pioneered preventive strategies to address violence at 
the local level, has a renowned expertise on the issue, has well trained and highly educated 
civil servants, and has a long-standing relationship with MDBs in general and in violence 
prevention in particular. All these characteristics make it a propitious context to investigate 
the main research questions from the counterparts’ perspective.  
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151 Counterparts are also called borrowers, borrowing countries, clients, or simply, Governments. 
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As such, this chapter has two objectives. First, it aims to better understand the opportunities 
and constraints to mainstream inclusive violence prevention at the national and local levels 
in Colombia (Section 9.1); and second, it seeks to assess MDBs’ relevance in this context, 
as per Colombian stakeholders’ views (Section 9.2). Fulfilling these two objectives aims to 
ground the discussion articulated in this thesis upon the practice at the country level, as well 
as to deepen the analysis of the dynamics between MDBs and Governments. This would 
also  allow  the  research  to  be  placed  in  the  wider  perspective  of  policymaking, 
implementation, and collaboration between diverse public agencies and stakeholders.  
9.1 Opportunities and constraints to mainstream inclusive violence prevention 
in Colombia 
	 ﾠ
The current policy framework on violence prevention in Colombia, as analysed in Chapter 
5  (see  Section  5.3.2),  shows  a  consistent  and  coherent  effort  to  adopt  a  multi-sector 
approach to prevent violence in urban contexts, in particular by focusing on risk factors 
related to human and social development. The analysis nonetheless highlighted two main 
issues  related  to  mainstreaming.  First,  few  sector-specific  indicators  reflected  the 
contribution  of  the  different  sectors  to  violence  prevention  (similarly  to  what  Sectoral 
Specialists in MDBs had pointed out, as analysed in Chapter 8, Section 8.1.3). Second, 
none of the sectors explicitly acknowledged the need and plan for preventing violence 
within the sector itself (i.e. none of them took into consideration the intra-sector level of 
mainstreaming, see Section 3.2.2 in Chapter 3). Appendices D.4 and D.5
152 present the 
detailed analysis of Colombia’s latest policy framework related to violence prevention that 
complements Chapter 5 and serves as a reference for this section. To go deeper into the 
understanding  of  the  policy  context  in  Colombia  as  regard  to  mainstreaming  inclusive 
prevention of violence, I subsequently discuss the findings at the national and at the local 
level (see Section 4.3.3 in Chapter 4 for the study population in Colombia).  
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152 The matrix analyses the strategic guideline of the 2010-2014 National Development Plan. To build this 
matrix, I assessed whether the sector diagnosis acknowledged the sector’s role in violence prevention or 
issues of violence within the sector; whether the sector strategic guidelines included components related to 
violence  prevention;  and  whether  sector  indicators  translated  sector  specific  contribution  to  violence 
prevention (either directly or indirectly through risk factors).   
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9.1.1 Through the lenses of Colombian policymakers and bureaucrats: findings 
from in-depth interviews with ministries and presidential agencies 
Based  on  the  analysis  of  interviews  with  eight  institutions  at  the  national  level,  sector 
ministries (or equivalent) can be classified in three categories: those engaged in violence 
prevention,  but  showing  resistance  and  stressing  constraints  to  mainstreaming  inclusive 
violence prevention; those engaged in violence prevention and creatively finding ways to 
make  mainstreaming  happen;  those  unengaged  with  violence  prevention,  but  seeing 
opportunities for it in their sector. The large majority of interviewees belonged to the first 
category. I thus begin with them.  
 
Sectors engaged with violence prevention but stressing constraints to mainstreaming 
Interviews at the Department of National Planning with the Social Development Direction 
(Dirección  de  Desarrollo  Social,  DNP-DDS)
153 and  social  ministries  show  a  clear 
understanding and familiarity with multi-sector, gender-sensitive approaches to violence 
prevention and the role of different line ministries in this respect. All interviewees were 
familiar with the epidemiological (public health) approach to violence prevention (see the 
ecological model in Chapter 2, Section 2.3.2),
154 and had a concrete understanding of risks 
factors to violence. Nonetheless, they had different views on the role of their own ministry 
towards the issue and the probability to implement and institutionalise a mainstreaming 
approach to prevent violence.  
 
The DNP-DDS embraced the idea of mainstreaming violence prevention in theory, but 
refrained in practice for at least two reasons. The first reason, according to the central 
department  that  has  a  prospective  vision  of  and  coordinates  with  all  social  sectors  in 
Colombia, was the lack of sector ownership for the issue, and even resistance towards it. 
This was particularly the case of the Health Sector, thus echoing findings from MDBs’ 
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153 The Direction of Social Development (Dirección de Desarrollo Social, DDS) has a prospective vision of 
the Social Sectors in Colombia (including Education, Health, Social Security, Employment, Culture, Sports, 
Recreation,  Income,  and  Stratification),  and  promotes  the  monitoring  and  evaluation  of  policies,  plans, 
programmes and development projects to implement the National Development Plan. The DDS is in charge of 
developing the strategy for Social Sectors in Colombia. It closely works with sector ministries (National 
Education, Social Protection, Culture, ICBF and Acción Social) to implement the social strategic guidelines 
of the PND. 
 
154 Perhaps the fact that the Director of the DDS was a medical doctor by training and profession helped in 
this regard. 	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staffs in the Health Sector (see Section 7.1.2 in Chapter 7). In fact, the Health Sector is 
primarily  responsible  for  diseases,  focusing  on  this  from  prevention  to  recovery.  For 
violence  prevention,  in  contrast,  the  Health  Sector  would  depend  on  others  to  achieve 
results, which would disincentive ownership of the issue. The second reason lay in the lack 
of the operationalisation of the shared responsibility (already discussed in Section 2.6 in 
Chapter 2). In other words, the lack of clarity in terms of how sector-specific objectives 
needed to be combined, and how sectors needed to act in a complementary fashion towards 
the same goal was an obstacle to mainstreaming inclusive violence prevention (Interview 
DNP-DDS,  Bogotá,  June  2011;  these  constraints  relate  to  issues  discussed  in  the 
operational knowledge category in Chapter 8, Section 8.1).  
 
Another constraint already highlighted by MDBs’ staff and confirmed by the DNP-DDS 
Director was the weak institutional capacity at the local level. In the Colombian context, 
Governors  and  Mayors  are  those  who  implement  policies  and  programmes,  and  their 
institutional capacity varies greatly. As the DNP-DDS pointed out:  
‘Implementing  basic  programmes  are  already  challenging  in  some  territories 
because of a very high turnover of personnel, corruption, and low capacity. [For an 
issue  as  sensitive,  complex,  and  inter-dependent  as  violence  prevention]  the 
challenges increase multi-fold.’ (Interview DNP-DDS, Bogotá, June 2011)  
 
Costs and sustainability-related issues were stressed as other constraints to translate the 
policy  of  mainstreaming  into  practice.  This  was  the  position  of  the  Health  Insurance 
Direction within the Ministry of Social Protection (MPS for its Spanish acronym). This 
Direction is in charge of implementing the universal health insurance coverage and thus, 
plays a crucial role in the translation of national policies into concrete planning and service 
delivery. Mainstreaming inclusive violence prevention directly concerns it as regards to 
potential services to victims and perpetrators of violence. The Director and his team of 
advisers had a clear understanding and acknowledged the importance of the issue, but they 
confirmed what the DNP-DDS pointed out in terms of resistance from the Health Sector. 
The  Direction  felt  this  resistance  was  mainly  for  financial  and  sustainability  reasons. 
Providing  psychosocial  assistance  to  victims  and  perpetrators  of  violence  would  be 
enormously costly for the health insurance system, for this would entail several sessions of 	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45 minutes or more by patient. Implementing the Law 1257 (2008) on domestic and sexual 
violence had already proved challenging for the Direction. In fact, the Law includes the 
obligation of the State to provide housing to victims of sexual and domestic violence who 
would need it. Yet, according to the team, such a measure was very expensive and difficult 
to implement in a sustainable way, and implementation remained uncertain at the time of 
interviews (Interview MPS-DSS, Bogotá, June 2011). Moreover, an additional piece of 
scepticism questioned the relevance of measures like early screening for child maltreatment 
and domestic violence, in the absence of other services to respond to the situation (thus 
echoing  concerns  already  expressed  by  an  IADB  Division  Chief,  see  Section  7.1.2  in 
Chapter 7). 
 
Despite  this  resistance  and  scepticism,  Directions  within  the  MPS  developed  specific 
programmes to prevent violence by targeting specific risk factors. The Social Promotion 
Direction,  for  instance,  was  responsible  for  providing  attention  to  victims  of  sexual 
violence, in particular to victims of the internal conflict and the displaced population. As 
for the Direction of Public Health, it was in charge of programmes to prevent adolescent 
pregnancy, and domestic and sexual violence. Directors and Technical Managers for those 
programmes
155 expressed  a  great  commitment  to  these  issues,  and  a  very  thorough 
understanding  of  the  need  for  mainstreaming  inclusive  violence  prevention.  They  also 
clearly saw the role the Health Sector could play in this respect. However, they quickly 
pointed  out  the  lack  of  political  commitment  at  the  highest  level  of  the  Ministry  and 
Government on the above-mentioned issues, and in particular on gender-based violence.
156 
(Interviews MPS-DPS and MPS-DSP, Bogotá, June 2011) 
 
The Technical Manager for the Early Pregnancy Programme nonetheless insisted on the 
leverage that international commitments (could) have on national political priorities (this 
refers back to the policy community cohesion in Shiffman and Smith (2007) framework, 
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155 It is noteworthy mentioning that all women interviewed were very committed and favoured a multi-sector 
approach to violence (with one exception who was more nuanced), whereas men (who were much less in 
number) had in general more mitigated views. 
 
156 They nonetheless mentioned the nomination of High Presidential Counsellor for Gender, which raised 
expectations for giving more visibility to the issue. 
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and to the political leadership by donors, as discussed in Section 3.3 in Chapter 3). In the 
case of early pregnancy and the use of contraception, for instance, the Manager emphasised 
how having Millennium Development Goals
157 and specific indicators enhanced, not only 
the visibility of the issues and their importance, but also their sustainability, as shown 
through the adoption of a Conpes, one of the documents with the highest levels of authority 
in Colombia.
158 The same was highlighted in the case of Early Childhood Development 
(ECD).  According  to  the  ICBF,  the  Institute  for  Family  Wellbeing  in  Colombia, 
international initiatives for ECD helped raise the issue on the Government’s agenda. There 
too,  a  Conpes  was  adopted  and  enhanced  the  institutionalisation  of  the  programme 
(Interviews  ICBF,  Bogotá,  June  2011).  However,  such  international  mobilisation  was 
absent for violence prevention. This translated in less visibility for the programmes that the 
ICBF  was  developing  in  that  regard  (programmes  that  promoted  positive  parenthood, 
reduced  corporal  punishment,  and  prevented  youth  incorporation  to  violent,  criminal 
groups, among others). In addition to the lack of political priority, the ICBF stressed a 
series of constraints related to the coordination among programmes and stakeholders at the 
national and local level, and the lack of capacity and resources at the local levels. These 
included the lack of pedagogical materials, the enormous needs for training large number of 
professionals, and the overall lack of capacity and motivation at the local level. 
‘There is a lack of coordination with other entities and not the same involvement 
from  other  sectors.  Each  one  has  its  own  agenda  and  priority  and  this  is  very 
challenging to gather efforts and focus attention on some common goals. […] The 
ICBF has too many programmes, 33 in total. We do not have enough for the 33 
programmes  in  all  the  regions,  so  this  has  a  negative  effect  on  impact  because 
resources  got  divided  and  spread  over.  […]  But  the  major  challenge  is  the 
articulation  between  entities,  this  affects  the  impact:  the  question  is  how  to 
operationalise it?’ (Interview ICBF, Bogotá, June 2011).   
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157 Specific goals and indicators of the Millennium Development Goals can be found at:  
 http://www.who.int/pmnch/media/press_materials/fs/about_mdgs/en/ 
 
158 Conpes is the National Council of Economic and Social Policy (Consejo Nacional de Política Económica y 
Social), which is the highest national planning authority. Its documents (called ‘Conpes’ with a number) 
formalise the importance given to an issue, and facilitate its institutionalisation across administrations. Since 
lack  of  continuity  is  a  major  challenge  in  public  policy,  such  normative  developments  are  essential 
(https://www.dnp.gov.co/CONPES.aspx). 	 ﾠ
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More generally, these institutional weaknesses at the local level were recurrently identified 
across  ministries  as  a  bottleneck  for  the  implementation  of  mainstreaming  inclusive 
violence prevention. They included a very high turnover (mainly due to short contracts and 
widespread corruption); the need to mobilise and maintain the mobilisation of departments 
and municipalities; the lack of resources to recurrently train secretaries, professionals and 
practitioners on the issue, and to monitor and evaluate those programmes:   
‘Colombia  is  very  decentralised.  At  the  departmental  level,  everything  is  very 
politicised. The Ministry comes and gives training to the Secretaries of Health and 
to the public hospital staff, and a few months later when they come to check if they 
are implementing it, the people who received the training are not there anymore. 
There is a huge rotation of human resources that really undermines the effectiveness 
of measures and programmes.’ (Interview MPS-DPS, Bogotá, June 2011) 
 
Sectors engaged and creatively finding ways to mainstream inclusive violence prevention 
The  more  advanced  Ministry  in  terms  of  violence  prevention  mainstreaming  was  the 
Ministry of National Education (MEN for its Spanish acronym). The MEN has indeed 
endorsed  the  shared  responsibility  for  violence  prevention  through  the  development  of 
‘citizenship competencies’. It has also given priority to address violence at school (i.e. 
intra-level  mainstreaming).
159 Interviewees  explained  that  the  decisive  factor  for  such 
advancement was strong leadership from the Minister of Education who gave priority to the 
issue.  This  political  will  echoed  efforts  from  the  academia  and  other  civil  society 
organisations that were also decisive in raising public awareness and mobilisation on the 
issue of violence in schools.  In particular, Colombian researchers (including Dr. Chaux and 
his  colleagues  at  Los  Andes  University)  undertook  surveys  to  measure  the  extent  of 
bullying  in  public  schools,  and  helped  develop  specific  indicators  to  assess  citizenship 
competencies and school climate. The ICFES, the statistical agency for education, then 
further developed those indicators in collaboration with the researchers, and applied them 
in a larger survey. By so doing, the MEN, the ICFES and Los Andes University sought to 
find concrete ways to not only capture the extent of the issue in order to better address it, 
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159 This intra-level mainstreaming was not captured in the analysis of the National Development Plan, as 
previously mentioned, for the PND stayed at macro level. However, interviews pointed out its priority in the 
Education Sector Plan.  	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
226 
but also to institutionalise it within the Education Sector priorities. Indeed, those indicators 
served as sub-indicators of the quality of the Education Sector, which is a remarkable tool 
to institutionalise the issue within the sector and a concrete step towards mainstreaming 
inclusive violence prevention (see Box 6). 
 
Box 6: Mainstreaming Violence Prevention within the Education Sector in Colombia 
The Ministry of Education in its Sector Plan 2010-2014 formally acknowledged the shared responsibility for 
violence prevention, as well as the issue of violence in school. A significant part of the plan is geared towards 
strengthening peaceful and responsible citizenship and preventing violence at school and in classrooms.  
Three main activities are outlined:  
1. The preparation of a national system;  
2.  The  preparation  and  adoption  of  a  Conpes  (this  Conpes  would  provide  guidelines,  objectives  and 
responsibilities for different actors and sectors at different levels to promote a culture of respect to life and 
dignity for all citizens); and 
 3. The strengthening of the programme.  
 
In addition, the Ministry works on strengthening sexual education, promoting human rights, and lowering 
down school desertion (in fact, violence was clearly identified as one of the factors explaining desertion). 
Finally, special attention is to be provided to population affected by violence.  
 
The plan conveys the Education Sector’s commitment towards violence prevention at two levels: inter-sector 
and  intra-sector.  At  the  inter-sector  level,  it  includes  indicators  to  measure  the  implementation  of  the 
citizenship competencies programme, which is an important signal of the commitment of the Ministry to 
pursue this objective. In particular, a new law will provide the legal framework for the education system to 
assume this shared responsibility for violence prevention. This law will create the National System on School 
Coexistence and Training for the Exercise of Human Rights, Sexual and Reproductive Rights (In Spanish, 
‘Proyecto de Ley por el cual se crea el Sistema Nacional de Convivencia Escolar y Formación para el 
Ejercicio de los Derechos Humanos, Sexuales y Reproductivos y la Prevención y Mitigación de la Violencia 
Escolar’); and at the intra-sector level, the prevention and mitigation of school violence. 
 
Source: MEN (2011). Plan Sectoral 2010-2014, Bogotá, Colombia. 
 
Sectors unengaged in violence prevention but seeing opportunities for it 
As far as the Ministry of Interior and Justice, the Ministry of Transport, and Acción Social 
are concerned, they all welcomed the idea of mainstreaming inclusive violence prevention, 
but in a more indirect way. In particular, the Ministry of Interior and Justice focused on the 
actual challenges that impede the implementation of the citizen security strategy,
160 while 
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160 Those challenges included: i) the fact that the Ministry is in charge of citizen security but the national 
police reports to the Ministry of Defence; (ii) the Mayor is in charge of citizen security in their municipality 
but there is only one national police that reports to the Central Government; (iii) the Direction of citizen 
security is weak within the Ministry of Interior and Justice; (iv) the Ministry of Interior and Justice plays a 
role of coordinator between the police and the Mayors, but the police reports to the Ministry of Defence so 
there is a confusion regarding whether or not the police is in charge of citizen security; (v) the justice system 
is overloaded with a lot of structural issues that hinder improvements in citizen security; (vi) there are more 
than 1100 municipalities under 5000 inhabitants which makes it extremely difficult to have a good coverage 
in terms of police forces; (vii) for the 50 biggest cities, there is an issue of lack of specialised police forces; 	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Acción Social explicitly acknowledged that violence prevention was not an objective of the 
conditional cash transfer programme (Familias en Acción), but saw opportunities to include 
features in future improvements of the programme. In that regard, Acción Social’s Strategic 
Adviser insisted on the importance of pilots. For instance, piloting a component involving 
positive fatherhood incentives, as suggested by Barker (United Nations 2011:27), would 
help introduce the issue of violence prevention within large poverty reduction programmes 
that serve millions of women and men, girls and boys.  
‘The IADB and the World Bank have some influence. For example, the World Bank 
was at the initiative of serving indigenous population [in the Familias en acción 
conditional cash transfer programme].  Now, the IADB and the World Bank say it is 
not enough to focus on access to education and health, the focus should be on the 
quality of education and health services. In this sense, climate of the classroom 
could well be included into quality of education. Or positive fatherhood could be 
included in pilots to see if it improves the programme in terms of getting fathers 
more involved with their family.’ (Interview, Acción Social, Bogotá, June 2011) 
 
As for the Ministry of Transport, it embraced the idea and acknowledged the importance of 
violence prevention within the Transport Sector, in particular in urban areas. To go beyond 
a reactive treatment of the sector to the issue,
161 the Director suggested that indicators and 
safeguards could help enhance the ownership of the issue by the sector as a whole, and as 
such  contribute  to  the  mainstreaming  process.  He  also  confirmed  the  importance  of 
international guidelines, following the example of road safety that became an international 
priority that all countries were implementing:  
‘[Violence] is a major concern and it could well be included in planning for the next 
generation,  even  though  many  preventive  measures  are  more  operational  than  a 
matter of planning per se, and each municipality is responsible for the operations, 
not the Ministry (that is responsible for norms). […] If the IADB and the World 
Bank do it in their projects [through safeguards for example], this could serve as 
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and (viii) information systems need to be strengthened and data triangulated to ensure greater reliability 
(Interview, Ministry of Interior and Justice, Bogotá, June 2011). 
 
161 At the time of the interviews in Colombia (2011), the Transport Sector only responded to violence-related 
issues during the implementation, for example through changing routes and protecting construction workers, 
and did not include any parameters relevant to violence prevention in the design and preparation phase. 	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model  for  other  Transport  projects  beyond  their  direct  involvement.  Exactly  as 
happened  with  environmental  safeguards.  This  could  have  a  multiplier  effect.’ 
(Interview, MinTransporte, June 2011).  
	 ﾠ
In sum, interviews with eight national institutions including five ministries in Colombia 
suggest country-specific prioritisation among opportunities and constraints related to the 
four analytical categories examined for MDBs. In particular, the case study found that 
political leadership is of paramount importance for a mainstreaming process to happen, as 
shown through the case of the Ministry of Education. Political leadership refers first and 
foremost to the highest authorities in the country, but also to the international community 
(see the different dimensions of political leadership in actor power, Section 3.3.2 in Chapter 
3).  Indeed,  interviewees  acknowledged  on  numerous  occasions  how  international 
commitments influenced national priorities. This is important in the case of MDBs, for they 
could  be  instrumental  in  contributing  to  such  international  commitments.  In  violence 
prevention, the WHO is leading the agenda from a public health perspective, and MDBs, as 
general development organisations would be well placed to complement those efforts and 
expand the scope towards a multi-sector, gender sensitive perspective.  
 
A common frame, sector-specific frames, and the need for indicators were also highlighted 
to enhance sector ownership on the issue (in line with cognitive frame and operational 
knowledge-related findings in Sections 7.1.1 and 8.1.3 respectively in Chapters 7 and 8). 
Here,  the  example  of  compound  indicators  developed  in  the  Education  Sector  to 
institutionalise violence prevention within sector priorities is a powerful illustration that 
creative options can enhance sector ownership towards the operationalisation of the shared 
responsibility of violence prevention. Such indicators could be developed for other sectors 
and  in  relation  to  gender  mainstreaming  to  ensure  that  gender  considerations  do  not 
evaporate in such innovative sector-specific violence prevention indicators.  
 
Finally, a widespread concern was raised regarding the enormous challenges to be tackled 
at the local level to make possible the implementation of mainstreaming inclusive violence 
prevention  (organisational  treatment  in  relation  to  incentives  and  accountability 
mechanisms between the national and local level, and actor power in relation to the critical 	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mass  of  local  experts).  Those  local  constraints  are  crucial  to  better  understand,  for 
programmes are ultimately implemented at the local level and local stakeholders play key 
roles in translating policies into actual change in the life of women and men, girls and boys. 
This  is  particularly  the  case  given  Colombia’s  decentralisation  structure.
 162   The  next 
section  thus  investigates  the  extent  to  which  stakeholders  at  the  local  level  share  the 
perception of central ministries and presidential agencies.  
9.1.2 Through the lenses of local decision makers and practitioners: findings 
from interviews in four municipalities 
 
Barranquilla, Bogotá, Medellin and Cartagena are the largest Colombian cities (in addition 
to Cali) and belong to the twenty priority municipalities targeted in the National Policy for 
Citizen Security and Coexistence (see Section 5.3.3 in Chapter 5). In particular, Bogotá and 
Medellin  have  consistently  been  among  the  cities  with  the  highest  violence-related 
indicators. Barranquilla and Cartagena, situated on the Atlantic Coast, have also suffered 
from increasing homicide rates, but the main issues concern intra-family violence, sexual 
violence, and inter-personal violence (opcit). I interviewed municipal secretaries in each of 
the four cities and programme managers in one department (Gobernación del Atlántico) 
(see Section 4.3.3 in Chapter 4 on study population).  
 
Secretaries  in  Barranquilla,  Bogotá  and  Medellin  pinpointed  a  pre-condition  for 
mainstreaming inclusive violence prevention, and this was addressing corruption. Actually, 
the  Administrations  preceding  Mockus  (1995-1997;  2001-2004)  in  Bogotá  and 
Fajardo/Salazar  (2004-2007;  2008-2011)  in  Medellin,  are  all  Mayors  who  focused  on 
fighting corruption and restoring transparent municipal accounting, which led to higher 
revenues and better governance as well as trust from citizens (Interviews, Bogotá, and 
Medellin, May and June 2011).  As a Senior Official of the Municipality of Barranquilla 
explained: 
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162 Decentralisation  in  Colombia  is  organised  around  the  principles  of  co-responsibility,  concurrence  and 
subsidiarity. The 1991 Constitution ensures the autonomy of local Governments, both at the departmental and 
municipal level. The National Government sets the objectives and guidelines for the overall strategy (National 
Development Plan, national policies, Conpes and sectoral plans). Local Governments adapt those to their 
respective context. They are the ones in charge of implementing policies and programmes, and delivering 
services in the territories. This is the case for violence prevention or citizen security, for which Mayors are the 
primary responsible in their territory. 	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
230 
‘First, you need to clean up and put some clarity in the ‘tributos’ [taxes], you need 
to control the collection of taxes and increase it. [You need to do that to cover 
urgent  needs  in  schooling,  infrastructure,  etc.]  […]  When  we  arrived  [the  Char 
Administration], 45,000 children were out of school. So the priority was to put them 
back into the education system. For this, you need to find money to cover for the 
gratuity of primary schooling, build mega-colegios [large high schools], reformed 
public schools, and provide food to children, etc. There was also an urgent need for 
roads. People were ‘hostages’ in times of rain because of muddy roads. They could 
not go out from their houses, the police could not go, and ambulances could not 
reach there. One major issue is that Barranquilla grew very rapidly because of the 
phenomenon of displacement, so there was a lack of roads in many neighbourhoods. 
So the Alcaldia [the Municipality] proposed the plan ‘Barrios a la Obra’ providing 
the machines and materials and asking people to provide time, skills and labour. It 
changed many things for them. [But for this, you need resources.] […] When the 
Mayor came into office, he spent the first year cleaning the house.’ (Interview, 
Barranquilla, May 2011) 
 
This quote also highlights the need for community participation. All municipalities agreed 
on this. In Bogotá, the municipality developed ‘community pacts’ (pactos) that officialise 
agreements between communities, the municipality, and other relevant institutions, such as 
the SENA, the institution in charge of technical training. They met once a month to monitor 
progress. In Medellin, community participation took the form of local assemblies where 
diagnosis  was  discussed  with  the  community  and  priorities  consensually  agreed.  In 
Barranquilla, local assemblies with cuadrantes were also organised, as well as escuelas de 
la vida (‘schools for life’) on gender-based violence and domestic violence.  Secretaries in 
the  four  municipalities  highlighted  these  examples  of  community  participation  as 
opportunities for action and for mainstreaming inclusive violence prevention at the local 
level, provided key conditions were met. Nonetheless, they mainly focused on constraints 
during  the  interviews.  They  unanimously  highlighted  the  lack  of  resources  at  the  local 
level. In Barranquilla, for example, secretaries acknowledged the issue of violence was 
widespread  in  the  city  and  the  department,  but  also  considered  they  had  very  limited 
margins of manoeuver to act upon it because of scarce resources, and other sector priorities 	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
231 
for  which  they  were  held  accountable.  The  transfer  from  the  Central  Government  was 
earmarked with no or very limited margins of manoeuvre to allocate the remaining part of 
the municipal budget. They also mentioned coordination difficulties among secretaries to 
implement a multi-sector strategy. According to many secretaries, this was mainly due to 
differences in understanding the issue of violence and the responses to it (thus clearly 
highlighting the lack of shared cognitive frame). Coordination difficulties also came from 
the fact that the Mayor was constitutionally responsible for ensuring citizen security at the 
local level, but did not have authority over the police that solely depended on the Ministry 
of  Defence  (i.e.  contradiction  between  responsibilities  and  means).  Another  major 
hindrance  highlighted  by  most  female  secretaries  was  the  male  chauvinist  culture,  in 
particular on the Atlantic coast, where sexual abuse and domestic violence, including child 
and elderly maltreatment, were largely tolerated.
163 Gender-based violence in Barranquilla, 
for instance, was under the responsibility of the poorly funded Sub-Secretary for Gender 
that  had  very  limited  means  to  develop  programmes.  For  a  population  of  1.2  million 
inhabitants, and over a period of three years, 1167 participated in the ‘schools for life’, the 
main programme of the city on gender-based violence.   
‘The biggest challenge is the machismo and the mentality, and the lack of resources 
for these questions. ‘Escuela para la vida’ [school for life] is a mobile school for 
men  and  women  to  teach  them  life  skills  and  the  law  of  protection  of  women 
[referring to Law 1287]. The programme comes from the will of these people, they 
asked for it. They wanted to become better persons, happier persons, to improve 
their relationships with others. This is how was born ‘Escuela para la vida’. […] 
We work with community leaders. Fifty leaders animate the process in different 
barrios [neighbourhoods]. They pay for their refreshments and food, this is not 
provided by the municipality, this is because the programme does not have a lot of 
money,  and  also  because  we  wanted  to  ensure  motivation  for  the  programme.’ 
(Interview, Barranquilla, May 211) 
 
The  interviews  with  secretaries  in  four  of  the  largest  Colombian  cities  suggest  that 
mainstreaming  inclusive  violence  prevention  is  very  complex  to  implement  without 
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163 In that respect, I met with the chief medical doctor at the Legal Medicine of the Atlantic department in 
Barranquilla, who confirmed this and was alarmed by the situation. 	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
232 
additional resources, a clear and shared understanding of respective responsibilities and 
corresponding  accountability,  and  the  Mayor’s  leadership.  Without  these  key  features, 
programmes were deemed to be precarious, leading to an overall lack of continuity and the 
incapacity to show results (also because without resources, costly evaluations could not be 
undertaken).  In  terms  of  resources,  it  is  interesting  to  contrast  local  Governments’ 
prioritisation with national authorities’ positions. The DNP, for instance, estimated that the 
main challenge in terms of policies and programmes’ implementation was to mobilise local 
Governments, agree on local strategic plans for violence prevention, and efficiently target 
available resources to reach most vulnerable groups (Interview DNP-DJSG, Bogotá, June 
2011; see Section 9.1.1). The DNP emphasised that the issue was not scarcity of resources, 
contrary to what local Governments were arguing, but a better use of available resources. 
Such  contrasting  positions  need  to  be  understood  in  a  context  of  widespread  local 
corruption and recent scandals both at the national and local levels. However, they also 
ground  the  analysis  on  the  difficult  but  necessary  exercise  for  national  and  local 
stakeholders  and  their  partners  to  reconcile  divergent  standpoints  for  policy 
implementation.
164  In such a context, are MDBs relevant, and how could they lever some 
of the identified constraints? Section 9.2 examines Colombian counterparts’ responses. 
9.2 MDBs’ relevance in (mainstreaming) inclusive violence prevention: 
reflections from Colombian stakeholders 
 
MDBs  staff  often  questioned  the  relevance  of  their  own  organisation’s  involvement  in 
violence  prevention.  They  also  explained  that  country  demand  largely  influenced  the 
evolution  and  treatment  of  the  issue  on  their  development  agendas.  This  section 
investigates those statements by looking at counterparts’ perceptions of MDBs in violence 
prevention in general, and in mainstreaming inclusive violence prevention in particular.  
9.2.1 Are MDBs relevant in violence prevention? 
Four main messages emerge from Colombian counterparts’ interviews. The four messages 
target both MDBs. Nonetheless, interviewees highlighted important differences between 
the IADB and the World Bank. In general, they consider the IADB as better positioned on 
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164 In terms of financing, the implementation of the policy is co-financed with local Governments that can also 
apply to a National Special Citizen Security Fund (FUNSECO).   
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the issue of violence prevention. This is mainly due to IADB’s citizen security loans that 
give visibility to the regional bank in the area. This is also due to numerous technical 
assistance  grants  at  the  national  and  local  levels.
165 In  general,  the  IADB  was  also 
considered more flexible and accessible than the World Bank. IADB’s specialists were 
more present in the field and responsive to different demands. The World Bank was mostly 
seen  as  absent  in  violence  prevention.  Nevertheless,  stakeholders  also  insisted  that  the 
IADB had no monopoly, and if the World Bank would be more proactive and take more 
risks to position itself, there would be space for it.  
 
Message 1: MDBs are needed and have a role to play in violence prevention in the region. 
This  is  probably  the  strongest  message  from  all  interviewees  in  Colombia.  Chapter  6 
showed how strong debates within MDBs existed around the question as to whether or not 
violence prevention was part of MDBs’ mission. This debate is not relevant for Colombian 
counterparts. They clearly see that violence is a development issue to which MDBs can 
contribute, and in fact, for which MDBs are much needed.  
 
Message 2: MDBs need to be coherent and consistent between what they preach and what 
they do. This was a recurrent message among interviewees, with a particular emphasis from 
Government officers and Ministerial technical staff: if MDBs want Governments to put 
some issues high on the agenda, they need to do it themselves in their own organisation. 
This was particularly salient for domestic violence and gender-based violence, above all in 
terms of number of projects and allocated funds, thus apparently contradicting what MDBs 
staffs were arguing. This is in reality more complex and highlights how tensions might 
exist  within  a  Government  between  the  Ministry  of  Finance  and  Planning  and  line 
Ministries,  in  particular  those  with  relatively  less  power,  who  then  look  to  MDBs  as 
partners to help them relay and push for an issue like domestic violence or gender-based 
violence in donor-recipient negotiations. In this more nuanced and complex context, they 
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165 During the interviews, the DNP mentioned that IADB’s technical assistance financed the development of 
the National Policy of Citizen Security and Coexistence through the contracting of Foundation Ideas para la 
Paz, a consulting firm and think tank dedicated to these issues. The Ministry of Education mentioned the 
flexibility of the IADB to include a component on citizenship competencies within the loan as well as the 
support  given  to  the  SREDECC,  a  regional  network  of  researchers  on  citizenship  competencies.  The 
municipality of Medellin referred to a technical assistance to develop local diagnostics on citizen security. 
Finally,  the  ICBF  and  the  MPS  mentioned  that  the  IADB  financed  impact  evaluations  and  the  MPS 
acknowledged the advisers paid through IADB’s technical assistance. 	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expressed frustration when MDBs did not take up the issue as their own, but still preached 
for it. Sector ministries and secretaries, including Public Health, Social Protection, and 
Early Childhood Development, also brought the coherence requirement up for issues such 
as  early  pregnancy,  youth-friendly  clinics,  assistance  to  victims,  and  early  detection  of 
abuse in early childhood. In fact, MDBs publish studies that highlight the importance of 
these issues that are not translated into their own operational priorities and projects. This 
message uncovers complex dynamics at stake in donor-recipient relations in part due to the 
multiple layers of responsibility and interests in each partner. 
 
Message 3: There is space for MDBs to be more proactive.  
‘MDBs need to clearly show what they could bring to the table.’  
(Interview, Government of Colombia, Bogotá, June 2011) 
 
Colombian stakeholders insisted on the need for MDBs to clarify their own position and 
comparative advantage at the central and local levels. Many interviewees called for MDBs 
to work on a clear strategy for their own organisation and to communicate it more widely. 
Counterparts at the local and national levels affirmed there was space for discussion with 
MDBs on violence prevention, and many of them even suggested they would welcome 
more  proactive  engagement.  This  finding  complements  message  1,  and  contradicts  the 
argument  that  MDBs  are  irrelevant  in  (upper)  middle-income  countries  and  have  no 
margins  for  manoeuver  to  influence  or  enter  into  strategic  discussions  with  their 
counterparts.  Interviews  show  that  there  is  space  for  dialogue  and  propositions,  and  a 
genuine interest towards MDBs’ (potential) offer to help prevent violence from a gender 
perspective.  
 
Message 4: MDBs need to strengthen their staffs’ skills and in-house expertise. To take 
advantage of the space for dialogue on violence prevention, MDBs nonetheless need to 
strengthen their own expertise. Ministerial Directors and Experts in particular expressed 
doubts regarding MDBs’ capacity of response. They explained that most MDBs’ specialists 
in charge of citizen security were not experts in violence prevention, and the number of 
specialists with appropriate knowledge and understanding was inadequate. In other words, 
they  pointed  out  that  MDBs  did  not  have  enough  trained  staff  or  in-house  experts  to 	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respond to an increased demand, develop policy dialogue on violence prevention, and gain 
or increase credibility as strategic partners in violence prevention in the region.
166 This does 
not  contradict  previous  messages;  it  is  a  call  to  MDBs  to  invest  more  on  violence 
prevention, for there is space and need for their support in the region. 
 
These  four  messages  show  that  Colombian  stakeholders  consider  MDBs  relevant  in 
violence prevention. In other words, there is no a priori barrier to entry for MDBs based on 
a political consideration that violence would be a sovereign issue, or that violence would 
not be linked to development, which would have discarded MDBs’ interventions. Actually, 
not one interviewee suggested MDBs were irrelevant and should not get involved. On the 
contrary, some even criticised them for either not taking the lead or not giving it enough 
priority  within  their  own  agenda.  This  again  reveals  the  complexity  of  donor-recipient 
relations,  and  confirms  the  need  to  complement  MDBs’  views  with  those  of  their 
counterparts. Without this, it would have been easy to conclude that countries do not want 
MDBs  to  intervene  in  violence  prevention  in  general  and  in  gender-based  or  domestic 
violence in particular. Another noteworthy finding is the need for MDBs to clarify and 
strengthen their approach to the issue, as well as their own expertise. Colombian Ministries 
wanted clarity from MDBs on their strengths and comparative advantage.  
‘MDBs should identify their comparative advantage and show it to the Government. 
They should be very clear regarding what benefits the Government could get by 
taking a loan versus getting funding on the markets.’ (Interview DNP-DDS, Bogotá, 
May 2011) 
 
It is probable that Colombian stakeholders’ level of exigency was higher than in other 
countries of the region because they are generally sensitised to the issue of violence and 
enjoy a relatively high common knowledge in violence prevention. It might also reflect an 
general demand for sound and proven technical expertise in the donor-recipient relations 
between UMIC and MDBs. In that sense, violence prevention would be no exception. It is 
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166 This message reveals concerns from counterparts but disregards the inherent limitations of MDBs in terms 
of staffing. As many staffs have underlined (see Chapter 6), budgetary constraints entail less staffing and 
therefore more workload for each staff member, and thus less possibilities to diversify skills and acquire new 
skills.  This message is important for the Board and Management of both organisations to decide whether or 
not to build a critical mass of in-house experts. 	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in fact probably a combination of both, with the specificity that MDBs do not have a track 
record of effective projects or demonstrated expertise in inclusive violence prevention, as 
opposed to what they can show in other sectors. Finally, there was an overall concern for 
ensuring  that  MDBs  limit  themselves  to  supporting  and  accompanying  ministerial 
programmes and projects, without changing, imposing, or seeking to influence too much 
those, in particular when they resulted from participatory processes. Practitioners at the 
local level echoed this concern (see Box 7). 
 
Box 7: Practitioners' call to MDBs for respecting realistic timing and scales 
Meetings with practitioners in the four municipalities, some of whom had worked with the international 
cooperation, wanted to warn MDBs against the tendency to aim too big too fast.  
‘Methodologies that are developed with communities and specific groups and are ‘owned by 
 the people’ cannot be stretched or scaled up rapidly unless you loose this ownership, and 
 therefore its meaning to people (and probably its impact too).’(Interview, Cartagena,  
April 2011) 
Similar remarks were made on repeated occasions. Civil society organisations’ leaders and managers who are 
deeply committed to their work and would like to benefit the greatest number of people possible, also know 
that it would be counter-productive to speed processes up just to reach quantity (they were indeed unwilling to 
take the risk of jeopardising quality).  
This was the experience, for instance, of a project supported by the World Bank in Cartagena. The project 
team had to reduce the number of participating children during implementation, simply because the initial 
target was too high and the organisation did not have the capacity to train the teachers in good conditions in 
the short time allocated in the project. To scale up, not only financial resources are needed, but also human 
resources. In this case, trainers who could replicate the model in different sites could not been trained on time, 
for training trainers or teachers takes several years. Not recognising that generated a lot of frustration for all 
counterparts and disillusion in beneficiaries who did not receive what they had been promised, and might 
jeopardise the scaled up project’s sustainability since the organisation would go back to its normal work and 
size at the end of the project sponsored by the international community.  
However, the same organisation also recognised that working with a MDB brought a lot of visibility to its 
work. It also acknowledges the importance of evaluations to strengthen their credibility and discourse, in 
particular with policy makers, and saw an important role for MDBs in that matter.  
Source: Interviews with NGOs, Cartagena, April 2011 
 
9.2.2 Where could MDBs help the most?  
 
If  MDBs  have  a  role  to  play  in  violence  prevention,  what  would  it  be?  Where  do 
Colombian stakeholders see MDBs’ main contribution to the issue?  MDBs’ comparative 
advantage  in  violence  prevention  is  drawn  from  a  combination  of  clients’  needs  with 	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MDBs’ resources and experience or expertise,
167 at least as interviewees perceive them. To 
facilitate the analysis, I group them into MDBs’ traditional types of activities: technical 
expertise,  political  dialogue,  financial  resources,  and  knowledge  contribution.  Some 
contributions overlap two types of intervention as shown in Figure 14. The findings are 
prioritised based on the frequency of responses, with a heavier weight given to MDBs’ 
direct clients, i.e. national and local Governments.  
 
Figure 14: How could MDBs contribute the most to violence prevention? Responses from Colombian 
stakeholders (2011) 
 
Source:  Own  analysis  based  on  findings  from  in-depth  interviews  with  stakeholders  of  violence  prevention  in 
Colombia. 
Note: TEFR: Technical Expertise and Financial Resources; FRK: Financial Resources and Knowledge; PDK: Policy 
Dialogue and Knowledge; TEPD: Technical Expertise and Policy Dialogue 
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167 Findings from in-depth interviews are inherently constrained by each interviewee’s own knowledge and 
familiarity with MDBs’ mission and means. However, the diversity of interviewees as well as the analysis 
from previous chapters and my own analysis mitigate these limitations (see Section 4.4.3 in Chapter 4).  
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Technical expertise 
The technical expertise focuses on the ‘how to’. Most interviewees directly or indirectly 
referred to the need to operationalise current theories in violence prevention. As Chapter 2 
as shown, this refers, in particular, to the ecological model and the notion of gendered 
continuum for violence. This includes clarifying each stakeholder’s role and developing 
incentives and accountability mechanisms to promote sector ownership for the issue. This 
also includes identifying the pace of reforms and effective coordination techniques, and 
confirms  what  MDBs’  Managers  and  staffs  themselves  had  identified  as  important 
variables to mainstream inclusive violence prevention (see Chapter 8, Section 8.1.2). The 
main difference lies in the fact that counterparts clearly considered this to be MDBs’ role, 
as they saw it as a public good fitting MDBs’ mandate. That is, stakeholders saw the MDB 
as a bridge between knowledge and policy making. In practical terms, they called on MDBs 
assistance for helping local and central Governments and civil society to strengthen the 
‘evaluability’  of  projects;  developing  toolkits  (i.e.  step-by-step  operational  guides  for 
practitioners and Government officers who are in charge of designing and implementing 
programmes,  projects  and  interventions);  strengthening  information  systems,  including 
developing  quality  assurance  mechanisms  for  violence  observatories  and  enhancing 
analysis  of  data;  strengthening  monitoring  and  evaluation  systems,  with  a  particular 
attention  on  the  implementation  processes  to  identify  facilitating  and  hindering  factors; 
financing and undertaking impact evaluations; and technically and financially assisting in 
scaling-up  processes.  Regarding  the  last,  scaling-up  processes,  many  interviewees, 
including key informants, pointed out how LAC was a laboratory for innovation in terms of 
violence prevention. However, most of these initiatives remained at the very local level and 
faced  great  difficulties  to  be  scaled  up  into  public  policies,  even  when  they  had  been 
evaluated as successful. Identifying conditions for scaling up successful experiences was 
seen as one of the most important contributions MDBs could bring to the issue at the 
regional level. 	 ﾠ
‘A major contribution would focus on scaling up local initiatives. For example, 
remedial education for youth. This would give visibility to local initiatives, develop 
some funding mechanisms and help make the initiatives be and stay non-partisan. 
There, MDBs could help. […] They develop a programme, evaluate it and hope for 
a scale up at the State level. Look at what happened with AIDS in Brazil: the World 	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Bank financed a stand-alone project and the Government matched the fund. Now, 
there  is  a  demand  for  it  and  the  programme  is  there  to  stay.’  (Interview,  Key 
Informant, Washington, D.C., April 2011) 
 
Policy dialogue 
The research in Colombia pinpointed policy dialogue as the second area where MDBs show 
a strong comparative advantage. Most interviewees cited the need for influential partners to 
help clarify debates on the causes of violence and its solutions. Despite the knowledge 
acquired over the past decades on the causes of violence, debates around violence remained 
trapped in ideology, in particular at the local level. According to Colombian interviewees 
and  international  experts  who  had  been  working  in  the  field  for  decades,  some 
policymakers  did  not  consider  prevention  as  a  serious  option  to  violence,  and  debates 
opposing prevention to repression were still vivid (Interviews, Key Informants, Washington 
D.C., July 2011). This suggests that efforts are needed to enhance a common understanding 
of violence as a development issue, which is multidimensional, multi-causal and gendered, 
which  emerges  and  reinforces  other  structural  injustices,  and  which  requires  an  multi-
sector, gender-sensitive and preventive approach to address multiple risk factors at multiple 
levels. As discussed in Chapters 3 and 5, the challenge at stake is to develop a powerful 
frame, simple enough to resonate with policymakers and their voters without caricaturing 
the issue and its solutions. MDBs could help by elevating the debate beyond ideology and 
clarifying the advantages and disadvantages of each type of policies. Through their policy 
dialogue with Governments, MDBs could consistently promote a mainstreaming approach 
to inclusive violence prevention both with Ministries of Finance and Planning, and with 
line Ministries. This would require a clear positioning from MDBs themselves and the 
implementation  of  a  mainstreaming  approach  within  their  own  agenda  (see  four  key 
messages, Section 9.2.1).  
‘There is an enormous political pressure for not so sophisticated policies. So one big 
contribution of development banks would be to enrich the public empirical debates 
through information, research that could lead to better quality policies. They have 
the expert criteria, but to reach their objectives they must be clear that politicians 
and policy makers face an enormous pressure, so in addition to long term preventive 
measures, they need to include short term gains that the Governments could show 	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and  sell  to  the  Media,  otherwise  they  won’t  listen.’  (Interview,  Key  Informant, 
Washington, D.C., April 2011)  
 
To  facilitate  MDBs’  policy  dialogue  on  mainstreaming  inclusive  violence  prevention, 
stakeholders  highlighted  priority  measures;  many  of  them  mirrored  what  MDBs’  staff 
members  had  highlighted.  They  included  defining  realistic,  meaningful  and  measurable 
indicators; benchmarking reforms, in particular in terms of pacing (what to do first and 
why), in contexts where many priorities compete for limited resources; providing specific 
guidance on why and how to work in a multi-sector, coordinated fashion; and identifying 
the  necessary  pre-conditions  for  any  violence  prevention  strategy  to  be  adopted, 
implemented, and to produce results (both in the short and medium term). While some of 
the measures overlap with and reinforce what respondents suggested for technical expertise, 
others are more controversial. This is the case for the last measure that experts, practitioners 
and local Governments put forth: MDBs went from being severely criticised for imposing 
too hard conditions on countries to not imposing any (or very minor ones). For issues such 
as violence prevention, many Colombian interviewees criticised MDBs for not imposing 
enough  conditions  on  Governments,  thus  echoing  concerns  from  MDBs  Specialists 
working  in  LMICs  (see  Chapter  8,  Section  8.2).  They  explained  how  failing  to  have 
minimum conditions to implement projects dealing with highly sensible and politicised 
topics might lead to no or few results, and even cancellation or restructuration. This was 
considered problematic not only for MDBs’ relevance, but for institutionalising a multi-
sector,  gender-sensitive  approach  to  violence  prevention.  According  to  them,  success 
breeds success, and credibility must be based on tangible results; therefore, MDBs should 
take the responsibility to identify which conditions are necessary and require they are in 
place before financing a policy, programme or project. 
‘It would be very useful if they could do it [MDBs on conditions].  In the end, they 
own the money they lend. So they should control it and provide TA and guidance 
on this, even through conditions.’  (Interview, MinTransporte, Bogotá, June 2011) 
 
Knowledge generation 
The third area where MDBs could significantly contribute to violence prevention in LAC 
deals  with  knowledge  generation  and  dissemination.  As  most  Colombian  stakeholders 	 ﾠ
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highlighted, much still needs to be researched in violence prevention, or make accessible to 
a wider public. This includes developing the evidence basis on what works and what does 
not work in Latin America, and on what contextual factors (institutional, political, social) 
are  necessary  for  an  intervention  to  be  successful,  and  eventually  be  scaled  up,  as 
previously  mentioned.  MDBs  can  help  generate  and  disseminate  research,  both  at  the 
operational  and  academic  level.  In  addition  to  flagship  publications,  which  provide  a 
thorough synthesis of the latest literature and evidence on the topic, interviewees mentioned 
the need for best practices and operational toolkits (also highlighted in technical expertise). 
Regarding MDBs’ flagship publications, most national ministries officers linked their value 
to  their  visibility  and  policy  scope.  Many  mentioned  the  World  Bank’s  recent  book, 
Violence  in  the  City  (2011),  as  well  as  the  World  Development  Reports  on  Conflict, 
Security  and  Development  (2011),  and  on  Gender  and  Development  (2012).
168 These 
widely disseminated publications were considered instrumental for drawing policymakers’ 
attention on the importance of violence and gender, and their link to development. In that 
regard, the World Bank had an advantage as compared to the IADB, for World Bank’s 
publications were much more visible and best known that those of the regional bank.	 ﾠOther 
suggested contributions focused on supporting regional researchers networks to develop 
regional  knowledge  and  promote  exchange  of  ideas  and  experiences,
169 organising 
conferences and workshops, and developing a work programme with the media, opposition 
parties and civil society, for these stakeholders play important roles in the adoption of 
multi-sector  strategies,  their  implementation  and  their  continuity.  Many  Colombian 
stakeholders referred to the Bogotá’s experience in that respect. The multi-sector strategy 
developed by the Mockus Administration (1995-1997) enjoyed an extraordinary longevity 
of  three  administrations  (Mockus,  1995-1997;  Peñalosa,  1998-2000)  from  the  opposite 
party;  and  Mockus,  2001-2003)),  which  made  possible  sustaining  the  initial  results. 
Interviewees pointed out the need for enhancing such continuity both at the national and 
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168 Even though the WDR on Gender was published in 2012, it was prepared in 2011 when I undertook field 
interviews.  
 
169 In that regard, the IADB has financed the SREDECC (Sistema Regional de Competencias Ciudadanas) in 
the Education Sector to promote exchange of experience on citizenship competencies and violence prevention 
in schools. However, according to interviews, the network does not receive funds anymore, for the IADB’ 
specialist  who  used  to  lead  it,  left  the Bank.  Therefore,  doubts  emerged  regarding  the  continuity  of  the 
network, that was considered particularly useful by interviewees (Interview, Bogotá, June 2011). 	 ﾠ
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local levels, and saw a role for MDBs in this endeavour, as technical a-political advisers to 
Governments.	 ﾠ
‘What we need from the banks is a project as long as possible to motivate people to 
stay in the project.’ (Interview DNP-DJSG, Bogotá, June 2011) 
 
‘What would be needed from the IADB and the World Bank are evaluations to 
ensure continuity of the programmes’ (Interview MPS-DGSP, Bogotá, June 2011) 
 
‘The banks should establish long-term strategies and should begin with countries 
that offer the best conditions: begin with those willing and with conditions to show 
impact could be generated.’ (Interview, Key Informant, Medellin, June 2011) 
 
Financial resources 
Interestingly, financial resources were not the main comparative advantage interviewees 
cited. This is probably because Colombia has access to international financial markets, 
which makes financial resources largely available. Nevertheless, financial resources were 
important at the subnational level, provided municipalities and departments had enough 
financial  health  to  take  loans.  At  the  national  level,  some  ministries  suggested  the 
separation between financial loans and technical assistance. They favoured budget support 
for the former, and grants negotiated separately for the later. All stakeholders considered 
technical assistance as valuable tools to consolidate MDBs’ comparative advantage.  
‘MDBs provide free expertise, so they play a big role. One of the priorities they 
should focus on is helping countries to select the first programmes to put in place 
and implement: the action should be strategic, proactive, the change would need at 
least a generation (15-20 years).’ (Interview, Key Informant, Medellin, June 2011) 
Technical assistance was also needed to strengthen capacity at the local level and for a 
series  of  activities  to  facilitate  the  daily  work  of  national  and  local  bureaucrats  and 
policymakers. Those particularly insisted on the facilitating role of MDBs for financing 
studies on specific issues relevant to the client and impact evaluations; providing grants to 
local researchers to develop local expertise (because having local experts was considered 
important  to  advise  Ministers  and  Mayors,  in  particular  when  they  tend  to  change 	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
243 
frequently); and providing grants to local NGOs to strengthen their capacity and develop 
programmes at the community level.  
9.3 Conclusion 
	 ﾠ
The case of Colombia illustrates the margins of manoeuvre for mainstreaming inclusive 
violence prevention in an upper middle-income country, with high capacity at the national 
level, yet facing important challenges in terms of inequalities and social and economic 
development.  
 
Findings  from  interviews  at  the  national  and  local  levels  in  Colombia  show  that 
mainstreaming inclusive violence prevention at the country level is possible provided a 
series  of  conditions  are  met.  It  is  possible  because  most  of  the  interviewees  showed 
receptiveness  to  such  a  strategy,  agreed  on  the  need  to  operationalise  the  shared 
responsibility for violence, and acknowledged its gender dimensions. It is also possible 
because the first steps of a multi-sector approach were actually being taken through the 
National Development Plan and the latest Policy for Citizen Security and Coexistence that 
seek to address the root causes of violence by engaging with multiple sectors at once. It is 
nonetheless  difficult  for  a  series  of  reasons  whose  prioritisation  diverges  between  the 
national  and  local  levels.  Overall,  political  leadership  at  all  levels  (national,  local,  and 
international) was seen as incontrovertible for such an enterprise to succeed. In that respect, 
having strong international partners who push the agenda forward on the global arena was 
seen as a propitious condition for greater visibility and priority at the local level. Along 
with  political  leadership,  all  interviewees  stressed  the  constraints  created  by  multiple 
cognitive frames and the need to clarify messages both on the issue of violence and on 
mainstreaming inclusive violence prevention. In other words, they acknowledged the need 
for  clarity  of  vision  and  goals  that  scholars  studying  gender  mainstreaming  had  long 
highlighted as explained in Section 3.2.3 in Chapter 3 (see for instance Daly 2005; Walby 
2005;  Razavi  2009;  Rao  and  Sandler  2012).  This  is  in  fact  a  condition  for  the 
mainstreaming  process  to  go  from  integration  to  agenda  setting,  and  transform  policy 
planning  in  highly  violent  countries  and  cities.  Overall,  Colombian  policymakers  and 
bureaucrats  referred  to  opportunities  and  constraints  in  relation  to  the  four  analytical 
categories (developed in Chapter 3), but also insisted on the need to address corruption and 	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to  focus  on  constant  capacity  building  and  community  participation  for  mainstreaming 
inclusive violence prevention to become a credible policy option. 
 
As  for  the  role  of  MDBs  in  violence  prevention  in  general  and  MiVP  in  particular, 
Colombian counterparts and key informants considered MDBs not only legitimate, but also 
relevant to accompany and even propose programmes and projects on inclusive violence 
prevention. In other words, MDBs were clearly welcomed as partners to respond to the 
challenge  of  violence  prevention,  and  Colombian  counterparts  even  called  for  more 
proactivity  in  demonstrating  that  MDBs  took  the  challenge  as  their  own.  This  was 
particularly the case for gender-based and domestic violence. Findings also show that from 
the counterparts’ perspective, perceived comparative advantage of MDBs was primarily 
technical and political. At the technical level, stakeholders saw MDBs adding value in 
capacity  building  at  the  local  level,  information  systems,  indicators  development, 
monitoring and evaluation, and policy-oriented studies. MDBs already undertake most of 
those activities (see Chapter 6), yet what was missing according to Colombian stakeholders, 
was a clear positioning and a more widely disseminated line of action within and outside 
MDBs, i.e. clearer communication. In addition, Colombian stakeholders highlighted the 
need for more in-house expertise on the topic both in general and sector by sector. Finally, 
the case study of Colombia highlights a series of specific new lines of action where MDBs 
could help on the political side. First, MDBs could be instrumental in enhancing conditions 
for continuity across administrations through long-term policy dialogue, loans and grants. 
Second,  MDBs  could  use  their  influence  to  push  the  international  agenda  on  violence 
prevention  by  organising  high  level  and  worldwide  events,  i.e.  by  participating  in  the 
development  of  an  external  policy  community,  and  eventually  suggesting  international 
commitments.  Through  those  efforts,  Colombian  stakeholders  and  key  informants 
considered MDBs could make substantial contributions towards institutionalising violence 
prevention  as  a  multi-sector,  gender-sensitive  issue,  and  thereafter,  towards  enhancing 
conditions for mainstreaming inclusive violence prevention.  
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Chapter 10: Conclusion 
 
 
I began this thesis five years ago. I was working for the World Bank at the time and 
designing a project to help women victims of violence in Colombia. Thinking about the 
main challenges that women and men, girls and boys in Latin America and the Caribbean 
had to face, I felt deeply that violence was the greatest injustice. The fact that not only most 
poor families had to struggle to survive but had to experience fear and violations of their 
very basic right to life for themselves, their children, partners, or friends, was unbearable. 
Then, as I was reading a number of life histories of young pandilleros in the region, the link 
between  violence  and  gender  gained  particular  salience.  These  young  men,  boys  many 
times, had either left home because of domestic violence or were trying to build an identity 
as men that dominant models associated with violence. Yet, discussions around gender 
seemed isolated and confined to women’s issues, and overall marginalised in strategies to 
prevent urban violence. So the basic question that motivated this research was: who can do 
what  to  influence  policymaking  towards  more  multi-sector,  gender-sensitive  and 
humanistic  strategies  that  would  be  built  around  the  understanding  that  violence  is 
preventable?  
 
There are many actors along the policy continuum, and Multilateral Development Banks 
are  just  one  of  them.  Beyond  all  debates  regarding  MDBs’  legitimacy,  relevance  and 
effectiveness,  few  other  organisations  have  so  much  financial  leverage  to  support  and 
advise  Governments  in  Latin  America  and  the  Caribbean.  In  addition,  I  had  insider 
knowledge of these organisations, having worked at the World Bank. I would then gain in-
depth knowledge of the IADB after joining the organisation a few years later after my field 
work. This dual positionality as insider and outsider researcher forced me to reflect on 
ethical issues of the research following a rich discussion by feminist scholars. By being 
transparent and conscious of this unique positionality, I acknowledge that the research is 
the result of an iterative and dialogical process where my experience fed my analysis and 
vice versa.  
 
So, as I began this research and throughout, I wanted to understand what MDBs’ role in 
violence prevention could be, and how they could contribute to push the policy agenda 	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forward for multi-sector, gender-sensitive approaches to violence with an agenda-setting 
perspective.  In  particular,  I  wanted  to  understand  why  a  mainstreaming  approach  to 
violence that would translate its multi-dimensionality and multi-sectorality had not been 
systematically  pursued  by  these  organisations,  and  what  had  been  the  constraints  and 
opportunities in that regard, as a basis for looking forward into developing more innovative 
and effective violence prevention approaches. For this, I had to proceed by stages. I first 
had to understand the emergence and evolution of violence prevention within MDBs. In 
particular, I had first to disentangle why these major development agencies had not given 
violence prevention more priority over the past two decades despite violence’s negative 
multiplier effects on development and its enormous costs. In understanding this, it was 
important to identify the particularity of violence prevention in the development agenda to 
be able to discuss strategies looking forward.  
 
I  thus  undertook  an  organisational  ethnography,  whose  complexity  is  reflected  in  the 
difficulty to disentangle the main analytical variables from a density of qualitative data. The 
qualitative methodology fitted this research that sought to uncover complex, subtle and 
multi-layered  dynamics  at  stake  within  international  development  organisations,  at  the 
country and local levels, and in donor-recipient relations. Puzzling out a large amount of 
data from a diversity of respondents whose perspective reflected their experience, training, 
gender, age and position required a systematic and synthetic analysis to pinpoint the most 
salient  variables  and  identify  commonalities  and  differences.  For  such  exercise,  it  was 
important to proceed in an iterative manner. This made it possible to take the most out of a 
deep knowledge of all the specificities and details gathered, while applying an analytical 
distance.  Without  such  iteration  in  the  analysis,  it  is  easy  to  either  over-simplify  and 
dismiss important data and thereafter findings, or become overwhelmed with the amount of 
data and the complexity of organisational processes and therefore incapable of meaningful 
analysis. This iterative process also allowed me to refine the conceptual framework whose 
key categories were initially identified through the review and analysis of important bodies 
of  literature,  but  whose  translation  into  specific  variables  was  refined  throughout  the 
research  process.  When  reflecting  on  the  methodology,  the  process  tracer  appears  as  a 
fundamental  part  of  this  research  as  it  underscores  how  historical  processes  matter  to 
understand opportunities and constraints for mainstreaming processes. This is all the more 	 ﾠ
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so in a context where MDBs are well known for their lack of institutional memory and a 
high turnover of personnel. Knowing, understanding and pondering on what happened in 
the past appeared as a key milestone to gain a finer understanding of potentialities in the 
present, which would then create conditions for substantial and lasting change in the future.  
 
Mainstreaming inclusive violence prevention is the institutionalisation of the prevention of 
violence from a gender perspective throughout the development agenda so as to create 
lasting conditions for peaceful, inclusive societies, communities, families and individuals in 
all  their  social  diversity.  The  concept  takes  its  theoretical  underpinnings  from  social 
constructivism and collective empowerment to place women and men, girls and boys at the 
core of defining the problems that affects their lives, and developing solutions by sharing 
responsibility for it. As there are many ways to define violence, this thesis opts for the 
WHO  definition  that  encompasses  many  manifestations  and  leaves  room  for 
acknowledging that structural injustices and patriarchy are embedded in the perpetuation of 
violence, as shown also through the gendered continuum of violence.  
 
The  concept  builds  on  the  lessons  from  the  scholarship  and  experience  of  gender 
mainstreaming and priority setting. It makes the synthesis of five frameworks and identifies 
four  analytical  categories  to  analyse  the  opportunities  and  constraints  to  mainstream 
inclusive violence prevention in the context of aid. These categories deal with cognitive 
frame, actor power, operational knowledge and organisational treatment, and are looked at 
through donor-recipient lenses.  
 
I found that these categories provided relevant keys for understanding the emergence and 
evolution of violence prevention, and the conditions for its mainstreaming from a gender 
perspective in MDBs. As noted previously, the selection of variables within each category 
was refined throughout the iterative research process. All these variables complement and 
reinforce each other to identify bottlenecks and make sense of the resistance to such an 
important issue gaining priority and being institutionalised. Together, they suggest that it 
will be difficult to implement an agenda-setting mainstreaming approach for the inclusive 
prevention of violence in both banks, but not impossible. The research in fact highlights the 
difficulties  in  mainstreaming  linked  to  the  multi-layers  of  collective  empowerment.  As 	 ﾠ
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discussed in Chapter 3, for transformation to happen, we need collective empowerment. 
What the comparative analysis in both MDBs and the case study in Colombia reveal is the 
difficulty  for  collective  empowerment  to  happen  at  different  levels  (community, 
Government, and MDBs), with processes that sometimes contradict each other. This was 
shown  through  differences  between  the  local  and  central  levels  in  Colombia,  but  also 
through the contradictory incentives within MDBs and the tensions between development 
and  financial  survival.  The  research  also  shows  how  the  analytical  categories  play  out 
differently at the IADB and the World Bank. In particular, their relative salience in the 
explanation suggests directions to prioritise efforts looking forward.  
 
A first interesting finding of this research confirms the importance of cognitive frames for 
priority setting and the institutionalisation of an issue in the development agenda. Framing 
is  of  course  interrelated  to  the  other  variables  (actor  power,  operational  knowledge, 
organisational  treatment,  donor-recipient  relations).  Yet,  it  is  seldom  taken  into 
consideration in strategic discussions. Through this research, I have shown how building a 
common understanding that strongly resonates is a key, and perhaps the main key, for 
priority  setting  and  institutionalisation.  This  concretely  means  investing  in  building  a 
powerful frame or common understanding in contexts where economists, the majority of 
MDBs’ staff members, might show spontaneous resistance to what might appear as ‘non-
economic’ issues. At the banks, even very dedicated people cannot push the issue forward 
by themselves. They need allies throughout the organisation. For this, they need people to 
visualise and build conviction of the relevance of the issue to their own work and their 
capacity  to  change  things  from  their  sector  perspective.  Given  staff  turnover  in  both 
organisations, such common understanding and credible and salient frames need to be seen 
as a recurrent exercise. More generally, as it was the case for gender, mainstreaming is a 
slow  process  that  requires  changing  mindsets  and  behaviours  towards  transformation. 
Today, new generations are used to dealing with gender even though a lot still needs to be 
done in implementation. For inclusive violence prevention, the first step is to make it a 
habit.  That  is,  a  practical  objective  would  be  to  make  violence  prevention  and  gender 
appear as normal and effective practices throughout the project cycle for relevant sectors. 
The  tension  between  integration  and  agenda  setting  might  remain  alive,  but  not 
incompatible, in particular in bureaucratic organisations that MDBs are. As Gupta (2010) 	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
249 
has  shown  in  the  case  of  climate  change,  they  evolve  along  a  continuum  of  political 
difficulty, but not necessarily in opposite direction. In the end, slowly changing mindsets 
and  behaviours  through  training,  incentives,  experience,  contact  with  the  field, 
accountability and tools, all participate in shifting paradigms and reaching the political 
agenda for more inclusive, peaceful societies through the operationalisation of the shared 
responsibility for preventing violence.  
 
A second interesting finding, even if it is not new, is the importance of women and men 
with influence. Here, the actor power factor played out differently at the IADB and the 
World  Bank.  Even  at  the  IADB,  where  barriers  are  less  rigid,  the  lack  of  vision  and 
implementers of such vision (that is, the lack of critical mass of in-house experts) hindered 
the regional bank to make the most of its influence and experience in the issue. This is 
clearly a constraint, but also an opportunity as people keep changing and teams can be 
strengthened, even though leadership is always harder to create. Recent efforts led by the 
few in-house experts at the IADB to develop clinics and specialised training are aiming in 
this direction.  
 
Other relevant findings had to do with knowledge and donor recipient-relations. Knowledge 
limitations were an easy answer many staff members in both banks almost systematically 
provided. Even though legitimate, it does not hold very long in particular when compared 
to other complex and nascent issues, such as climate change or corruption that also face 
strong knowledge limitations but nevertheless have climbed the priority ladder relatively 
quickly. Donor-recipient relations were another easy answer: ‘we do not work more on 
violence prevention, and within it on gender-based violence or domestic violence, because 
countries  do  not  ask  for  it.’  Yet,  when  counterparts  were  asked  in  the  case  study  on 
Colombia, often the opposite answer was given: ‘MDBs should first show what they can 
offer and be more proactive.’ Here again, the case of climate change is interesting as a 
comparison in the sense that a strong agenda by donors gave space to push the agenda 
forward in negotiations with countries, first through grants and technical assistance, and 
then loans. The multi-donor fund at the IADB might help doing so, provided the IADB 
strengthens its in-house expertise and own vision for its contribution to the issue. From my 
work experience, I am convinced there is room for greater and more strategic involvement 	 ﾠ
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from  MDBs.  Finally,  organisational  constraints  revealed  the  contradictions  of  being  a 
financial institution and a development agency at once. This created, in particular at the 
World Bank, a series of contradictory incentives not favouring the emergence of complex, 
small violence prevention loans, and was clearly a constraint for mainstreaming processes.  
 
Today, as I write the conclusions of this research, violence is still a tremendous challenge 
and much still needs to be learned and done to prevent it in an effective, humanistic, and 
gender-sensitive manner. This thesis aimed to be a humble contribution to this by shedding 
light on the different factors that influence such a complex issue to gain priority among 
MDBs and their country partners, and second, by providing a firmer knowledge base for the 
discussion  on  how  to  institutionalise  the  issue  from  a  gender  perspective  through 
developing the concept of mainstreaming inclusive violence prevention and investigating 
opportunities and constraints in MDBs’ context.  
 
As  such,  the  main  contribution  of  this  research  is  to  propose  a  framework  for 
mainstreaming  inclusive  violence  prevention  by  providing  a  definition  for  debates,  and 
looking at the variables that would eventually facilitate its implementation in MDBs. The 
framework  builds  on  lessons  from  interlocking  bodies  of  literature  on  priority  setting, 
gender mainstreaming, and donor-recipient relations, and evolved throughout the research 
to reach its final stage of four categories and twelve variables. In other words, this research 
with the proposed framework aims to contribute to a nascent discussion, initiated by a few 
authors, including Moser (1999, 2006, 2009) and Whitzman (2008) who tried to link theory 
with practice, and inspired me to begin working on violence prevention. By exploring the 
views of MDBs’ staff and counterparts on mainstreaming, the objective was to assess the 
resonance of such an approach and pinpoint where the main resistance would be. Much 
remains to be done and studied in terms of better understanding how to operationalise the 
ecological model in MDBs and beyond. In particular, the concept and its corresponding 
operational  discussion  would  benefit  from  debate  in  a  variety  of  contexts  so  as  to  be 
refined,  improved,  and  finally  endorsed  by  academics,  policymakers  and  practitioners. 
Among the main areas of research to deepen the concept and its practical implications, I 
suggest that future research investigates why other complex challenges did not gain more 
priority  and  were  not  mainstreamed  within  MDBs.  This  is  the  case  for  instance  of 	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biodiversity,  as  a  former  World  Bank  Vice  President  suggested,  and  would  usefully 
complement this research by showing similarities and differences in priority setting and 
institutionalisation processes in MDBs. Further investigation on mainstreaming inclusive 
violence prevention could usefully assess the resonance of different frames on the political 
goal as well as on the relevance of inclusive violence prevention by sector, study tools in 
terms of operational effectiveness and pertinent indicators and sub-indicators by sector, 
analyse  the  kind  of  mechanisms  (incentives,  accountability  and  coordination)  most 
effective in different contexts to consolidate and expand the knowledge-base on conducive 
conditions for the mainstreaming process of the inclusive prevention of violence.  
 
Finally, I want to go back to the bottom line of violence prevention, which is to always 
keep a human face in the strategies to be designed and implemented even in the worst 
contexts of all. Violence is preventable, and every person has a role to play. Since many 
cities in Central America and other parts of Latin America have been compared to war 
zones because of the very high levels of violence affecting daily life, I want to end with a 
note of hope coming from a survivor of one of the most horrific times of the XX
th century 
that nevertheless had the courage and the motivation to live through it all and keep hope in 
humanity and the meaning of life. More than that, he showed how each single person 
mattered. His words remind me of countless stories of unknown heroes, many women and 
men who kept hope, cared, and helped improve other people’s life despite the most terrible 
adversity. I had the honour to witness such extraordinary behaviours in ‘ordinary life’ to 
borrow the expression from Moser’s latest book (2009), on multiple occasions over the past 
fifteen years in working and living in more than twenty countries. Throughout this research, 
I have had the privilege of meeting with numerous persons most of whom were honest, 
knowledgeable, and fully dedicated professionals who wanted to help. Violence prevention 
is definitely a very humbling topic. There is so much more that we do not know than we do 
know. And as a PhD researcher it is even more humbling as I look with some distance at 
very  complex  settings  where  margins  of  manoeuver  are  constantly  changing.  So  this 
research was conducted with full humility holding an honest, transparent analysis while 
acknowledging its limitations (including those I might not be aware of), and the difficulty 
of the job at stake for each individual in the organisations. For this reason, I have tried to 
always keep the analysis at the organisational level. But I nonetheless believe that each 	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
252 
individual can change things for the better.  The challenge at stake is complex, but the 
many dedicated women and men, in all their diversity and responsibilities that worked to 
change things give me hope. They include many women and men in Washington, D.C. and 
in Colombia who can actually do things, despite the big organisational constraints. These 
women and men all matter in their singularity and have the power to change the status quo 
and create safer, more inclusive societies.  
 
‘This  uniqueness  and  singleness  which  distinguishes  each  individual  and  gives 
meaning to his [or her] existence has a bearing on creative work as much as it does 
on human love. When the impossibility of replacing a person is realised, it allows 
the  responsibility  which  a  man  [or  a  woman]  for  his  [or  her]  existence  and  its 
continuance to appear in all its magnitude. A man [or a woman] who becomes 
conscious  of  the  responsibility  he  [or  she]  bears  toward  a  human  being  who 
affectionately waits for him [or her], or to an unfinished work, will never be able to 
throw away his [or her] life. [They] know the ‘why’ for [their] existence, and will 
be able to bear almost any ‘how’.’ 
Viktor Frankl (1959) 
Man’s search for meaning: the classic tribute to hope from the Holocaust 
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Appendices A: Policy Approaches to Prevent Violence 
 
 
This appendix complements the discussion in Section 2.6 in Chapter 2. I regroup policy 
approaches  into  five  categories:  criminal  justice,  epidemiological/public  health,  urban 
development, education, and multi-sector approaches to mirror traditional sector ministries. 
 
The criminal justice approach 
 
There  are  two  broad  strategies  within  this  approach:  the  repressive  one  and  the 
preventive/rehabilitative one. The first approach has been very popular in Central America 
and is referred to as Mano dura or Mano super dura. It seeks to harsher punishments and 
increase  arrests  (Neild  1999;  Rodgers  2007).  It  does  not  invest  in  rehabilitation  of 
offenders, often leading to counterproductive effects, as overcrowded prisons can serve as 
criminal  laboratories.
170 Mano  dura  and  its  sister  policies
171 have  been  criticised  for 
abusing human rights (whoever was poor, young and male (and tattooed in some countries) 
was  immediately  assumed  to  be  a  gang  member  and  risked  being  arrested,  often  with 
abusive treatment by the police) (Moser et al. 2005:149).
172 Critiques have also pointed out 
counterproductive  outcomes  of  repressive  strategies  (many  gangs  have  radicalised  their 
practices and reorganised, leading to ‘a tit-for-tat spiral of violence’ (Rodgers and Muggah 
2009:312).
173  
 
Other countries and cities have adopted less radical approaches while still seeking to reduce 
impunity. Their rationale is that in many low-income neighbourhoods, police and justice 
are  often  inefficient  and  not  trusted.  For  many  poor  people,  police  is  often  seen  as  a 
problem rather than the solution
174 and justice is considered inexistent and therefore useless 
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170 In  Guatemala,  for  example,  rival  incarcerated  gang  members  engaged  in  a  ‘tit-for-tat  prison  warfare’ 
(Rodgers and Muggah 2009:307). 
 
171 Called cero Tolerancia in Honduras, Plan Escoba in Guatemala (Rodgers and Muggah 2009). 
 
172 In El Salvador, for instance, ‘the directive advocated the immediate imprisonment of gang members for 
having gang-related tattoos or flashing gang signs in public (a crime punishable by two to five years in jail 
and  applicable  to  gang  members  from  the  age  of  12  and  older).  Between  July  2003  and  August  2004, 
approximately  20,000  pandilleros  were  arrested,  although  95  per  cent  of  them  were  eventually  released 
without charge when the Mano Dura law was declared unconstitutional by the Salvadoran Supreme Court for 
violating  the  United  Nations  Convention  on  the  Rights  of  the  Child  (UNCRC)’  (Rodgers  and  Muggah 
2009:308).    
 
173 Rodgers  and  Muggah  conclude:  ‘Repression  simply  does  not  remedy  the  underlying  factors  that 
contributed to gang formation and consolidation in the first place, and is leading to the rise of more organised 
crime’ (2009:312). The authors emphasise the importance of class (through unequal political economy) as a 
key of understanding of why it has been so difficult to develop coherent approaches to gang violence in 
Central America. Hume (2009) agrees and emphasises gender in addition to class to capture a more realistic 
picture of the reality and its complexity. 
 
174 A participatory research in Jamaica clearly shows this mistrust in police: ‘a focus group of young men in 
Campbell Town ranked police brutality third- equal to, but distinct from war and gang violence. […] Almost 
all teenagers and young adults, and many of their elders, had negative views of the police as an institution. 
They perceived the local police to be ineffective, unresponsive and uncaring’ (Moser and Holland 1997:8). 	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(Moser and Holland, 1997; Moser et al 2005). This has led to a worrisome and out-of-
control privatisation of security (Briceño-León 2002; Arriagada and Godoy 2000).
175 To try 
to restore trust in criminal justice institutions, some countries have decided to bring the 
police and the judiciary closer to communities, and to develop their preventive role rather 
than  just  the  repressive  one.
176 It  is  what  is  generally  called  ‘community  policing’  and 
‘community courts’ (Neild 1999). Many capitals have adopted and adapted a version of it 
(including Caracas, Buenos Aires, Santiago, Bogotá, São Paulo and Lima) (Moser et al. 
2005; Neild 1999). 
 
The epidemiological/public health approach 
 
By  reducing  risks  factors  such  as  alcohol  consumption  and  firearms  possession,  this 
approach  seeks  to  prevent  violent  behaviours.  Most  famous  applications  of  this 
epidemiological methodology (inherited from the public health sector) are the programmes 
developed in Bogotá, Cali (Desepaz) and Medellin, as well as in Diadema, São Paulo, 
Brazil at the end of the 1990s. Mayors Mockus and Peñalosa in Bogotá first developed this 
approach in 1994 (Moser et al. 2005). It begins with an assessment of the time, place and 
circumstances of most homicides to identify risk factors. Measures include a reduction in 
the sale of alcohol (famously known as the ‘ley zanahoria’ that forced bars to close at 1 
a.m.),
177 and of permit to wear firearms at certain times. They also include justice reforms 
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This is confirmed in participatory research in Colombia and Guatemala with ‘the general distrust of the state 
security  forces  […],  coupled  with  widespread  impunity,  [leading]  to  the  proliferation  of  other  perverse 
organisations created to fill the void of law enforcement’ [i.e. social cleansing groups and paramilitaries] 
(Moser and McIlwaine 2001:980). Neild (1999:9) summarises saying that ‘the police are experienced as a 
‘service’- even if an increasingly inadequate one- by the wealthy, but as a repressive ‘force’ by the poor’. 
 
175 In many poor neighbourhoods, when the police intervenes, it often comes after a violent incident has 
happened, therefore leaving the inhabitants without any protection most of the time. As a result, private 
security has developed rapidly in many Latin American cities. Even though there is no (or very little) data on 
private security forces, it is estimated that they are up to three to five times the number of public police 
officers  in  some  countries  (Arriagada  and  Godoy  2000:115-116).  This  has  had  serious  and  worrying 
consequences: often, the poorest need to pay substantial share of their small income just to be able to go out 
and work (Hume (unpublished), Conference given at the Institute for the Study of the Americas, London on 
March 10, 2010). Not paying for a private armed vigilante (guard) might mean increased danger in an already 
very  dangerous  environment.  It  also  certainly  increases  fear,  which  is  already  widespread  in  these 
neighbourhoods.  Private  security  forces  have  also  led  to  ‘social  cleansings’  that  have  different  names 
depending on the country, but all consist in killing street children or youth gang members as a mean to ‘clean’ 
the  neighbourhood  from  ‘the  bad  boys’  (Arriagada  and  Godoy  2000;  Briceño-León  1999).  These  social 
cleansings are particularly worrisome in terms of human rights and many civil society groups across Latin 
America have mobilised to protest against them. In many communities, there is also the huge problem (under-
documented) of extortion, be it by the police, the gang members or the vigilantes. These factors increase fear 
and insecurity and worsen already difficult life conditions to a dramatic extent.   
 
176 They also invest more on rehabilitation of juvenile offenders rather than putting them into [overcrowded] 
adult jails (Biehl 1999). These rehabilitation programmes include institutional treatment, group homes, and 
non-institutional  treatment.  Chile  for  instance  has  developed  such  rehabilitative  approach  of  juvenile 
offenders. 
 
177 Bogota’s  1994  Crime  and  Violence  Reduction  Programme  included  improving  access  to  justice, 
controlling alcohol consumption and traffic accidents, assisting at-risk youth, recovering public parks (Moser 
et al. 2005:157). In Diadema, São Paulo, the bars were forced to close at 11p.m. (ICPC 2005). 
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and programmes for youth-at-risk. These policies were assessed very successful since the 
rate  of  homicides  lowered  by  50  per  cent  in  Bogotá  over  six  years  of  implementation 
(Moser et al. 2005).  
 
Urban planning/Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design  
 
Similar to the rationale of the epidemiological approach, the Crime Prevention Through 
Environmental  Design  (CPTED)  considers  that  some  settings  of  infrastructure  might 
increase  risks  of  violence  and  crime.  For  instance,  isolated  parks  or  overcrowded  bus 
stations might be propitious to sexual harassment of women, or aggressive robberies.
178 
CPTED is increasingly popular in Latin America and the Caribbean. Chile, Honduras, and 
Brazil  (Prometropole  in  Pernambuco),  for  instance,  have  developed  such  programmes. 
Urban planning could be an effective tool that could impact both criminality and the fear of 
it, as examples from North America and Europe show (Moser et al. 2005:150). However, 
its impact may differ greatly for women and men depending on its design, implementation 
and maintenance. Women and men have indeed different use of public space (Smaoun 
2000) and public transport (Levy 1992). Studies have shown that women from low-income 
neighbourhoods tend to walk more than men and use more buses (Levy 1992:102). They 
also experience different fears in relation to public spaces (Hollander 2001).
179 Critics of 
CPTED underscore the fact that modification of infrastructure alone might not be enough to 
change behaviours. Human presence remains a fundamental aspect that should complement 
urban planning. This is particularly important in relation to fear (more salient for women, in 
particular  regarding  sexual  harassment  and  aggression).  Most  CPTED  planning  (the 
‘second generation’ of CPTED) now enhances human presence and adopts an educational 
approach.  
 
Education and youth development 
 
If  violence  is  a  learned  behaviour,  it  can  be  prevented  and  unlearned  (Biehl  1999; 
Arriagada and Godoy 2000; PAHO 2003).  This is what education and youth development 
strategies intend doing. Schools are a direct medium to reach a large number of boys and 
girls.  Studies  have  shown  that  greater  connection  to  school  from  early  childhood  to 
secondary and tertiary education is the most effective way to prevent young people to join 
delinquent (often violent) groups and adopt risky behaviours (Naudeau et al. 2008; Blum 
and Ireland 2004).
180 As a result, reducing school absenteeism and dropout are key features 
of  youth  violence  prevention.  Conflict  resolution  skills,  early  childhood  development, 
vocational training, and sexual education are also among the most recommended strategies 
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178 Attacks in public transportation such as buses are well known all over Latin America.  
 
179 Tools such as women’s safety audits are useful in this sense. These audits were initially developed in 
Toronto, Canada in 1989 and include an assessment of the situation by male and female users of the public 
space (Smaoun 2001). 
 
180 Risky  behaviours  include  school  absenteeism  and  dropping  out,  sexual  behaviours  leading  to  early 
pregnancy  or  HIV/AIDS  (or  both),  delinquency,  violence,  and  substance  use  and  abuse  (Naudeau  et  al. 
2008:76). 
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for youth violence prevention (Naudeau et al. 2008).
 181  Conflict resolution programmes 
aim to teach boys and girls to find peaceful ways to resolve their conflicts (Chaux 2002). 
Vocational training aims to equip young people with skills that will help them find a job 
and integrate the formal labour market. Youth clinics seek to address the specific health-
related needs of young people, in particular in relation to their sexual behaviours, but also 
to detect if some young people are victims of abuse (PAHO 2003). Finally, it is noteworthy 
underscoring the findings of a youth health survey undertaken in the Caribbean (Blum and 
Ireland 2004:495-496).
182 This survey shows that females and males react differently to 
educational and youth development programmes, with some protective factors having more 
impact on girls than on boys. These results therefore advocate for different approaches for 
each gender (opcit:500).
183 
 
Multi-sector approaches 
 
Scholars and practitioners widely agree on the fact that violence is multidimensional and 
interventions  that  combine  different  approaches  are  expected  to  have  better  outcomes 
(McIlwaine 1999; PAHO 2003; Buvinic et al. 2005; Moser et al. 2005). The municipal 
multi-sector  programmes  Fica  Vivo
184 (Belo  Horizonte)  and  Diadema
185 (São  Paulo)  in 
Brazil, as well as Desepaz (Cali) in Colombia illustrate this. International organisations, 
including  PAHO,  UN-Habitat,  IADB  and  World  Bank,  have  thus  advocated  for  the 
adoption of such cross-sector approaches. The IADB has pioneered in the late 1990s by 
developing a ‘blueprint’ multi-sector approach of urban violence reduction (Moser et al 
2005; Buvinic et al. 2005). These citizen security programmes have similar components 
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181 Naudeau et al. (2008) review the most effective youth development interventions. They include providing 
parenting information and support to expecting and new parents; fostering connections to schools from early 
age and for as long as possible; developing youth-friendly reproductive health services; providing youth with 
opportunities for civic engagement; incorporating life skills into all interventions for youth; and providing 
youth with information and guidance.   
 
182 The study shows that ‘68.1 per cent of males and 75.9 per cent of females reported violent behaviour when 
no protective factors were present. […] School connectedness was the single most powerful protective factor 
associated with violence reduction; from 68.1 per cent to 39.9 per cent for males and 71.9 per cent to 11.6 per 
cent  for  female  adolescents.  When  all  three  protective  factors  are  entered  into  the  model  [school 
connectedness, family connectedness and religious attendance/religiosity], violence involvement falls to 26.7 
per cent for males and 5.8 per cent for females’ (Blum and Ireland 2004: 495-496).  
 
183 In  the  case  of  conflict  resolution  for  instance,  if  gender  relations  are  not  included  into  the  training, 
outcomes of such programmes might not reach their full potential. At a young age, boys tend to gather with 
boys and girls with girls, therefore they might learn to resolve their conflicts between peers of the same 
gender, but this does not guarantee that they will apply these skills to conflicts with their partners when they 
grow up, above all if domestic violence is culturally tolerated.  
 
184 Fica  Vivo  developed  in  2003  in  Belo  Horizonte  (Brazil)  combines  both  police  and  social  protection 
actions. This includes community policing in risky areas to ‘alter the community’s negative perception of the 
police and to establish cooperation between the community and the police’; and ‘social support activities for 
young people such as education, health, sport, leisure and professional training projects’ (Peixoto, Andrade 
and Azevedo 2009). 
 
185 Diadema  and  Desepaz  follow  the  same  logics  with  an  epidemiological  assessment  and  risk  control 
measures such as reduction of alcohol sales and firearms permits combined with police and justice reforms 
and youth-at-risk programmes. 	 ﾠ
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across countries and combine the creation of information systems, reforms of police and 
judiciary  (often  including  community  policing,  community  courts  and  rehabilitation 
programmes) with poverty reduction, youth development programmes, and some features 
of  CPTED.  Although  they  do  not  only  target  youth  violence,  most  of  the  resources 
allocation (38-52 per cent for the first four projects implemented) goes to prevent juvenile 
violence and delinquency (Moser et al 2005:154). Evaluations of these programmes have 
concluded  that  is  was  impossible  to  attribute  results  to  the  IADB  multi-sector  projects 
(OVE  2010)  and  that  implementation  was  challenging,  mainly  because  of  a  lack  of 
mechanisms to ensure efficient and effective multi-sector work (OVE 2013).  
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Appendices B: Methodology 
 
Appendix B.1: Questions asked during semi-structured interviews 
 
Appendix B.1.1: Questions asked to IADB and World Bank staff 
 
Opened questions 
- Could you please tell me about your experience or impression regarding the evolution of 
the  Bank  (both  banks  call  themselves  ‘the  Bank’)  in  terms  of  engaging  on  violence 
prevention?  
- What are the most plausible factors according to you that explain this evolution?  
- What is the comparative advantage of the Bank according to you in the field of violence 
prevention? 
- How gender-based violence and domestic violence have appeared in the policy dialogue 
and negotiations with counterparts? 
 
Specific questions regarding gender 
- To what extent and how has gender been taken into account in the discussions towards 
developing the strategy on citizen security and in the negotiations with Governments?  
- What explains that very few operations have a component on domestic violence and/or 
masculinities?  
- Why do gender-based violence, domestic violence and masculinities belong to the gender 
unit and not the violence prevention/citizen security unit?  
- Why did the general Gender Strategy of the Bank choose not to deal directly with gender-
based violence?  
- Why are the Anchors and Regions not aligned in this respect (for the World Bank)?  
-  What  would  be  needed  to  more  systematically  include  gender  into  citizen 
security/violence prevention projects? 
 
Specific questions regarding multi-sector approaches and the relevance and potential of 
mainstreaming violence prevention within sectors 
- Do you consider violence relevant to your specific sector? If not, why? If yes, have you 
included violence prevention in operations? If yes, how and was it gendered? If not, what 
would be needed to do it (without adding an additional burden to the to do list of project 
managers)?  
- What are your views regarding mainstreaming processes in general? What would be the 
best way according to you to include an issue such as violence prevention in a systematic 
fashion in your sector work to create continuity (i.e. to institutionalise the issue)? 
 
Specific questions regarding the decision making process within the organisation 
- How does an issue become a priority for the Bank?  
I used the examples of climate change and anti-corruption to assess what was determinant 
when  they  suddenly  became  strong  priorities  for  each  bank.  I  also  asked  how  the 
mainstreaming process works or could work, and who decided to opt for such a strategy.  
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Appendix B.1.2: Questions asked to study populations in Colombia 
 
Colombian counterparts 
-  Could  you  please  share  with  me  your  thoughts  about  what  you  consider  the  main 
challenges in terms of designing and implementing urban violence prevention policies and 
programmes? What would be most needed to respond to these challenges? 
- According to you, how is gender usually considered in citizen security strategies? How do 
you  think  domestic  violence  fits  within  these  policies  and  why?  Is  there  a  general 
understanding about causal links between different forms of violence? 
- What do you think about the power of influence of development banks? How do you 
appreciate their involvement in violence prevention? According to you, do they have a 
comparative advantage in this sector, and why? What would be most needed from them? 
 
Sector experts, technical staff or practitioners 
- How do you perceive violence prevention? Does it or could it fit within your sector 
priorities? Would it be relevant and doable? What would be needed for it? According to 
your experience, what would be the best way to include it more systematically in the 
sector’s priorities? 
- How is gender taken into account in your sector? What are the main factors that explain 
how gender is considered and dealt with?  
- What do you think about the role of development banks? How do you perceive each of 
them?  What  is  their  comparative  advantage  in  your  sector?  Do  they  have  influence  / 
margins of manoeuver as regard to suggesting priorities or components’ design in projects 
they support? Would that make a difference if they adopted gendered violence prevention 
lenses in the project they fund in your sector? According to you, what would be the best 
way to go about it? How could they contribute the most? 
 
Appendix B.1.3: Questions asked to international experts 
 
- How do you perceive development banks as far as violence prevention is concerned?  
- Do you work with them? How would you qualify this partnership? 
- According to your experience and expertise, what are the main challenges to develop 
gendered and multi-sector violence prevention strategies? 
-  What  is  lacking  and  what  would  be  most  needed  to  improve  the  situation  in  Latin 
American cities? 
- Do development banks have a comparative advantage? What is it and why? 
- What has been MDBs’ main contribution and what would be needed from them looking 
forward? 
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Appendix B.2: List of interviews 
 
Appendix B.2.1: Interviews at the IADB 
 
Unit  Contact title 
Office of the Executive Director for Mexico and Dominican Republic  Executive Director (ED) 
Office of the Executive Director for Mexico and Dominican Republic  Senior Counselor 
Office of the Executive Director (ED) for Argentina and Haiti  Executive Director 
Office of the ED for Barbados, Bahamas, Guyana, Jamaica, Trinidad 
and Tobago  Executive Director 
Office of the ED for United Kingdom, Croatia, Japan, Korea, Portugal, 
Slovenia  Alternate ED 
Office of the ED for Brazil and Suriname  Executive Director 
Office of the ED for USA  Executive Director 
Office of the ED for Chile and Ecuador  Executive Director 
Uruguay, Bolivia and Paraguay  Counselor for the ED 
Country Department for Belize, Central America, Mexico, Panama and 
Dominican Republic  General Director 
Gender and Diversity Unit  Chief 
Gender and Diversity Unit 
Social Development Lead 
Specialist 
Education  Chief-Education Division 
Education/Early Childhood Development 
Education Senior Specialist 
(ECD) 
Education  Education Lead Specialist 
Transportation  Transport Lead Specialist 
Social Protection and Health  Social Protection Economist 
Office of External Affairs  Youth Program Coordinator 
Communication Office  Communication Specialist 
Human Resources 
Diversity Advisor Human 
Resources 
Private Sector Vice Presidency  Vice President for Private sector 
Social Safeguards  Senior Specialist 
Country Office in Colombia 
Education Economist-Lead 
Specialist 
Country Office in Colombia  State Modernization Specialist 
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Appendix B.2.2: Interviews at the World Bank 
 
Region  Unit  Contact title 
Board 
Office of ED for Sweden, Denmark, Estonia, 
Finland, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway  Executive Director 
Board  Office of Executive Director (ED) for Germany  Advisor ED Germany 
Board  Office of ED for UK 
Adviser to the UK Executive Director - 
IMF and World Bank  
Board 
Office of ED for Spain, Mexico, Central America 
and Venezuela  Senior Advisor to ED 
Anchor 
Conflict, Crime and Violence/ Social 
Development Department  Cluster Leader 
Anchor 
Conflict, Crime and Violence/ Social 
Development Department  Violence and Crime Specialist-ETC 
Anchor/LAC 
Social Development Department-Sustainable 
Development Network- Conflict, Crime and 
Violence Team  Violence Prevention Specialist-ETC 
Anchor 
Social Development Department-Sustainable 
Development Network  Gender-Based Violence Specialist-STC 
Anchor Gender  Gender and Development  Gender Head 
Gender Anchor  Gender and Development  Senior Gender Specialist 
Youth  Children and Youth Unit   Children and Youth Head 
Human 
Development 
Network  Youth/ Impact evaluation  Sr. Economist 
World  IEG  Retired Lead Evaluator 
WDR Gender  WDR Gender  Lead Education Specialist 
World  Fragile and Post conflict states  Adviser Fragile and post conflict states 
LAC  Social development Unit  Coordinator 
LAC  Social development Unit  Violence Prevention Specialist 
LAC  Sustainable Development  Sr. Urban Planner 
LAC  Urban Transport  Sr. Transport Specialist 
LAC  Justice/Public Sector Reform  Sr. Public Sector Reform Specialist 
LAC  Operations Services  Adviser Governance and Anti-Corruption  
LAC  Education  Sr. Education Economist 
LAC  Education  Sr. Education Specialist 
LAC  Social Protection  Senior Social Protection Specialist 
LAC  LCSPE  Lead Economist 
LAC  Health  Lead Health Specialist 
Colombia 
Country 
Management 
Unit (CMU)  Colombia Country office  Country Manager 
Colombia CMU 
Colombia Country office, Sustainable 
Development Unit  Sr. Transport Specialist 
Colombia CMU  Colombia Country office  Rural Development Specialist 
Africa  PREM  Sector Director 	 ﾠ
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Africa  Social Development Unit 
Sr. Social development specialist-Now 
retiree consultant 
Asia  SASDU 
Senior Urban Specialist, former Violence 
and Crime Coordinator in LAC 
World  Urban Transport 
Urban Transport Planning- Retiree 
consultant 
Domestic 
Abuse  Domestic Abuse Prevention Program/HRSCO  Domestic Abuse Prevention Coordinator 
Eastern Europe 
(ECA)  Urban Development  Lead Urban Economist 
Development 
Economics 
(DEC)  Development Research Group  Lead Economist 
Nordic Trust 
Fund  Operations Policy and Country Services  Senior Program Officer 
Human 
Resources 
HRSLO, Leadership and Organizational 
Effectiveness, Leadership Practice  Program Coordinator 
Retiree  Former Early Childhood Head  Former Head of ECD 
South Asia  Social Development Unit  Sector Manager  
Africa  Human Development  Lead Population Specialist 
Anchor Energy, 
Transport and 
Water  Transport 
Environmental and Social Development 
Specialist 
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Appendix B.2.3: Interviews in Colombia 
	 ﾠ
Organisation  Title  Unit  City 
CINDE (Fundación 
Centro Internacional de 
Educación y Desarrollo 
Humano) 
Regional Director Bogotá-
Colombia, Coordinator of 
Technical Secretariat of the 
Network 
Network of the 
consultative group for 
ECD in LA 
Bogotá 
Municipality of Bogota  Sub-Director Coexistence and 
Citizen security  
  Bogotá 
Ministry of Interior and 
Justice  
Director of Citizen Security   Citizen Security  Bogotá 
Ministry of Social 
Protection  
Director General   Management of Health 
Demand 
Bogotá 
Ministry of Social 
Protection 
Advisor  Management of Health 
Demand 
Bogotá 
Ministry of Social 
Protection 
Advisor  Management of Health 
Demand 
Bogotá 
Ministry of Social 
Protection 
Programme Coordinator  Public Health, Adolescent 
Pregnancy  
Bogotá 
Ministry of Social 
Protection 
Programme Coordinator  Domestic Violence  Bogotá 
DNP  Director General   Social Development  Bogotá 
DNP  Director  Direction of Justice, 
Security and Government  
Bogotá 
DNP  Coordinator Coexistence and 
Citizen security 
Direction of Justice, 
Security and Government 
Bogotá 
DNP  Specialist  Direction of Justice, 
Security and Government 
Bogotá 
Ministry of Social 
Protection  
General Director  Direction of Social 
Protection 
Bogotá 
Ministry of Social 
Protection 
Coordinator for the Prevention 
and Attention of Women 
Victims of Sexual Violence and 
Displaced Population 
Direction of Social 
Protection 
Bogotá 
Acción Social  Advisor of the Strategic Group   Familias en Acción  Bogotá 
Ministry of National 
Education  
Coordinator of ‘Fomento de 
Competencias’ 
Citizenship Competencies  Bogotá 
Ministry of National 
Education 
Coordinator Component 
Mobilisation 
Citizenship Competencies  Bogotá 
Ministry of Transport  Director Transport and Transit    Bogotá 
Universidad de los 
Andes 
Associate Professor – Doctor in 
Education 
Department of 
Psychology 
Bogotá 
Universidad de los 
Andes 
Researcher - Professor   Faculty of Economics- 
Universidad de Los 
Andes 
Bogotá 
Afecto  Expert in Intra-Family Violence     Bogotá 	 ﾠ
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GIZ  Coordinator of Component 4 
Culturas de Paz 
Programme CERCAPAZ 
Deutsche Gesellschaft für 
Internationale 
Zusammenarbeit (GIZ)  
Bogotá 
ICBF  Sub-Director of Attention to 
Early Childhood 
Instituto Colombiano de 
Bienestar Familiar 
Bogotá 
ICBF  Advisor in Early Childhood  Instituto Colombiano de 
Bienestar Familiar 
Bogotá 
ICBF  Advisor in Early Childhood  Instituto Colombiano de 
Bienestar Familiar 
Bogotá 
ICBF  Psychologist, Direction of 
Protection 
Instituto Colombiano de 
Bienestar Familiar 
Bogotá 
Corpovisionarios  Specialist in citizenship culture   Corpovisionarios  Bogotá 
Corpovisionarios  Specialist in citizenship culture  Corpovisionarios  Bogotá 
Corpovisionarios  Director de Projects  Corpovisionarios  Bogotá 
EMBARQ  Director of Research/ Sr. 
Transport Engineer 
EMBARQ  Bogotá 
Chamber of Commerce 
of Bogota 
Director of Security and 
Coexistence dad  
Vice-Presidency of Civic 
and Social Management  
Bogotá 
UN Women Colombia  Advisor in Gender  ONU Mujeres  Bogotá 
UN Women Colombia  Specialist in Prevention  MDGIF, Fondo para el 
logro de los ODM, 
Programa Integral contra 
violencias de genero 
Bogotá 
Expert Citizen Security      Bogotá 
ICFES  Director of evaluation ICFES    Bogotá 
Universidad Nacional  Director  Instituto de Estudios 
Politicas y Relaciones 
Iternacionales (IEPRI) 
Bogotá 
Masculinidades No 
hegemonicas 
Comité Provisional de 
Construcción - Red Colombiana 
de Masculinidades No 
Hegemónicas – Red MenEngage 
  Bogotá 
UNODC  Consultant in 
violence/criminality 
  Bogotá 
Universidad de 
Antioquia, PREVIVA 
Faculty of Public Health, 
PREVIVA, Universidad de 
Antioquia 
  Medellin 
Municipality of Medellin  Advisor in Citizen Security    Medellin 
Ex PAHO  Regional Advisor, 
Injury/Violence Prevention 
  Medellin 
Banco de la Republica  Department of Economics 
Studies  
  Medellin 
Banco de la Republica  Department of Economics 
Studies 
  Medellin 	 ﾠ
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Municipality of Medellin  Director  Fuerza Joven  Medellin 
UNINORTE  Director of the Department of 
Psycology 
Universidad del Norte  Barranquilla 
UNINORTE  Director of the Department of 
Public Health 
Department of Family 
Health 
Barranquilla 
UNINORTE    Public Health  Barranquilla 
Forensic Medicine  Director of Section  Forensic Medicine  Barranquilla 
Forensic Medicine    Forensic Medicine  Barranquilla 
Gobernación del 
Atlántico 
Coordinator of the ‘Comité - 
Secretaría de Gestión y 
Estrategias en Salud Pública’ 
  Barranquilla 
Gobernación del 
Atlántico 
Coordinator  Observatory in Insecurity   Barranquilla 
Gobernación del 
Atlántico 
Specialist in human rights  Human rights division  Barranquilla 
Gobernación del 
Atlántico 
Specialist in human rights  Human rights division  Barranquilla 
Foundation Proceder 
Siglo XXI 
Advisor of the Mayor in Safe 
Neighbourhoods  
Foundation Proceder 
Siglo XXI 
Barranquilla 
Municipality of 
Barranquilla 
Finance Minister  District of Barranquilla  Barranquilla 
Municipality of 
Barranquilla 
Advisor of the Mayor in 
Women’s issues  
Secretary of Social 
Management  
Barranquilla 
Personaria Distrital de 
Barranquilla 
Lawyer  Ministerio Público  Barranquilla 
Personaria Distrital de 
Barranquilla 
Staff member  Ministerio Público  Barranquilla 
Foundation Nu3  Executive Director  Nu3  Barranquilla 
Chamber of Commerce 
of Barranquilla 
Chief of Government Affairs  Chamber of Commerce of 
Barranquilla 
Barranquilla 
Fútbol con Corazón  Executive Director  Fútbol con Corazón  Barranquilla 
Fútbol con Corazón  President  Fútbol con Corazón  Barranquilla 
Family Court   Family judge  Fifth Family Court  Barranquilla 
El Colegio del Cuerpo  Co-Director    Cartagena 
El Colegio del Cuerpo  Academic Sub-Director    Cartagena 
El Colegio del Cuerpo  Staff member    Cartagena 
Pelaos  Director  Cuidado el Machismo 
Mata 
Cartagena 
Municipality of 
Cartagena 
Specialist  Secretary of Finance, 
Treasury 
Cartagena 
Municipality of 
Cartagena 
Specialist  Unit of Economic 
Development  
Cartagena 
Municipality of 
Cartagena 
Advisor  International Cooperation  Cartagena 	 ﾠ
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Municipality of 
Cartagena 
Mayor of Locality 2  Alcaldia localidad 2  Cartagena 
 
 
Appendix B.2.4: Interviews with international experts 
 
Organisation  Title  Unit  City 
Man Up  Founder of Man Up 
 
New York 
Promundo  International Director  Promundo Washington Office  Washington D.C. 
PAHO 
Regional Advisor, Intra-Family 
Violence 
Area of sustainable development 
and environmental health  Washington D.C. 
ICRW 
Gender Based Violence and 
Masculinities specialist  ICRW  Washington D.C. 
Open Society 
Foundations  Program Officer 
 Initiative on Confronting Violent 
Crime  Washington D.C. 
WOLA 
Senior Associate for Citizen 
Security 
Washington Office on Latin 
America (WOLA)  Washington D.C. 
Brookings Institute  Fellow, Foreign Policy  21st Century Defense Initiative  Washington D.C. 
WOLA, ex IDB 
Former Head of State 
modernization  Retiree and fellow at WOLA 
Rockville, 
Maryland 
Brookings Institute  Senior Fellow  Global Economy and Development  Washington D.C. 
Brookings Institute  Senior Fellow  Latin American Initiative  Washington D.C. 
OAS  Public Security Specialist 
Secretariat of Multidimensional 
Security  Washington D.C. 
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Appendices C: IADB’s Citizen Security projects  
	 ﾠ
Country	 ﾠ Title	 ﾠ Objective	 ﾠof	 ﾠLoan	 ﾠ Components	 ﾠ Sectors/key	 ﾠactivities	 ﾠ
Colombia	 ﾠ Support	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
Peaceful	 ﾠ
Coexistenc
e	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
Citizen	 ﾠ
Security	 ﾠ
Reduce	 ﾠlevels	 ﾠof	 ﾠviolence	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
insecurity	 ﾠin	 ﾠseveral	 ﾠColombian	 ﾠ
cities	 ﾠby	 ﾠstrengthening	 ﾠefforts	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
prevent,	 ﾠcounteract	 ﾠand	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠ
factors	 ﾠassociated	 ﾠwith	 ﾠcriminal	 ﾠ
acts	 ﾠand	 ﾠviolence.	 ﾠ
Two	 ﾠsub-ﾭ‐programmes:	 ﾠ(a)	 ﾠa	 ﾠnational	 ﾠ
sub-ﾭ‐programme	 ﾠto	 ﾠassist	 ﾠthe	 ﾠColombian	 ﾠ
government	 ﾠin	 ﾠdesigning	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
implementing	 ﾠa	 ﾠstate	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠto	 ﾠpromote	 ﾠ
community	 ﾠharmony	 ﾠand	 ﾠsecurity;	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
(b)	 ﾠa	 ﾠmunicipal	 ﾠsub-ﾭ‐programme	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
enhance	 ﾠcommunity	 ﾠharmony	 ﾠin	 ﾠcities	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠprevent,	 ﾠintervene	 ﾠwith	 ﾠrespect	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠurban	 ﾠand	 ﾠdomestic	 ﾠ
violence.	 ﾠ
Information	 ﾠsystem,	 ﾠjustice,	 ﾠ
police,	 ﾠresearch,	 ﾠ
communication,	 ﾠyouth	 ﾠat	 ﾠrisk,	 ﾠ
citizen	 ﾠeducation,	 ﾠ
institutional	 ﾠstrengthening	 ﾠ
Uruguay	 ﾠ Programme	 ﾠ
for	 ﾠCitizen	 ﾠ
Safety:	 ﾠ
Crime	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
Violence	 ﾠ
Prevention	 ﾠ
Prevent	 ﾠand	 ﾠdeal	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
interpersonal	 ﾠviolence	 ﾠand	 ﾠreduce	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠperception	 ﾠof	 ﾠinsecurity	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
Uruguay.	 ﾠ
Three	 ﾠsub-ﾭ‐programmes:	 ﾠ(a)	 ﾠ
strengthening	 ﾠUruguay's	 ﾠinstitutional	 ﾠ
capacity	 ﾠfor	 ﾠcrime	 ﾠand	 ﾠviolence	 ﾠ
prevention,	 ﾠincluding	 ﾠdomestic	 ﾠviolence	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠpolice	 ﾠtraining	 ﾠin	 ﾠprevention	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
community	 ﾠrelations;	 ﾠ(b)	 ﾠPromoting	 ﾠ
youth	 ﾠas	 ﾠviolence	 ﾠpreventers,	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠ
actions	 ﾠboth	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠand	 ﾠoutside	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
classroom,	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell	 ﾠas	 ﾠrehabilitating	 ﾠ
youth	 ﾠoffenders;	 ﾠand	 ﾠ(c)	 ﾠSupport	 ﾠto	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
community-ﾭ‐based	 ﾠactivities	 ﾠin	 ﾠcrime	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
violence	 ﾠprevention.	 ﾠ
Reform	 ﾠ/	 ﾠModernization	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠState	 ﾠ(Modernization	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
Administration	 ﾠof	 ﾠJustice):	 ﾠ
institutional	 ﾠcapacity,	 ﾠ
community	 ﾠorganization,	 ﾠ
youth	 ﾠprogrammes	 ﾠ
Jamaica	 ﾠ Citizen	 ﾠ
Security	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠJustice	 ﾠ
Programme	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Enhance	 ﾠcitizen	 ﾠsecurity	 ﾠand	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠJamaica:	 ﾠ(i)	 ﾠprevent	 ﾠand	 ﾠreduce	 ﾠ
violence;	 ﾠ(ii)	 ﾠstrengthen	 ﾠcrime	 ﾠ
management	 ﾠcapabilities;	 ﾠand	 ﾠ(iii)	 ﾠ
improve	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdelivery	 ﾠof	 ﾠjudicial	 ﾠ
services.	 ﾠ
Four	 ﾠcomponents:	 ﾠ(a)	 ﾠa	 ﾠNational	 ﾠCrime	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠViolence	 ﾠPrevention	 ﾠStrategy;	 ﾠ(b)	 ﾠ
capacity	 ﾠbuilding	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠMinistry	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
National	 ﾠSecurity	 ﾠand	 ﾠJustice	 ﾠ(MNSJ);	 ﾠ(c)	 ﾠ
strengthening	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcriminal	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠ
system;	 ﾠand	 ﾠ(d)	 ﾠcommunity	 ﾠaction	 ﾠ
Justice,	 ﾠinstitutional	 ﾠ
strengthening,	 ﾠ
communication/education	 ﾠ
campaign	 ﾠ
El	 ﾠSalvador	 ﾠ Project	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
Support	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
social	 ﾠ
Peace	 ﾠ
Programme	 ﾠ
Improve	 ﾠcitizen	 ﾠsecurity	 ﾠby	 ﾠ
combating	 ﾠcrime	 ﾠand	 ﾠviolence	 ﾠ
through	 ﾠpreventive	 ﾠactions	 ﾠ
targeting	 ﾠyouth	 ﾠ(10-ﾭ‐25	 ﾠyears)	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠmetropolitan	 ﾠarea	 ﾠof	 ﾠSan	 ﾠ
Salvador	 ﾠand	 ﾠother	 ﾠmunicipios	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠhighest	 ﾠlevels	 ﾠof	 ﾠcrime	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
violence	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdensest	 ﾠ
population	 ﾠ
Three	 ﾠcomponents:	 ﾠ(a)	 ﾠjuvenile	 ﾠviolence	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠdelinquency	 ﾠprevention;	 ﾠ(b)	 ﾠ
rehabilitation	 ﾠand	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠreintegration	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
young	 ﾠoffenders;	 ﾠand	 ﾠ(c)	 ﾠinstitutional	 ﾠ
strengthening	 ﾠ
Social	 ﾠinvestment	 ﾠ(Family,	 ﾠ
childhood	 ﾠand	 ﾠyouth):	 ﾠ
prevention	 ﾠof	 ﾠyouth	 ﾠviolence,	 ﾠ
citizen	 ﾠparticipation,	 ﾠ
prevention	 ﾠof	 ﾠdomestic	 ﾠ
violence	 ﾠand	 ﾠvictims	 ﾠservices,	 ﾠ
police,	 ﾠyouth	 ﾠemployment,	 ﾠ
public	 ﾠawareness	 ﾠcampaign,	 ﾠ
innovative	 ﾠprojects,	 ﾠ
rehabilitation	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
reintegration,	 ﾠinstitutional	 ﾠ
strengthening	 ﾠ
Honduras	 ﾠ Peace	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
Citizen	 ﾠ
Coexistenc
e	 ﾠProject	 ﾠ
for	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Municipaliti
es	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Sula	 ﾠValley	 ﾠ
Improve	 ﾠlevels	 ﾠof	 ﾠpeace,	 ﾠ
coexistence	 ﾠand	 ﾠcitizen	 ﾠsecurity	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠ17	 ﾠmunicipalities	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSula	 ﾠ
Valley	 ﾠRegion,	 ﾠcontributing	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
reduction	 ﾠin	 ﾠinsecurity	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
violence	 ﾠamong	 ﾠyoung	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ
12	 ﾠto	 ﾠ25	 ﾠyears	 ﾠof	 ﾠage.	 ﾠ
Four	 ﾠcomponents:	 ﾠ(a)	 ﾠInstitutional	 ﾠ
strengthening;	 ﾠ(b)	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠprevention	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
violence	 ﾠand	 ﾠjuvenile	 ﾠdelinquency;	 ﾠ(c)	 ﾠ
support	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcommunity	 ﾠpolice	 ﾠ
and/or	 ﾠcrime	 ﾠprevention	 ﾠproject	 ﾠin	 ﾠSula	 ﾠ
Valley	 ﾠRegion	 ﾠ(RVS);	 ﾠand	 ﾠ(d)	 ﾠ
communications	 ﾠand	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠawareness	 ﾠ
strategy.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Social	 ﾠInvestment:	 ﾠ
institutional	 ﾠstrengthening,	 ﾠ
social	 ﾠprevention	 ﾠyouth	 ﾠ
violence,	 ﾠyouth	 ﾠat	 ﾠrisk,	 ﾠ
domestic	 ﾠviolence,	 ﾠ
community	 ﾠpolice,	 ﾠ
communication	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
awareness	 ﾠcampaign.	 ﾠ
Chile	 ﾠ	 ﾠ Programme	 ﾠ
Safer	 ﾠChile	 ﾠ
Contribute	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠreduction	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
violence	 ﾠand	 ﾠcrime,	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
insecurity	 ﾠassociated	 ﾠtherewith,	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
selected	 ﾠmunicipalities	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠneighbourhoods	 ﾠin	 ﾠChile’s	 ﾠ
metropolitan,	 ﾠfifth,	 ﾠeighth,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
ninth	 ﾠregions,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠare	 ﾠaffected	 ﾠ
by	 ﾠdrug	 ﾠtrafficking	 ﾠand	 ﾠorganized	 ﾠ
crime.	 ﾠ
Four	 ﾠsub-ﾭ‐programmes:	 ﾠ1)	 ﾠsub-ﾭ‐
programme	 ﾠfor	 ﾠstrengthening	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Citizen	 ﾠSecurity	 ﾠPolicy;	 ﾠ2)	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSafe	 ﾠ
Municipality	 ﾠsub-ﾭ‐programme;	 ﾠ3)	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Safe	 ﾠneighborhood	 ﾠsub-ﾭ‐programme;	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
4)	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsub-ﾭ‐programme	 ﾠfor	 ﾠstrengthening	 ﾠ
police	 ﾠcommunity	 ﾠintegration	 ﾠ
Social	 ﾠInvestment:	 ﾠinter-ﾭ‐
sector	 ﾠcoordination,	 ﾠM&E,	 ﾠ
communication,	 ﾠinstitutional	 ﾠ
strengthening,	 ﾠmulti-ﾭ‐sector	 ﾠ
pilot	 ﾠprogrammes	 ﾠof	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠ
prevention,	 ﾠcommunity	 ﾠ
organization,	 ﾠrehabilitation,	 ﾠ
justice,	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
observatories	 ﾠof	 ﾠgood	 ﾠ
practices.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
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Nicaragua	 ﾠ Citizen	 ﾠ
Security	 ﾠ
Programme	 ﾠ
	 ﾠContribute	 ﾠto	 ﾠimprove	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
citizen	 ﾠsecurity	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠsupporting	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠreduction	 ﾠof	 ﾠyouth	 ﾠviolence	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
specific	 ﾠlocalities.	 ﾠ
Four	 ﾠcomponents:	 ﾠa)	 ﾠinstitutional	 ﾠ
strengthening,	 ﾠespecially	 ﾠof	 ﾠMIGOB,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
authority	 ﾠresponsible	 ﾠfor	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
citizen	 ﾠsecurity;	 ﾠb)	 ﾠintegration	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
strengthening	 ﾠof	 ﾠjuvenile	 ﾠviolence	 ﾠ
prevention	 ﾠservices	 ﾠusing	 ﾠan	 ﾠinter-ﾭ‐sector	 ﾠ
care	 ﾠand	 ﾠprevention	 ﾠmodel	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
municipal	 ﾠlevel;	 ﾠc)	 ﾠexpansion	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
consolidation	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcommunity	 ﾠpolicing	 ﾠ
programme	 ﾠinitiative;	 ﾠand	 ﾠd)	 ﾠa	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠ
information	 ﾠprogramme	 ﾠto	 ﾠencourage	 ﾠ
inclusion	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtopic	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠ
agenda	 ﾠand	 ﾠto	 ﾠeducate	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
need	 ﾠfor	 ﾠvalues	 ﾠand	 ﾠstandards	 ﾠin	 ﾠorder	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠhave	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠharmony.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Social	 ﾠInvestment:	 ﾠ
institutional	 ﾠstrengthening,	 ﾠ
national	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠpolicy,	 ﾠ
capacity	 ﾠbuilding,	 ﾠinter-ﾭ‐
institutional	 ﾠcoordination,	 ﾠ
information	 ﾠsystem,	 ﾠM&E,	 ﾠ
education,	 ﾠyouth	 ﾠ
employment,	 ﾠafter	 ﾠschool	 ﾠ
activities,	 ﾠyouth	 ﾠat	 ﾠrisk,	 ﾠ
community	 ﾠorganization,	 ﾠ
reinsertion	 ﾠ,	 ﾠcommunity	 ﾠ
policing,	 ﾠdomestic	 ﾠviolence,	 ﾠ
communication	 ﾠof	 ﾠpolice,	 ﾠ
social	 ﾠcommunication.	 ﾠ
Guatemala	 ﾠ Violence	 ﾠ
Prevention	 ﾠ
Programme	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Comment:	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠ
decided	 ﾠto	 ﾠturn	 ﾠto	 ﾠbilaterals	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
support	 ﾠits	 ﾠroad	 ﾠmap	 ﾠon	 ﾠsecurity	 ﾠ
Initially	 ﾠthree	 ﾠcomponents:	 ﾠa)	 ﾠ
institutional	 ﾠstrengthening,	 ﾠb)	 ﾠ
prevention	 ﾠof	 ﾠjuvenile	 ﾠviolence	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
delinquency,	 ﾠand	 ﾠc)	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠ
communication.	 ﾠ
Social	 ﾠInvestment	 ﾠ(Citizen	 ﾠ
Safety)	 ﾠ
Guyana	 ﾠ Citizen	 ﾠ
Security	 ﾠ
Programme	 ﾠ
Enhance	 ﾠcitizen	 ﾠsecurity	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
coexistence	 ﾠamong	 ﾠGuyanese	 ﾠ
citizens	 ﾠby	 ﾠcontributing	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
reduction	 ﾠof	 ﾠcrime,	 ﾠviolence	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
insecurity.	 ﾠ
Four	 ﾠcomponents:	 ﾠa)	 ﾠCapacity	 ﾠbuilding	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠthe	 ﾠMinistry	 ﾠof	 ﾠHome	 ﾠAffairs;	 ﾠb)	 ﾠ
Capacity	 ﾠbuilding	 ﾠand	 ﾠmodernization	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠGuyana	 ﾠPolice	 ﾠForce;	 ﾠc)	 ﾠCommunity	 ﾠ
action;	 ﾠand	 ﾠd)	 ﾠProgramme	 ﾠmanagement	 ﾠ
Social	 ﾠInvestment	 ﾠ(Citizen	 ﾠ
Safety):	 ﾠinstitutional	 ﾠ
strengthening,	 ﾠTA,	 ﾠcomputer	 ﾠ
equipment,	 ﾠsoftware,	 ﾠ
rehabilitation	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
infrastructure,	 ﾠpolice,	 ﾠ
capacity	 ﾠbuilding,	 ﾠservices	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠcommunity	 ﾠmobilization.	 ﾠ
Panama	 ﾠ	 ﾠ Integral	 ﾠ
Security	 ﾠ
Programme	 ﾠ
Help	 ﾠimprove	 ﾠcitizen	 ﾠcoexistence	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠsecurity	 ﾠin	 ﾠcommunities	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠhighest	 ﾠrates	 ﾠof	 ﾠviolence	 ﾠ
through	 ﾠstrategic,	 ﾠcomprehensive,	 ﾠ
interagency,	 ﾠparticipative	 ﾠactions	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠprevent	 ﾠjuvenile	 ﾠviolence.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Two	 ﾠcomponents:	 ﾠa)	 ﾠInstitutional	 ﾠ
strengthening	 ﾠ(MINGOB,	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠ
system	 ﾠand	 ﾠobservatory,	 ﾠM&E,	 ﾠnational	 ﾠ
police	 ﾠforce,	 ﾠMIDES,	 ﾠMEDUCA,	 ﾠMunicipal	 ﾠ
governments);	 ﾠb)	 ﾠCitizen	 ﾠsecurity	 ﾠ
programmes	 ﾠ(primary	 ﾠprevention:	 ﾠat	 ﾠ
school,	 ﾠyouth	 ﾠat	 ﾠrisk,	 ﾠcommunities	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
high	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠzones,	 ﾠdomestic	 ﾠviolence;	 ﾠ
secondary	 ﾠprevention;	 ﾠtertiary	 ﾠ
prevention).	 ﾠ
Reform	 ﾠ/	 ﾠModernization	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠState	 ﾠ(Modernization	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
Administration	 ﾠof	 ﾠJustice):	 ﾠ
police,	 ﾠinstitutional	 ﾠ
strengthening,	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠ
systems,	 ﾠM&E,	 ﾠschool,	 ﾠyouth	 ﾠ
at	 ﾠrisk,	 ﾠcommunity	 ﾠ
mobilization,	 ﾠobservatories,	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠrehabilitation.	 ﾠ
Trinidad	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠTobago	 ﾠ
Citizen	 ﾠ
Security	 ﾠ
Programme	 ﾠ
Contribute	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreduction	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
crime	 ﾠand	 ﾠviolence	 ﾠin	 ﾠ22	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠcrime	 ﾠ
pilot	 ﾠcommunities	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
financing	 ﾠof	 ﾠpreventive	 ﾠ
interventions	 ﾠaddressing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmost	 ﾠ
proximal	 ﾠand	 ﾠmodifiable	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠ
factors.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Three	 ﾠcomponents:	 ﾠa)	 ﾠCommunity	 ﾠaction	 ﾠ
(TA	 ﾠfor	 ﾠdevelopment,	 ﾠimplementation,	 ﾠ
M&E	 ﾠof	 ﾠpreventive	 ﾠinterventions+	 ﾠ
strengthening	 ﾠcommunity	 ﾠcenters	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
carry	 ﾠout	 ﾠthese	 ﾠactivities);	 ﾠb)	 ﾠTrinidad	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠTobago	 ﾠPolice	 ﾠService	 ﾠ(rehabilitation	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠpolice	 ﾠstations,	 ﾠIT	 ﾠtraining	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
computer	 ﾠequipment,	 ﾠvictims	 ﾠservices	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠimprovement	 ﾠpolice-ﾭ‐citizens	 ﾠ
relations);	 ﾠc)	 ﾠInstitutional	 ﾠstrengthening	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠMinistry	 ﾠof	 ﾠNational	 ﾠsecurity	 ﾠ(TA,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
information	 ﾠsystem,	 ﾠtraining	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
statistical	 ﾠanalysis	 ﾠand	 ﾠvictimization	 ﾠ
surveys).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Social	 ﾠInvestment	 ﾠ(Citizen	 ﾠ
Safety):	 ﾠpolice,	 ﾠinstitutional	 ﾠ
strengthening,	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠ
system,	 ﾠand	 ﾠcommunity	 ﾠ
services.	 ﾠ
Belize	 ﾠ Community	 ﾠ
action	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
Public	 ﾠ
Safety	 ﾠ
Contribute	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreduction	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
youth	 ﾠinvolvement	 ﾠin	 ﾠmajor	 ﾠviolent	 ﾠ
crime	 ﾠin	 ﾠBelize	 ﾠCity	 ﾠby:	 ﾠ(i)	 ﾠreducing	 ﾠ
youth	 ﾠinvolvement	 ﾠin	 ﾠcriminal	 ﾠ
activities	 ﾠand	 ﾠyouth	 ﾠviolent	 ﾠ
behavior	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠschools	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
beneficiary	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprogramme	 ﾠ
resources;	 ﾠ(ii)	 ﾠreducing	 ﾠrecidivism	 ﾠ
among	 ﾠyouth	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠintervened	 ﾠ
juvenile	 ﾠrehabilitation	 ﾠinstitutions;	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠ(iii)	 ﾠenhancing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
government'	 ﾠs	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
formulate	 ﾠand	 ﾠimplement	 ﾠ
evidence-ﾭ‐based	 ﾠpolicies	 ﾠon	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠ
safety.	 ﾠ
Three	 ﾠcomponents:	 ﾠa)	 ﾠSchool-ﾭ‐based	 ﾠ
positive	 ﾠyouth	 ﾠdevelopment;	 ﾠb)Support	 ﾠ
for	 ﾠjuvenile	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠrehabilitation;	 ﾠc)	 ﾠ
Interagency	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠsafety	 ﾠmanagement	 ﾠ
information	 ﾠsystem.	 ﾠ
Reform	 ﾠ/	 ﾠModernization	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠState:	 ﾠschool,	 ﾠyouth	 ﾠat	 ﾠ
risk,	 ﾠassessment,	 ﾠcare	 ﾠmodel	 ﾠ
rehabilitation,	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠ
system,	 ﾠinstitutional	 ﾠ
strengthening.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
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Costa	 ﾠRica	 ﾠ Violence	 ﾠ
Prevention	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠSocial	 ﾠ
Inclusion	 ﾠ
Promotion	 ﾠ
Programme	 ﾠ
Help	 ﾠreduce	 ﾠviolent	 ﾠcrime	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
country:	 ﾠmake	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpolice	 ﾠforce	 ﾠat	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠnational	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠmore	 ﾠeffective;	 ﾠ
reduce	 ﾠcriminal	 ﾠbehavior	 ﾠamong	 ﾠ
at-ﾭ‐risk	 ﾠyouth	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠproject'	 ﾠs	 ﾠareas	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠinfluence,	 ﾠand	 ﾠreduce	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
recidivism	 ﾠrate	 ﾠamong	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
population	 ﾠin	 ﾠconflict	 ﾠwith	 ﾠcriminal	 ﾠ
law.	 ﾠ
Three	 ﾠcomponents:	 ﾠa)	 ﾠstrengthening	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
institutional	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠof	 ﾠMinistry	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
Public	 ﾠSafety	 ﾠand	 ﾠMinistry	 ﾠof	 ﾠJustice	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
Peace;	 ﾠb)	 ﾠSocial	 ﾠprevention	 ﾠtargeting	 ﾠat-ﾭ‐
risk	 ﾠchildren	 ﾠand	 ﾠyoung	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠin	 ﾠcritical	 ﾠ
areas;	 ﾠand	 ﾠc)	 ﾠSocial	 ﾠreintegration	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
individuals	 ﾠin	 ﾠconflict	 ﾠwith	 ﾠcriminal	 ﾠlaw.	 ﾠ
Social	 ﾠinvestment:	 ﾠpolice,	 ﾠ
institutional	 ﾠstrengthening,	 ﾠ
youth	 ﾠat	 ﾠrisk,	 ﾠreintegration,	 ﾠ
equipment,	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠ
system.	 ﾠ
Jamaica	 ﾠ Citizen	 ﾠ
Security	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠJustice	 ﾠ
Programme	 ﾠ
II	 ﾠ
Contribute	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreduction	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
crime	 ﾠand	 ﾠviolence	 ﾠin	 ﾠ28	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠcrime	 ﾠ
urban	 ﾠcommunities,	 ﾠby	 ﾠfinancing	 ﾠ
prevention	 ﾠand	 ﾠstrategic	 ﾠ
interventions	 ﾠto	 ﾠaddress	 ﾠidentified	 ﾠ
individual,	 ﾠfamily	 ﾠand	 ﾠcommunity	 ﾠ
risk	 ﾠfactors.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Two	 ﾠcomponents:	 ﾠa)	 ﾠcommunity	 ﾠaction	 ﾠ
(mobilization	 ﾠand	 ﾠgovernance,	 ﾠservices,	 ﾠ
community	 ﾠcenters,	 ﾠrestorative	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
community	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠtribunals,	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠ
marketing	 ﾠand	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠcampaigns);	 ﾠb)	 ﾠ
Institutional	 ﾠstrengthening	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Ministry	 ﾠof	 ﾠNational	 ﾠSecurity	 ﾠ(TA	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
equipment,	 ﾠinter-ﾭ‐agency).	 ﾠ
Social	 ﾠInvestment	 ﾠ(Citizen	 ﾠ
Safety):	 ﾠpolice,	 ﾠinstitutional	 ﾠ
strengthening,	 ﾠinteragency,	 ﾠ
community	 ﾠjustice,	 ﾠ
community	 ﾠservices	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
organization,	 ﾠcommunication.	 ﾠ
Argentina	 ﾠ Citizen	 ﾠ
Security	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠ
Inclusion	 ﾠ
Programme	 ﾠ
Help	 ﾠreduce	 ﾠlevels	 ﾠof	 ﾠcrime,	 ﾠ
violence	 ﾠand	 ﾠinsecurity	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
province	 ﾠof	 ﾠBuenos	 ﾠAires	 ﾠby	 ﾠ
improving	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
province	 ﾠ'	 ﾠs	 ﾠMinistry	 ﾠof	 ﾠSecurity,	 ﾠ
strengthening	 ﾠcommunity	 ﾠ
participation,	 ﾠand	 ﾠintroducing	 ﾠ
prevention	 ﾠprogrammes	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwill	 ﾠ
promote	 ﾠfactors	 ﾠfor	 ﾠprotection	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
communities,	 ﾠfamilies	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
individuals.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Three	 ﾠcomponents:	 ﾠa)	 ﾠEnhancing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
institutional	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠMinistry	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
Security	 ﾠ(information	 ﾠsystem,	 ﾠsurveys	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
victimization,	 ﾠemergency	 ﾠresponse	 ﾠ
system);	 ﾠb)	 ﾠStrengthening	 ﾠcitizen	 ﾠ
participation	 ﾠmechanisms	 ﾠ(TA	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
forums/community	 ﾠparticipation,	 ﾠ
equipment,	 ﾠoutreach	 ﾠcampaigns);	 ﾠc)	 ﾠ
Improving	 ﾠservices	 ﾠfor	 ﾠvictims	 ﾠof	 ﾠgender-ﾭ‐
based	 ﾠviolence,	 ﾠand	 ﾠviolence	 ﾠprevention	 ﾠ
programmes	 ﾠ(prevention	 ﾠof	 ﾠgender-ﾭ‐
based	 ﾠviolence,	 ﾠcrime	 ﾠand	 ﾠviolence	 ﾠ
prevention	 ﾠprogrammes).	 ﾠ
Social	 ﾠInvestment	 ﾠ(Citizen	 ﾠ
Safety):	 ﾠinstitutional	 ﾠ
strengthening,	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠ
system,	 ﾠsurveys	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
victimization,	 ﾠemergency	 ﾠ
response	 ﾠsystem,	 ﾠcommunity	 ﾠ
participation,	 ﾠoutreach	 ﾠ
campaign,	 ﾠprevention	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
services	 ﾠto	 ﾠvictims	 ﾠof	 ﾠGBV,	 ﾠ
domestic	 ﾠviolence	 ﾠand	 ﾠyouth	 ﾠ
violence.	 ﾠ
Ecuador	 ﾠ Citizen	 ﾠ
Security	 ﾠ
Programme	 ﾠ
for	 ﾠSocial	 ﾠ
Cohesion	 ﾠ
Improve	 ﾠthe	 ﾠefficiency	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
police	 ﾠaction	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
improvement	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠuse	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
information	 ﾠto	 ﾠreduce	 ﾠdelinquency.	 ﾠ
Two	 ﾠcomponents:	 ﾠa)	 ﾠimprovement	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
information	 ﾠquality	 ﾠ(strengthening	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠobservatory	 ﾠof	 ﾠGuayaquil,	 ﾠ
observatory	 ﾠat	 ﾠnational	 ﾠlevel,	 ﾠ
victimization	 ﾠsurvey);	 ﾠand	 ﾠb)	 ﾠSupport	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠdesign	 ﾠof	 ﾠPITIS	 ﾠ(information	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠ
strengthening	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdesign	 ﾠof	 ﾠcrime	 ﾠ
prevention	 ﾠplans).	 ﾠ
Reform	 ﾠ/	 ﾠModernization	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠState:	 ﾠschool,	 ﾠyouth	 ﾠat	 ﾠ
risk,	 ﾠassessment,	 ﾠcare	 ﾠmodel	 ﾠ
rehabilitation,	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠ
system,	 ﾠinstitutional	 ﾠ
strengthening:	 ﾠobservatories,	 ﾠ
victimization	 ﾠsurvey,	 ﾠcrime	 ﾠ
prevention	 ﾠplans.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ  	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
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Appendices D: Colombia 
	 ﾠ
Appendix D.1: Statistics related to violence in Colombia 
 
Colombia has relatively good violence-related data for LAC standards. There are three main 
official sources:  
(i) the National reference center on violence of the National institute for legal medicine and 
forensic sciences (Centro de Referencia Nacional sobre Violencia del Instituto Nacional de 
Medicina  Legal  y  Ciencias  Forenses,  INMLCF)  that  publishes  statistics  on  homicides, 
interpersonal violence, sexual violence, intra-family violence, and suicide on a yearly basis  
(http://www.medicinalegal.gov.co);  
(ii) the Information system on delinquency, contraventions and operational activity of the 
National  police  (Sistema  de  Información  Estadístico  Delincuencial,  Contravencional  y 
Actividad Operativa de la Policía Nacional, Siedco)  that  publishes  annual  statistics  on  a 
variety of crimes, from homicides to kidnappings, acts of terrorism and robberies  
(http://www.policia.gov.co/portal/page/portal/UNIDADES_POLICIALES/Comandos_deptos
_policia/Comando_depto_Bolivar/Resultados_opeativos_estadisticas/Estadisticas); and 
(iii)  the  criminal  justice  system  (Sistema  Penal  Oral  Acusatorio,  SPOA)  that  gathers 
information on trials and perpetrators.   
 
In terms of data sources consolidation, issues include differences in figures and in units of 
analysis, as well as a lack of regular victimization surveys. Only once was such a survey 
applied in three major cities, in 2003 (Encuesta nacional de victimización, 2003, applied by 
Dane with IADB support). 
 
There are also other efforts led by civil society. They include observatories and citywide 
victimization surveys, including those financed by Chambers of commerce (in particular the 
Chamber of commerce of Bogotá), and by other institutions such as Fundación Seguridad y 
Democracia,  Corpovisionarios  and  Universidad  del  Valle  (Activa  survey).  There  are  also 
international surveys including those of Latinobarómetro and International Crime Victims 
Surveys  (ICVS).  Finally,  there  are  opinion  surveys,  including  those  done  by 
Bogotacomovamos,  Medellincomovamos,  Barranquillacomovamos  etc.,  and  the  Vandebilt 
University-Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).  
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Appendix D.2: Demography, geography and territorial administration in 
Colombia 
 
Colombia is very diverse geographically, ethically and culturally. At the time of the 
last  census,  the  population  counted  43  million  inhabitants  (2005  Census  DANE), 
mainly living in urban centers (75 per cent of the population). The five largest cities 
(Bogotá,  Medellín,  Cali,  Barranquilla,  Cartagena)  gather  42  per  cent  of  the 
population. In 2010, it is estimated that 8 million of Colombians were 14-26 years old 
(DNP 2011:339), and 3.5 million were displaced population because of the armed 
conflict (DNP 2011: 443). 
 
In terms of geography, Colombia is the fourth largest country in Latin America, after 
Brazil, Argentina and Peru. It is the only country with access to two oceans: the 
Pacific  Ocean  and  the  Atlantic  Ocean  (Caribbean  sea).  It  is  crossed  over  by  the 
Andean  cordillera,  and  also  includes  the  amazon  forest,  which  makes  part  of  its 
territory difficult to access.   
 
Colombia  is  a  pluri-ethnic  and  multicultural  nation  with  four  main  ethic  groups: 
indigenous  population  (87  groups);  Raizal  population;  Black  and  Afro-Colombian 
population; and Rom or Gypsy population. According to the 2005 general census 
(DANE), 13.7 per cent of the national population declared themselves as belonging to 
an ethnic group, of which nearly 75 per cent were Afro-Colombians (NDP 2010-14: 
463).  In  terms  of  multi-culturality,  there  are  65  indigenous  languages  spoken  in 
Colombia.  Indigenous  groups  also  show  cultural  specificities  related  to  a  certain 
understanding  of  the  world  (cosmovisión),  their  relationship  to  their  land,  the 
environment,  among  others  (opcit).  These  groups  are  in  general  among  the  most 
vulnerable groups in terms of poverty, informality, and overall quality of life.  
 
In  terms  of  territorial  administration,  there  are  three  levels  of  government  in 
Colombia:  national,  departmental  (Gobernación),  and  municipal.  At  the  territorial 
level, there are four districts (Bogotá, Cartagena, Santa Marta and Barranquilla), 32 
departments,  and  1098  municipalities.  Other  territorial  entities  include  provinces, 
regions, and indigenous territories (art. 286, 1991 Constitution). Decentralization has 
been one of the key issues opposing the two main parties in Colombia over the past 
century. Since the end of the 1980s, decentralisation has made significant progress. In 
1988, mayors were directly elected. A few years later, the 1991 Constitution made 
drastic  changes  in  this  respect  by  transferring  45  percent  of  current  resources  to 
departments and municipalities, and constitutionally protecting and increasing local 
taxes (DNP 1998-2002:41). Article 1 of the 1991 Constitution states: ‘Colombia is a 
social  state  governed  by  the  rule  of  law,  organized  as  a  Unitarian,  decentralized 
Republic,  with  autonomy  of  its  territorial  entities,  democratic,  participative  and 
pluralist, funded on the respect to human dignity, work and solidarity among persons 
that belong to it, and the prevalence of general interest.’
186 
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186 Own translation, original version in Spanish: ‘Colombia es un Estado social de derecho, organizado 
en  forma  de  República  unitaria,  descentralizada,  con  autonomía  de  sus  entidades  territoriales, 
democrática, participativa y pluralista, fundada en el respeto de la dignidad humana, en el trabajo y la 
solidaridad de las personas que la integran y en la prevalencia del interés general’ (Art.  1.  1991 
Constitution). 	 ﾠ
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Three  principles  govern  the  Colombian  decentralization:  coordination  (coherence 
among  levels  of  governments  to  implement  national  priorities  as  defined  by  the 
national government); concurrence (concurrencia; when two levels of government or 
more  work  together  towards  a  common  goal  to  enhance  efficiency  and  following 
respective competencies); and subsidiarity (when authorities of lower level ask for the 
support of authorities at higher level to implement their own activities and plans) 
(DNP 2004). 
 
In terms of responsibilities, municipalities are in charge of service delivery and local 
development;  departments  control  municipalities’  service  provision  and  ensure 
territorial  planning;  and  the  national  government  defines  plans,  policies,  and 
strategies. In other words, the three levels of government have some level of inter-
dependency, but territorial entities are autonomous. In particular, to be implemented, 
national policies need to be translated in local plans and strategies, local development 
plans, and annual budgets. Each level of government can raise taxes. Since 2001, the 
national  transfer  to  departments  and  municipalities  for  education  and  health  are 
earmarked (2001 law 715). 
 
Regions are extremely diverse in Colombia, in terms of income but also institutional 
capacity. For instance, the GDP per capita of Casanare and Bogotá are 4.3 and 1.6 
times the one of Chocó, whose income per capita is the lowest in the country (DNP 
2011: 37). Ten departments (Guaviare, Guainía, Magdalena, Putumayo, La Guajira, 
Sucre,  Córdoba,  Bolívar,  Vichada  and  Amazonas)  are  below  the  median  of  the 
institutional capacity (DNP 2011:38).  
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Appendix D.3: Colombian government composition (2011) 
 
At  the  time  of  the  interviews,  in  2011,  the  Colombian  Government  included  the 
President of the Republic, a Vice-presidency and sixteen ministries:  
 
- Ministry of Justice (MinJusticia)     
- Ministry of National Defense (MinDefensa)  
- Ministry of Interior (MinInterior)      
- Ministry of External Relations (MinRelaciones) 
- Ministry of Finance (MinHacienda) 
- Ministry of Mining and Energy (MinMinas) 
- Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Tourism (MinComercio) 
- Ministry of Information Technology and Communication (MinTIC) 
- Ministry of Culture (MinCultura); Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development   
(MinAgricultura) 
- Ministry of Environment and Sustainable Development (MinAmbiente) 
- Ministry of Transport (MinTransporte) 
- Ministry of Housing, Cities and Territories (MinVivienda) 
- Ministry of National Education (MinEducación) 
- Ministry of Labor (MinTrabajo) 
- Ministry of Health and Social Protection (MinSalud) 
 
In addition, ten High presidential counselors (Altos Consejeros Presidenciales- ACP 
for its Spanish acronym) directly report to the President. They include:  
-  ACP for Good Government and Administrative efficiency;  
-  ACP for Women equality; 
-  ACP for Public and Private Management;  
-  ACP for Peace; ACP for Political affairs;  
-  ACP for Social Dialogue;  
-  ACP for Citizen Security and Coexistence;  
-  ACP for Communications;  
-  ACP for Regions and Citizens Participation;  
-  ACP for Special programmes.  
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Appendix D.4: 2010-2014 NDP strategic guidelines related to violence 
prevention 
 
Strategic)guidelines/programs Sectoral)Ministry
1.)Early)childhood De#Cero#a#Siempre#(integral#attention#for#early#childhood:#quality,#universal#
access)#+#family#(parenting)
Instituto#Colombiano#de#Bienestar#
Familiar#(ICBF)
Quality#assurance#system#for#early#childhood#(training#of#
trainers/educators/carers)
National#Education#Ministry#(MEN#in#
Spanish)
2.)Childhood,)
adolescence)and)
youth
Red#Juntos;#Protection#of#childhood#and#youth#and#youth#participation#
(parenting,#training#of#teachers,#nutrition,#increase#of#school#day#(jornada#
escolar),#culture,#recreation:#positive#use#of#free#time;#prevention#child#
labor)#
National#Youth#System,#Social#
Protection#Ministry#(MPS),#National#
Education#Ministry#(MEN);#ICBF#+#
local#governments
>)6>12)years)old National#policy#for#prevention#and#attention#to#different#forms#of#violence,#
incluiding#intrafamily#violence,#maltreatment#and#sexual#abuse;#prevention#
school#desertion
Local#Governments;#MPS,#MEN#and#
ICBF
>)12>18)years)old Increase#age#of#first#pregnancy;#lessen#risky#sexuality;#National#policy#for#the#
prevention#and#attention#to#intrafamily#violence,#maltreatment#and#sexual#
abuse;#National#policy#of#psychoactive#sustance#consumption;#National#plan#
to#reduce#drug#consumption;#Criminal#responsibility#system#for#adolescents#
(SRPA);#social#and#situational#prevention#(to#complement#citizen#security#
strategies#at#local#level)
Local#Governments;#MPS,#MEN#and#
ICBF
>14>26)years)old Promotion#of#youth#participation#(Los#Jóvenes#Tienen#la#Palabra;#youth#
counciles;#consultative#youth#committees;#Human#Rights#and#Duties#Schools)#
and#prevention#of#youth#delinquency;#Strategy#"Municipios#y#
Departamentos#por#la#Infancia,#la#Adolescencia#y#la#Juventud"
Multisecorial:#National#system#for#
family#wellbeing#(Sistema#Nacional#
de#Bienestar#FamiliarX#SNBF)#+#local#
governments
Child)labor)
prevention)and)
elimination
National#strategy#to#prevent#and#eliminate#the#worst#forms#of#child#labor#
and#to#protect#the#young#worker,#2008X2015#(ENETI);#Fondo#para#la#Atención#
Integral#de#la#Nicñez#y#Jornada#Escolar#Complementaria#(FONIÑEZ);#
Inspección#Vigilancia#y#Control#del#Trabajo#(IVC)
Local#Governments#+#MPS,#DANE,#
ICBF,#MEN,#DNP#and#national#police
3.)Human)capital)
formation
Reduce#existing#gap#in#terms#of#quality#of#education#at#all#levels#(includings#
extended#schooling#day#for#a#positive#time#of#free#time;#studies#on#how#to#
develop#a#combined#indicator#for#quality#education;#improve#overall#quality#
control#of#the#system#including#vocational#training#provided#by#SENA;#
promotion#of#parents'involvement#in#schools#and#increase#accountability#of#
educative#institutions#and#education#secretaries
MEN,#SENA#+#local#governments#
(education#secretaries#at#
departmental#and#municipal#levels)
Generate#opportunities#of#access#and#permanence#to#close#regional#gaps#
within#all#cycles#of#the#education#system#(reduce#school#desertion#in#
particular#for#vulnerable#population)
MEN,#Acción#social,#Local#secretaries#
of#education
Educate#with#relevance#for#innovation#and#productivity#(promote#better#
articulation#between#secondary#education#and#tertiary#education#and#
education#for#work;#among#others)
MEN#and#local#secretaries#of#
education
Strengthen#the#management#model#at#all#levels#of#the#education#system MEN#
Strengthen#education#secretaries#for#risk#prevention#and#management(both#
natural#disasters#and#armed#conflict)
MEN,#Comités#regionales#y#locales#
para#la#prevención#y#atención#de#
desastres#(CREPAD#and#CLOPAD)
4.)Universal)and)
sustainable)health)
access)and)quality
Promote#wellbeing#and#healthy#life#based#on#the#promotion#of#helath#and#
illness#prevention#(including#strengthening#the#national#policy#for#the#
reduction#of#psychoactive#substance#consumption;#implementing#the#
national#plan#for#mental#health#2011X2014;#developing#actions#to#comply#
with#the#law#1257#to#prevent#and#sanction#forms#of#violence#against#women;#
among#others)
MPS#+#local#governments#and#EPS
Relevant#and#quality#service#to#SGSSS#users#(sistema#general#de#seguridad#
social#en#salud)
MPS
Consolidate#health#assurance MPS
Regulation#of#services#excluded#from#the#benefits#plans MPS
Institutionally#strengthen#SGSSS#(including#strengthen#the#vigilance#system#
for#adolescent#pregnancies;#national#and#local#information#system#for#
monitoring#and#evaluation#of#events#in#mental#health,#different#forms#of#
violence#and#use#of#psychoactive#substance;#inspection,#vigilance#and#control#
system;#implement#management#models#and#guidelines#for#health##
institutions#and#practitioners;#among#others)
MPS
Strengthen#the#inspection,#vigilance#and#control#system#(IVC) MPS
Accountability MPS
Institutionalization#of#labor#market MPS
Implementation#of#a#policy#of#employment#promotion#within#a#framework#of#
decent#work
MPS,#local#governments,#Red#Juntos,#
Acción#Social
Regional#management#structures#for#employment MPS,#local#governments
Support/accompaniment MPS
Information#systems MPS,#Comisión#intersectorial#para#la#
Formalización#(CIF)
Expansion#of#microcredit#offer#at#the#national#level MPS
Strategies#for#publicXprivate#partnerships#for#the#private#sector#inclusion#in#
public#and#private#programs#of#selfXemployment
MPS
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6.#Culture#
promotion
Consolidate+the+national+system+for+culture's+articulation Ministerio+de+Cultura+(Sistema+
Nacional+de+Cultura+(SNCu))
Strengthen+reading+and+writing+processes+through+facilitating+access+to+
knowledge+(public+libraries)
MinCultura,+MEN,+Ministerio+de+las+
Tecnologías,+Información+y+
Comunicaciones
Contribute+to+the+integral+development+of+children+under+5+years+old,+
promoting+cultural+rights+through+expresive+and+esthetic+languages
MinCultura
Promote+artistic+training+and+cultural+creation+(in+particualr+in+schools) MinCultura,+MEN
Strengthen+the+social+ownership+of+cultural+patrimony+(including+promote+
cultural+diversity+and+community+development;+historic+center+preservation)
MinCultura
Strengthen+cultural+industries MinCultura,+DANE,+Ministerio+de+
Comercio,+Industria+y+Turismo+(MCIT)
7.#Sport#and#
recreation
Improvement+and+maintenance+of+infratsructure+for+physical+activity,+
recreation+and+free+time+(creation+of+national+social+fund+for+sport+
infrastructure+and+recreation)
Coldeported,+Sistema+Nacional+del+
Deporte+(SND),+local+governments
Promotion+of+recreation,+physical+activity+and+school+and+community+sport+
to+develop+coexistence+and+peaceful+environments+(including+"superate"a+
stretgy+of+social+insertion+targeting+vulnerable+populations)
Coldeportes,+MinCultura,+MPS,+MEN
Training+and+preparation+of+athletes+to+enhance+the+national+sportLrelated+
leadership
Coldeportes
B.#Social#
Promotion
1.#Network#for#
extreme#poverty#
alleviation#
(JUNTOS)
Improve+social+spending+targeting+and+implement+exit+strategies+for+social+
programs
Sistema+de+promoción+social+(SpS),+
Red+Juntos
Transversal Transversal Consolidate+JUNTOS+and+empower+it+as+a+strategy+for+risk+social+
management+(incluidng+national+plan+for+social+propseirty+that+enhances+
community+participation+and+social+capital,+and+seeks+to+reduce+issues+in+
local+development;+strengthening+of+red+Juntos+that+becomes+Red+Unidos
SpS+and+16+national+entities+
(including+MEN,+MPS,+Acción+Social,+
DNP,+ICBF,+Ministerio+de+Ambiente,+
Vivienda+y+Desarrollo+Territorial,+
Policia+Nacional,+Ministerio+del+
Interior+y+Justicia,+Ministerio+de+
Defensa+Nacional,+and+others)
Transversal 2.#Policy#for#
population#victim#
of#forced#
displacement#due#
to#violence
Effective+use+of+right+(Goce+efectivo+de+derechos+LGED)+for+displaced+
population++(including+measures+to+prevent+forced+displacement+and+to+
protect+victims'rights;+articulation+of+housing,+income+generation+and+land+
restitution+policies+within+the+framework+of+forced+displacement;+
articulation+of+actions+for+integral+reparation,+among+others)
Vicepresidency+of+the+Republic,+
Acción+social,+MDN,+MIJ,+MEN,+MPS,+
Ministerio+Defensa+Nacional,+ICBF
C.#Differentiated#
policies#for#
social#inclusion
1.#Ethic#groups Promote+equal+opportunities+to+development+benefits,+with+a+differential+
focus
Tranversal:+all+ministries
Transversal Protect+fundamental+rights+of+ethnic+population Tranversal:+all+ministries
Strengthen+organizations+and+own+forms+of+government Tranversal:+all+ministries
Transversal 2.#Gender National+Integral+Policy+for+gender+equality+(including+development+of+
instruments+to+measure+nonLpaid+work;+intersectorial+actions+for+equalizing+
opportunities;+monitoring+of+genderLbased+violences+and+establishment+of+
strategic+guidelines+for+its+elimination+(through+among+others+the+creation+of+
a+national+obervatory+of+violences+with+a+special+focus+on+domestic+and+
sexual+violence;+services+to+victims+of+genderLbased+violence;+prevention+
adolescent+pregancy);+enhancement+of+women+participation+in+political+life
Transversal;+Alta+Consejería+
Presidencial+oara+la+Equidad+de+la+
Mujer+(ACPEM),+Vicepresidencia+de+
la+República;+MPS;+other+national+
ministries
Transversal 3.#Disability Política+de+Discapacidad+(including+indentiffication+of+risk+factors+for+
disability;+improve+employability+of+diable+persons;+strengthen+opportunities+
for+sports,+recreation+and+culture;+ensure+quality+education+for+disable+
persons+within+the+eductaion+system;+promote+equal+opportunities;+
coordinate+with+territories)
Sistema+Nacional+de+Discapacidad+
(SND),+MPS;+intersectorial	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
298 
 
Source: Author’s compilation based on NDP 2010-2014. 
 
 
   
A.#Security,#
public#order#and#
citizen#security
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Appendix D.5: Matrix analysing the 2010-2014 NDP through a violence 
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